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True story of Woodrow Wilson

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The True Story of
WOODROW WILSON

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WOODROW WILSON

The True Story of WOODROW WILSON

by

DAVID LAWRENCE

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W698la

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THE TRUE STORY OF WOODROW WILSON
—A—
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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To
MY WIFE

FOREWORD

With respect to the major incidents in this book, the author follows the practice of modern journalism in giving first-hand information, based upon personal inquiry and observation over a period of eighteen years, and extends his thanks to the many persons who have furnished corroborative data but who, for reasons which must be respected, prefer at present to remain unnamed.

Every one of the principals mentioned in the story of Woodrow Wilson's public career was personally known to the author with whom almost all of them discussed, at one time or another, the events described. In those episodes in which only two or three persons were present, the author has had the benefit of the statements they made to others immediately thereafter. The information on controversial points has been checked from both sides.

Most of the material contained in this book was gathered at the time the events mentioned were happening and in the very atmosphere of their occurrence. The author had been engaged in newspaper work for three years when he was appointed the correspondent of The Associated Press at Princeton, New Jersey, serving from 1906 to 1910—four eventful years which embraced the reporting of the last two years of Grover Cleveland's residence there and his death, and the famous Graduate School controversy which led to Woodrow Wilson's withdrawal from the University to accept the nomination for Governor of New Jersey. In 1910, the author joined the Washington staff of The Associated Press and, upon the nomination of Mr. Wilson for the Presidency in 1912, was assigned to Sea Girt, New Jersey, to report the candidate's activities. From that time forward through the campaign and the pre-inauguration period at Bermuda, Trenton and Princeton, the author was writing daily dispatches for The Associated Press, and when Mr. Wilson was inaugurated, was assigned to

the White House by The Associated Press to report almost hourly the incidents of that eventful administration. In December, 1915, the author was invited to enter the field of interpretative writing, becoming special correspondent at Washington for the New York *Evening Post,* and later for the newspapers served by The Consolidated Press, in which work he has been engaged from day to day since 1915, covering the Paris Peace Conference as well as all other activities of the late President Wilson away from the national capital.

Acknowledgment is hereby made to those who have given the author an opportunity to examine many self-revealing letters, both official and personal, written by Woodrow Wilson. Emphasis in the title on the *true* story is deliberate in order that one who was in a position to verify might state with positiveness the facts in the life of a man about whom was conducted a whispering campaign without parallel in American history.

The writer has never identified himself with either the Republican or the Democratic Party and intends this work for no other purpose than to serve as a dispassionate record from which the reader may draw his own conclusions.

D. L.

Washington, D. C.
March 21, 1924.

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The True Story of WOODROW WILSON

THE TRUE STORY OF WOODROW WILSON

CHAPTER I

THE PERSONAL PARADOX

Woodrow Wilson died as he lived—unexplained and unrevealed. None—not even his intimates—ever knew the mental processes which crystallized his decisions on policy or flung friends of a life-time into the coldness of utter detachment. Those who held office under him lived in fear of his disfavor—they repressed their criticisms. Those with whom he broke were involuntarily prejudiced against him—they were tempted to exaggerate his defects and minimize his virtues.

Stern and impassive, yet emotional; calm and patient, yet quick-tempered and impulsive; forgetful of those who had served him, yet devoted to many who had rendered but minor service; unforgiving and fierce in his contempt for some who had dared to disagree with him, yet generous with others even to the extent of appointing them to high office; precise and business-like, and yet, upon occasion, illogical without more reason than intuition itself; seclusive, yet a crusader for democracy—thus might his characteristic contradictions be grouped incoherently in a series of paradoxes.

And even these are not all the attributes of the strange personality of Woodrow Wilson. The author knew Woodrow Wilson for eighteen years, stood at close range through the rise and fall of his eventful career, felt the throb of his efforts for a better humanity, watched the inconsistencies of policy develop, perceived the boldness by which almost alone he em-

barked on major programs, and often took note of the eccentricities of a personality perplexing to all but those who blindly accepted its leadership.

This chronicle and analysis of the man whose words during the World War were broadcast to the four corners of the earth, as had happened to no other American in history, is not intended to give aid and comfort either to those who saw in Woodrow Wilson an empirical opportunist of boundless ambition, arbitrary and tyrannical in the exercise of his power, or to those who with partisan zeal placed the stamp of unqualified approval on his acts personal and political, his singular concepts of party discipline or international intercourse.

The author essays a task of historical disclosure because, in all the years of his acquaintance with Woodrow Wilson, no favor was sought and none given. No obligation was incurred, no political allegiance established. Most of the time it fell to the author's lot as a newspaper reporter to see behind the curtain of events. It was a scrutiny necessitated by the never-ending demands of present day journalism, a scrutiny resented at times by Mr. Wilson himself, tolerated upon occasions as a necessary evil but never wholly accepted by him as the corollary of that "pitiless publicity" which, in an unguarded moment of impromptu speech, he coined as a slogan for his first administration.

Books, no doubt, will be written revealing various aspects of Woodrow Wilson's life, hitherto inadequately outlined. Letters, documents, conversations, passing remarks—these will serve to chart more accurately the turbulent course of his extraordinary career, but there can be no departure by those who know the truth from the inescapable facts which made him, to some, a wrathful chieftain, impatient and headstrong, and to others, the harassed prophet of a new day.

Turning points there were in the career of Woodrow Wilson, spaced, indeed, by fateful intervals, but climaxes nevertheless which marked assuredly his progress from the cloistered college to the center of the world stage itself in the greatest crisis of modern times. They were like acts in a drama with a touch of comedy here and there, a triumphant rise over enemies who

wished him ill and plotted his defeat, and a tragic collapse at the moment he most needed the physical strength to carry forward his greatest battle.

Seemingly connected as if by predestination were the major occurrences in Woodrow Wilson's life. Defeat at Princeton forced him reluctantly into the realm of national politics. Repudiation of the man who practically had made possible his nomination as governor of New Jersey in 1910 drew nation-wide attention even as the cry of "ingrate" was raised. His sensational victory at the national convention in 1912 after an unprecedented series of ballots turned his campaign into a crusade. The college professor who had become in his day the most noted authority on the doctrines of constitutional government had the unexampled opportunity to put his theory into actual practice.

Again and again Woodrow Wilson, sure-footed, confident, self-reliant, so far as the outside world was concerned, seemed on the verge of a great blunder only to be saved therefrom by the insistent counsel of his colleagues and advisers. As fascinating is the tale of what Woodrow Wilson wanted to do but did not, as the story of the spectacular things he did do, some of them, too, in direct opposition to his most faithful friends and counsellors.

Romance, which in the lives of all great men has played a dominating rôle, runs through the drama of the Wilsonian career. In all history, perhaps, there is no statesman who was as deeply influenced or as quickly stimulated in intellectual vigor by an atmosphere of feminine brilliance. It raised him to the loftiest heights. Chivalrous, always wholesome, he was susceptible to the charms of those he loved. He craved their inspiration. He wrote feelingly to his friends. Indeed, the unpublished writings of Woodrow Wilson apart from the affairs of state constitute a most remarkable collection of literary gems. In Woodrow Wilson the world missed a great novelist. His spontaneity was genius itself.

The death of the first Mrs. Wilson in 1914 nearly wasted away the moody husband who survived her. The second courtship and marriage, following a tomb-like melancholy of

six months in the White House, which alarmed his physicians and family, gave Woodrow Wilson the inspiration to carry on in the Great War. It was the largest single factor in prolonging his life four years and a half beyond the ill-omened day when there came an end to his famous speaking-trip for the League of Nations.

Consistency he often threw to the winds, obstinacy reared itself implacably at moments when compromise would have won the day. That which happened before his physical collapse must be judged differently from that which occurred thereafter. Had he retained his health, Woodrow Wilson, just as sure as day follows night, would have accepted the Lodge reservations to the Versailles treaty and secured thereby for the United States a membership in the League of Nations. He was almost persuaded to do so on his sick-bed but his illness induced a consciousness of incertitude which together with the exclusion of outside advice made him irritable and inflexible.

The purpose of this biographical study, however, is not to construct a defense of the temperament of Woodrow Wilson nor to cast X-rays of penetrating criticism on his mode of self-expression. The story is unfolded for no other purpose than to place on record a dispassionate narrative of the man who traveled not the accustomed routes of the politician practicing the arts that make for personal popularity, but the paths of personal magnetism and intellectual power—the unparalleled ascent of a college professor to the throne of moral leader in a world torn between intense commercialism and Christian idealism.

CHAPTER II

PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON—RELATIONS WITH GROVER CLEVELAND

Woodrow Wilson was at heart a rebel. Impatient of things as they were he did not advocate change for change sake. He was awed neither by the cumbersome processes of reform nor by the travail of evolution. Iconoclast he was not. With fierce logic and penetrating criticism he dissected the moldy political system of the day—it became the object of his wrath as a student of government in boyhood days. But invariably he offered a constructive alternative; he was not merely content to demolish; he was ambitious to build.

Whence came this boldness of expression and severity of criticism? In what background did the crusading spirit within Woodrow Wilson take root? Both heredity and environment played their part in shaping the character of Woodrow Wilson. His grandparents were Scotch-Irish. Joseph R. Wilson, born in Steubenville, Ohio, was a professor of rhetoric first and then became a Presbyterian clergyman. He married Janet Woodrow, daughter of Thomas Woodrow, also a Presbyterian clergyman. Their distinguished son, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, named in honor of the grandfather, was born on December 28, 1856, in the manse of the Presbyterian church in Staunton, Virginia. The family moved to Augusta, Georgia, in 1858, and subsequently to the theological seminary at Columbia, South Carolina. Dr. James Woodrow, a graduate of the University of Heidelberg, and a brother of the future President's mother, came to the seminary at Columbia where "he long tried in vain to reconcile dogmatic theology and natural science." The family circle was of the stern, precise, and religious temperament requiring morning and evening readings of the

Bible and a stillness on the sabbath while the father meditated upon his sermons of the morrow. It was at Dr. Wilson's home that the Southern Presbyterian Church was organized by the leaders of the presbytery from all the seceded states. Young Wilson saw the South in the throes of war and, as a boy of ten, witnessed the closing scenes of that conflict. His boyhood, however, was one of intimacy with the church. His father was a masterful pedagogue. Although young Wilson attended a boys' school in Augusta and another in Columbia, the father may truly be said to have been the maker of the future President. It was his father who taught him the proper use of words.

The whole world has recognized Woodrow Wilson's ability to express himself on the public platform or in his books and essays. His command of English is conceded. All who ever came in contact with him know that the same ability was manifested in conversation. Mr. Wilson's choice of words was without fault. He was precise in pronunciation. Very few people have known to what he, himself, attributed this ability. It has been assumed that years in the class room and on the lecture platform developed his exactness.

"When I was a boy," explained President Wilson to a friend who complimented him in later years on his style of expression, "my father would not permit me to blurt things out, or stammer a half-way job of telling whatever I had to tell. If I became excited in explaining some boyish activity he always said, 'Steady, now Thomas; wait a minute. Think! Think what it is you wish to say, and then choose your words to say it.' As a young boy, therefore, even at the age of four or five, I was taught to think about what I was going to say, and then I was required to say it correctly. Before I was grown, it became a habit."

At eighteen, "Tommy" Wilson attended Davidson College in North Carolina for a year but returned home broken in health. His father had become minister of the Presbyterian church in Wilmington, North Carolina, a port in which first ambitions to become a seaman were developed. His year at home was spent in reading books, especially those which informed him about

the career of William E. Gladstone and British statesmen. The next year he entered Princeton. Woodrow Wilson's father had gone to the college of New Jersey where the atmosphere of Scotch Presbyterianism was exactly that which a son of the distinguished clergyman would find congenial.

As a student young Wilson was not a star. Out of a class of 122 he graduated forty-first. His record in the literary and debating societies, however, was conspicuous. Whig Hall, the literary society which he had joined, chose him as its representative in a joint debate with Clio Hall, the rival society. Sides were drawn by lot and young Wilson was to defend the Protective Tariff as against Free Trade. He declined. Rather than surrender his convictions for the sake of a prize, which was as high an honor to come to him, he chose to lose the prize for he would not do what he considered an act of mental treason.

As early as 1879, the year of his graduation from Princeton, at the age of twenty-three, he contributed an article to "The International Review" analyzing the methods and procedure of Congress, indicting the congressional system, pointing to the absence of responsible leaders, condemning secrecy in committees, and commenting upon the failure to apply open methods in fixing tariffs and taxes. In this article may be seen the germ of his future teachings as well as the doctrines of his public career.

After studying law at the University of Virginia he again broke in health and took to reading at his father's home. Endeavoring to practice law in Atlanta in 1882 his thoughts were not of future clients but of a literary career. The articles he had written on public affairs stimulated him to further research. He went to Baltimore in the autumn of 1883 and, within two years, received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from John Hopkins University, his thesis being entitled "Congressional Government". It was widely read and commented upon. It was reprinted again and again, becoming a textbook of almost universal use. He next accepted the position of Associate Professor of Political Science in Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania. Thus did he begin his academic career by teaching young ladies. That same year he was married to Miss Ellen

Axson, daughter of a Presbyterian clergyman of Rome, Georgia, who had visited at the Wilson home in the south.

Fate might have turned Woodrow Wilson to the clergy. His spirit of intense application to the sterner side of world affairs might have plunged him into the controversies of a later day between the Modernists and the Fundamentalists. There seemed always within Woodrow Wilson the interminable struggle of two personalities. He was wont to comment on the clash of temperaments remarking frequently after he reached the White House that he felt as if he had a dual personality. He attributed this to his Scotch and Irish blood.

"When my Scotch personality is in the ascendancy" he would say, "I feel withdrawn within myself. I don't want to talk to anybody. It irritates me to be approached. But this is not my personality most of the time. When my Irish blood is in the ascendancy, I feel like singing, kicking my heels together, or kicking my feet in the air and trailing my coattail down the plank turnpike. There is something in me which at times relieves my Scotch conscience and gives me moments of delightful irresponsibility."

Well-liked by his fellow students and popular among his colleagues later in the faculty, Woodrow Wilson was not infrequently the artist who preferred seclusion to recreation. Notwithstanding his labors in the classroom he set aside a number of hours daily to pursue his own studies and to continue his writing. His literary achievements became known and he was in demand as a speaker on public affairs. After leaving Bryn Mawr College he taught at Wesleyan University and finally joined the faculty at Princeton in 1890. Six years later he had won for himself such a conspicuous place in the academic world that he was chosen to deliver an address at the 150th Anniversary of the founding of the college of New Jersey. His speech was strangely prophetic of the battles of later days as President of Princeton University—struggles to which he gave the better part of his life. He expressed his ideal of the future Princeton in 1896 in a paragraph which has become a classic in Princeton literature:

"I have had sight of the perfect place of learning in my

thought: a free place, where no man could be and not know with how great a destiny knowledge had come into the world,—itself a little world; but not perplexed; living with a singleness of aim not known without the home of sagacious men, hard-headed and with a will to know, debaters of the world's questions every day and used to the rough ways of democracy; and yet a place removed,—calm Science seated there, recluse, ascetic, like a nun, not knowing that the world passes, not caring, if the truth but come in answer to her prayer; and Literature, walking within her open doors, in quiet chambers, with men of olden times, storied walls about her, and calm voices infinitely sweet; here 'magic casements, opening on the foam of perilous seas, in faëry lands forlorn; to which you may withdraw and use your youth for pleasure; there windows open straight upon the street, where many stand and talk, intent upon the world of men and business. A place where ideals are kept in heart, in an air they can breathe; but no fool's paradise. A place wherein to learn the truth about the past and hold debate about the affairs of the present, with knowledge and without passion; like the world in having all men's life at heart, a place for men and all that concerns them; but unlike the world in its self-possession, its thorough way of talk, its care to know more than the moment brings to light; slow to take excitement; its air pure and wholesome with a breath of faith; every eye within it bright in the clear day and quick to look toward heaven for the confirmation of its hope. Who shall show us the way to this place?"

There were already unmistakable signs of the power of a great intellect bursting with a desire to break the fetters of convention and project itself into the controversies of the hour. As if with peculiar anticipation of later day events, Woodrow Wilson continued his writings on governmental affairs, contributing frequently to the periodicals and supplementing his early work on "Congressional Government" by a book on "The State," giving an analysis of the various systems of government throughout the world which also became a standard textbook in many college courses. The young professor possessed the charm of eloquent expression and the genius of con-

structive criticism so that when President Patton resigned as head of the University, Woodrow Wilson was a natural choice. Not quite forty-four years old, he was well known as a historian and professor of political science, an unusual orator and an intense champion of higher education.

The theme of his inaugural address in 1902 was "Princeton for the Nation's Service"—a curious counterpart of subsequent appeals for service to humanity.

"I have studied the history of America," he said. "I have seen her grow great in the paths of liberty and of progress by following after great ideals. Every concrete thing that she has done has seemed to rise out of some abstract principle, some vision of the mind. Her greatest victories have been the victories of peace and of humanity. And in days quiet and troubled alike Princeton has stood for the nation's service, to produce men and patriots. Her national tradition began with John Witherspoon, the master, and James Madison, the pupil, and has not been broken until this day. I do not know what the friends of this sound and tested foundation may have in store to build upon it; but whatever they add shall be added in that spirit, and with that conception of duty. There is no better way to build up learning and increase power. A new age is before us, in which, it would seem, we must lead the world. No doubt we shall set it an example unprecedented not only in the magnitude and telling perfection of our industries and arts but also in the splendid scale and studied detail of our university establishments: the spirit of the age will lift us to every great enterprise. But the ancient spirit of sound learning will also rule us; we shall demonstrate in our lecture rooms again and again, with increasing volume of proof, the old principles that have made us free and great; reading men shall read here the chastened thoughts that have kept us young and shall make us pure; the school of learning shall be the school of memory and of ideal hope; and the men who spring from our loins shall take their lineage from the founders of the republic."

Woodrow Wilson was beginning to think already of a broader field of usefulness than the narrow confines of academic research. His dissent with the modern college

method was that it prolonged the era of boyhood and did not always begin soon enough the earnest teachings of manhood. Almost in the beginning he insisted upon rigid examination tests and, in one of his early addresses, remarked:

"Some day I predict with great confidence there will be an enthusiasm for learning in Princeton."

Dr. Wilson was not disturbed when the number of students diminished because of the rigors of the new curriculum. He insisted upon the classics. He did not believe in the elective system in its entirety declaring that for the first two years a certain prescribed course should be followed. He thought large classes frequently failed to give the proper opportunity for individual instruction. Under his leadership the famous preceptorial system was introduced whereby classes were divided into small groups and a preceptor or instructor was assigned to meet with four or five students at least an hour a week in each course of study so that in informal man-to-man fashion the students were encouraged to coördinate their minds with mature personalities. It cost Princeton much more money as the faculty was necessarily increased in size. It was a bold adventure, first regarded as an experiment, but since maintained with striking success.

Woodrow Wilson was not satisfied with this improvement. He thought he saw difficulties in the social system of the college. Princeton had been one of the first colleges in America to abolish Greek-letter fraternities twenty-five years before and the upper-class dining clubs had developed as a substitute. These clubs were built largely by contributions from the alumni and were magnificent structures which impressed Mr. Wilson however as being more in consonance with theories of American aristocracy. Mr. Wilson imported the Oxford quadrangle idea. New dormitories grouped about a main quadrangle were to be built in which preceptors and unmarried instructors of the faculty were to live so that the students of all four classes might mingle with each other and exchange ideas in their leisure hours.

Looking back at Mr. Wilson's own boyhood and the stern discipline in which he was himself grounded, it was not un-

natural that he should regard the colleges as institutions for serious mental application rather than as incidents to an athletic or social career.

"I have never worried about the school room," he said in one of his speeches as President of Princeton. "I am not anxious about what happens in the lecture room, but I am very anxious about what happens between exercises, about the life of our students in our schools and colleges. Is the life of the college overshadowing the instruction of the teachers? Are the side-shows swallowing the circus? I think they are, for I have found the main tent very poorly attended and the side-shows crowded. Under such circumstances, I do not care to be ringmaster in the main tent."

Lecturing in Chicago once, he was interviewed by a reporter on the proposal, then being discussed, to make the college course in America three years instead of four. Dr. Wilson disapproved, remarking:

"When the Lord wants to produce an oak tree, He takes a hundred years to do it, but He can grow a quash in one summer."

I can see him walking slowly across the campus of Princeton, attired in academic gown, meditating as he walked that autumn day of 1907, his eyes on the gravel path that led toward Nassau Hall where the formal exercises opening the University for the year were to be held. Suddenly a freshman fleeing from a pursuing sophomore collided head-on with the University President just as he was crossing in front of Marquand Chapel.

"I should think," Dr. Wilson burst forth angrily, "that you would respect this sacred place and perform your pranks elsewhere."

Not long afterwards he proposed that this mild form of hazing or "horsing" freshmen (a name derived from "horseplay") should cease. It did not. Student opinion brought about some modifications but not until after Dr. Wilson had resigned was the custom abolished altogether.

Princeton had accepted with enthusiasm the Preceptorial System, but when Mr. Wilson proposed that the social life of

the University be altered and that the Oxford "quad" system be instituted, he encountered a stubborn resistance.

The Board of Trustees at first gave their tentative approval but subsequently held the matter in abeyance to canvass alumni sentiment. From that moment on it seemed as if Woodrow Wilson had found a greater opportunity than had been vouchsafed him theretofore. He made speeches to the students, before alumni bodies outside of Princeton and before audiences of various kinds throughout the United States discussing the needs of higher education with all the fervor that was later manifest in political life. He gave no quarter. He drew away from those who opposed him. Factions developed not only in the faculty but in the alumni associations of Princeton throughout the country.

In and around New York city lived a large number of influential alumni who had contributed by gift quite liberally to the support of Princeton University. Dr. Wilson accused them of "proprietory inclinations" and of wanting to impair the natural democracy of Princeton. He saw what in politics might have been called the "vested interest" crushing out those who would invade privilege. Enmities developed which to his dying day were not forgotten.

One might have imagined from a reading of the diatribes of both sides in that controversy that Princeton was unlike other colleges. But it really had a social system more advanced than many colleges with Greek-letter fraternities. Dr. Wilson's ambition, nevertheless, was to make of Princeton an institution rivalling the universities of the old world. To him Oxford and Cambridge were productive of more serious minded students. He saw no objection to the creation of artificial units. To him a college was not a social club but a place for earnest study with the social side an incidental consideration. To bring teacher and student into social relationship was his aim, but the American youth, his critics said, wanted to choose his own social companions and did not relish the constant presence of his masters.

For many years Princeton had yearned for a Graduate School. Andrew F. West was the moving spirit in the enter-

prise. He spent his time visiting wealthy alumni urging them to furnish the funds for the project. He held the title of Dean of the Graduate School but had scarcely twenty students enrolled in the frame house known as "Merwick" situated apart from the University in an atmosphere all its own. In 1906 Dean West was offered the presidency of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dean West inquired whether the Board of Trustees of Princeton seriously intended to develop his plan for a Graduate College and, if not, he felt he should accept the New England offer. Dr. Wilson authorized Dean West to develop his plans for the Graduate College. Funds were not available either for the building of a Graduate College or the endowment of the Preceptorial system. When, therefore, in the spring of 1907 Dr. Wilson proposed the "Quad System" involving additional expense, Grover Cleveland broke with Woodrow Wilson. The clash came in June 1907 at a meeting of the Board of Trustees of which Mr. Cleveland was a member, in fact he was chairman of the Board's special committee on the Graduate College and an intimate friend of Dean West who had been instrumental in persuading him to take up his abode in Princeton on leaving the White House. As next door neighbors they saw a good deal of each other. Dean West was Dr. Wilson's principal opponent. Grover Cleveland imbibed many of the Dean's ideas. At the historic meeting in June 1907 Mr. Cleveland delivered a bitter attack on Dr. Wilson's proposals. Dr. Wilson stood for a minute with flashing eyes but controlled the temper within him.

"You will live to regret what you have said," he remarked bluntly and turned to the discussion of other matters.

When Grover Cleveland died in the summer of 1908 Woodrow Wilson was in Europe on a bicycling trip through England and Scotland. On his return in the autumn there was a noticeable omission of any reference in Dr. Wilson's speech at the opening of the University to the death of Grover Cleveland. Nor did he order memorial exercises. It caused talk. It was characteristic of Woodrow Wilson. He lavished no praise where at heart he felt he could sincerely give none.

He rarely if ever mentioned Grover Cleveland in public addresses. Although Mr. Cleveland was the last Democratic President of the United States and retained a large measure of popularity with the Democrats of the nation, Woodrow Wilson never sought the aid of the so-called Cleveland Democrats.

Only once did Woodrow Wilson fear that his relationship with Grover Cleveland might work to his disadvantage politically. Grover Cleveland had written a letter to Dr. Henry van Dyke, then professor of English literature in Princeton University, denouncing Dr. Wilson and calling him a man of "an ungovernable temper" and accusing him of a "lack of intellectual integrity." The Republican strategists in 1912 tried hard to get possession of that letter hoping to have it published so as to wean away the Cleveland followers in the Democratic party and as an index of the Wilson character.

Dr. Henry van Dyke never gave up the letter. Woodrow Wilson and Dr. Henry van Dyke had had some sharp differences of opinion on the Graduate School question but Dr. van Dyke refused to be a party to Governor Wilson's political downfall. On the contrary, he was one of the first of the Princeton group to come out in support of Governor Wilson's candidacy for the Presidency of the United States. Woodrow Wilson never forgot that. He later chose Henry van Dyke to be Minister of the United States to the Netherlands and the latter made a notable diplomatic record at the Hague in the trying days of American neutrality from 1914 to 1917.

Nineteen hundred eight and nine were two eventful years in the life of Woodrow Wilson. They were curiously like the years of his later battle for the League of Nations. In acrimony and bitterness the controversy at Princeton over the kind of a Graduate School to be established was more intense perhaps than the legislative dispute which led to President Wilson's physical breakdown. There is an interesting analogy in the circumstances of the two fights both of which made him taste the dregs of defeat.

Personal friendships were severed in Princeton which time

never reunited. Charges and counter charges were made on the meaning of phrases and ambiguous utterances. Dr. Wilson's opponents did not hesitate to accuse him of a species of "intellectual dishonesty". And he, on his part, attributed to them motives of personal exploitation rather than the best interests of the University.

For thirty years there had been an unbroken intimacy between Moses Taylor Pyne and Woodrow Wilson. No friendship of later days ever compared with it. Mr. Pyne was chairman of the Graduate School committee of the Board of Trustees. He issued a statement announcing his regretful opposition to Dr. Wilson's plan. Before it was printed I took the statement to Dr. Wilson to obtain his comment for the newspapers. He was visibly affected but would not say a word for publication.

"If you give the other side rope enough," he remarked, "they'll always hang themselves." It was a characteristic comment. He believed in ultimate vindication.

Princeton had always wanted a Graduate College. Dean West had made a survey of European educational institutions and had mapped out a definite plan which provided for the selection of a site about a mile from the center of the University and subject to a separate administration. It was not intended as a rival institution but was viewed as such by Dr. Wilson and his group who insisted that the Graduate College be an integral part of the University itself.

The controversy came to a head when William Cooper Procter, Class of 1883, of Cincinnati, Ohio, manufacturer of "Ivory" soap offered $500,000 for the building of a Graduate School provided the Trustees could raise a similar amount. Woodrow Wilson turned the gift down. His defense was that the gift had "strings tied to it". He thought the reservations interfered with the authority of the Board of Trustees to administer the University. One of the conditions of the gift was that Dean West should remain at the head of the Graduate School. Dean West was a close friend of Mr. Procter and was instrumental in persuading him to make the offer. Could a donor specify how his gift was to be admin-

istered, would it be right to accept dictation in University affairs simply because a large sum of money accompanied it?

Dr. Wilson made the issue one of interference in University administration. The Board of Trustees upheld his view and the Procter offer was withdrawn.

On account of the severe strain of the Princeton controversies and the extremes to which he would drain his vitality, Mr. Wilson frequently ran off to Bermuda for a quiet vacation. He went there in February 1910 at the height of the Graduate School fight. He entered into the life of Hamilton and Paget with enthusiasm and felt a great relief away from the endless debates, slanders, sessions of trustees and committees, and the series of misunderstandings which made life at Princeton so troubled. He enjoyed Bermuda—it appealed to his romantic soul. He liked to take walks on the island to renew old acquaintances and to roam on the sandy beach of the South Shore.

On Dr. Wilson's return he found the alumni embittered because the Procter gift had been in effect rejected. The Princeton Club of New York was so antagonistic that for a time it looked as if an invitation to speak which had been extended to him before the Procter incident became acute would be withdrawn. But it was not. Neither did Dr. Wilson seek to avoid the meeting. He went straight to the camp of the enemy.

The tension that evening was indescribable. Never in his later career did Woodrow Wilson face an audience more hostile to him. The perfunctory cheers at the opening of the meeting were not as usual for "Wilson" but for "the President of Princeton"—the irony of which did not escape his notice.

"You want to know why I turned down a million dollars," was Dr. Wilson's opening remark. He talked for more than an hour. His words were eloquent, his argument had the ring of sincerity. He was never interrupted with applause. At the end a few clapped their hands—the ordeal was over. Classmates of Dr. Wilson, men like Robert Bridges, Editor of

the *Scribner's Magazine,* reiterated their faith in him but for the most part the speech made no converts.

Reporters were not supposed to be present yet a full account of what occurred plus the prejudiced slant of those who opposed Dr. Wilson was published in two New York newspapers the next day, a circumstance that added fuel to the flames. Two stenographers took down what was said. There had been an undercurrent of talk about Dr. Wilson's constant denials of his reported attitude on the Graduate School question. No opportunity, his opponents said, would be given this time to deny what he said.

Inside and outside of Princeton the division between pro-Wilson and anti-Wilson was sharply defined. Among the members of the faculty social invitations were carefully extended so that wives of the supporters of one group would not meet the other side.

Gradually the demand that Dr. Wilson resign the presidency of Princeton began to grow in volume. "Wilson must go" was the slogan of his opponents. Some years before George Harvey in the *North American Review* had written an article calling attention to the peculiar fitness of Woodrow Wilson to be President of the United States. The students wrote a song about it and jokingly refused to part with him. There began to be rumors now that he might become the Democratic nominee for Governor of New Jersey. Some of his enemies sincerely hoped so. One of the "bosses" in New Jersey politics was even given reason to suspect that if he could accomplish the nomination of Woodrow Wilson and his withdrawal from the University, some of the wealthy alumni might be persuaded to contribute heavily to the campaign fund. This was stoutly denied and probably was not true so far as my would-be-contributors were concerned, but unquestionably the anti-Wilson men wished the Democratic bosses all the luck in the world if they only would furnish the circumstances that would take Dr. Wilson out of their way.

Yet Dr. Wilson did not seek a way out. He talked politics to a few close friends. If he was to leave Princeton at all he wanted to do so with a victory behind him and not defeat.

In the spring of 1910 I was calling at Dr. Wilson's office to get a copy of a speech he was to deliver a few days later. Professor Robert McElroy, who lectured on American history and who has recently written the authorized biography of Grover Cleveland, was leaving Dr. Wilson's office.

"What do you think!" exclaimed Professor McElroy. "Dr. Wilson thinks we are bound to have a third party in 1912 and he is inclined to believe he has a chance to be its Presidential candidate."

It was my first insight into the independent views of Woodrow Wilson on politics. I knew he cherished no admiration for William Jennings Bryan's policies. Dr. Wilson's famous letter to Andrew O. Joline, a distinguished Princeton alumnus, denouncing a speech at Madison Square Garden relating to government ownership of railways delivered by Mr. Bryan on his return from Europe was not then public. In that letter Dr. Wilson expressed the wish that somebody would "knock Mr. Bryan into a cocked hat" once and for all. While Dr. Wilson was not in sympathy with the Bryan doctrines he was not fond of the "bosses" who exercised so big an influence in the Democratic party. He thought the country had tired of both parties and would discard them unless there was reform from within.

Woodrow Wilson made many speeches during the years 1909 and 1910 and attracted attention wherever he spoke. His Princeton critics accused him of making a campaign for the Presidency of the United States. They said his whole quarrel about democracy at Princeton was simply a vehicle for the advancement of his candidacy—a publicity effort. The anti-Wilson group inspired several newspaper articles along this line.

Dr. Wilson undoubtedly had an eye to the future but he was endeavoring to win his Princeton fight by building up such a prestige with the American people that his views on educational matters would carry weight with his own alumni and board of trustees. He had no thought of resigning until he won.

Suddenly in May 1910, just before the Commencement

Exercises which were to bring alumni from all parts of the country to Princeton, there came a development which changed the whole course of affairs. Isaac Wyman of Boston had died and his will provided what was then estimated to be a gift of approximately four or five million dollars for Princeton. Of all things in the will was a provision that the fund was for a Graduate College and that it was to be expended as the executors directed—and one of the executors named was none other than Dean Andrew F. West, the principal antagonist of Dr. Wilson.

It was my duty as Associated Press correspondent to carry the first news of Mr. Wyman's bequest to Dr. Wilson to get his comment. The expression of disappointment on his face as he read the dispatch was unmistakable. He was silent for several minutes.

"What shall I say?" I asked Dr. Wilson.

"What can I say?" was his hopeless reply.

"Well," I suggested, "since the funds are so large it would seem as if the site of the Graduate School would become a secondary question and possibly there is money enough now to buy all the intervening property between the two proposed sites and make a greater university. The Graduate College would then be on University grounds as you have wanted."

Dr. Wilson adopted the suggestion and issued a statement along those lines expressing satisfaction with the bequest and the hope that the University might now go forward with the Graduate School plan.

"A voice from the grave" was Dean West's comment as he read the news the next day of the Wyman bequest. Dr. Wilson was beaten at last and felt it keenly. At the commencement exercises when the valedictorian of my class pronounced his farewell it was not the ordinary good-by. It was Woodrow Wilson's valedictory too. Tears streamed down his face as the students gave him again and again that day in thunderous cheers a testimonial of their affection and esteem. They knew little of the merits of the Graduate School controversy and cared less. They knew only that he was a strong man, a capable teacher and an inspiration to them all.

During that summer Dr. Wilson had several offers to become the president of various educational institutions. He declined them. Instead he became a receptive candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor of New Jersey.

Woodrow Wilson's rise in the political world has so often been described as accidental that undisputed evidence showing the deliberate nature of his departure from Princeton University is now available to refute that theory.

For many years it has been contended by those who disliked Mr. Wilson's administration of affairs at Princeton University that he was forced out. The author is in possession of information which has never been published and which proves conclusively that Mr. Wilson left of his own volition and put his fate in the hands of a group of eight friends who had supported him in the fight at Princeton.

This data not only discloses that when Mr. Wilson left Princeton he had in mind running for the Presidency of the United States but it reveals also that he was offered the nomination for the Governorship of New Jersey without pledges of any kind, a fact which is important to bear in mind in view of the charges that he had pledged himself to support former United States Senator James Smith for another term in the Senate. Mr. Wilson's failure to support Mr. Smith has been referred to often as the first instance of his ingratitude. Just a month after the famous Wyman bequest at Princeton had made it appear that the Graduate School project which Mr. Wilson favored would be superseded by that of Dean Andrew F. West, Mr. Wilson communicated his thoughts to Henry B. Thompson of Wilmington, Delaware, a member of the class of 1877 in Princeton, and a trustee of the University who had supported the Wilson viewpoint in the Graduate School controversy:

"I have needed your counsel very greatly and have had to decide a very important matter without letting you know even that it was pending.

"I have been asked by the men most influential in the Democratic party in New Jersey whether I would accept the nomination for Governor next autumn if it came to me un-

sought, unanimously, and without pledges of any kind, and I have felt obliged to say that I would. This is just the duty I have preached to my classes all my life, and the men I was able to consult (Dodge, Sheldon, McCormick, the Joneses, Jacobus, McIlvaine) have all said what the Chicago men put into this telegram:

"'All four concur unreservedly in the opinion that no obligation whatever exists on your part, either to any individual supporter or to the University as a whole, which should deter you from following your own inclination. Question what you had better do is largely personal to yourself. We do not feel sufficiently clear on the subject to advise. We appreciate your perplexity and our sympathies are, and will continue to be with you. Whatever your conclusion may be you can rely on our hearty support in any field of service you may enter upon.'

"Surely a more generous telegram was never sent! I had said to them that I felt myself so deeply their debtor that I was ready and willing to accept any conclusion they might arrive at as to my obligations to them and to Princeton and, of course, I should have included you if you had been within reach of conference.

"Of course the men who are planning my nomination for the Governorship look forward to putting me up for the Presidential nomination later; and there have been some rather extraordinary indications that that is what Democrats in other parts of the country want. The suggestion came from the Middle West. But I have not allowed that part of the program to form my opinions as to my duty in the matter of the Governorship. Of course, I am giving you the bare bulk of the thing because I want you to learn of this from me, and because it gives me an opportunity to tell you how happy and proud I have been to win your friendship and support, how deeply I have admired the firmness, the good feeling, the courage, and the unhesitating following of conviction with which you have always acted. It has been a tonic and a blessing to me to have such a friend. I want to express my deep gratitude and admiration.

"I cherish a sneaking hope that the thing may not, after all, come off; but I fear from present indications that it will."

The men mentioned above are Cleveland H. Dodge, of the Phelps-Dodge copper interests; Cyrus H. McCormick, president of the International Harvester Company; Edward D. Sheldon, president of the United States Trust Company, all four of whom were in Mr. Wilson's class of 1879 at Princeton; David Jones (since deceased) and Thomas D. Jones of Chicago of the class of 1876, twin brothers who became prominent in business affairs in the Middle West; M. W. Jacobus of the class of 1877, Dean of the Hartford Theological Seminary, and William B. McIlvaine of the class of 1885, a Chicago lawyer and also alumni trustee.

These men were in the aggregate very wealthy and they were in a position to finance a campaign if need be. Some of them did contribute to the campaign of 1912. All of them remained Mr. Wilson's personal friends throughout his entire life although two—Mr. Thompson and Mr. Jacobus—did not support him politically in his last term.

The story of this little group whose support enabled Woodrow Wilson to cast off collegiate ties and take a plunge into the dark of politics is one of the episodes which point clearly to the fact that while he had many breaks in official life he never really abandoned the close personal ties of earlier days.

It is a fact that none of these men had official business or political relations with him. They sought nothing. He endeavored to make Thomas D. Jones governor of the Federal Reserve System just after the Federal Reserve Act was passed, but a controversy in the Senate prevented confirmation.

Personal friendships—not political or official—they were. No differences of principle or policy could arise to cause friction. There were others, too, like Robert Bridges, Editor of *Scribner's Magazine,* another classmate, Dean Henry B. Fine of Princeton who was offered the ambassadorship to Germany but declined, and Professor Winthrop M. Daniels who subsequently became one of the most valued members of the Interstate Commerce Commission,—all of whom should be classed as among the really intimate friends of Woodrow

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Wilson. So was Professor Stockton Axson of Princeton, a brother of the first Mrs. Wilson. Until the very end they were close to him, always in his thoughts as the unwavering friends of a life-time.

When elected in the autumn of that year, however, Woodrow Wilson abandoned his Princeton associations and never identified himself thereafter with the University. He and his family retained their Princeton home during his two and a half years as Governor. But in the social life of Princeton Woodrow Wilson never entered again. And the wounds received in the Princeton battle never healed—he felt their ache to his last days on earth.

The Graduate College was built—one of the most imposing quadrangles in America—and in it a beautiful edifice known as Cleveland Memorial Tower. A new president was chosen for the University, Dr. John G. Hibben, professor of logic, a man with whom Dr. Wilson had for years been intimate. He sent no word of congratulation to Dr. Hibben. He refused in later years to meet half-way the effort of Dr. Hibben to bring about a reconciliation. Indeed once when Mr. Wilson as President of the United States went to Princeton to vote, Dr. Hibben went to the polling booth to pay his respects, but President Wilson turned on his heel and walked away. Dr. Hibben had been allied with the faction which had opposed him. That was his way of showing displeasure. Forgiveness was not in his vocabulary. People were to Woodrow Wilson either loyal or disloyal. And when he broke with them he rarely, if ever, looked their way again.

CHAPTER III

GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY

With a heavy heart Woodrow Wilson turned from the college campus to the political world. As early as 1909 suggestions had begun to appear in newspapers and periodicals that Dr. Wilson might run for Governor of New Jersey in 1910. There had been occasional mention of him for the Presidential nomination of 1912. But he could not bring himself to believe that the miracle would happen.

On two occasions Dr. Wilson felt that the Board of Trustees in Princeton had failed to follow his leadership. He was angry and disheartened and was tempted to resign but did not think it would be good sportsmanship to do so—he wanted to stand by the men who supported him. When his thoughts did intermittently touch the question of resigning from Princeton, he felt instinctively that the alternative would be a political career. He saw as early as 1909 that the nomination to the Governorship of New Jersey could mean the Presidency in 1912 if he made a worthy record. He thought his health was not equal to the strain—he entered politics with a strange consciousness, expressed to a few close friends in 1909, that it would kill him.

For a time the address delivered by Dr. Wilson at the University Commencement Exercises in June 1909 appeared to be sufficiently indiscreet to eliminate him from consideration as a candidate for anything. He had said in his speech that labor frequently scaled down its product to a minimum and gave as little as possible for wages. It was, of course, an abstract statement but enough to scare the politicians.

Woodrow Wilson's article on the tariff which appeared in George Harvey's *The North American Review* in the

autumn of 1909 was rather favorably received but not until the hand of fate defeated Dr. Wilson in June 1910 did he earnestly consider leaving the University. He would have resigned in June if he had not believed that it would look as if he were piqued. But he did enter conferences immediately afterward with those in New Jersey who for two years had been looking upon the president of Princeton as the man to capture the state for the Democratic party. The nomination came easily because the Democratic bosses wanted to win. They felt sure they could afterwards handle the academic individual who would lend respectability to the state ticket and make victory possible.

The people in New Jersey were fascinated by the kind of campaign Woodrow Wilson made. His speeches were printed in full—they were unusual in style and content. The New York and Philadelphia newspapers, Republican and Democratic alike, gave an unprecedented amount of space to the Jersey campaign. Not every year did the scholar venture into politics. It was extraordinary news. And the publicity helped win the election by 49,000 majority in a state normally Republican by that number of votes.

Woodrow Wilson was probably the only President of the United States who spent twenty years or more studying the power and duties of the Chief Executive long before he entered public life. The theory of government was his hobby. As a professor in Princeton University on constitutional government, his lectures were voted by the students year in and year out the most popular in the curriculum.

Little did I dream as I took notes with my classmates in the spring of 1909 that exactly four years later the professor before us would be actually applying his doctrines of government in the White House and that I would be reporting them for the Associated Press.

What was said in the lecture room in those days was by common consent a private affair. Reporters were never present. And for that reason Dr. Wilson was as free with his comments on current news as if he were in the seclusion of his own home.

. It was April 1909. President Taft had just been inaugurated and was beginning to struggle with the tariff. Aldrich was in command of the United States Senate and Cannon was enthroned in the House of Representatives. Dr. Wilson would read to us a paragraph or two from the daily newspapers giving the gist of Washington dispatches on the legislative situation and would make his comments thereon.

"Nobody in Congress," he used to say again and again, "represents the national will. Every member of the House or Senate represents his district or his state—his section. The sum total of their desires is not the national will. Only one man, the Chief Executive, is responsible to all the people. He must assume leadership and determine what is best for all and not for one section or group or class. If President Taft appreciates that he will make headway. If he does not then he will fail."

Presently the dispatches from Washington announced that President Taft had summoned Messrs. Aldrich and Cannon and other Republican leaders in Congress to the White House urging them to frame a tariff law that would be in the national interest. This particular development elicited from Dr. Wilson warm expressions of approval and prompted a comment on the Rooseveltian attitude toward Congress.

"Whatever else we may think or say of Theodore Roosevelt," remarked Dr. Wilson, "we must admit that he is an aggressive leader. He led Congress—he was not driven by Congress. We may not approve his methods but we must concede that he made Congress follow him."

Two years later when Woodrow Wilson had been inaugurated Governor of New Jersey after a campaign full of sarcasm about the "schoolmaster in politics", the professor tried out his theory on the members of the state legislature. The Democrats had called a caucus to adopt a legislative program. No one ever had thought of having the Governor present at such a meeting. But Mr. Wilson attended. It precipitated a debate as to the propriety of his presence there. One of the speakers insisted that the Executive of the State had no business in a conference of members of the legislature.

Someone proposed that the Governor be formally invited by resolution. Mr. Wilson did not share the opinion that a conference of his party colleagues was such a formal affair that the leader of the party could not drop in if he cared to do so. Finally he rose to speak.

"Gentlemen," he said, "I have been elected Governor of New Jersey by the people of New Jersey, after being selected by the convention of the Democratic party, and I thereby have become the responsible leader of the Democratic party in the State. I will be held responsible by the people at the polls. I will be held responsible for the administration of the affairs of the State of New Jersey. Each of you gentlemen will be held responsible in the districts where you were elected. I am held responsible as well as you by the same people. I am the only person in the whole State, however, to express approval or disapproval on behalf of all the people and I will express that approval or disapproval for the people by determining what we should do."

The Governor took from his inside pocket a comprehensive program he had personally typewritten. It was far-reaching, and provided, among other things, for the passage of a Corrupt Practices Act governing elections, a law to authorize cities to adopt the commission form of government, and a series of suggestions to reform the corporation laws of New Jersey. The Governor was on his feet arguing or answering questions for nearly three hours with the result that the conference unanimously adopted his program. Within a few months thereafter the suggestions were enacted into law.

In those days the State legislature elected United States Senators. The primary system had been introduced as a means of expressing party desires but was not yet binding upon the party organization. James E. Martine had won the primaries for the Senatorial nomination, but the leaders were inclined to regard the primary as purely advisory and not mandatory. Woodrow Wilson could not have been nominated by the State convention for Governor in 1910 but for the support of former U. S. Senator James Smith and his

henchmen. Indeed, while Woodrow Wilson as candidate had made no promises, the politicians accused him of base ingratitude when he later turned on Smith, the very man who had made his entry into public life possible. But Governor Wilson stood by the primary and persuaded the State legislature to do likewise. He felt that the wishes of the people expressed in a specific way at an election could not be disregarded. It cost him a friendship and won him in later years not even the uninterrupted support of the man whom he had helped into the United States Senate, for Mr. Martine frequently departed from the leadership of President Wilson.

The Martine affair, however, was but an incident. It emphasized merely that Woodrow Wilson felt the weight of his responsibility as party leader. On becoming a State executive he practiced in office what he had preached in college. It caught the imagination of Democrats throughout the United States and helped immeasurably in bringing him to the front as a candidate for the Presidency of the United States.

He looked at the future indifferently and without caring whether he would have to undertake larger obligations after serving his term as Governor of New Jersey. He entered the Governorship impersonally with a feeling that it was an adventure well worth his enthusiasm but not worth his loss of dignity or principles. He was courageous in politics because he did not at any time fear defeat. Defeat in a righteous cause to him meant release from a tedious burden. He could court defeat with a clear conscience—it was the very sinew of his strength in public life.

Hardly had Woodrow Wilson begun to serve as Governor in January 1911 when from all parts of the country he began to receive letters indicating there was a public sentiment in the Democratic party favoring his candidacy for the Presidency. He was at a loss to understand it and made up his mind that he would not lift a finger to solicit the higher office. He concentrated on the problems of the Governorship. He spoke in the home town of former Senator Smith at Newark, New Jersey, carrying the fight to the citadel of the en-

emy. The idea of a college president unhorsing an old line politician was novel indeed. In his soliloquies Mr. Wilson convinced himself that he did not want to be President of the United States—that it was too distressing a job for his temperament. He longed to handle the affairs of the world but confessed he did not wish to wear the yoke of responsibility.

In February 1911 magazine editors, newspapermen, feature writers, and interviewers besieged the new Governor at Trenton.

"What can I do for you, young man?" asked Governor Wilson, when he met one of the first newspaper correspondents sent to "size him up".

"Tell me what became of 'Tommy' Wilson," replied the newspaper inquirer.

At the time most reporters were asking him about his prospective candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President. His face broke into a pleased smile at the question, for it brought up something which even he had almost forgotten—that he was christened Thomas Woodrow Wilson, and through his boyhood and young manhood in school and college was called "Tom" or "Tommy" by his chums.

"I'll tell you," he said. "My mother's name was Woodrow, and the men of her family had distinguished themselves in the field of letters. I wanted to use that part of my name for that reason, but Thomas Woodrow Wilson made too much of a mouthful, and, of course, I couldn't stand T. Woodrow Wilson because I don't like a split name, so I just dropped the 'Thomas' entirely."

Months later, in the 1912 campaign against Taft and Roosevelt, Mr. Wilson stepped to the platform to deliver a speech before several thousand people in Dover, Delaware, and those close by were astonished to see a rather stout man rise, slap him on the back and cry "Hello, Tom." They were further amused to see Mr. Wilson slap the other fellow on the back in return and exclaim, "Why, hello, Bob." The stout man was former Governor Robert Glenn of North Carolina, who had attended school with Mr. Wilson in boyhood days.

"Mr. Wilson, I find, upon reading your works," said another newspaper investigator, "and talking with men who attended your classes, that for a great many years you declared that the initiative and referendum would not work. I also find that in one of your political speeches you declared that it *would* work. Now, between the time you began teaching that it wouldn't work and that political speech, the initiative and referendum has become a popular political doctrine throughout the Middle West and Far West. We'd like to know why you switched."

Mr. Wilson pulled a leaf out of the side of his desk, picked up a pencil, drew forth a sheet of paper and leaned forward on his forearms.

"That's a perfectly fair question," he said, "and I'm going to give you a perfectly honest answer. Now, I can sit here and in fifteen minutes I can demonstrate to you that the initiative and referendum won't work. I can demonstrate it with a degree of conclusiveness approaching the conclusiveness of a mathematical demonstration, but—the unfortunate part of my demonstration will be the *fact* that it does work. I demonstrated to my own satisfaction for years that the initiative and referendum would not work, and then along came Mr. Uren and some other gentlemen from Oregon and introduced me to the *fact* that it does work. I've simply had to throw away my useless demonstration."

During March 1911, he continued his speech-making before chambers of commerce, boards of trade, civic bodies generally, thus arraying a powerful public opinion on the side of his legislative program. The Assembly was Democratic but the Senate had a Republican majority of three. On March 10 Mr. Wilson spoke before the Southern Commercial Congress in Atlanta on the same platform with President Taft. He felt that the country had an increasing respect for Mr. Taft because of his energy in connection with the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty. The program was overloaded and Mr. Taft did not begin speaking until nearly midnight. Theodore Roosevelt had spoken in the same auditorium the night before. Due perhaps to the fact that Mr. Wilson was speaking in the

South or to the fame which had already spread to the southland from New Jersey, he was given as big, if not a bigger ovation, than either Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Taft. His speech made a deep impression.

On Sunday, March 13, Mr. Wilson greeted Mr. Bryan who addressed the Princeton Theological Seminary. It was the first time he had heard Mr. Bryan speak and he was deeply impressed by the Bryan personality, his sincerity and forcefulness. Mr. Bryan dined that evening with Mr. Wilson and his family and Thomas H. Burch of Burlington, New Jersey, who later became American Minister to Portugal in the first Wilson administration.

It was in the March number of the *North American Review* that Colonel Harvey had an article entitled "The Political Predestination of Woodrow Wilson". *The New York Times* predicted that it might turn out to be true.

Mr. Wilson was not affected by the talk of the Presidency—he felt that it must be about some third person. On March 26th, after a hard struggle, the principal reform bills passed the Assembly by 34 to 25. Just before the vote Mr. Wilson sent for James Nugent, Chairman of the Democratic State Committee. Mr. Nugent accused Governor Wilson in that conference of getting the votes by the use of patronage. The Governor jumped to his feet and showed Mr. Nugent the door, his eyes flashing as he said, "Good afternoon, Mr. Nugent." Editorials were written about it and the newspapers began cartooning the incident. Democrats throughout the country commended Mr. Wilson's boldness and courage. He himself regarded it as a distasteful incident and got much less satisfaction out of it than did his supporters.

During the same month Mr. Wilson had a conference in New York with a group of men who decided to collect a fund to promote his chances for the Presidential nomination. They arranged a western trip for him to Missouri, Iowa, Colorado, California and the State of Washington and decided to send a publicity man with him, all of which Mr. Wilson accepted with the tolerant air of a novice who dislikes the mechanisms of politics but recognizes its inevitable machinery.

Dr. Walter Hines Page, editor of *World's Work,* destined later to be the American Ambassador to Great Britain, was one of the leading spirits in the movement. Frank Parker Stockbridge, newspaperman and publicity expert, tells the story of how Dr. Page asked him to help the cause of Governor Wilson.

"The people will like him once they know him," said Dr. Page. "The problem is: How can we get them to know him? It is a problem of publicity, and that is why I have sent for you".

"Just what is Governor Wilson's attitude and how far do you represent him?" asked Mr. Stockbridge.

"I don't represent him at all," replied Dr. Page. "I represent only myself and two or three other gentlemen, none of us politicians or experienced in any degree in political manipulation. We met a while ago and came to the conclusions I have just stated to you, that he is the right man if the people can be made to see it. Then we called on Mr. Wilson. We stated our belief and asked his consent to start a movement looking toward his nomination. He vetoed flatly the suggestion that anything be done that might make it appear he was seeking the nomination. He agreed with us, however, that the next Democratic nomination must come from the people and not from the bosses. Because he feels that so strongly he will never put himself forward as a candidate, as he could accept no nomination that came to him otherwise than as a voluntary demand for his candidacy by the mass of the party voters.

"He will not lift a finger to gain the nomination for himself. That he will accept, if it comes to him, goes without saying. But he recognizes, as we do, that it will not come to him nor to any other man whom the people, especially the people of the West, do not know. So, with a great deal of reluctance, which I assure you was entirely genuine, he consented to our introducing him to the people of the United States.

"Now, this is my idea of a beginning. The people of the West not only do not know Mr. Wilson, but because he is of

the East they are naturally suspicious of him. New Jersey is very close to Wall Street; Princeton University is regarded by many good people in the West as a country club for rich men's sons. And the comic papers have given the public an impression of college presidents that makes them wary of the scholar in politics; they think he must of necessity be an impractical theorist. Even among the men who are familiar with what Governor Wilson has already done there exists an impression of him as a sort of detached intellect moving freely in space, a brain with no body. And if the people demand any one predominant quality in their choice for President, it is that he shall be, first of all, a human being. After Roosevelt they will not be satisfied with anything less human.

"So it is not enough to tell people about Governor Wilson, to offer them reading matter about him, to send them copies of his speeches; they must see him face to face, shake hands with him, hear him talk. I am confident that if they could all know him, as I know him, he would be nominated by acclamation and elected unanimously. As that is impossible, the next best thing is to bring him into personal contact of one sort or another with as many people as possible and let him do the rest. It is the only chance of success.

"We have presented that suggestion to Mr. Wilson. I do not know how fully convinced he is of its value, but he has agreed, after the New Jersey legislature adjourns this spring, to make a number of speeches in the West. These will not be political speeches in the ordinary sense, though they will, among them, define his political principles and beliefs. He will not speak before political meetings or under the auspices of political organizations of any kind. There must be spontaneous invitations from representative bodies of citizens, such as business men's clubs, chambers of commerce and similar groups. And he will do this only on condition that we attend to all details, make all arrangements and provide somebody to travel with him and act as his guide and friend, especially in matters of publicity. Academically, and as a matter of practical politics, he has the keenest appreciation of its

value; personally, he does not understand the principles of publicity at all.

"We met last evening and decided to follow the course I have just outlined. I was asked to find a man who could attend to all the details, leaving to us only the general plan and the financing. None of us is wealthy, but we can raise a few thousand dollars among ourselves—sufficient for this initial experiment. Whether it will go any farther depends upon how the people of the West respond to Governor Wilson. Are you interested? Would you like to do it?"

Stockbridge answered that it was the one thing above all others he would like to do.

"As I look back," relates Mr. Stockbridge, "what Dr. Page said still seems to express as completely as possible the purposes and principles that guided the movement from the beginning. The job I had agreed to take part in was not to be an easy one. Nobody, in our time at least, had been nominated for the Presidency without the aid of a well organized political machine, backed by ample funds; nobody had ever been nominated by the force of publicity, the pressure of public opinion—not since party politics had become the highly developed and complicated affair of these later days. And yet, as I thought it over that afternoon and evening, it seemed possible. Fresh from the West, I thought I knew the temper of the people of the West, knew how they would rise to a new prophet of political liberty if his message rang true. If millions of Democrats still pinned their faith to Mr. Bryan, there were more millions ready to jump the flimsy fences that had kept them in the Republican party and to rally to the standard of a new leader, no matter by what party name he might call himself, provided only he promised them the new freedom they demanded and they believed in the sincerity of his promise and his pledges. If ever there was a time when a mad project had a chance of success, it was then. And if we failed, at least there would be the satisfaction of having been in a good fight."

The Western trip was scheduled for May. Meanwhile on April 5th at Burlington, New Jersey, a big political meeting

was arranged by Thomas Burch, who brought Mr. Bryan to speak on the same platform with Governor Wilson. It was a rare opportunity to compare the oratory of each. Mr. Wilson was impressed by the magnetism of the Commoner. Mr. Bryan paid a tribute to Mr. Wilson as a forward-looking Democrat, all of which was regarded as very significant at the time.

Mr. Wilson on April 13th was the chief figure at a big Democratic rally in Indiana. Colonel George Harvey was there. Mr. Wilson was the guest of Governor Thomas R. Marshall, destined to become Vice-President for two terms with Mr. Wilson. The New Jersey Governor told his friends later that he formed an instant liking for Mr. Marshall.

The Legislature finally adjourned on April 22nd. Mr. Wilson had accomplished all that he had attempted—the four big acts on which he had set his heart, namely: the Primary and Election Law, the Corrupt Practices Act; an act giving a public utility commission control over railways and street car lines, water companies, gas and electric-light and power companies, and a Corrupt Practices Act with reference to the conduct of elections as well as school reforms and a law enabling any city in the State to adopt a commission form of government. The pressure of public opinion won all these, for with a Senate that was Republican nothing else could have brought the triumph. Mr. Wilson felt that not a small part of this was due to the fact that he established cordial relations with the individual members of the Senate. Republicans drifted to his office for advice. Everybody was dazed by the new turn of events. It was unprecedented.

During the next few months Governor Wilson continued his speech-making trips. The journey to the coast in May brought new triumphs. The crowds liked Mr. Wilson's style of speaking and admired his disinterested attitude on public questions. People of all classes gathered to hear him speak. He had large and enthusiastic audiences in Des Moines, Kansas City, Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Portland. Again and again he was introduced as "The next President of the United States." The small fund of $3,000 which had

been raised by Dr. Walter Hines Page, and two Princeton men—Walter McCorkle and William F. McCombs—was soon exhausted. Mr. Stockbridge relates that Charles Bryan, a brother of William Jennings Bryan, lent Mr. Wilson and himself fifty dollars to make up the required sum for the railroad tickets back to New Jersey.

The summer at Sea Girt hardly brought seclusion. Military reviews, callers from all parts of the State and numerous functions absorbed his time. By December his political strength had grown to such a point that efforts were made to injure his prestige. Opponents tried to ridicule his application to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching for a retirement allowance. He had made the application when it seemed as if he would spend his life teaching. The attack against Mr. Wilson began in earnest in January 1912 with the publication of a letter that he had once written speaking of Mr. Bryan in uncomplimentary terms. Rumors also began to be spread concerning the letter which Grover Cleveland had written criticizing Mr. Wilson as "lacking in intellectual integrity", but the letter was never printed.

While Mr. Wilson did not seek the Presidency he felt a renewed desire to frustrate the efforts of his enemies. He fancied that big business was trying to encompass his defeat and that it was his duty to fight the "vested interests". He became convinced that he was championing the cause of the inarticulate public.

In February he visited Richmond, speaking to the Legislature and a large audience in the auditorium. A special train came from Staunton, Virginia, his birthplace, to greet him at Richmond. The same month he went to Kentucky to deliver an address at the invitation of the Legislature. From Kentucky he went to Chicago, where he was entertained by the Iroquois Club, the Democratic organization. Governor Wilson made a score of speeches in Illinois from the rear of his train. The Legislative session of 1912 in New Jersey was not very active. Governor Wilson traveled through New York State in April and filled speaking engagements in other parts of the East.

As Governor of the State of New Jersey Mr. Wilson was ex officio a member of the Board of Trustees of Princeton University and could have attended the inauguration exercises of his successor, John G. Hibben, on May 11th, but deliberately went to New York instead to make a speech. He did not like to mingle with the men who, in his judgment, had not supported him faithfully.

CHAPTER IV

AS THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES

Woodrow Wilson foresaw long before he entered politics as a candidate for Governor of New Jersey that the Democratic party of the nation needed new leadership. His letters reveal that he looked forward to the campaign of 1912 as the occasion for a rebirth of the Democratic party. Prior to 1910, when he became Governor of New Jersey, suggestions that Mr. Wilson himself might prove the new leader did not appeal to him as possible of fulfillment. He had no party following. He had made speeches from time to time, it is true, on public questions and had spoken from one end of the country to the other before civic bodies and educational institutions, but not until the Democratic leaders in New Jersey sought him for the gubernatorial nomination did he begin to think that, perhaps at last, the road to the Presidency had been opened.

As if with prophetic instinct Woodrow Wilson wrote a friend in the spring of 1912: "Roosevelt and Taft are busily engaged in splitting the Republican party wide open—so that we may get in."

Mr. Wilson was then Governor of New Jersey. He entered the Democratic primaries in various states and was successful in some but resisted, as a rule, by the organization Democrats. Progressive sentiment in both the Democratic and Republican parties had begun to crystallize. The reflex of the Taft-Roosevelt controversy on stand-patism and progressivism was felt in the Democratic ranks where it was not difficult to kindle fires of discontent over bossism and organization rule.

There had been times when Mr. Wilson felt so indignant over boss control in the Democratic party that he was not unsympathetic with the idea of having a new party formed by the progressives of both the Republican and Democratic parties. Just after the regular Republican convention renominated Mr. Taft, a third party, with Roosevelt at the head of it representing the progressive Republicans and Woodrow Wilson as his running mate representing the progressive Democratic sentiment of the country, was not only seriously suggested among progressives but there was an occasion when Woodrow Wilson himself thought of it too.

It was in those weary hours when the Democratic convention at Baltimore was deadlocked and it looked as if Champ Clark might be nominated. Mr. Wilson had persuaded himself that a victory for Clark would be a victory for the bosses in the Democratic party and he felt that those bosses were somehow in the control of Wall street. This was so deeply ingrained in his mind that at a critical moment in the balloting he turned to members of his family and remarked that he might not be able to support the Democratic ticket if Wall Street captured the Democratic party. When a friend standing by suggested that the third party convention would soon be held and that Mr. Wilson might be tendered the nomination for the Vice-Presidency, the then Governor of New Jersey remarked that "circumstances might make such a development possible."

Strange as were the incidents which led to the nomination of Woodrow Wilson for the Presidency, stranger still are the tales of how it was accomplished. The Wilson forces seemed like crusaders. They had responded to William Jennings Bryan's outcry against boss control. They refused to make trades and political bargains. They refused to yield even when Champ Clark had passed the majority mark—never before had a candidate got so far without winning the necessary two-thirds. National political conventions are rarely susceptible of precise analysis. Too many things happen at once as the numerous tacticians concentrate their subtleties

and cajolery. Coincidently the floor leaders are working in a half dozen places to accomplish the same general result.

The newspapers at the time gave William Jennings Bryan substantial credit for bringing about the nomination of Mr. Wilson, but ever since then prominent delegates have insisted that in the many secret conferences of that convention Mr. Bryan, after successfully blocking the nomination of Champ Clark, really favored himself, proposing from three to five other candidates on the Monday morning following the Sunday adjournment on the theory that the Convention was "hopelessly deadlocked". Irrespective of what really happened, the country was given the impression that Mr. Bryan played an effective part in setting the stage for the nomination of Woodrow Wilson. And Mr. Wilson, not unmindful of the Bryan influence in preceding Democratic conventions, was inclined to share that view.

Without doubt the fact that the third party convention would meet a week or so later and nominate Theodore Roosevelt as the national progressive candidate was imbedded in the minds of the Democratic delegates who, as usual, were not a little influenced in selecting a candidate by the thought that he deserved the nomination who had the best chance of winning the election. Would the Democrats permit the third party to draw progressives from the Democratic party? The nomination of a progressive Democrat like Woodrow Wilson, his champions at Baltimore argued, would checkmate such a possibility and give the country a new view of the Democratic party. There was something fascinating, if not sensational, about the spectacular rise of the college president to fame as a courageous administrator and a fearless spokesman of Democratic principles. Also, he had carried New Jersey by approximately 50,000 majority only two years before and his strength was undiminished by the record he had made as Governor in a State oppressed theretofore by bi-partisan boss management.

Convinced that he won the nomination at Baltimore on principle, Woodrow Wilson endeavored to conduct his campaign on the same high plane. Not once during the 1912 contest,

for instance, did Mr. Wilson mention the name of Theodore Roosevelt. Never during his eight years of the Presidency did he make a direct reply to any statement by Colonel Roosevelt. He tried to avoid personalities in politics. He was much more interested in principles, preferring always to deal with persons implicitly rather than explicitly.

Woodrow Wilson did not feel bound by party platforms in the making of which he had had no part. Certain principles of policy appealed to him as worthy of emphasis but, knowing the hasty manner in which platforms were drafted and perfunctorily adopted, he construed each document to be really a series of suggestions and not a program of action. In his formal speech accepting the nomination in 1912 he revealed that interpretation, but its true significance did not become apparent until Mr. Wilson as President developed his legislative programs. He wrote practically all of the 1916 platform himself and felt privileged to do so as leader of the Democratic party.

Two planks in the 1912 platform Mr. Wilson never mentioned during that campaign. One pledged the party to a constitutional amendment restricting a President of the United States to a single term and the other upheld the action of the Democrats in enacting a law exempting American vessels from payment of Panama Canal tolls. Mr. Wilson believed the discussion of the one-term plank was none of his affair because, if the party chose, it could repeal that plank in a subsequent convention—it was only binding upon the party in convention assembled and not upon individuals who inevitably would be compelled to accept the party's decision. The Democratic party—not Woodrow Wilson— reversed itself in 1916 by nominating for a second term the man who in the judgment of the delegates had made a worthy record in a single term. Similarly, Mr. Wilson held that the 1912 plank relating to Panama Canal tolls was merely an offhand endorsement of the action of the Democrats in Congress and that, if the Democrats on Capitol Hill in their wisdom, chose to reverse themselves, the party would be compelled to approve the reversal.

Throughout the campaign Mr. Wilson suppressed a certain admiration for many of the planks in the Bull Moose platform. After he was elected he did not fail to seek the support of many of those who had voted the Bull Moose ticket by striving to meet the wishes of the progressive leaders, men and women, who had supported the third party.

Mr. Wilson's praise for the third party platform was ungrudging. The author and several other newspapermen were seated with Governor Wilson on a train going to New York two days before the election in 1912 when someone in the group, realizing that no one of us could be home on Election Day, asked the indiscreet question of how each would vote if he had the opportunity. Fortunately, another wisely suggested that the vote be taken on the question of platforms rather than individuals and, when the author stated that he would vote neither the Republican nor the Democratic ticket in 1912, but the Bull Moose ticket because of its platform, Mr. Wilson with a twinkle in his eye admitted there was a great deal to be said in favor of that viewpoint.

Running through Mr. Wilson's political career is a streak of independence which did not bind him to the Democratic party as a lifelong proposition. It is not difficult to conceive of him as the candidate of some party other than the Democratic. He sensed the division of groups in American politics along the lines of conservatives and radicals, reactionaries and progressives, standpatters and liberals.

Parties, in Mr. Wilson's judgment, depended entirely for their appeal on the leadership given them. Just as many sincere Republicans finally became persuaded that they could accomplish more inside of the Republican party toward making it progressive than outside, so did Mr. Wilson become convinced that he could rid the Democratic party of some of its bossism and old fashioned conservatism and make it the instrument of progressivism and liberalism.

Although Mr. Wilson was an excellent speaker, eloquent and ingenious in his ability to make impromptu addresses, he really did not enjoy stump-speaking or back-platform talks. His audiences were never aware of that fact. Every outdoor

meeting was an ordeal for him. Nor did he like to prepare speeches in advance, preferring to map out addresses with a few notes ahead of time and trusting to his power of concentration to develop a theme in original fashion as he spoke. This meant that his best speeches were made when he had an attentive audience or when he spoke in a small hall where quiet could be assured. The speeches sounded well and read well. He never edited them after delivery. Newspapermen who traveled with him were impressed again and again by his versatility in handling from day to day the same topic in a different way. If his speeches were to be examined and compared, it would be found that, while he employed the same argument, he never used the same phraseology. Reporters never knew what he was going to say—they found themselves listening always for the unexpected.

Occasionally the reporters used to feel that he was conscious of their presence and that he felt the necessity of making every speech different so as not to seem to them to be repeating. Each campaign held the interest of those who were reporting it and, in this respect, Mr. Wilson's publicity sense, which was none too good as a whole, was especially effective.

Governor Wilson's abundance of good stories made him a delightful companion and the newspapermen, while well aware that he was not the usual type of candidate, found him particularly engaging. Once, just after he was nominated, when mail was pouring into Sea Girt more rapidly than his small clerical force could handle it, a newspaperman asked him how he was getting along with the piles of letters. Mr. Wilson replied:

"I am like the Irishman who was eating soup with his fork and someone offered him a spoon, but he waved it aside and said, 'Oh, it is all right I am gaining on it.' "

Coming back to his car from the observation platform after a rear end speech in a small town, there was a smile on his lips:

"Well," he said, "at last I feel that I have arrived in politics."

"Why?" a newspaperman asked.

"Somebody out there in that crowd waved his arms and yelled 'Hello, Woody' at me."

In the campaign of 1912 the terms "reactionary," "conservative" and "progressive" were frequently used. He was asked one day how he classified himself:

"I understand," he said, "the popular conception is that a 'radical' is one who goes too far; a 'conservative' one who doesn't go far enough, and a 'reactionary' one who won't go at all. I think I must be a 'progressive'—one who recognizes new forces and adjusts his policies and processes to them as they arrive.'"

On another occasion, talking along the same lines, when he was accused of being a "radical," he said,

"Let us see what is a 'radical'? Turn to the dictionary and you will find this definition: 'Of or pertaining to the root; proceeding directly from the root; of or pertaining to the origin; original; fundamental; reaching to the center or ultimate source; affecting the vital principle or principles; hence thoroughgoing.' Do you see anything disgraceful in admitting you are any one of those things?"

Mr. Wilson felt there was virtue in flexibility. He was already being accused of changing opinions he had earlier held. Indeed, when he went to the White House, this was not an uncommon source of criticism.

"The man who never changes his mind," argued Mr. Wilson, "indicates his profound ignorance. If your mind doesn't change with changing conditions, you are out of harmony with the world. I'll agree not to change my mind if someone with power to do so will guarantee that if I go to bed at night I will get up the next morning and see the world the same."

Governor Wilson had positive views about the duty of all voters to participate not only in elections but in primaries, believing that nominations were of paramount importance.

"When a man belittles politics and politicians," he remarked, "and says politics is a dirty business, or complains because conditions are bad, I say to him, 'Did you vote in the

last primaries of your party?' and he says 'No,' then I invite him to shut up."

In the 1912 campaign Mr. Wilson introduced, to some extent, the principles which he applied as Governor of New Jersey. He favored cleanliness in elections and felt that the Corrupt Practices Act which he had been instrumental in getting on the statute books in New Jersey, should be extended to the entire nation.

"I think that what we have done in New Jersey," he said, "should be done in all States in the Nation. We have met the issue by a very simple act which merely says 'If you buy an office you don't get it.' "

The "trusts" were at that time an issue of transcendent importance. A caller asked Governor Wilson how he proposed "to squeeze the water out of the trusts".

"I don't propose," he replied, "to squeeze the water out of the trusts. What I propose is that the water be put in a tank on their backs and that they be made to carry it in the race with industries that have no water. Then they will either break their backs or get rid of the water themselves".

"If the corporations would only hire costly lawyers," exclaimed Mr. Wilson one day apropos of trusts, "to advise them how to conform to the law instead of how to violate it, they would get along much better."

His comments on the tariff were equally pointed.

"I wish we could have a different arrangement about paying the tariff tax," said the Governor. "If, when a man buys a suit of clothes, he was required to pay $20.00 to the clothier, and then have to go down to the customs house and pay out $10.00 more to the Collector of Customs, I think a new method of raising money for the Government would speedily be discovered."

Someone in the group of newspapermen reminded Governor Wilson that President Taft had just made a speech that the tariff would benefit the farmers.

Governor Wilson replied: "Nobody but orators on the stump would say that, because you would have to be on the

stump to keep your face straight when you made such a statement."

During the same campaign when Theodore Roosevelt was attacking Governor Wilson bitterly, calling him "Dr. Wilson" and in fact not even dignifying him with his title of Governor, Mr. Wilson refused to be drawn into a personal controversy. "I believe," said Mr. Wilson, "party battles should be fought without personal participation. I am not the least bit interested in fighting persons, but I am tremendously interested in fighting issues."

Governor Wilson felt as early as August 1912 that the contest was between him and Theodore Roosevelt, and not between Mr. Taft and himself. He felt that Colonel Roosevelt appealed to the imagination and was a vivid person over whom the whole country would shout itself hoarse, while he was impersonal, academic and obscure. Nevertheless, Governor Wilson did attract large crowds and was enthusiastically received. He made a trip as far as Denver, speaking in several states. He tried to prepare his speeches in advance and did read from manuscript his Labor Day address at Buffalo but gave it up as being "too dry" a performance both for himself and the audience. After that he made impromptu addresses with much better effect, though from a publicity viewpoint he did not fare as well because his speeches were made too late as a rule to be given space on the telegraph wires on a parity with those speeches of the other candidates which were prepared in advance and mailed to all newspapers several days ahead of time.

A would-be assassin's bullet at Milwaukee temporarily prevented Colonel Roosevelt from continuing his campaign when Governor Wilson, with characteristic courtesy, promptly cancelled all his speeches so as not to seem to be taking unfair advantage of his opponent. About that time friends of the Governor insisted that he too should have a body-guard. Colonel House of Texas provided Captain Bill McDonald, a picturesque Ranger from the Rio Grande region. The Captain was of the eagle-eye sort who was as quick as a flash in

handling a gun. He was credited in Texas with having laid low a number of desperadoes.

"The Saturday night before election 1912," related Mr. Wilson in one of his favorite stories about Captain Bill McDonald, "we were motoring from Red Bank, New Jersey, back to Princeton when we struck a 'thank-you-mum' in the road. It threw us upward against the top of the car and cut my head badly, and bruised Captain Bill on the head and shoulders. We were passing through Hightstown at the time and the accident occurred almost directly in front of a doctor's house. Blood was streaming down my face, so we woke the doctor and he dressed our injuries. When we were back in the car, and again on our way, McDonald settled down in the seat, sighed and remarked with his usual drawl, 'I always did hate to get hurt by accident' ".

Governor Wilson's wound was painful. The scalp had been cut to the bone and the gash was about six inches long. It was just three days before the election and there was much speculation as to what the effect of the news would be. At such times it is difficult to anticipate what may be the turn of the public mind. Mr. Wilson had an engagement to speak at Paterson for Monday night, the night before election, but Sunday night and Monday morning he felt badly as the nervous reaction from the accident had set in.

Governor Wilson had decided to keep his Paterson date for Monday night. He got through the meeting, took a local train back to Newark, and had half an hour's wait for the train at Princeton on the second-story platform of the Newark station. Captain McDonald and one newspaperman were with him.

"Captain, will you step down and get the tickets?" suggested Governor Wilson. The three men were at the head of a flight of stairs leading down to the ticket office. McDonald hesitated and the reporter saw Mr. Wilson look at the old Ranger inquiringly.

"I guess the Captain doesn't want to leave his charge unprotected, on the last night of the campaign," said the reporter.

Comprehension and a smile spread over Mr. Wilson's face.

"To be sure," he said, and although there wasn't a soul on the platform at that midnight hour, and no possible danger could befall him, he took McDonald's arm and went down stairs with him, merely out of consideration for the old man's concern. Afterwards, back on the platform, as the three walked up and down, Mr. Wilson talked of the election the following day:

"I'm glad the campaign is over," he confided. "It has been hard, and I'm a little tired."

"I should have thought you would have passed up to-night's meeting," remarked the newspaperman. "It couldn't have had much influence one way or the other."

"No, I suppose not," continued Mr. Wilson, "but I'm peculiarly constituted, I guess. I never feel the slightest concern over the outcome of anything when I have done all that I could do. It is only when I feel that I haven't done my part that I worry about results. Tonight, I felt as if I wanted to keep driving right up to the last minute. I have done so, and now I can go home and go to sleep and get a complete rest."

"Do you mean to say you will sleep well to-night?" asked the reporter.

"Absolutely. I shall lay my head down on my pillow in the consciousness of having done my best and I shall not awaken until eight or eight-thirty to-morrow morning. Whatever happens to-morrow will be right, no matter whether I am elected or not."

Inquiry next day revealed the fact that Mr. Wilson had apparently slept without waking until 8:30. He took it easy early in the morning, resting and joking with the family until about 10:30, when he went to the polling place and cast his ballot for the Wilson electors from New Jersey. In the afternoon he had his picture taken in front of the porch of a little cottage in Princeton, surrounded by the newspapermen who had been through the campaign with him. He then took the reporters on a long walk in the country about Princeton,

and explained points of historic interest connected with the Revolutionary War.

Passing a building in the University grounds, Governor Wilson pointed to a cornice.

"There is a typical illustration," he remarked, "of the erudition of an undergraduate, reported when this building was being constructed. One student met another where we are standing, and pointing up said, 'Those are mighty fine gargoyles up there, aren't they?' The other student said, 'Now don't that beat the devil how fast things get around school. Just yesterday somebody called that a gargoyle and now it is all over college'."

After a quiet dinner with his family at home, Mr. Wilson lounged in the library quietly reading a book on American government while the early returns were coming in. About eight o'clock he joined the family, friends and newspapermen in the reception room, where a telegraph key had been installed, but refused to get excited about the favorable returns, when everybody else was not only excited but talkative. In fact, as the evening wore on, Mr. Wilson became more and more solemn, and his face took on an expression of deep seriousness. Others were bubbling over with joy but he was quiet, grave and pale. It was suggested that he issue a statement claiming the election, but he did not do so until the returns from Massachusetts arrived. When it was beyond question that he had carried the Bay State, he said: "That was what I was waiting for," and issued a formal statement.

Possibly it was that Mr. Wilson had been confident of the result or possibly it was Mr. Wilson's characteristic ability to disguise his true feelings. But were it not for the student body of Princeton University, who came marching down to the little cottage on Cleveland Lane, a stone's throw from the house where Grover Cleveland lived and died, the incident might have passed into history without even a cheer of enthusiasm or a note of exultation of any kind.

To the modest cottage on Cleveland Lane, came the torchlight procession, with fife and drum, singing, yelling, and giv-

ing to the whole atmosphere more of the appearance of an athletic victory than a political celebration. Students in Princeton will parade anyhow on the slightest provocation and the fact that a graduate had been elected President of the United States gave them a thrilling excuse.

Down the same streets students had tripped in the days when General Washington received the thanks of the Continental Congress meeting at Nassau Hall after the Revolution. It was in the same environment that James Madison, another President of the United States, had lived. More recently—only five years before—the students had marched to the home of Grover Cleveland to greet him on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. The last President of the United States elected on the Democratic ticket and the first Democrat to be elected since then—both had been a vital part of Princeton.

Only a few persons were admitted to the Wilson cottage, mostly newspapermen who had accompanied the Governor during his Presidential campaign. Except for the tickling of a telegraph instrument in the library one would have believed it was a social evening in the Wilson home.

Serenaded by the students, Woodrow Wilson made his first speech that night as the elected Chief Executive of the American people.

"I do not feel exuberant or cheerful," he said. "I feel exceedingly solemn. I have no inclination to jump up and crack my heels together. A weight of seriousness and responsibility seems to be pressing down upon me. I feel more like kneeling down and praying for strength to do what is expected of me."

It was an impromptu speech but it paralleled strangely the words of his second inauguration address more than four years later. He said then in 1912 what he said in 1916—he did not feel the thrill of triumph but a sense only of solemn responsibility.

CHAPTER V

PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE UNITED STATES; SELECTING THE CABINET

Day by day we had our conferences with the President-elect. His answers to newspaper questions were general—he was feeling his way. His first impulse was to get away from it all and think alone. This tendency, not unlike that of the artist who seeks solitude or the literary genius who locks himself in his study for uninterrupted thought, was noticeable on later occasions when Mr. Wilson was face to face with a crisis.

Off to Bermuda, presumably on a vacation, went the President-elect as soon as elected, but the real purpose of the journey was to find a quiet place in which to think out a course of action. On the steamer en route to Bermuda and in the life of the Wilson household during the month's sojourn in the beautiful Paget section of Bermuda, the Wilsons revealed themselves as truly democratic. They were innocently unaware of the burdens of officialdom.

All the correspondents who made the daily trip to the Wilson home found a delightful family circle,—in fact, one of the embarrassments from the newspaperman's viewpoint was the fact that Mr. Wilson accepted the correspondents as social visitors then rather than as professional callers. Many a visit which was begun with the avowed object of getting news from the President-elect turned out in vain because of the charm and attractiveness of the drawing room where Mr. Wilson, his wife and daughters participated in a discussion of everything except news. It effectively prevented the scribes from conducting their usual cross-examination.

There is no doubt that Mrs. Wilson won the friendship

of every one of the correspondents. On more than one occasion she smoothed out a difference between the newspapermen and her husband. She was their friend throughout and sympathized with them in the embarrassing duty of pursuing a President-elect while he was trying to get a needed rest.

It was while Mr. Wilson was in Bermuda that he encountered his first bit of world diplomacy. The British Government maintains at Bermuda a Governor-General who was instructed on that occasion to extend every hospitality to the President-elect. Just what instructions beyond that were given him is a matter which is known only, of course, to the British Government, but the Governor-General took occasion during one of his social chats with Mr. Wilson to express the hope of Great Britain that Mr. Wilson might be able to bring about a reversal of the action of Congress which had exempted American vessels from the payment of Panama Canal tolls. This was regarded by the British as a discrimination against their vessels which had been guaranteed equal treatment under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

Woodrow Wilson had an opportunity to discuss the same question with Ambassador James Bryce before the latter left for England. He had a profound admiration for Mr. Bryce, begun in Princeton days when the noted ambassador had visited there.

Mr. Wilson was cognizant of the value of British support as opposed to British hostility in world affairs, but he was much more impressed by the fact that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty seemed to give Great Britain rights which the Act of Congress had taken away. Mr. Wilson knew also that the slightest indication of American friendship for Great Britain would irritate the Irish-Americans and would cause Germany to look askance at American policy—a reflex of which might be German-American opposition. Indeed, Mr. Wilson's fears were fully confirmed on these two points a few months later when he asked Congress to repeal the law that had been passed in a previous session by which American vessels had been exempted from the payment of tolls. Count Von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, realized that

a victory for President Wilson in the circumstances would be construed abroad as the growth of an entente between the United States and Great Britain. He worked tooth and nail to defeat the purpose of Mr. Wilson.

As it happened, the President-elect little dreamed while he was in Bermuda of the far-reaching importance of the Panama Canal tolls controversy on world diplomacy. His decision to make the appeal in behalf of Great Britain on the ground that a treaty had been violated was a momentous one as will appear in subsequent exposition of the Wilson foreign policy.

But even though Mr. Wilson realized and feared that he would be confronted with important questions of foreign policy, he did not think they would become paramount. His mind was fixed during the Bermuda vacation on the all-absorbing task of picking a Cabinet.

Should its members be political leaders chosen for their influence in Congress, or should they be trusted personal friends of proved competence and administrative talent? He frankly discussed the two theories but gave no indication at the time as to which he preferred. Circumstances, he realized, would control the ultimate decision and he was enough of a student of practical politics to realize that he must give weight to political considerations if he expected to win the necessary support for a legislative program in Congress.

To all the talk that there would be friction between himself and Champ Clark, the Speaker of the House, or Oscar W. Underwood, the majority leader, there came from Mr. Wilson unequivocal predictions of the contrary. He scented mischief-makers but gave evidence that he would go more than half way to meet the wishes of Congressional leaders.

Possibly nobody in America realized better than Woodrow Wilson the difficulties that might ensue if he failed to select William Jennings Bryan for a portfolio in the Cabinet. No one, on the other hand, had been as keenly aware of Mr. Bryan's temperamental fondness for the stump and public speaking rather than the involuntary silence and seclusion imposed by tradition upon a Secretary of State. Mr. Wilson

felt from the start that Mr. Bryan's position as a leader of the Democratic party in three separate campaigns entitled him to the ranking position in the Cabinet of a Democratic administration.

One of the first things Mr. Wilson did on his return from Bermuda early in December 1912 was to offer the Secretaryship of State to Mr. Bryan and the latter accepted. The tender was made verbally and was kept a secret for many weeks. Colonel Edwin M. House, who had become identified with the Wilson preconvention campaign, began at once to enlist Mr. Wilson's interest in currency reform on which he had spent many years of study. The President-elect sanctioned a trip by Colonel House to Florida to let Mr. Bryan know in a general way of the plans for currency legislation and to win his support. It was Colonel House's tact and skill on this mission which prompted the President-elect to rely more and more on the judgment of his new-found adviser.

The Colonel had the happy idea that John Bassett Moore, America's most eminent authority on international law, could be persuaded to accept the position of Counsellor of the Department of State, and that the team of Bryan and Moore would satisfy public opinion, especially that part of it which did not believe Mr. Bryan would follow a conventional policy in handling foreign affairs.

Looking back on the hopefulness with which that plan was launched, one cannot help feeling that it was a splendid example of the kind of things which looks well on paper but never works in actual practice. It was a good political move but bred its disappointments later on. Mr. Moore was a stickler for tradition and precedents—he is now one of the judges on the Court of International Justice at The Hague. Mr. Wilson respected tradition and precedent only in so far as they presented an opportunity to create a new precedent. Mr. Bryan, whose heart was as big as the world itself, felt that precedent and law were compelling only in so far as they conformed to principles of Christian morality and a broad faith in civilization itself.

As Secretary of State Mr. Bryan surprised Mr. Wilson by

his zealous advancement of certain fundamentals of foreign policy, and though the President and Mr. Bryan disagreed on the use of physical force instead of moral force in issues with Germany, there is no doubt that the Bryan-Wilson combination was a closer one than either man had dreamed it would be in the days of 1912. Their emotions frequently were aroused in the same way—their sympathies stimulated by identical circumstances. Points of difference were many but the decision to take Mr. Bryan into the Cabinet was a plunge into the dark by Mr. Wilson—it was simply a conviction that the Democratic party should be kept united and that Mr. Bryan had earned first place in the Cabinet.

Selection of the Cabinet of President Wilson was a unique process. No party leader but a trusted friend played the most influential rôle in making that Cabinet. The friend was Colonel Edwin M. House of Texas.

The development of the friendship between the quiet man from Texas and Woodrow Wilson was as remarkable as their subsequent separation under circumstances all the more amazing when the full story of their association is unfolded.

Colonel House was, first of all, a man of independent means, a liberal in politics and of influential personality. His tact and diplomacy, his progressiveness and unselfishness, captured Mr. Wilson's imagination.

"What I like about Colonel House," explained Governor Wilson one day to a group of newspapermen who displayed curiosity about the growing friendship, "is that he holds things at arm's length—objectively. He seems able to penetrate a proposition and get to its very essence quickly. He wants nothing for himself. He will not hold office and is a truly disinterested friend—the most valuable possession a man could have."

In those weeks preceding the inauguration of Mr. Wilson, Colonel House did an extraordinary thing which from that day to this has not been disclosed in print, but it shows the remarkable influence he possessed. As will be remembered by persons who follow the stock market, the uncertainty over what the new Democratic Administration might do had an

unsettling effect in the financial district—at least so claimed the leading financiers, some of whom kept hinting that unless the uncertainty was allayed even a panic might follow the inauguration of the President. Wall Street professed to be alarmed over the radicalism of the newly elected Chief Executive and what he might do to business generally. Some of the leading bankers asked Colonel House to attend a dinner and explain what was likely to happen under the new Administration. He did not consent until he had Mr. Wilson's sanction. According to some of those who were present, the amount of money represented at that gathering was at least five billions of dollars in actual wealth and many billions more in potential credit. All the important financiers in America were there or sent representatives. The Colonel erased the notion that Woodrow Wilson was a "wild radical" who would turn things upside down and, instead, gave a general sketch of what Mr. Wilson hoped to accomplish by way of currency reform. What the bankers wanted was something straight from headquarters about the Wilson intentions—not necessarily the details but his general attitude toward business and finance. Whether the talk Colonel House gave that night to all the important financiers of the country had any sequel in the confidence thereafter displayed by the markets is too intangible to prove, but there was a noticeable let-up in the predictions of disaster and calamity which had spread about the metropolitan district.

Again and again Governor Wilson went to the apartments of Colonel House in New York, seeing many important visitors there. Later on, after Mr. Wilson was inaugurated, the home of Colonel House was a sort of New York branch of the White House.

There were frequent conversations over the long distance telephone and a regular series of letters day by day. These communications were private in every sense and were not opened by any intervening officials. Naturally there was often a disposition on the part of other advisers of the President to wonder what subjects were being discussed or taken up between Colonel House and Mr. Wilson. The Colonel

was reticent—he earned a reputation of "silent partner" and has kept Mr. Wilson's confidence faithfully.

Many of the matters with which Colonel House dealt related to appointments to office. If the President wished to conduct an investigation as to the fitness of an individual for an important place, he would ask Colonel House to make such an investigation tactfully. It was Colonel House who suggested the name of Walter Hines Page to be American Ambassador to Great Britain. I rode from New York to Washington with him on the day before he took this matter up with Mr. Wilson and he told me of the prospective appointment, feeling absolutely sure he could persuade Mr. Wilson to make it. And he did. It was with considerable amusement, therefore, that the Colonel read later on of reports that friction had developed between Ambassador Page and President Wilson because Colonel House had been sent to Europe as an unofficial envoy.

In the weeks immediately preceding the inauguration Colonel House was especially valuable to Mr. Wilson in deciding political questions relating to the personnel of the Cabinet. After the inauguration the Colonel continued to deal with patronage matters for Mr. Wilson and kept the latter informed on the impressions the Administration was making in the large centers of the East. But the Colonel brought to Mr. Wilson also an intimate knowledge of foreign affairs and a personal acquaintance with many of the most important figures in world diplomacy. Mr. Wilson's readiness to entrust Colonel House with his confidence on missions relating to foreign policy was due to a conviction that the Colonel was tactful and diplomatic and would not be restricted by the same forms and conventions that surrounded a full fledged ambassador. Many people never could understand why President Wilson made use of unofficial envoys. The truth of the matter is that Mr. Wilson felt more could be accomplished by an unattached envoy than by one who was officially accredited to a government and, therefore, unable by personal investigation to reach into the heart of a

problem or say things as bluntly as could a casual envoy who had no official status.

Mr. Wilson used to refer to Colonel House as his "eyes and ears". He was more than that. He was Mr. Wilson's personal representative in making a first hand investigation of the facts and opinions conveyed to the White House by ambassadors and ministers in their lengthy and discussive official reports. Colonel House was really analogous to the star reporter who is occasionally sent by his newspaper to make a general survey of a situation. Local correspondents are maintained in nearly every important center but large newspapers, every now and then, send a representative to visit a certain section of the country and follow a particular line of investigation. Often he is able to pry into matters which the local correspondent for one reason or another is embarrassed in attempting to untangle. Colonel House, moreover, had the faculty of digesting situations and putting them into brief reports. He was adroit in his conversations—he never committed the Government of the United States to any policy. He worked in close harmony with the ambassadors and ministers, and thus took a large burden off Mr. Wilson's mind.

Before the inauguration Colonel House can be said to have been responsible for the selection of at least half of Mr. Wilson's cabinet. For years he had known David F. Houston, who became Secretary of Agriculture. Mr. Houston had been president of the University of Texas. The friendship of Mr. Wilson and Secretary Houston was the admiration of one intellectual for another. Indeed, when it became apparent to Mr. Wilson in 1920 that on account of ill health he could not expect the Democratic Convention at San Francisco to nominate him, he wished that the Convention might turn to a man like Houston. He never made public announcement of that fact, but among the President's intimate friends this was an open secret. Charles R. Crane, who became Minister to China and who exerted a great deal of influence on Mr. Wilson in connection with Russian af-

fairs, was one of the inner circle who favored Mr. Houston's candidacy in 1920.

Mr. Houston had always shown a practical knowledge of economics. At that time Mr. Wilson leaned heavily on Mr. Houston's advice. In the Treasury portfolio, which he had assumed in 1919, he was one of the strong men of the administration. Many of the communications to Congress, particularly on fiscal matters signed by President Wilson during his illness, were word for word written by Secretary Houston.

The selection of William Gibbs McAdoo to be Secretary of the Treasury was due in no small measure to the splendid capacity which Mr. McAdoo had shown in the 1912 campaign. As Vice-Chairman of the Democratic National Committee he was opposed by W. F. McCombs who, on account of ill health, did many irresponsible things, the course of the campaign often being threatened by internal friction. Mr. McAdoo was a diplomat throughout and twice offered to efface himself if it would assist Mr. Wilson's political fortunes.

Oddly enough, Mr. McAdoo did not see Mr. Wilson for many weeks after the election of 1912. These circumstances gave rise to rumors that there had been a break, something, of course, which the McCombs faction was eagerly trying to bring about. But it was not true. Mr. McAdoo was one of the few men in the New York financial district who had pronounced Woodrow Wilson safe and sane; he gave his support to the candidacy of Mr. Wilson in pre-convention days. Mr. McAdoo had won attention as the builder of the Hudson tunnels. His readiness to cast his lot with Governor Wilson was no small influence in those days when the New Jersey candidate needed all the friends he could get from the conservative areas of the Empire State.

The nomination of Josephus Daniels to be Secretary of the Navy was a sequel to a friendship formed in 1911 when Woodrow Wilson as Governor of New Jersey spoke in North Carolina and visited at the Daniels home in Raleigh. For twenty years Josephus Daniels had been the Democratic

National Committeeman from North Carolina. When Mr. Wilson was elected, nearly all the Democratic National Committeemen of the United States joined in a petition to have him made a member of the Cabinet. It has been supposed that William Jennings Bryan was responsible for the appointment of Mr. Daniels, because they were warm friends, but Mr. Bryan did not know until after the selection was made that his stanch supporter had been chosen. The Commoner was deeply gratified and his faith in Woodrow Wilson promptly increased.

Another endorsement came from Joseph R. Wilson, brother of the President-elect, who had worked in Democratic national headquarters where Mr. Daniels was in charge of the publicity bureau throughout the campaign. Mrs. Wilson also urged the appointment. Opposition came from Dr. Walter Hines Page of North Carolina, editor of *World's Work,* but it was of no avail.

Mr. Wilson had considered Dr. Page for the secretaryship of the Interior, but realized that the Pension Bureau was in that department of the government and felt it would be unwise to give a Southerner jurisdiction over it because of the antipathy which might be aroused among the G. A. R. veterans.

Another man whom Mr. Wilson might have had for Secretary of Interior was Newton D. Baker, then mayor of Cleveland, but he declined the portfolio so as to be able to complete an important municipal program.

Franklin K. Lane, who finally became Secretary of the Interior and one of the conspicuous members of the Wilson cabinet, never met his Chief until inauguration day. Various tales are told of how Mr. Lane happened to be chosen, among them being a story that he wrote a letter to Mr. Wilson urging that Walter L. Fisher, Secretary of the Interior in the Taft cabinet, be permitted to continue in that office, and that Mr. Wilson was so impressed with Mr. Lane's grasp of the problems of the Interior Department that he became convinced, instead, the Californian should be appointed. Mr. Lane was a progressive, a great admirer of Theodore Roosevelt, who had

appointed him to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and one of the few Democrats who had an opportunity to win national fame in Washington.

It so happened, however, that Mr. Lane was an intimate friend of one of the members of Colonel House's family and visited in Texas. His qualifications were presented to Mr. Wilson by Colonel House. He was accepted on paper, so to speak, and was one of the first to be decided on for the Cabinet.

In later years, a coolness developed between Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Lane. Mr. Wilson once said the Secretary of the Interior was too "visionary," and that while he was the sponsor of many good ideas they did not always seem practicable. Mr. Lane was outspoken. He frequently criticized things the administration did and volunteered his opinions on many matters outside the Interior Department, all of which was bound sooner or later to create friction in a cabinet as sharply departmentalized as was that of Woodrow Wilson.

Selecting William B. Wilson to be Secretary of Labor was largely the outgrowth of a desire to make good the promises given in the campaign to be friendly to labor. Congress had just created the portfolio of Secretary of Labor and the President-elect felt that the recommendations of the American Federation of Labor should be given serious weight. He was always happy over the selection of William B. Wilson and counted it as one of his best strokes. Secretary Wilson was a splendid colleague, an honest, fair-minded, devoted friend, loyal to the *n*th degree, sympathetic to be sure with labor's viewpoint, but by no means radical in his views. He was influential often in persuading the labor leaders to a more conservative policy, for he had their trust and confidence.

Albert Sidney Burleson was a political choice. The influence of Colonel House in this appointment was evident. Mr. Burleson, like Mr. Houston, hailed from Texas where Colonel House knew him intimately. Postmaster-General Burleson was a strong figure—an old fashioned Democrat of the parti-

san kind who had a convincing way about him which, on more than one occasion, caused Mr. Wilson to follow him in opposition to other advisers. Mr. Burleson had been Chairman of the Democratic caucus in the House and, frequently as Postmaster General, busied himself about the lobbies of the Senate and House, winning support for various administration measures. His activity in this respect in later years aroused resentment. There can be no question that he did many things which the President could never have done for himself—especially in lining up the Democrats in Congress. His persuasive arguments won over many a wavering vote.

Mr. Wilson's greatest difficulty in making up his Cabinet developed in filling the portfolio of Attorney General. Throughout the campaign he had made effective use of the argument of Louis D. Brandeis on government regulation of big business. Again and again, the correspondents accompanying Governor Wilson would hear from his lips words of praise for the magnificent articles written by Brandeis, some of which were paraphrased in the speeches of Mr. Wilson on the trust question. His heart's desire was to appoint Mr. Brandeis Attorney General, but he was afraid to do so because of the reputation Mr. Brandeis had as a radical. When taken to task later on by a friend for not appointing Mr. Brandeis, the President said:

"In the position of Attorney General I simply could not appoint a radical—that is I could not appoint a known radical. The people must have confidence in the Department of Justice —they must have confidence in the Attorney General. He can not be a person of the crusader type in public life. I have tremendous admiration for Mr. Brandeis, and I know of his great mental capacity, but he just doesn't fit in that particular place because he is known all over the country as a crusader and it would shock the sensibilities of the public to appoint him to that particular position."

Mr. Wilson's unwillingness to appoint Mr. Brandeis as Attorney General led him to consider tentatively the selection of Mr. Brandeis as Secretary of Commerce. He really wanted him at the Cabinet table. Just about the time he was inclined

to make the appointment the Boston critics of Mr. Brandeis, who had fought many a fight in New England against the railroads and against the conservative interests in both the Democratic and Republican parties, came to the President-elect and told him he would lose the support of the Democratic organization in Massachusetts if he nominated Mr. Brandeis to his Cabinet. Mr. Wilson did not believe comments made about Mr. Brandeis's alleged inconsistencies as a lawyer and sent Dudley Field Malone, who was at that time a close friend of Mr. Wilson, to New England as a sort of investigator. While the report of Mr. Malone was not unfriendly to Mr. Brandeis, the controversial aspect of the case was such as to cause Mr. Wilson, at the last minute, to eliminate the name of Mr. Brandeis and choose another Secretary of Commerce, namely, William C. Redfield of New York. In later years Mr. Wilson regretted his omission of Mr. Brandeis from the Cabinet and made amends by appointing him to the Supreme Court of the United States. While it was not generally known, Mr. Wilson frequently consulted Justice Brandeis during the war and in reconstruction days. He was an inconspicuous but influential adviser.

What Mr. Wilson liked about Mr. Redfield was his knowledge of the tariff question. Although Mr. Redfield as a member of Congress had attacked Mr. Wilson's candidacy in the days prior to the Baltimore Convention, Woodrow Wilson ignored that opposition and accepted the estimate which so many people gave him of the business ability of William C. Redfield. During the campaign Mr. Wilson had occasion to confer frequently at Sea Girt with Mr. Redfield and found him so familiar with the tariff question that he came to respect his judgment on business questions very highly.

Another intimate friend of Mr. Wilson who felt that he should be Attorney General was A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania, the floor leader of the Wilson forces in the Baltimore Convention, but the President-elect wanted him for another portfolio.

James C. McReynolds owed his appointment as Attorney General not to any political influence but to his achievements.

He had appeared in the Federal courts under Judge William Howard Taft. When the latter became President, Attorney General Wickersham was in need of a special assistant to prosecute the tobacco cases and Mr. Taft remembered that Mr. McReynolds had made a very good impression upon him in early days. Mr. McReynolds became Assistant Attorney General of the United States under the Taft administration, and when the Supreme Court rendered its opinion saying the tobacco combine was a "good trust", Mr. McReynolds issued a powerful refutation of the decision. Woodrow Wilson, studying the trust question, read the McReynolds statement on the tobacco case and filed it in the back of his mind.

The whole country was scoured to find an Attorney General who would fit in with the Wilson specifications of what the head of the Department of Justice should be. But the choice inevitably turned to Mr. McReynolds because he already was at work in the Department of Justice and was in a position to carry forward the all-important New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad prosecution and the coal cases. Mr. McReynolds was politically qualified—he was a Tennessee Democrat. Mr. Wilson always held him in high esteem as a lawyer and subsequently appointed him to the Supreme Court of the United States.

When Mr. McReynolds was elevated to the bench, Colonel House was instrumental in the selection of Thomas W. Gregory of Texas as Attorney General.

In offering the portfolio of Secretary of War to Mr. Palmer, in 1913, the President-elect expressed a conviction that the head of the War Department should be an able lawyer. When Mr. Palmer declined, because of Quaker convictions against war, Mr. Wilson turned in perplexity to his private secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, who recommended Lindley M. Garrison, vice-chancellor of New Jersey. Mr. Garrison's reputation on the bench was such as to assure an absolutely clean administration of the War Department with its many judicial questions, for during peace times there are various projects under the supervision of the Secretary of War in which a legal mind is of inestimable value. And when Mr.

Garrison resigned in 1916 the President chose another lawyer, Newton D. Baker, for the same post.

The appointment of Robert Lansing in 1915 to succeed William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State was natural because Mr. Lansing as counsellor had prepared many memoranda which had been useful to Mr. Wilson in writing the notes to Germany and the allied governments on questions of neutrality. Undoubtedly Mr. Lansing is a great international lawyer and Mr. Wilson recognized his ability, but the President became obsessed with the idea that Mr. Lansing was too fond of precedents and convention and that he was not elastic on questions of policy. Mr. Lansing's difficulties with Mr. Wilson were to a large extent the same kind that John Bassett Moore had with William Jennings Bryan. The legal mind came in conflict with the political mind. Policy in foreign affairs can not always be developed by the same empiricism or intuition that characterizes decisions on domestic questions, particularly party politics. International relations, especially to the minds which have been trained to think in terms of sovereign power and tradition, are not as easily resolved by the rules of expediency as are so many domestic questions.

When Mr. Lansing resigned President Wilson had broken down in health. His first impulse was to transfer Newton D. Baker from the portfolio of Secretary of War and have Bainbridge Colby succeed Mr. Baker. The friends of Frank L. Polk, Undersecretary of State, were active in his behalf and it looked for a time as if Mr. Wilson might promote Mr. Polk and make no change in the War Department. Mr. Colby was not a Democrat but had been affiliated with the Progressive Republican party and had made the speech nominating Theodore Roosevelt in the Progressive Convention of 1916. Mr. Wilson cherished the hope that the nomination of Mr. Colby to the Cabinet would bring to his support the liberals and progressives who had been inclined to stray from him in his last administration.

An undercurrent of gossip to the effect that Secretary Baker had concurred in the view of Secretary Lansing with

respect to the supposed disqualification of President Wilson to continue in office because of his physical disability in 1919 was brought to Mr. Wilson's attention when he considered the possible appointment of Newton D. Baker as Secretary of State. Here again Mr. Wilson applied the acid test of loyalty and asked his advisers whether there was truth in the current reports concerning Mr. Baker's supposed disaffection. President Wilson was assured to the contrary but for reasons best known to himself he did not transfer Mr. Baker to head the Department of State. His admiration for Newton D. Baker was by no means diminished, in fact their warm friendship continued long after Mr. Wilson left the White House.

Changes in the Wilson cabinet were relatively few in the two administrations. After the World War Secretary McAdoo, Attorney General Gregory and Secretary Lane felt the call of private business. Carter Glass of Virginia filled the Treasury portfolio but was soon drafted for the United States Senate. The President offered the place to Bernard M. Baruch of New York who declined it. Then Secretary Houston was transferred to succeed Mr. Glass and Edward T. Meredith of Iowa was appointed Secretary of Agriculture. John Barton Payne of Illinois succeeded Mr. Lane as Secretary of the Interior. A. Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania took Mr. Gregory's place in the Department of Justice—the portfolio he had wanted in 1913.

Of the original Cabinet three men—Secretary Daniels of the Navy Department, Postmaster General Burleson, and Secretary William B. Wilson of the Department of Labor—served the entire eight years.

Although as President-elect Mr. Wilson allowed party considerations to influence him, to some extent, he paid even less attention to the political factor in making appointments to his Cabinet after he reached the White House. Personal loyalty and individual ability were the qualities which influenced him in the admission of new members to the Cabinet.

While the Cabinet problem, of course, was the principal work upon which Mr. Wilson was engaged as President-elect, he began a series of conferences with Congressional leaders

on prospective legislation. It was in the little cottage at Princeton that Colonel House and Representative Carter Glass, Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, first laid before Mr. Wilson the essentials of the plan which in time gave to the United States the Federal Reserve Act now on the statute books, substituting for an antiquated currency system a structure in keeping with the business expansion of the country.

The bold and outspoken manner in which Mr. Wilson as President-elect discussed what he intended to do as President on the major issues, namely the tariff and currency reform, gave many of those about him the impression that he was overconfident. Mr. Wilson however had a sublime faith in the power of public opinion. Neither the Tariff Act nor the Federal Reserve Act, as finally written into law, was actually what Mr. Wilson wanted but the fundamentals were what he had sought from the beginning. He believed the people were behind him and that a Chief Executive who could marshal public opinion would compel Congress to abandon filibusters and dilatory tactics and enact constructive measures.

Mr. Wilson's impulse as President-elect was to carry his program of reform to the uttermost. He would have liked to see the seniority rule abandoned in the selection of committee chairmen in Congress so that progressives, or men in close sympathy with his ideas, might lead in the preparation of legislation. But the practical difficulties in the way of such reform impressed Mr. Wilson and persuaded him to avoid what certainly would have followed, namely a serious conflict with Congress. Rather did Mr. Wilson decide that he could accomplish the same result by converting men who had been reactionaries into progressives so far as their votes were concerned. If he could make the reactionaries vote with him even against their own will through the pressure of public opinion, Mr. Wilson felt he would be achieving as much as if he were to attempt to revolutionize congressional custom and practice. And as matters turned out Mr. Wilson's caution in this respect was fully justified. In the first few years

he did get the votes of his own party without permitting factionalism to develop.

To an amazing extent did the members of the Democratic party in Congress seek the guidance and counsel of the President-elect. Of many subjects he was plainly in ignorance and confessed his unfamiliarity. His disposition with respect to appointments to office was, of course, well known because of his independence while Governor of New Jersey. He was opposed to the distribution of jobs as a political reward. His instinct told him that public offices ought not to be the subject of barter. But he retained a sense of party loyalty as well as an understanding of the practical side of national politics. If the distribution of offices were simply a matter of reward to those who had performed political service, the successful candidate might well insist upon selecting from groups of political supporters, especially if among them were to be found men or women competent to perform official duties. The difficulty however was not in rewarding those who had performed service but in encouraging those who would be the means of winning important support in Congress or in subsequent elections.

Although the newspapers tried in vain to penetrate the workings of Mr. Wilson's mind in an effort to ascertain his plans with reference to important appointments, the Cabinet list was not officially disclosed until the nominations were sent to the Senate. Mr. Wilson kept his own counsels well. Another secret which the new President managed to withhold from everybody, including the very man who suggested it to him, was the plan to address Congress in person.

The day after election Oliver P. Newman, one of the newspapermen assigned to write about the activities of the President-elect, went to Mr. Wilson's home in Cleveland Lane in Princeton and asked for an interview. The conversation ran about like this:

"Governor, I want to ask you some questions for publication, if you will, but if you do not wish to answer for publication I would like to have you talk about them anyway so that I may be prepared for the future."

"I don't want to talk for publication as President-elect," replied Mr. Wilson, "and from now on until the 4th of March it is my intention to keep my mouth shut, but I would be very glad to have you ask me things for your own information."

"How, as President of the United States," inquired Mr. Newman, "are you going to apply your theory of Executive responsibility?"

"Well, Newman, I can't say in advance what I am going to do," said the Governor, "but I have a few general ideas. In the first place you may be sure I am going to practice my theory. My views about Executive responsibility will be applied in the Presidency just as much as they were in the Governorship. Now the details as how to proceed and just what processes to deal with will be carefully considered as each case arises."

"It occurred to me," suggested Mr. Newman, "that you might abandon the practice which all the Presidents since Jefferson have followed during the last hundred years in having a written message sent to Congress and having it read by the clerk to the Senate and House while half the members are absent. You could call on the Speaker and say to him: 'Tomorrow morning I would like to get the House and Senate together. I am going to speak to them in person' and then deliver the message yourself."

The President-elect looked at the reporter in surprise.

"You mean go down there and personally address the House and Senate—deliver the message verbally?" inquired Mr. Wilson.

"Just that, why not?" suggested Mr. Newman.

Woodrow Wilson walked to the window in his library and paused.

"Why do you say the practice has not been followed since Jefferson?" he asked.

"Well, Washington delivered his message in person," explained Mr. Newman, "but Jefferson being a poor speaker sent his communication to be read."

Again the President-elect looked toward the window, smiled and turned.

"Newman," he said, "that would set them by the ears."

Further thought made him doubtful.

"I am afraid," he commented, "that it would be too radical. You know there are certain things which simply can't be done the way you would like to do them. It would be such a shock to the sensibilities of the members of Congress—to their orthodox ideas. I desire to do things the way they are done in Washington. The matter of presenting the message might arouse antagonism which would tend to injure my recommendations for legislation."

After that Mr. Wilson never said a word to Mr. Newman or to any of the other reporters about delivering the message in person. It seemed as if he had vetoed the idea. When he reached the White House, of course, his decision to address Congress in person was one of the sensations of the first administration, establishing a precedent which has since been followed by other Presidents of the United States and giving Presidential messages not only a more dramatic setting but more effective publicity.

After Mr. Wilson had delivered his first message in person and when he was motoring back to the White House with Mrs. Wilson, she could hear him chuckling under his breath, chuckling to himself, and for several minutes she said nothing. Finally she turned and asked what he was chuckling about. He laughed and said, "Wouldn't Teddy have been glad to think of that—I put one over on Teddy and am totally happy."

Possibly Mr. Wilson was thinking of the story which one of the newspapermen told him during the winter of 1913. A New York editor was lunching at Colonel Roosevelt's home in Oyster Bay with four or five other prominent people. During the luncheon Mr. Roosevelt made several sneering references to "Professor" Wilson. The New York editor finally objected. He said:

"Colonel, I don't like to hear you refer to Mr. Wilson in that manner. I admire Mr. Wilson because I believe he has the same progressive principles and is working for the same idealistic purposes as we are."

"I suppose," said the Colonel, "I am a little hard on Wilson. What I object to about him is his mildness of method. I suppose, as a matter of fact, (tapping himself on the chest) Wilson is merely a less virile *me!*"

CHAPTER VI

IN THE WHITE HOUSE—DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

Woodrow Wilson was given a touching farewell by the student-body of Princeton University as he said good-by to the scenes in which he had spent a quarter of a century. The turmoil of controversy and the bitterness of past disputes seemed swallowed up in the boisterous enthusiasm of the students who engaged a special train and escorted Mr. Wilson from the campus to the White House. The strains of "Old Nassau" brought tears to the eyes of the President-elect as the train moved slowly out of Princeton to the National Capital. And the very next day, just before Mr. Wilson started in his carriage from the White House steps with President Taft for the ride to the Capitol, the delegation of students again gave the characteristic Princeton cheers. They were determined that whatever wounds he may have felt in the Faculty Room or in the meetings of the Board of Trustees, the spirit of Princeton, —the institution—should be with him as he dedicated himself to the Nation's service, the very theme which, ten years before, had marked his first appeal to the college world.

The sunshine of good omen—in contrast to the wintry days of the Taft inauguration four years before—gave the ceremony a picturesque setting.

"This is not a day of triumph"; said Woodrow Wilson in his inaugural address, "it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to see what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my side. God

helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me!"

The story of Woodrow Wilson's remarkable hold on the Democrats in Congress during the first administration is simply a case of skillful presentation of his proposals to the American people. His tactics were better calculated to retain the support of public opinion than those of his opponents.

Mr. Wilson's success with his own party in the first administration was due in part to intimidation—there was no certainty what the leader of the party would do with threatened insurgency. Also there developed a certain faith that his major policies, like currency reform and tariff revision, were constructive achievements and would help the party at the polls. Just as soon as any President becomes strong enough to carry local, county and State tickets with him in an election, to the same extent does he dominate his party and put himself in a position to lead it effectively. Conversely, when a President is bitterly opposed and is the victim of his own vacillation and compromises, the public loses confidence in him as do the members of his party who strike out on their own and assume the leadership.

Woodrow Wilson was aided in what he accomplished in his first administration by the astuteness of his private secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and the constant counsel of Colonel House and Albert Sidney Burleson, Postmaster General, who had for many years been a member of the House of Representatives.

Naturally the judgments of these advisers became the source of much debate among President Wilson's friends as would be natural in political matters. For every time that one man is selected the friends of the disappointed candidates are loud in their expressions of criticism. It always has been the viewpoint of politicians themselves that more enemies than friends are made by appointments to office.

Lack of contact with Washington itself—Mr. Wilson had studied Congress only in a theoretical sense—made the first few months a perilous proposition for President Wilson. He was not a mixer. He was never known to slap anyone on the back in jovial fashion. He was sociable enough upon occa-

sions, good-humored and a fascinating conversationalist, but he did not know how to inspire the practical politicians with that species of support which means working tooth and nail and with unflinching loyalty.

Impressions may differ, jealousies are always present in the immediate circle of a President's daily life, but the success of Woodrow Wilson's first administration may be attributed in no small measure to the warmth, enthusiasm and political sagacity of his private secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty.

No one in recent years had been the private secretary of the Tumulty type. He was unique. He was neither the Machiavelli that so many of his enemies thought him to be nor did he exert the influence over Mr. Wilson which so many inaccurate accounts of their friendship would seem to indicate.

President Wilson listened to Tumulty, read his memoranda and took his advice on so many important matters that in the inner circle those who were dismayed by Tumulty's growing influence sought to check it—and eventually did.

Mr. Wilson, as Governor-elect of New Jersey, did not select Tumulty to be his private secretary because of a desire to have at his elbow a man of his own temperament but because he knew he needed someone with the qualities he himself lacked. Tumulty knew New Jersey politics, he was a progressive in the State legislature and a conscientious worker. He was, moreover, frank—one of the few men who could stand before Woodrow Wilson and tell him in plain language wherein he was making a mistake. Most of the other advisers Mr. Wilson had were afraid of him—rather than incur his disfavor they would couch their dissent in euphemistic phrases.

Certain influences were working in 1912 to bring about the selection of others to be private secretary to the President. It was not due to any lack of confidence in Tumulty but to a belief that someone who had experience in larger affairs might be more of a help to Mr. Wilson. There was a time when the name of Newton D. Baker was given serious consideration for the post of private secretary. He was at that time mayor of Cleveland and had made a very favorable impression during the 1912 campaign.

Mr. Wilson's mind was made up more or less along this line —he wanted Tumulty to continue but he was ready to be convinced if anyone could show him why some other type should be selected.

Curiously enough, the opposition to Tumulty was one of the things which crystallized Mr. Wilson's determination to appoint him. Mr. Wilson retained the office of Governor of New Jersey while he was President-elect and continued to live in Princeton, commuting every morning the twelve miles between his home and his office. The author rode with him many mornings and discussed various questions relating to the news of the day. On one occasion, when he had been riding along in silence for several minutes, Mr. Wilson suddenly said: "You would be surprised to know the number of letters I have been receiving telling me I must not appoint a Catholic to be my private secretary." His jaw set, his eyes flashed. "I would like to ram that appointment down their throats!" he added.

Newspapers began to predict that Tumulty would be selected but he never had the slightest information to that effect until two weeks before the inauguration when Governor Wilson called him into his office and offered him the secretaryship.

There was in those days a good deal of skepticism as to how Mr. Wilson would fare with the political strategists in Congress. One day he read an editorial in a New York newspaper expressing the fear that, because he had been a school teacher, he would not be able to cope with the wise politicians at Washington.

"Of course," said Mr. Wilson, "I cannot answer this and say 'Don't worry, I can take care of myself.' Nobody would believe it for I will have to prove my knowledge of politics and politicians as time passes but whenever I see anything of this kind in print I can't help but think that, compared with some of the college politicians, the party politicians are amateurs. The party politician plays his hand openly. You always know what he is going to do. He always follows the same rules and is always up to the same purpose. A college politician should not be mentioned in the same breath. He is very shrewd—and you never know what he is going to do. He has the gift of

speech and can make black look like white—and I have been dealing with him for the past thirty years.

"When I was a candidate for Governor of New Jersey, the opposition called me a schoolmaster in derision. I told them the definition of the word was a man trained to find out things and tell them to others as effectively as possible. I said that that was what I was doing about New Jersey affairs, and that I proposed to continue finding out things and telling people about them as long as I lived."

It was Mr. Wilson's chief weapon—the power of public opinion. No one was more adept in its use, however, than Secretary Tumulty. He was able to set the stage for an address by the President or for the announcement of some other important action, hinting a few days in advance that a sensation was forthcoming or revealing bit by bit, and with an air of mystery, things which appeared to the eager newspapermen to be great secrets, data which Tumulty, with all the arts known to the practiced publicity expert, divulged with an idea to headlines and conspicuous display.

Woodrow Wilson little knew how the artful Tumulty did handle the delicate question of relations with the press, but the effectiveness of the Tumulty policy was as a rule conceded. Time and again, Secretary Tumulty revealed the President's views and articulated the administration viewpoint with more skill than the President showed in his conferences with the newspapermen. Nobody in the entire eight years kept in closer touch with the editorial opinion of the American press than did Secretary Tumulty. He watched the upward and downward curve of administration popularity with all the concentration that a banker studies the rise and fall of the investment markets. Secretary Tumulty possessed an intuition which is invaluable in the realm of politics. And with it he brought to Mr. Wilson a keen judgment of men and political influence. Mr. Wilson never knew of the many bits of tactful conversation conducted in his outer offices which sent Senators and Representatives back to the Capitol in a different frame of mind than they had on arrival at the White House. Hostilities were overcome, grievances were smoothed out, and contacts strengthened all

because of the liaison maintained by Secretary Tumulty. Naturally he had his opponents. No politician ever took a step in one direction without antagonizing someone on the opposite side. President Wilson's confidence in Tumulty in the earlier years was unbounded. He gave him a free hand. Secretary Tumulty, on the other hand, stimulated by his successes in handling the President and callers generally, took the responsibility for many steps which possibly the President might not have taken had he been consulted, but just as often was Secretary Tumulty right in these plunges as was his chief wrong.

Often Secretary Tumulty intervened at the psychological moment and prevented political blunders. And the breaks of the game, so to speak, were with him often so that the President forgave occasional slips and mistakes, being mindful of the larger accomplishments of his private secretary.

Altogether it was a remarkable association—an unusual blend of two types, wholly different, but working effectively in combination. The break between these two really relates to the second administration of Mr. Wilson and will be reserved for a future chapter.

On a number of important occasions Mr. Wilson paid more attention to the advice of his private secretary than he did to his whole Cabinet.

Mr. Wilson's occasional impatience with his Cabinet was not due to any lack of confidence in their respective judgments. He accepted advice wholeheartedly on questions arising in their own departments, but there were not more than two or three men in the Cabinet whose opinions he valued on problems outside of those departments. It is unfortunately characteristic of the American system of government that Cabinet officers become absorbed in the details of their own departments and have neither the time nor the inclination to analyze other questions. Men like Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, however, who always studied the ebb and flow of the public opinion, brought to the Cabinet table well defined opinions on questions relating to Mexico and foreign affairs. There were others who did likewise but Mr. Wilson realized, as he listened to the Cabinet discussion, that none but the Secretary of State and

himself was as familiar with the details of a foreign question. For this reason Mr. Wilson fell into the habit of deciding many questions of foreign policy in conference with the Secretary of State alone. He followed the same plan with the heads of other Departments. Frequently, after a general Cabinet discussion, he would have a series of engagements with individual Cabinet members in which more important subjects were discussed than at the Cabinet meeting itself.

The President would bring once in a while to the Cabinet meeting an important diplomatic note to a foreign government and ask for opinions but he did not enjoy the procedure. Too often hair-splitting arguments resulted and the clash of opinions left him in a quandary and made him wish that he had not broached the subject at all. The Cabinet never knew Mr. Wilson's inward feelings—he was always polite and outwardly appreciative. On political questions he would sometimes ask the opinion of the members of the Cabinet because he thought their contacts and experiences in public life would enable them at least to express individual viewpoints. But the Cabinet did very little legislating. It was an advisory council, not a board of directors. Mr. Wilson was quick to sense the general opinion at the table and tactfully terminated the discussions when he thought they had gone far enough to bring out the views of all.

Taken as a whole, Mr. Wilson never shared the feeling of some critics that his Cabinet was a weak one. He conceded its inexperience. The Democratic party had not been in power for sixteen years and, therefore, had no opportunity to develop Cabinet timber. Mr. Wilson had in fact to reconstruct the Democratic party. He realized in later days that some of his Cabinet selections might have been better but, as a historian, he knew that Cabinets were never perfect and that his advisers were the best that a combination of politics and personal trust could bring together. For, after all, what counted more with Woodrow Wilson than anything else was personal loyalty. And, in almost all cases, that meant a mind which might suggest differences but which, in the last analysis, would go along enthusiastically with his.

President Wilson made a flying start, so to speak, in the execution of policies which he had conceived before he entered the White House. He determined to develop America's foreign policy, on the one hand, and press for two principal items of reform, on the other. He called immediately for tariff revision in an extra session of Congress and by October 3d of his first year in office the Underwood Simmons tariff bill became law. In June of the same year he addressed Congress in person a second time appealing for revision of America's banking and currency system. This was not consummated until December 23d, but when Mr. Wilson turned from his desk on that day for a well earned vacation, he had put through Congress in a remarkably short time two measures of paramount importance, either of which might well have consumed a year.

Ever since the raising of income taxes had been declared unconstitutional, when incorporated in the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act in the second Cleveland administration, there had been a deliberate fight against the adoption of the amendment to the Constitution authorizing the levy. Just before Mr. Wilson entered the White House on February 25th an amendment to the Constitution was adopted permitting an income tax. This was included, therefore, in the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act and furnished the basis for future income tax measures. The Democrats had thus carried out their traditional theory of a tariff for revenue on the one hand, plus a graduated income tax to take care of the nation's expenditures if the customs receipts fell off. They preferred this to a system of high protection which, they argued, simply permitted American industry to raise its own prices up to within a few inches of the top of the tariff wall.

The President rode into office on a wave of popularity and was astute enough to recognize that if he assumed aggressive leadership he would retain his hold on public confidence. It was that strength which prompted Congress to act. The President had placed the responsibility on the national legislation in such unmistakable fashion that even the Republicans found it unwise to obstruct. No law in recent years has been as universally praised as the Federal Reserve Act which gave America

the long needed substitute for her antiquated currency system. It is true that currency reform had been agitated before Mr. Wilson took office, and that the late Senator Aldrich of Rhode Island conducted an exhaustive inquiry into the subject, but the Republicans, when in power, had plenty of opportunity to enact the recommendations of the Aldrich Commission and did not. Indeed Mr. Wilson encountered bitter opposition from certain large banking interests. It was not that they liked the old currency system but they feared tinkering at the hands of the Democratic party, and especially its President, who had shown an inclination to accept a radical view when radicalism contained what to his mind seemed commonsense.

Up to the time the Federal Reserve Law was enacted the Democratic party had been looked upon by a great many people as the party of incapacity and experimentalism. Since the Federal Reserve Act, however, the Democrats have had a convincing answer to that accusation and it is no secret to disclose that Mr. Wilson felt the necessity of demonstrating, once and for all, that the Democratic party could offer a constructive program which would aid business. Many an American of prominence both inside and outside of Congress has said since the war that but for the Federal Reserve system the United States could not have financed the war as effectively as it did.

Mr. Wilson gave his attention at once to a program of Rural Credits which resulted in the passage of the Federal Farm Loan Act by which twelve Federal Loan Banks were created to make loans to farmers for productive purposes. Both the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Farm Loan Act have been materially improved by amendments since the first year of the Wilson administration, but the historian cannot fail to give due credit to the leader who had the vision to press Congress into action on major reforms which had been long neglected. It was proof, moreover, of the impatience of Woodrow Wilson with things as they were—his whole life had been dedicated to the cause of better government, and the fact that a reform was difficult and complex did not frighten him away. Urged again and again by his friends to let well enough alone when the tariff law was passed, he smiled at the idea that the next step in his

program could be postponed. He was a born progressive—using the term, of course, in the sense in which he had defined it as in contrast with "standpatter" and "radical".

"I remember," explained Mr. Wilson, "when I was president of a university a man said to me, 'Good heavens, man, why don't you leave something alone and let it stay the way it is?' And I said, 'If you will guarantee to me that it will stay the way it is I will let it alone; but if you knew anything you would know that if you leave a live thing alone it will not stay where it is. It will develop and will either go in the wrong direction or decay.' I reminded him of this thing that the English writer said, that if you want to keep a white post white you can not let it alone. It will get black. You have to keep doing something to it. In that instance you have got to keep painting it white, and you have got to paint it white very frequently in order to keep it white, because there are forces at work that will get the better of you. Not only will it turn black, but the forces of moisture and the other forces of nature will penetrate the white paint and get at the fiber of the wood, and decay will set in, and the next time you try to paint it you will find that there is nothing but punk to paint. Then you will remember the Red Queen in 'Alice in Wonderland,' or 'Alice Through the Looking Glass'—I forget which, it has been so long since I read them—who takes Alice by the hand and they rush along at a great pace, and then when they stop Alice looks around and says, 'But we are just where we were when we started.' 'Yes,' says the Red Queen, 'you have to run twice as fast as that to get anywhere else.'

"That is also true of the world and of affairs. You have got to run fast merely to stay where you are, and in order to get anywhere, you have got to run twice as fast as that. That is what people do not realize. That is the mischief of these hopeless dams against the stream known as reactionaries and standpatters, and other words of obloquy. That is what is the matter with them; they are not even staying where they were. They are sinking further and further back in what will sometime comfortably close over their heads as the black waters of oblivion. I sometimes imagine that I see their heads going down,

and I am not inclined even to throw them a life preserver. The sooner they disappear the better. We need their places for people who are awake; and we particularly need now men who will divest themselves of party passion and of personal preference and will try to think in the terms of America. If a man describes himself to me now in any other terms I am not sure of him; and I love the fellows that come into my office sometimes and say, 'Mr. President, I am an American.' Their hearts are right, their instinct true, they are going in the right direction, and will take the right leadership if they believe that the leader is also a man who thinks first of America."

The leisurely processes of framing bills in committee and the long-drawn out debates in Congress gave President Wilson, during his first year, plenty of time to devote himself to questions of foreign policy. Of only passing importance at the time, but of greater significance in retrospect, was the first meeting at the White House of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The President invited both Republicans and Democrats of the committee. He spent a whole evening with them in the spring of 1913 outlining his hopes with reference to the external policies of the United States. He said, in effect, that the United States was without friends in Europe. Great Britain had been estranged by the passage of the Panama Canal Tolls Act which violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and discriminated in favor of American vessels as against British freighters. Germany had assumed a haughty air and, while not openly sympathetic with anything British, the discrimination against German merchant marine was equally distasteful to Berlin. The Germans, however, had for years been a source of irritation to the Department of State and, in the closing days of the Taft administration, had assumed an arbitrary attitude with reference to American corporations engaged in the potash trade. Tariff difficulties were vexing. The domineering tactics of a German naval commander in Manila Bay in the Spanish American war had not served to improve American relations with Germany. Teutonic activity in the Far East had been a source of apprehension to the United States. President Roosevelt had had occasion to remonstrate with the Germans con-

cerning their aggression in China, but Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, reported to his government that the United States would never back with force what she had said about protecting the territorial integrity of China—he claimed that President Roosevelt had admitted this to him in private conversation.

Mr. Wilson was aware of the antipathy being developed in South America by German and British interests who rarely lost an opportunity to upbraid everything American. To competition and trade rivalry was this spirit attributed but it was not discouraged by the foreign offices of either Great Britain or Germany.

As for Japan, the Wilson administration had hardly settled down to work when the passage of a law in California prohibiting the Japanese from owning land wounded the sensibilities of the Japanese people and led to the first real crisis of the Wilson administration.

The President unfolded to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a new world policy. He sought to develop a better understanding with Japan, he counseled patience with Mexico, he urged the repeal of the Panama Canal Act as the means of winning the lasting friendship of Great Britain and of improving America's relations with all maritime countries, including Germany. Looking southward he proposed that the United States redress the wrongs done Colombia when the territory of Panama was taken from her during the Roosevelt administration and a Republic of Panama set up in order that the construction of the Panama Canal might not be delayed. Mr. Wilson proposed, moreover, that the United States refrain from joining in the financial enterprises which, up to that time, had been urged by banking groups of the United States and four other powers, and which contemplated, as Mr. Wilson saw it, an interference with the administrative independence of China. The President's plan was a world program, lofty in conception, broad in its purposes, and obviously difficult of fulfilment.

Members of the Foreign Relations Committee left the White House somewhat bewildered by the maze of problems which the President had disclosed. It was a good beginning and the

fact that it was nonpartisan contributed, in no small measure, to the ultimate success on one of the cardinal points in the plan, namely, the repeal of the Panama Canal Act. Two eminent Republican leaders—Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and Senator Elihu Root of New York—were staunch in their support of the President's request for a better understanding with Great Britain as were many members of the Democratic group in the Senate. The controversy over the California alien land laws was never satisfactorily settled but the quiet hand of diplomacy quieted the fever of war and there is no doubt that Great Britain, by reason of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, played an influential part in counseling the Japanese not to permit the issue to inflame their people and make it a cause of war.

Interwoven in the larger problems of world diplomacy was of course the Mexican question. None of Woodrow Wilson's policies will be more difficult for the historian to understand than the complicated relations with Mexico. The author writes from first hand impressions. It was during the Taft administration that the author, as a representative of the Associated Press, was privileged to win the confidence of both the Madero and Diaz factions and to assist in bringing about an armistice and, subsequently at Juarez, Mexico, the signing of a treaty of peace whereby the Madero revolution was formally terminated and bloodshed avoided. While engaged in reporting the events of the Mexican revolution in 1912 instructions were sent me by the Associated Press to proceed to Governor Wilson's headquarters and begin a daily chronicle of Mr. Wilson's activities as a Presidential candidate. While accompanying the President-elect one day from New York to Trenton, word came of the capture of President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez by Victoriano Huerta who made himself dictator in Mexico. Mr. Wilson told the newspapermen that he did not believe any harm would befall either Madero or Suarez. He was deeply shocked, therefore, when he heard of the brutal murders which followed.

Secretary Knox of the State Department, accustomed as he was to the habits of the countries below the Rio Grande, was

not inclined to make an issue of the murder and refuse recognition because, as a practical thing, the United States Government, in the past, had extended recognition wherever a government seemed to be in military control of the situation. Inquiry was never made too closely into the virtues of any particular individual or group of individuals in a Latin American government. The Taft-Knox administration was ready to recognize the Huerta régime but asked for a settlement of the troublesome boundary dispute in the Chamizal zone. The Huerta administration, mistakenly believing that better terms could be secured from the Wilson administration, procrastinated and the 4th of March, 1913, arrived with no recognition extended.

Secretary Knox instructed Huntington Wilson, Assistant Secretary of State, to get in touch with Mr. Wilson before the inauguration and advise him of the status of Mexican affairs. The President elect was suspicious and did not act in accordance with the advice given him. Nor did he accept in later weeks the counsel of Henry Lane Wilson, the American Ambassador at Mexico City, largely because Mr. Wilson, long in the diplomatic service, had influenced the past policy of the Government toward Mexico and also because differences of opinion arose between the President and the Ambassador affecting the policy to be pursued. When Ambassador Wilson returned to the United States and Nelson O'Shaughnessy was left in charge of the American Embassy in Mexico City the same distrust and differences were apparent. Mr. O'Shaughnessy was on intimate terms with Huerta and President Wilson believed that O'Shaughnessy did not press with proper vigor and emphasis the notes being sent to the Huerta administration.

Although President Wilson was stubbornly insistent that "Huerta must go", he was never anxious to precipitate a controversy with Mexico involving the use of physical force. The dispatch of former Governor Lind of Minnesota to Mexico as an unofficial envoy rather than commissioner was decided upon by the President and Secretary Bryan as a means of getting impartial reports on the situation in Mexico. Governor Lind had had no experience in the diplomatic world or in Latin America,

but his reports impressed both the President and Secretary of State as lucid and accurate. Mr. Wilson had the idea, however, that the Mexican policy on which he was embarked would have an influence in Central and South America. The arbitrary usurpation of power, and especially the overthrow of governments by physical force, had unsettled Latin America for generations. President Wilson became convinced of the necessity of taking such a stand in order that moral aid might be rendered in stabilizing the governmental situations in Latin America. Confirmation of this view was publicly given when Mr. Wilson made his famous speech at Mobile early in 1914, in which he declared that the United States did not wish to add another foot of territory in the Western Hemisphere by conquest and that the American government frowned upon efforts by any American citizens to exploit the peoples to the south of us. He denounced concessionaires who interfered with the processes of orderly government and who intrigued to overthrow one administration in Latin America so that it might be succeeded by another more favorable to these privileged interests.

Unfortunately for Mr. Wilson, his own Department of State did not consistently follow the outline of policy he made at the start of his administration with respect to the recognition of governments which obtained their power by the arbitrary overthrow of the preceding administration. The kidnaping of the President of Peru and the succession of its Vice-President was followed by recognition, extended in the usual way by the Wilson administration, and there were other cases in Central America in which the United States found that expediency required the recognition of the existing régime so as to give it moral support rather than to encourage a period of chaos and disintegration.

Theoretically, Mr. Wilson's policy of insisting upon the orderly processes of government and free elections to prevent disturbance was excellent, and there is no question that Mr. Wilson contributed a great deal toward the formulation of a policy which, some day, may be more literally followed than it was in his own administration; but the fight made against

Huerta did not lead to the kind of impression Mr. Wilson wanted to make in Latin America. On the contrary, it gave the agitators in Central and South America an opportunity to insist that the United States was trying to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign countries and that one step of interference would be followed by another until the "Colossus of the North" gobbled up its weaker neighbors.

As an interesting corroboration, however, of Mr. Wilson's early aspirations with respect to Latin-American policy, the Department of State under the Republican administration of Secretary Charles Evans Hughes, brought about the signing of a series of treaties between five Central American countries whereby it was mutually agreed that recognition would not be extended to any government which owed its origin to the use of physical force, or the intrigue of ambitious politicians at the head of revolutionary armies.

President Wilson had little idea that his Mexican policy would lead to serious complications with Europe, and the general public was not aware of the pressure being brought upon him by European interests to recognize the Huerta régime and secure a settlement of the debts owed by Mexico to foreign bond holders.

The Mexican policy became entangled in curious fashion, indeed, in the diplomatic relations which developed between the United States and Japan, on the one hand, over the alien legislation of the State of California and the controversy of the British government with the United States to obtain a repeal of the law passed by the Congress exempting American vessels from the payment of canal tolls.

Mr. Wilson had many tempestuous conflicts with the British Foreign Office over the apparent support given to the Huerta régime by Sir Lionel Carden, the British Minister to Mexico, a support intensified to no small extent by the large British oil companies in Mexico whose influence in London official circles was appreciable.

Mr. Wilson felt, of course, that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty guaranteed Great Britain against discrimination and he was ready to ask Congress for the repeal of the Panama Canal

Tolls Act but in doing so he saw the wisdom of obtaining a reciprocal pledge from Great Britain whereby the London foreign office would exercise its great influence with the Japanese in bringing about a peaceful solution of the Japanese-American controversy.

Great Britain by virtue of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in a position to hold Japan in check in the event of an effervescence of war spirit. It never had been unequivocally established whether, in the event of war between Japan and the United States, Great Britain would be obliged to assist Japan or could remain neutral. In any event the British were in a position to persuade the Japanese not to make a serious issue of the California question. That is what Mr. Wilson meant when he uttered this much discussed—because mysteriously worded—sentence at the conclusion of his message to Congress asking for the repeal of the discriminatory provision of the Panama Canal Act:

"I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it (the repeal) to me in ungrudging measure".

After the Panama Canal Tolls Act was repealed and Mr. Wilson had done what he thought would please the British Foreign Office, he was very much surprised to discover that the British were continuing to support the Huerta régime in Mexico. Walter Hines Page, American Ambassador to Great Britain, had many a stormy conference with Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, which led finally to an expression from the British government of a willingness to permit the United States to have a free hand in dealing with the Mexican government. Mr. Wilson was convinced at the time that the Huerta régime would have toppled much sooner if it had not been for the British help.

As for the controversy with Japan, only those in the inner circle knew how serious the crisis really became. The United States and Japan were much nearer war in those days than anybody dreamed. Mr. Wilson hated war and yet was powerless, it seemed, to remove from the Japanese mind the impression which had become fixed there, namely, that the United

States must cease discriminating against Japanese nationals and that pride required a show of might.

There were midnight conferences, with the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, in attendance. American naval vessels were secretly ordered to proceed to points of best advantage in protecting American interests in the Far East. The American troops stood under arms at Corregidor, the fortress at the Philippines. The Japanese fleet was not unmindful of what was happening.

Mr. Wilson saw the danger of a single slip—a collision of forces or an overt act like the blowing up of the *Maine* which might precipitate war. Suddenly instructions were issued to all American naval vessels to suspend all movements while the diplomats struggled again with a formula by which it was hoped to maintain peace.

Some day when the diplomatic correspondence of that period is made public, it will reveal the worrisome hours spent by the President almost from the beginning of his administration in battling with foreign questions which, in the end, proved his physical undoing.

The Mexican question itself was incidental to larger phases of world diplomacy, and circumstances beyond the control of the Washington government often dictated a course of action distasteful to Woodrow Wilson himself.

For instance, when a few American sailors on shore leave, were arrested on the streets in Tampico and Rear Admiral Mayo demanded a salute as well as an apology, Mr. Wilson would have preferred to ignore the affair and accept the written expression of regret which was extended by the local Mexican commander at Tampico. When the news became public, however, that a demand for a salute had been made, the President could not turn back. Much against his will he supported the action of Mayo. I remember how irritated he was when he received the news of the Tampico incident. We were at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, where President Wilson had taken Mrs. Wilson in the hope that her health would improve. He returned to Washington at once and in the next few days a crisis in Mexican relations developed, the climax

coming in the sudden seizure of Vera Cruz as a reprisal for what was termed an insult to American blue-jackets.

Mr. Wilson did not issue the order for the seizure of the customs house at Vera Cruz with any idea that bloodshed would follow. He had been led to believe by the reports from John Lind, his envoy, that the customs house could be seized without the loss of a life. A German ship was en route to the port with munitions, the landing of which was to be frustrated. Resistance from the Mexicans was not expected, but the whole manœuver with its consequent loss of Mexican and American lives made upon Mr. Wilson's mind a profound impression of tragedy. He could not rid himself of the thought that Mexico was a weak country, and that the United States might have found some other way of satisfying pride. Although there were interests desirous of intervention and Mr. Wilson was criticized for not ordering the American expeditionary force to proceed to Mexico City, no such plan ever received his sanction. He believed there was such a thing as a nation too proud to fight a neighbor as weak and helpless as Mexico, however irritating the cause. Woodrow Wilson's forbearance with respect to Mexico in latter days was to no small extent prompted by his regret over the Vera Cruz tragedy in which many innocent noncombatants lost their lives.

The author attended the conference at Niagara Falls in the early part of 1914 in which the diplomatic representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Chile endeavored to mediate as between the Huerta administration and the United States Government. Sir Lionel Carden was recalled from Mexico City and the British Government significantly declined to make an issue of the killing of William C. Benton, a British subject, by Villa. The elimination of Huerta was a foregone conclusion. Mr. Wilson did contribute toward that result and was thus of assistance to the Carranza faction which achieved military supremacy when the Huerta régime came to an end.

What might have happened if the European war had not broken out in July 1914 cannot be conjectured because the entire policy of the United States toward Mexico from that time forward was influenced again by the relation of the Mexican

problem to world events. It is true the pressure from the European powers for a settlement of pending problems with Mexico eased up considerably with their minds concentrated on the large developments of world war in August 1914. Hardly had Carranza, with his lieutenant, General Obregon, reached Mexico City and begun to establish a government when the disaffection of Pancho Villa in the north frustrated hopes of internal peace below the Rio Grande. Not until the summer of 1915 was the Carranza faction able to win dominance and mastery from a military viewpoint.

Hoping again to enlist the cooperation of the Latin American governments, Mr. Wilson, through Secretary Lansing, laid before the diplomatic representatives of the Pan-American countries a proposal whereby elections might be held in Mexico and a compromise effected between the Carranza and Villa forces. It was at this point that the author, by reason of his close friendship with some members of the diplomatic corps and his familiarity with the Mexican viewpoint, was in a position to bring together one of the Carranza envoys and some of the Latin American diplomats, most of whom took the stand that until all factions in Mexico invited outside mediation it would be futile to attempt to supervise an election or negotiate a settlement. Finally the author was assigned by the Associated Press to visit Vera Cruz and discuss with General Carranza the proposal that had been made by the United States Government for a peace conference in which all the chieftains in Mexico would participate. Both President Wilson and Secretary Lansing were apprised of the author's mission, in fact, they were instrumental in having the journey brought about, their idea being that one who had the confidence of the Mexican authorities and who was in no way connected with the United States Government might be able to present impartially a view of the situation that would appeal to General Carranza.

Several days' conference at Vera Cruz developed some interesting information the principal item of which was that General Carranza, with the typical adroitness of his Spanish mind, sensed the importance of German aid, particularly as it ap-

peared to him likely that Mexico could play the United States against Germany and the Allies against Germany and thus obtain the support desired and, ultimately, recognition.

The author discovered on that trip to Vera Cruz in 1915 an intimacy altogether too close between the German Minister to Mexico, who had all but recognized the existing government, and General Carranza himself. It was a symptom of what developed in 1917 when the famous Zimmerman note was intercepted and the plot of the German foreign office to align Mexico with Japan against the United States was exposed.

Returning to Washington in the autumn of 1915 with a full report of his investigation in Mexico the author recommended that the most effective way to counteract German influence and prevent Mexico being used as a base for hostilities, especially in the event the United States entered the war, was to recognize the Carranza administration and formalize the relations between the United States and Mexico, insisting upon the proper assurance for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens. These assurances were given in writing and recognition was extended by the United States after consultation with the diplomatic representatives of the Latin American countries.

The United States hoped that the extension of recognition would make Carranza more friendly and would checkmate German influence. Unfortunately, the bandit depredations of Pancho Villa in the north upset all plans and with the outlawed bandit actually crossing the American boundary line and raiding Columbus, New Mexico, it seemed as if the provocation to war, which the Germans had been hoping would develop, had come at last. The United States, during the first two years of her neutrality, had become the arsenal for the Allies, supplying munitions and guns. The German plan was to divert the supply of war material from Europe to an American army engaged in a war below the Rio Grande. Mr. Wilson's decision to send a punitive expedition after Pancho Villa was criticized in Mexico as hostile but public opinion in the United States in 1916 would have countenanced no other action, especially as Mr. Wilson was already being accused of vaccilla-

tion and weakness in foreign policy in dealings with Germany after the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other American vessels by German submarines.

Mr. Wilson occasionally exhibited a sardonic humor. He issued the order to General Pershing to organize an expedition and, for several days, declined to interfere in the actual plans of the expedition, believing that the men in the War Department who had been clamoring for an opportunity to show their mettle would now have plenty of chance to show what they could do in getting an expedition under way in quick time. Mr. Wilson gave the War Department a free hand and watched, with an amusement understandable only by those who heard his comment from time to time, the efforts of thousands of American troops to catch a single bandit. Somewhere in the Wilsonian makeup there was a streak of admiration for his opponents and he could not help but express himself once about the daring of Pancho Villa. Something of the same humor in Mr. Wilson came out as he observed Huerta wriggling cleverly in his effort to outwit the American Government. The truth is Mr. Wilson liked the fighting man.

As things developed, it was fortunate that the War Department was given a chance to bestir itself in the Mexican expedition for there were even greater demands not many months later when the United States finally entered the war. From that time on, of course, the policy of the United States toward Mexico was one of tolerance. Although the neutrality of the Carranza Government was often questioned by the authorities in Washington, and there were rumors galore of wireless stations in Mexico through which spies were believed to be operating and plans made to foment trouble with the United States, the United States would not be diverted from its huge task overseas by what was happening below the Rio Grande.

When the European war was over the Mexican policy at Washington continued to be one of opportunism. Friction between the United States and Mexico did not cease, but the danger of hostilities between the two countries began to disappear. Whether the existence of a large American army ready for any emergency below the Rio Grande developed a

more practical spirit, or whether public opinion in the United States had had its fill of bloodshed, or whether the troops returning from France were indifferent about further service, none of these views can be deemed conclusive because European peace negotiations overshadowed all else in the mind of the American people and in the attention of President Wilson himself. But slowly the relations between the two peoples tended to improve and the policy of forbearance was vindicated by the succeeding Republican administration in Washington.

CHAPTER VII

THE PRESIDENCY AS A SUPERHUMAN TASK

What a President of the United States can do is prescribed by the Constitution and innumerable statutes derived therefrom; what a President cannot do is a proscription imposed by society. The one defines his legal powers, the other limits his personal liberty. To survey not alone what the President must do to discharge the manifold duties of his office, but what he is by convention, custom, or other cause prevented from doing, one must observe from day to day his trials and tribulations, his vexations, his tangled problems, his unremitting labors, his opportunities for error, and understand something of his public and private worries and apprehensions. These constitute an unalluring, though fascinating, side of the Presidency of which the general public gets only an occasional glimpse. For while the office is the most powerful in the world, the paradox of it is that the President is at the same time the most restricted person in the country—restricted as to personal liberty, and the exercise of that degree of selfishness or desire for self-enjoyment, however small, with which every man is by nature endowed.

Few people ever stop to think what a captive of convention and dignity a President really is. The city of Washington is not his accustomed residence; it is, in fact, the home town of few, being simply a house of transients, and in the later years of life intimate friends are not easily made. Unless, therefore, the new President has previously lived amid Washington's migratory population and is acclimated to the city's periodic changes, he finds himself alone in a strange environment, a cold atmosphere, depressing to the new-comer. Even after he has made friends he cannot call upon them casually or

at random. Form, that ancient regulator of Washington life, is the immediate barrier. Discretion is another. The President may drop in on his friends now and then, but not too frequently. Such visits, unless distributed with calculating foresight, are apt to be misunderstood, and it is difficult to discriminate. So the new President must at once detach himself from private life, primarily because disinterested men are few. Somebody is always wanting something from the President.

Mr. Taft went about Washington freely, for he had lived there several years before being elected to the Presidency; but the general criticism of him was that he spent too much time socially, and his defense, it will be remembered, was that the White House was a lonesome place. Mr. Roosevelt provided his own recreation,—boxers, wrestlers, and rough-riders,—but these were exceptional diversions, revealing, indeed, the artificiality of a President's position.

Though before his election a President may have been a sociable fellow, may have liked upon occasion to drop in at a club, lounge in the reading-room, or recline in an easy-chair enveloped in smoke-rings and gossip, he cannot now be a clubman in that sense. Even if he so desired, he would not find time for it and do his work conscientiously. Mr. Wilson played golf, for instance, but rarely if ever stayed longer at the clubhouse than necessary to pass through it to a waiting automobile. He used to be fond of the University Club of New York, and frequently, as President-elect, went there to write personal letters or to read magazines. He longed, as President, to lose himself for hours in the retreat of a library, but he could not; he never could be completely alone. He was like one under arrest, always guarded, always protected, always awkwardly aware of his own troublesome presence.

But if the President's hours of play were confining, it is easy enough to imagine what must have been his periods of work. The office of Chief Executive of the United States combines nowadays the tasks of the railroad president, the department-store manager, the financier, the pastor, the theorist, the academician, the philosopher, and the politician. He must know a great deal about a great many subjects; he must be

instinctively omniscient and apperceptive. His is a task with almost as many phases to it as there are special problems in our over-complicated national life.

The American people, moreover, demand efficiency. They elect a human being, but they really need a superman to do their work. Happily some of our Presidents virtually become supermen; they rise to great emergencies. It is the essence of American vitality, this power of integration, this energizing of a personality, this development of an aptitude for the new problems of the day as well as the chronic ills of a nation. And there is no preparatory school for the Presidency except the school of life, the daily contacts of men with men, and a contemporaneous use of those interpretative powers commonly assembled in the single phrase, "understanding human nature."

In these extraordinary times an abstract view of the Presidency can be of only ephemeral value, for not in many years has there been such a legion of delicate problems massed before the Chief Executive of the nation. Our thinking about the Presidency is of course in terms of such men as we have seen in the White House in the last twenty-five years: Harrison, Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge. Only the last four, however, actually witnessed the marvelous industrial and commercial expansion of the United States, and the consequent progressive increase of Executive problems. Recent tendency has been toward centralization of power, a new nationalism for efficiency's sake; and through force of circumstances President Wilson was more heavily taxed with the new burdens of the age than any of his immediate predecessors.

Mr. Wilson, from a domestic point of view, introduced many changes in the Presidency, among them a closer cooperation between the Executive and the legislative branches of the Government, a new emphasis on party responsibility. In the field of foreign affairs he occupied a position conspicuously coordinate with the rulers of the world. To him were borne the outcries and heartaches of a stricken humanity. He was at the head of the most powerful nation of the world. International complications threatened the peace of the United States. It

was an awful consciousness to have on one's mind or in one's hands the power virtually of war or peace, the good or ill of a hundred millions of people.

In recent years our Government became essentially a one-man government. With President Roosevelt came the change, but President Wilson was even more adept in emphasizing Executive functions, especially in foreign affairs. European monarchs rely on their cabinets or councils to take a certain share of responsibility; but while the President of the United States may delegate tasks to individual members of the Cabinet, the ultimate responsibility for their decisions is with him alone. Add to this, then, the incapacity of a single Cabinet officer, and by just so much is the President's burden augmented. The obvious remedy is to substitute efficient for inefficient men in the Cabinet. This requires courage as well as a sense of discrimination; a man in the Presidency must learn how to part with his best friends. It is the severest test of true greatness and likewise the most disagreeable one. Whatever may have been the political or other expediencies that governed the original selection of his Cabinet officers, Mr. Wilson's hands were presently untied. His only obligation was to the nation and posterity.

Mr. Wilson's first term taught him much about his task that enabled him to direct his own improvement. At the outset every man is an amateur in the Presidency; he must feel his way into it. The neophyte days of Mr. Wilson, his gradual transition from the empiricism of a novice to the steadiness of a sure-footed administrator, are interesting in retrospect. Many men are born executives; others become so in the sudden circumstances of great responsibility. Mr. Wilson had many opportunities for self-instruction in his first two years.

Take one day in 1916 as an example of what the President must sometimes do to meet the demands of his office. It was an extraordinary day, but it will illustrate the scope of Presidential duty and obligation.

Mr. Wilson rose early, breakfasted with his family in the state dining-room, glanced at the head-lines in the morning newspapers, and in a few minutes was in his study on the

second floor of the White House, the historic room where Lincoln held his famous Cabinet meetings long before the days of the new Executive Offices. Mr. Wilson was attended only by Charles Swem, his stenographer, one of the fastest shorthand men in the world. He had brought the mail from the Executive offices, where a staff of clerks had sifted the letters and telegrams and collected the most urgent ones. The President read them all hastily, put aside some for a second reading, and answered others promptly. He dictated for half an hour or more. He rarely had to change or revise a dictated letter, for he had the rare faculty of being able to say at once exactly what he wished to say. His style flowed on as easily in his dictated letters as in his books or speeches. This capacity for ready expression was of inestimable help, as it would be to an executive in any business, public or private.

His dictation finished, the President hurried from the White House proper to the Executive Offices, passing through a latticed corridor, screened from public view and, of course, constantly guarded. As a rule his first engagement was at ten o'clock, but this day it was at half-past nine. Several Congressmen and Senators wished to see the President, and each said he wished only two or three minutes, and the secretaries at the White House had grouped the calls in that first half-hour. One by one Patrick McKenna, usher for many Presidents, showed them the way to the President's desk.

With hurried callers like these Mr. Wilson did not sit down. In their eloquence they would forget all about the clock. Some the President kept longer. He wished, perhaps, to know more about their errands. With others he found it necessary to arrive at a decision on the spot.

There could be no procrastination. Persons who came to see the President, and who get an audience, usually had something of importance to say. Yet everything was important. The President was leader of his party as well as the nation's Executive. He must perhaps determine a point of political strategy in a doubtful State. A Congressman wanted somebody pardoned. The President promised to send for the papers in the case and read them. A Senator had an invitation to

present. If the President went West, the people of the Senator's State hoped Mr. Wilson would stop at three cities therein. Mr. Wilson replied that he would keep it in mind; he had much to keep in mind. He made a memorandum of the call, or the Senator left a copy of the invitation.

Several Senators then came to consult the President on legislative matters, and he examined the bill they brought. What should the committee do? What was the administration's desire? And Mr. Wilson must either decide the point at once,—the bill may have been in conference between the two houses,—or he must take the question under advisement, expecting to consult Cabinet officers and others. Yet he was in such constant touch with the progress of legislation through Congress that he often expressed the administration's wish without delay.

All this was only the beginning of a busy day. Ahead of the President were conferences with the Brotherhood chiefs and the railroad presidents, for it was at the time of the impending railway strike, and Congress was completing its work. The closing days of a long and laborious session were at hand. At such times it is necessary to exercise unusual caution, as legislation becomes hurried, and frequently is stacked with "jokers" that nullify the fundamental purpose of the bills.

On that particular day the President's engagement-list included five minutes given over to the ceremony of signing four important acts of Congress: the child-labor bill, an act granting virtual autonomy to the Philippines, and the two bills authorizing the reorganization of the Army and Navy and the expenditure of more money for troops and battle-ships than at any other time in the history of the nation's peace. The President's eyes were blood-shot; his face was drawn and haggard. He had been up most of the night working on his message to Congress on the railroad situation, and had already done a day's work.

The signing of the four important measures competed for attention with a dozen or more pressing questions, and committees of Congress had come to witness the ceremony. It

was brief. Mr. Wilson said a few words, hardly adequate, he admitted, to explain the significance of the new legislation; and the chairmen of the different committees by whom the bills had been drawn and completed stepped forward to get the pens with which the bills had been transformed into law, a souvenir habit that has run through many administrations.

The room was clear again, and the President sat down for another half-hour of conferences, this time with the Secretary of the Treasury and later with the Secretary of Commerce. At noon he was ready for another session with the railroad executives whom he had seen the night before. Until one o'clock he was debating, arguing, pleading with them, and finally walked over to luncheon, mentally worn out. One o'clock was the luncheon-hour at the White House, but that day it was not a breathing-spell. Ambassador Walter Hines Page and Ambassador William G. Sharp were home from London and Paris respectively on their first furloughs. They had made long cable and mail reports, but by way of supplement they had much to tell the President about the war in Europe, the state of opinion in the Allied countries, the possibilities of peace, the new offensive of the Allies, a great deal about the attitude of the Allied governments toward the United States, and the gossip of diplomatic circles in Europe—what the diplomats of Europe really thought about the war in contradistinction to what they publicly said. There was no other time on the calendar for these ambassadors, so Mr. Wilson combined work and luncheon.

Immediately afterward the Japanese Ambassador was due to call. He was in uniform, for he came to say formal good-by, and Mr. Wilson, attended by a military aid, received him. The formalities were over in a few minutes, and the President turned to his next callers. They were Vance McCormick, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and Henry Morgenthau, chairman of the finance committee of the campaign and an active political manager; for while Mr. Wilson was busy with public business, he could not forget the campaign. His opponent was stumping the country; the Republicans, not burdened by legislative responsibilities, were work-

ing day and night in the campaign. Mr. Wilson was consulted about his speech of acceptance and the general plan of campaign at Shadow Lawn. He was with his political aids for nearly an hour; it was his first conference in weeks.

Finally he took refuge from all this congestion of business in a motor-ride. There was no time for golf that day, but only for a cooling ride in Rock Creek Park; for it was midsummer, which means an average of eighty degrees Fahrenheit.

On the President's return, the Secretary of State was waiting with a mass of cablegrams and diplomatic notes received from other governments. He made a brief, comprehensive explanation of new developments, and together the President and he determined the policy of the Government. There was not always time to wait for a regular Cabinet meeting, and Mr. Wilson avoided special meetings because of the exaggerated importance that might be given to the subjects under discussion. Mr. Lansing brought to the President's attention only a few of the matters in his department—the matters of vital importance. He brought disturbing reports about the German submarine raids, their slowly extending circle of operations, which raised the question of the validity of Germany's pledges. Requests for facts were despatched to a dozen consuls and embassies and legations which might be in a position to get news from survivors. The Secretary spoke also of the disquieting situation in the Far East, the financial straits of China, and a number of other questions which in normal times would get hours of consideration, but were then crowded in among matters of greater concern nearer home.

After the Secretary of State had gone, the President received Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, whom he had sent for to discuss the railroad situation. Mr. Lane was the all-around man in the Cabinet, the general-utility player. He had served on the Interstate Commerce Commission, and was therefore of much help in the railroad controversy. He knew about Mexico, railroad finance, conservation, politics, and a multitude of other problems. He was summoned specially to go over the message which the President had prepared to read to Congress on the railroad situation and to ex-

amine the proposals left by the railroad executives earlier in the day, for in a few minutes the President was to receive the Brotherhood chiefs.

It was after sunset and nearly dinner-time, and still the day was not ended for the President. It was an interminable procession of nerve-racking problems and duties. All day the oral tasks had absorbed Mr. Wilson's attention; at night, after dinner, he repaired again to his study, there in solitary quiet to pore over a mass of memoranda, pardon cases, confidential reports from abroad, important letters from prominent men in this country and in Europe, communications from various departments of the Government, and reams of suggestions or questions relating to the conduct of the political campaign. Mr. Wilson had no stenographer with him at night. He kept a little typewriter beside him, and typed a brief comment or reply to each of these long communications.

Even the President's private secretary, when anxious to lay before him a matter of importance, drew up a memorandum or brief, giving the pros and cons of the subject. He could just as well have walked a few steps to the White House from the Executive Offices to consult the President when he is in his office, but ever since New Jersey days as governor, Mr. Wilson indicated that he preferred to have important questions placed before him on paper, so that they could be examined at his leisure, though the very word was a misnomer. No mind could retain all that was said to the President in a single day; so it happened that Mr. Wilson's desk was always piled high with papers; it was a constant battle against a constantly ascending pile. Part of the mountain was made up of official papers and commissions which merely required the President's signature, small bills and resolutions that passed Congress. Of the thousands upon thousands of commissions for army and navy officers, appointments to West Point and Annapolis, commissions for postmasters and federal office-holders without number, all must bear the signature of the President. Writing one's name a hundred times is a monotonous undertaking, but the President must do it literally thousands of times a week. For example, requests for autographed

photographs are eternal, and are not to be denied, for it is one of the easiest ways to dispense Presidential favor.

The President's mail is really voluminous. Aside from his official correspondence, people write to him on almost every subject under the sun. A staff of clerks does nothing else every day but sift the mail.

Some people had the mistaken notion that religious prejudices somehow blocked letters to the President. Of one thing the public can be assured: Mr. Wilson had no patience with protestations about religious intrigue. All reached him, but he had neither the time nor the inclination to read them. Crank letters were ever in the mail; a trained corps of readers can spot these in an instant.

Not all the days of the year were like the one described above, but there were many such in the Wilson administration through the long and tedious sessions of Congress over the tariff and currency laws. There were fortunately also days of recreation. These were wellnigh compulsory, and here Dr. Cary T. Grayson, the President's physician, was sovereign. The President obeyed Dr. Grayson implicitly, a fact which accounted for his good health. All work and no play would have undermined a physique more robust than that of Mr. Wilson. On Saturday afternoons, therefore, the President stole away for a long automobile ride. The half-holiday was a survival of academic days, when the Princeton professors were wont to tramp the neighboring country with him. Mr. Wilson boarded the *Mayflower* on a Friday night and cruised down the Potomac to Chesapeake Bay, but he was always in communication with the White House by wireless. He usually took a mass of papers with him, too. He was never detached from his office, its anxieties, cares, and burdens; they always pursued him.

Many an evening Mr. Wilson sought diversion at the theater. By his order "The Star-Spangled Banner" was not played when he arrived, and no ceremony attended his coming or going.

A President must always be on his dignity; he can never relax. He cannot sit in the orchestra or in the balcony, away

from everybody's staring glances. He cannot laugh too uproariously; he cannot fail to applaud. He is constantly on exhibition.

Dignity, after all, is the most terrible punishment that is inflicted on a President. He is constantly reminded of it wherever he goes. When he travels, he must appear at all the railroad stations that he passes through lest the impression get abroad that he is undemocratic. He may be tired or sleepy; it makes little difference, for he must be seen. It is not sufficient that the President modestly follow the ways of the ordinary man; he finds himself hedged about by the knowledge that while a private citizen can walk the streets at will, gaze in the shop-windows, and move about unmolested, the President cannot go anywhere without finding a big crowd tagging at his heels and a number of people pressing forward to shake hands.

This task of shaking hands is by far the most exacting of all the physical labors of the office. Unquestionably, the eagerness of the people to come into intimate contact with the President is appreciated by him, but after shaking hands with a few thousand people at public receptions, not only are the hands tired, but the neck and shoulders ache too. Mr. Wilson broke the precedents of previous occupants of the White House by cutting down the number of popular receptions; but still several thousand people shook hands with him every month. To Senators and Representatives it is important that they be able to present their constituents who visit the National capital. These are the courtesies which a President must not fail to observe.

Then there are the strictly social demands of the Presidency. Every winter four state dinners are given at the White House, to the Diplomatic Corps, the Supreme Court, The Cabinet, and the Speaker of the House, to each of which about fifty guests are invited. Every member of the Cabinet also gives a dinner to the President. Four big receptions are held in the winter months, and a series of garden parties takes place in the spring. At least two thousand persons are received at the White House on each of these occasions.

Even the social function has in it none of the freedom of an ordinary social affair. It is like so much public business. Secret-service men are constantly on guard, indistinguishable from the guests. McKinley was shot at a popular reception, Garfield at a railroad station, and Lincoln at a theater. The precautions taken to guard the President are nowadays very elaborate. Not much is said about it in the public prints lest more cranks become possessed of a notion to outwit the detectives. A sane man, of course, would find it easy to break the barriers, but sane men are not assassins. Mistakes are frequently made by the secret-service men, but they proceed on the theory that it is best to take no chances. Yet the President must appear in public; he cannot be afraid or seem afraid. President Wilson, who was very much like Colonel Roosevelt in this respect, always rode in open automobiles or carriages, bowing conspicuously to the street crowds.

The secret-service men are by act of Congress ordered to guard the life of the President. They never leave him. They are faithful, tireless men, companionable fellows, silent when silence is desired, conversational when conversation is invited, always, however, alert and ready for any emergency. The secret-service men are at his side wherever the President goes. They shop with him, they accompany him on the links, they sit in his limousine, they go to the oculist with him, to church, to the bank. And when the President arrives at the bank, for instance, everyone is watching, and doubtless after he has gone the curious know just what he has drawn or deposited. And whenever a check goes through a corresponding bank, the clerks must needs examine it.

The President's private business becomes everybody's business. He could not, for example, get married without having the whole world theoretically present, as the news services must have a detailed account of the event. If the President had a slight cold, the world must be informed. If he canceled an engagement, the reason must be given or there is much ado among the newspapermen. If he is simply exhausted and wants to see no more callers for a few days, it is announced that the President needs a rest and a squad of

newspapermen and secret-service men go along to help him "rest." The market bobs up and down on reports of whether he is only slightly ill or seriously indisposed. A policeman is always on guard at the bedroom door. The President, in short, is not a private person at any time; he is treated by the Government, the people, and the press as public property.

"In between things that I have to do as a public officer," explained Mr. Wilson after his first year in the White House, "I never have had any sense of being identified with that office. I feel like a person appointed for a certain length of time to administer that office, and I feel just as much outside of it at this moment as I did before I was elected to it. I feel just as much outside of it as I still feel outside of the Government of the United States.

"No man could imagine himself the Government of the United States; but he could understand that some part of his fellow-citizens had told him to go and run a certain part of it the best he knew how. That would not make him the Government itself or the thing itself. It would just make him responsible for running it the best he knew how.

"The machine is so much greater than himself, the office is so much greater than himself—the office is so much greater than he can ever be—that the most he can do is to look grave enough and self-possessed enough to seem to fill it. I can hardly refrain every now and again from tipping the public the wink, as much as to say, 'It is only "me" that is inside this thing. I know perfectly well that I will have to get out presently. I know that then I will look just my own proper size, and that for the time being the proportions are somewhat refracted and misrepresented to the eye by the large thing I am inside of, from which I am tipping you this wink.'

"For example, take matters of this sort: I will not say whether it is unwise, simple or grave, but certain precedents have been established that in certain companies the President must leave the room first, and people must give way to him. They must not sit down if he is standing up.

"It is a very uncomfortable thing to have to think of all the other people every time I get up and sit down and all that sort

of thing. So that when I have guests in my own house and the public is shut out, I adjourn being President and take leave to be a gentleman. If they draw back and insist upon my doing something first, I firmly decline.

"There are blessed intervals when I forget by one means or another that I am President of the United States. One means by which I forget is to get a rattling good detective story, get after some imaginary offender, and chase him all over—preferably any continent but this. Because the various parts of this continent are becoming painfully suggestive to me. The post offices, and many other things which stir reminiscence, have 'sicklied them o'er with a pale cast of thought'.

"There are post offices to which I wouldn't think of mailing a letter, which I can't think of without troubling with the knowledge of all the heart-burnings of the struggle there was in connection with getting somebody installed as postmaster."

The Presidency is regarded by many persons as a philanthropic institution. Aid is invoked for all manner of good causes as well as by many private persons in distress. These are among the most difficult of all questions to handle. Personal friends constitute another embarrassment of consequence. Many of them cannot understand why the President has not time to receive them, or why he hasn't selected them for any of the numerous positions he must fill. All cannot be satisfied. Some deserving ones are no doubt ignored in the congestion. Senators and Congressmen whose support is, of course, of the utmost importance recommend men for public offices in the most laudatory terms. All the applicants are to their sponsors' minds possessed of the necessary qualifications, and Mr. Wilson, like many another President, had neither the time nor the facilities for checking up information as to qualifications. Most appointments, therefore, were made blindly on somebody else's say-so. That is why many proved unfortunate. About the only remedy for this is the extension of the civil service, so that virtually all federal officeholders will be required to take competitive examinations at stated intervals.

Perhaps the most intrinsic phase of the Presidency is the

quasi-judicial power it subtends—the necessity for decision. If not absorbed hours at a time in reading an application for a pardon, court records, etc.,—there were several of these every week,—Mr. Wilson was wrestling with a point in do-domestic policy involving party tradition as well as party solidarity. If he was not weighing a moot point in neutrality, a vague zone in international law, he was examining the rival claims of the railroads and Brotherhoods and the intricacies of railroad finance, rates, wage schedules, and a multiplicity of detail which he knew in his heart he could not master in the short time allotted to him to determine governmental policy. He would study, too, the cases of cadets expelled from West Point or Annapolis,—and some Congressman or Senator was always interested. Mr. Wilson was occupied with military and naval reports on the needs of the Army and Navy, a business unto themselves. Appointments galore also had to be made—appointments to the Shipping Board, the Tariff Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the Farm Loan Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Supreme Court of the United States.

Picking the right men requires weeks and sometimes months of persistent search,—quiet search, too,—and then after locating the most available men, the President must frequently persuade them at financial sacrifices to themselves to abandon their accustomed occupations for public service. In countless matters of a similar character does the President often find himself confronted with a beggar's choice. Frequently he must make decisions of the efficacy of which he cannot himself be oversanguine. Many times he is well aware of the fact that, whatever the course he pursues, it will meet with severe criticism. The Mexican problem and questions of neutrality growing out of the European War, the eight-hour controversy and other domestic tangles, furnished ample field for such criticism. Hindsight is better than foresight, and few men and few newspapers were constructive in their criticisms of the Wilson administration. Few pointed out an alternative course at the same time that a decision was compelling. Many were prolix when the failure of the policy chosen was perfectly obvious.

Bitter abuse was flung at the President by enemies visible as well as invisible. He was under a strain at all times.

Is there joy or satisfaction in such an eminence? Is the intermittent applause of the populace the only recompense? Is the mental chaos of four or eight years and its enervating labor the price a President pays for intangible fame? There must be only one answer. The atmosphere of the Presidency is uplifting and of the highest morality. The very possession of a mighty power makes for earnestness. It inspires a passion for service.

On the whole, our Presidents are conscientious men. They do exactly what is expected of them; that is, the best they know how in the circumstances. The American people sometimes misjudge their man; they raise too lofty an expectation. This can be and is corrected on the following election day. In the case of Woodrow Wilson, the majority must have felt, no doubt when he was reelected that he did as well as could have been expected of him or of any other man in the unusual circumstances of the day. And if the meaning of their verdict were to be epitomized in a single phrase, it would be that Mr. Wilson was rewarded, after all, for that which in sports, in politics, and in the Presidency especially, the American people love to exalt—an honest effort. Which is little less than can be justly demanded of a President nowadays in a task that is slowly outgrowing the mental capacity and physical energy of a single human being.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PRIVATE LIFE OF WOODROW WILSON—AND THE WHISPERING CAMPAIGN

It was in the home that one glimpsed a Woodrow Wilson little known to the public. Life in the Wilson family was simple, modest, congenial and refined. The Wilsons were closely knit by ties of kinship, especially during their life at Princeton and the early days at the White House. Cousins to the *n*th degree were welcome to the house, made much of and revisited in turn. Special occasions were always dear to the hearts of all in the family group. Christmas, other holidays and birthdays were remembered and observed by special gatherings. If a member of the family had intended to be away or to have guests, plans would be changed so that on New Year's Day or a birthday or on other special occasions the whole family could be together. When any member of the household was to go away for any length of time all the others would make it a point to be there the last few days and refrain from inviting outsiders. The spirit of the home life in the Wilson family was one of uniform happiness. Woodrow Wilson was mainly responsible for this because his heart was as tender as a child's in affection for the members of his family and in consideration for them.

Once, after Mr. Wilson became President, a week-end trip on the yacht *Mayflower,* down Chesapeake Bay, had been planned. His eldest daughter, Miss Margaret, remembered at the last minute that she could not go because of an engagement to speak at a community center meeting. Instantly the President abandoned the trip rather than leave one member of his family in the White House alone. She was nervous about the address she had to deliver and he said he wanted to

be with her merely as a moral support in preparing for the ordeal.

An atmosphere of culture prevailed about the Wilson home. It was neither stiff nor formal but reserved and wholesome. Mrs. Ellen Axson Wilson was a southern woman of refinement who had been reared in an environment of letters and art. She was a painter of real merit. Mr. Wilson's father was a clergyman. So was Mrs. Wilson's. Their daughters grew up in the same puritanical surroundings. Wholesome fun, wit, laughter and innocent gayety were there but not a bit of the auto-racing, cigarette-smoking, cocktail-drinking tendencies of so many homes of today.

Things read and discussed in the home circle pertained, as a rule, to literature, the arts, history and the drama. There were games for recreation—never any card-playing. Frequently the family would operate a ouija board and jest with each other over what it spelled. They often amused themselves by writing quotations and guessing the authors. Each one would write a quotation and the next person would write another without of course reading the first until a long sentence had been evolved. Members of the family wrote limericks about each other or about anybody else who happened to enter their thoughts. They were always on the lookout for new limericks and when members of the family heard a new one it was promptly brought home. One of the most famous of these limericks was Mr. Wilson's about himself:

"For beauty I am not a star,
There are others more handsome by far,
But my face—I don't mind it;
You see I'm behind it;
It's the fellow in front that I jar."

Another favorite of Mr. Wilson's was the following:

"A wondrous bird is the pelican;
His mouth holds more than his bellican;
He takes in his beak
Enough food for a week,
But I'm darned if I see how the hellican."

Still another favorite was:

"There was a young man so benighted,
He didn't know when he was slighted
But went to the party
And ate just as hearty
As if he'd been really invited."

One of the dominant characteristics of the Wilson family was its regularity and the methodical habits of the man at the head of it. From his boyhood on one could set a watch by Woodrow Wilson's comings and goings. Meals were eaten at precisely the same time every day. He always arose at the same time and shaved himself with an old fashioned razor. He used the same strop for years—a heavy, well-grained and oiled piece of leather upon which he was able to predict the character of the weather.

"I can sometimes tell twenty-four or thirty-six hours in advance when it is going to storm", he remarked to a friend. "If it is going to be clear, my strop is smooth and the razor slips over it easily and without noisy friction and when it is going to storm the strop gets heavy and the razor sticks."

On the 3d of March, 1913, the day before Mr. Wilson became President, he laughingly told his friends that, judging by his razor-strop, it would be a clear day for his inauguration. And it was.

In one sense the Wilson family life was exclusive. Tom, Dick and Harry were not invited into the home, or to the table, or taken into full friendship in the group. The home was considered a sacred place where none but those worthy by culture, character and breeding were urged to stay. The family was not snobbish, but simply selective of its companions. Once a person was taken into the home, the bars were completely down. There was neither reserve nor limit in the welcome, the hospitality and the friendship bestowed. Even when he was President Mr. Wilson seemed to give his complete confidence to anyone within the family circle. Problems of state were discussed with the utmost abandon and without the slightest hint that it was confidential. Mr. Wilson held in

good faith to the old southern idea that confidence given in the home or at the table was inviolable. Many of those who were guests at his table often gasped with amazement—almost with fear—at the frankness manifested by Mr. Wilson.

The reason, of course, that Woodrow Wilson was so unreserved in his conversation was that guests were not invited indiscriminately to the White House. Neither Mr. Wilson nor the members of his family looked upon the Executive Mansion itself as a public institution but as their temporary home. The Executive Offices, connected with the White House by a covered corridor, were different. There Woodrow Wilson was the President of the United States acting the rôle of public official, but, in the White House itself, he was a Virginia gentleman entertaining his chosen guests to whom hospitality and confidence were given without restraint.

No such attitude, of course, was noticeable in the state affairs in the White House. Official dinners were rather formal. Receptions were much the same as under previous administrations. Musicales and teas, required by official custom, were few in number and simply polite affairs. The Wilsons were always gracious but they did not disclose the same intimacy then as on less public occasions.

In the entire eight years of the Wilson régime not a single individual was ever invited to the White House to luncheon or dinner for the purpose of exercising a political influence upon him. This was true as to both Mr. Wilson and the members of his family. Few people in official and political life were there at all *en famille*. This is hard to realize but it is true. There were scores of cases when an invitation to a Senator or Representative, or to the wives of members of Congress, for family dinner at the White House might have gained for Mr. Wilson the support of certain influential leaders. But he rebelled at the thought of using the White House table to advance his political fortunes.

"On two counts", he once said to a friend, "I will not permit my home to be used for political purposes. One is that, if I make an intimate of a man in politics, it isn't long before he wants me to do something which I ought not to do. The

other is that, if I have a certain Senator, say to luncheon, he goes back to the Senate and casually remarks in the cloak rooms where the Senators sit around smoking and talking: 'The President said to me at luncheon at the White House today . . .' and so on. Here in Washington there is such a craving to get close to the Presidency—as if there was something really important about it that would rub off, that many can not resist the inclination to brag and boast that they are in the President's confidence. This not only might hurt some good friend and supporter who had not been to the White House for luncheon but in time it might destroy the effectiveness of others who had been. The others might become jealous and refuse to work with him. His leadership, if he had any, would be likely to be destroyed. All of which simply means that a President must isolate himself during his term of office."

This attitude on the part of Mr. Wilson was never thoroughly understood by the people of Washington. Loyal supporters and friends in Mr. Wilson's own party felt hurt by it and some became critical because of it. The Wilsons earned the reputation of being exclusive simply because they did not invite leaders, so-called leaders, self-imagined leaders, political characters and others to the White House. As a matter of fact, there was a simple endeavor on Mr. Wilson's part to play no favorites.

"I can't have the whole Senate to lunch", he commented, "so I cannot have any of them. The moment I make an intimate of anyone, other good friends of whom I am just as fond are hurt because they think they are slighted."

The same policy was followed by Mr. Wilson in his daily game of golf. On a few occasions Colonel House went to the golf course with him but, as the Colonel did not play, he walked about the course or waited for the President on a seat beside a tee. Dr. Cary T. Grayson, Mr. Wilson's physician, was a constant golf companion. No one could feel slighted, Mr. Wilson thought, if he played golf with his physician. After the second marriage Mr. Wilson occasionally took his wife to the golf course and she played for several weeks, but the Virginia hills were much too hard to climb and Dr. Gray-

son again became the golf partner, continuing until Mr. Wilson was stricken. Woodrow Wilson declined any special consideration at the club house because he was President. He dressed at the White House and, at the conclusion of his game, donned a sweater or coat and rode back to the Executive Mansion for a shower. He was always a "regular fellow" with other players he encountered on the course. Frequently those in front would ask him to play through but he would not take advantage of the offer extended because he was President of the United States. As a result members of the club would pretend to lose a ball which, of course, gave him the right to play through. Invariably he made some pleasant remark about the game, the weather, or the incident of the play, and thanked the player who let him pass.

"If I could just hit the ball as squarely as I hit these daisies I could play a great game", he remarked on one occasion while he swung at several daisies growing on the green, clipping the head off each. "My right eye", he explained to a group of golfers, "is like a horse's. I can see straight out with it but not sideways. As a result I cannot take a full swing because my nose gets in the way and cuts off my view of the ball. That is the reason I use a short swing."

The day after election in 1916, the President and Dr. Grayson were playing No. 18 when they passed other players going down to No. 1.

"How is your game today, Mr. President?" one of the players called.

Mr. Wilson waved his hand and called back "Grayson has me three down, but I don't care; I am four states up on yesterday's election."

Although the Virginia course which he played was a hard one, he made it in the nineties, sometimes getting as low as 92.

Mr. Wilson really never took up golf seriously until after he entered public life. There is no doubt that the watchful attention given him at the White House, the insistence on recreation every day, had much to do with the prolongation of his life. From a frail individual who never seemed in good

health while at Princeton, the same man began to glow with the vigor of health after he reached the White House.

Mr. Wilson used to say that he needed eight hours' sleep but required nine. He was one of the few persons who could fall fast asleep sitting in the front seat of an automobile or in a Pullman chair. He disliked ice water and always had difficulty getting what he wanted when he ordered cooled water. He did not take cream in his coffee. He drank liquor moderately. Some of the newspapermen who accompanied him on the naval yacht *Sylph,* down the Potomac to Alexandria on Washington's Birthday, just after Secretary Daniels had made the navy "dry", remember his discomfiture on discovering that the dry order was being literally obeyed and that nobody on board had a stimulant. Mr. Wilson felt in need of it as he had been suffering from a cold for several days, and the icy blasts sweeping across the river did not make him feel any better. What Mr. Wilson thought or said about the "dry" order that day was not published.

Of no phase of Woodrow Wilson's life was there less actual knowledge and at the same time more misrepresentation than the personal side. The true story never appeared in print largely because there never was an occasion to take public notice of that which originated in partisan politics.

Almost from the beginning of his political career, Mr. Wilson could not bring himself to believe that what he did in the privacy of his home, what the members of his family did, whom he entertained and whom he did not, was of any business to the newspapers or the public. More than once he exhibited indignation over the inquiries of the press relative to his personal plans from day to day—he never did become accustomed to the fact that, just as the secret-service men were constantly in the company of a President of the United States, so also the representatives of the large press associations must keep their eyes on a President or, at least, know where he is every minute of the day.

One of the reasons for this espionage was a practical one. Strange as it may seem, there develops every now and then a rumor that the President of the United States has been as-

sassinated. Unless it can be instantly investigated, the rumor travels onward. Just what the source of these rumors really is no one has ever determined, although newspapermen suspect that the reports are originated by persons who are interested in playing the stock market, hoping that the rumor will gain currency and that certain stocks will be affected before the truth can be determined. Perhaps the author is superstitious but, in his experience in trailing Presidents for a large news association, nothing ever happened except on those few occasions when the newspapermen neglected their assignment believing all was well. Not a reporter was with Mr. Wilson, for instance, when he motored from Red Bank, New Jersey, to Princeton on the Saturday night before he was elected President of the United States. His automobile struck an obstacle and he was painfully injured. At another time, when Mr. Wilson had become a Presidential nominee, he objected to being followed to New York one afternoon by a squad of newspapermen. He said he did not mind one man being selected to act for the group. The author went to New York that day with Mr. Wilson who, for some eccentric reason, insisted upon taking street cars in traveling the long route from the railroad station to the University Club. As he alighted from a street car at Madison Avenue, he stepped in front of a truck and someone caught his arm in time to prevent an accident. Needless to say, I tried to convince Mr. Wilson that he would never be in personal danger if he permitted the newspaper correspondents to accompany him. His ideas on the subject, however, never changed.

But, after all, the newspapermen did keep close tab on Mr. Wilson's movements after he came to the White House or checked up with the secret-service men whenever possible. So the author's knowledge of Mr. Wilson's goings and comings was first hand.

When Mr. Wilson first came into national prominence in the campaign for the Presidential nomination in the months preceding the Baltimore Convention, his personal life was the subject of a penetrating investigation on the part of a group of newspapers interested in advocating the candidacy of an-

other man. The investigators naturally went to the little town of Princeton to search for something in Mr. Wilson's private life which would lend itself to scandalous exposure. They supposed that Mr. Wilson's enemies in Princeton would be the first to disclose facts which would be damaging to his political future. But they were mistaken.

"One of these newspapermen came to me and offered a large sum of money", said a Princeton professor to the author in 1912, "if I would write an article even hinting that Mr. Wilson's personal conduct in Princeton had been improper. You know how bitterly I despise Woodrow Wilson but I told that newspaper representative I not only would not write anything for him but that there was nothing to write."

The pursuit of something that might be injurious did not end. Through some irresponsible source the investigator learned that Mr. Wilson had at one time engaged in an extensive correspondence with a woman of brilliant intellect. This was promptly magnified entirely out of its proportion and was whispered about the corridors of the Democratic National Convention at Baltimore. But it failed to hurt Mr. Wilson's candidacy.

Inasmuch as Baltimore is only a short distance from Washington and there were Republicans in close touch with the gossip of the Democratic Convention, certain Republicans who heard the rumor began talking about it and wondered if it were worth investigating further. The investigation was made and disclosed nothing improper and the matter was dropped.

One of the highest officials of the Republican administration then in power subsequently told the author that in a casual conversation with Dean Andrew F. West, Mr. Wilson's arch-enemy in Princeton, the latter had said in 1912 that the gossip at Baltimore was absurd and was altogether news to the people who had known Mr. Wilson for twenty years or more in Princeton. When Mr. Wilson was elected President, he took Mrs. Wilson and his family to Bermuda for a rest. They occupied the cottage of the woman who had been mentioned as the recipient of attention from Mr. Wilson in earlier days.

She was not in Bermuda at the time. When the President-elect and Mrs. Wilson returned to New York they motored from the dock to the hotel where their hostess of Bermuda was making her home. Mrs. Wilson invited her to come to the White House whenever she passed through Washington and, on one occasion, persuaded her to spend a week there.

The correspondence which had sprung up was typical of Mr. Wilson's attitude of appreciation of worth-while friends. He usually discussed public matters in his letters and found a means of self-expression in these communications. It was an inspiration to him to write. He made no secret of his fondness for letter-writing. These mental adventures took him as completely out of his day's burdens and responsibilities as a good detective story or a game of golf proves diverting to so many men nowadays.

From 1912 until the latter part of 1915 the campaign of slander was intermittent. But when announcement was made of Mr. Wilson's engagement to Mrs. Galt there was a noticeable revival of the old gossip. At one time the renewal of this talk was attributed to German sympathizers who were particularly bitter because of Mr. Wilson's alleged unneutrality. By the time the 1916 Presidential contest was in full swing the same rumors which had been heard in 1912 had been so widely distributed that hardly a part of the United States was immune from the whispering campaign. The author, in his canvass of political sentiment from coast to coast in 1916, visited many States and invariably was asked what effect the widespread discussion of Mr. Wilson's personal life was having in other States.

The Democratic National Campaign Committee was fully aware of the effort to damage Mr. Wilson's candidacy but was powerless to meet the accusations by any direct means except to point to his exceptionally happy home life.

Nothing but the death of Mrs. Ellen Axson Wilson in August, 1914, broke the bond which had existed between these two people since they first became engaged in 1883. Mrs. Wilson gave her whole life and energy to her husband, standing devotedly at his side through the strain of his many battles

at Princeton and through the trying days when his health broke, for the pressure on him was so great that he twice suffered a serious breakdown before he came to the White House.

Just what was the true source of the effort to hurt Mr. Wilson by a campaign against his personal life will probably never be known. That is was malicious cannot be doubted. For instance, about a year after the death of Mrs. Wilson, on the night before Thanksgiving Day, 1915, several of the more important newspaper bureaus in Washington were called on the telephone and mysteriously given a tip to the effect that important court proceedings had been filed involving Mr. Wilson. The newspapermen could not afford to ignore the information and yet they disbelieved it. Many of them spent the better part of a week investigating the story and found it baseless. Dissatisfied with this, the rumor-mongers tried another tack and insisted that prominent lawyers knew the circumstances. Every lawyer named was visited but none knew anything about it. The fact was the story was made out of a wholecloth for some purpose the true nature of which probably is known only to those who originated it. Sneers from the Senate cloakroom were carried to Mr. Wilson and helped to develop certain personal bitterness with men on Capitol Hill. Occasionally Mr. Wilson was told that one or two newspapers had planned to attack him in connection with the old gossip. Mr. Wilson was always ready to meet the slander squarely—he never flinched. He was mostly disturbed that a defenseless woman should suffer because of political malice.

When the President was on his last Western trip he introduced the second Mrs. Wilson to his Bermuda friend in California, where she had for some time been making her home. The President and Mrs. Wilson spent almost an entire afternoon with her in Los Angeles which, considering the little time available for social calls on that trip, was an indication of the high esteem in which he held his accomplished friend whose letters had been so much of an inspiration to him.

President Wilson was not the only occupant of the White House, however, who had to contend with a campaign of in-

nuendo. All sorts of ugly rumors have from time to time been current respecting the character of our Presidents either relating to excessive drinking or indulgence of one kind or another, but they can be traced almost always to the people who harbor a grudge—and there are many persons who fancy themselves aggrieved by the acts of public officials.

Woodrow Wilson's attitude toward the opposite sex was one of chivalrous admiration. He was stimulated always by the conversations of brilliant women and never seemed wittier than in their company. His conversation was often eloquence itself.

Almost always in private talks on and even in public speeches Mr. Wilson referred to a woman as a "lady" or to women as "ladies". To his mind a woman was something finer than man, finer than politics, finer than life as men lived it. She was a creature to be exalted, put on a pedestal, worshiped, cared for and protected. The idea of a woman going into politics, business and the professions, foursquare with a man was somewhat offensive to his sensibilities.

Mr. Wilson's prejudices against woman suffrage were founded partly on his belief that the only women interested in woman suffrage were the aggressive, masculine-like, harsh-voiced type which was all that in his southern tradition a woman should not be. He actually encountered such types in the early suffrage campaigns and disliked them.

This attitude was continued and his conversion delayed to some extent by the action of the militant suffragettes in picketing the White House in 1916. The militants in England by their violence had confirmed his belief that the type of woman fighting for suffrage was offensive. He had for many years been opposed to woman suffrage. In 1912, just as he became President-elect, he said to a friend:

"The principal objection to giving women the ballot is that they are too logical. A woman's mind leaps instantly from cause to effect, without any consideration whatever for what lies between. She thinks too directly to be enfranchised *en bloc*. She would run into all sorts of trouble.

"For instance a woman's mind works like this: If she were

voting and taking an active part in politics as men do, and if she was desperately anxious to accomplish a particular thing she would ignore every obstacle that lay in her path and try to get it by instant, direct action. Now, in politics or in life, you must take cognizance of obstacles, if there are any. Logically they ought not to be there. You cannot always proceed in a direct line. You must meet obstacles as they arise, and deal with them the best way you can, and get around them toward your goal. A woman will not do that. If she can not do directly and immediately what seems to her logical, she won't play. That is the reason I think it inadvisable to give the women the ballot now."

Two of Woodrow Wilson's daughters—Margaret and Jessie—were in favor of woman suffrage. His youngest daughter, Eleanor, who later married the Secretary of the Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoo, was not at first a suffragist.

The two daughters who favored the cause of suffrage constantly endeavored to persuade Mr. Wilson to change his mind. Three outsiders who were adroitly trying to convert Mr. Wilson by the slow process of breaking down a prejudice were Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt; Mrs. Anna Howard Shaw and Mrs. Helen H. Gardener. He later appointed Mrs. Gardener to be a member of the Civil Service Commission.

Finally yielding to the argument of the suffragists Mr. Wilson said to a friend:

"When I find two of my daughters such ardent suffragists, passionately devoted to the cause, and when I find also such refined cultured ladies as Mrs. Catt, Mrs. Shaw, and Mrs. Gardener equally devoted and conscientious, I must concede that some of my prejudices were unreasonable, and that the desire for the ballot cannot be limited to the relatively few agitators. A cause which could enlist the enthusiastic, devoted idealistic support of such ladies must be wholesome."

In this connection it is worthwhile perhaps to relate the inside story about the picketing of the White House and Mr. Wilson's part in the incident which the militant suffragettes always charged was tyrannical. They blamed him for throwing them into jail. To them Mr. Wilson was represented as furiously

indignant and as employing the power of the Presidency to fight back at them.

The actual facts are that Mr. Wilson did none of these things. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia, in whom the police power is vested in Washington, repeatedly urged him to sanction a breaking up of the picketing of the White House. Repeatedly Mr. Wilson said to them:

"Let them alone. They don't worry me a particle. If they derive any satisfaction out of parading about the White House or standing with their banners, for goodness' sake let them do it. I not only do not object but I never think about it except when I ride through the gates in the afternoon on my way for a drive. Let them picket to their heart's content."

Later on when the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany and an international crisis was growing, the District Commissioners sent for the leaders of the militant suffrage group and appealed to them to forego picketing because it looked as if the United States would enter the war and it was desirable for all forces of the nation to appear united. They declined. After war was declared the appeal was made again and once more the Commissioners urged the President to permit them to break up the parades and the picketing but he refused. At none of these conferences did he reveal the slightest irritation about the picketing. His attitude on the other hand was one of amusement. His eyes always twinkled and he chuckled as he talked.

One day an unusually large crowd gathered in front of the White House and attacked the suffragettes. The police reserves were called out and it was with difficulty that the militants were saved from bodily harm. This finally became a regular occurrence in the front of the White House as the clerks were leaving the Government departments at 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Major Raymond W. Pullman, Superintendent of Police, and himself an ardent believer in woman suffrage for years, was accused of inciting the rioters but he was really trying to protect the picketers from harm. Appeals to Mr. Wilson were of no avail. Finally the Secret Service, charged under the law with the duty of protecting the White House, took the

initiative and cooperating with the police caused the arrest of the suffragettes. This of course was just what they wanted. Mr. Wilson had said: "Don't arrest them, that is exactly what they want." In police court the judge, out of patience with the seriousness of their performance sentenced the women to sixty days. That also was what they wanted. They then started hunger strikes and began a campaign of publicity about their alleged ill-treatment in the workhouse, whereupon Mr. Wilson stepped in and pardoned them.

Instead, therefore, of being an ogre who persecuted the suffragettes, President Wilson was the one man in the situation who was tolerant, who refused to give his consent to their arrest, and who pardoned them after they were sent to jail.

CHAPTER IX

THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR AND THE DEATH OF MRS. WILSON—THE NEUTRALITY PERIOD

If Woodrow Wilson's problems were such as to break the vitality of much stronger men in the first year of his administration, those burdens seem in retrospect to be relatively insignificant compared to the mental strain he felt when war broke out in Europe in July 1914, just seventeen months after his inauguration.

August 1914 will always be a date which separates one epoch from another in the history of all mankind; but even more abrupt was the change which that historic month wrought in the life and career of Woodrow Wilson. It was a turning point, hardly perceived at the time, as he struggled not only with matters of state but with a melancholy induced by the death of Mrs. Ellen Axson Wilson.

For more than a year in the White House the restraints of official obligation and the artificial atmosphere of the Executive Mansion with its enforced seclusion for the Chief Executive, had troubled Mr. Wilson's spirit and given him hours of unforgettable loneliness.

His was a restless soul, seeking self-expression, wishing that official cares and responsibilities could be swept aside and the free air of irresponsibility breathed once more. In a torment of conflicting desires, he lived from day to day. His craving for companionship was pathetic. He longed for old friends. He yearned for the freedom of other days. He saw himself imprisoned in the White House, forced to do many things which an artistic temperament and an irrepressible spirit would never have tolerated in private life. He was devoted to his family, to his wife and daughters. The birth of the first grandchild

had brought new joy to the household. The marriage of his youngest daughter Eleanor to the Secretary of the Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoo, had made the last days of Mrs. Wilson's life happy. Both the President and Mrs. Wilson were very fond of Mr. McAdoo and in a letter to a personal friend, written at that time, Mr. Wilson described the affair as a genuine love match which had the hearty approval of the whole family.

The death of Mrs. Wilson a short time after the marriage cast a shadow of despair over the White House. Although the physicians had anticipated that the illness would be fatal, Mr. Wilson did not know until a few days before death came that he would be deprived of his life companion. His answers to letters at that time revealed the depth of his feeling. Tenderly he said farewell at her last resting place in Rome, Georgia, whither he had gone, consoled only in the thought that her life had as long been spared.

It was under such circumstances that Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States and bereaved husband, faced alone the trying problems which beset him in the neutrality days.

On the night of August 4th Mr. Wilson was walking slowly from the Executive Offices to the White House when the message reached him from the State Department that England had declared war on Germany.

"Let us pray that Germany will not develop a Von Moltke" was Mr. Wilson's spontaneous comment. He had been apprised of the situation in Europe by Colonel House and had followed carefully the course of affairs since the assassination of the Austrian archduke. Recognizing that the world would expect the United States to intervene with its good offices, Mr. Wilson made the customary tender of mediation and was, of course, brushed aside by the belligerents who were already at each other's throats.

Historian that he was, Mr. Wilson saw at once the far-reaching effects of a European war. He told his friends that the entire course of the world would be changed by the war,

and that whether the conflict were of short or long duration, the world would never be the same.

Unhesitatingly, Mr. Wilson issued his proclamation to the American people asking them to be neutral in word, thought, and deep. This statement was criticized abroad, but it was, after all, in consonance with the legal requirements of the situation. From the very beginning, the President recognized that the militarism of which the Kaiser was the exponent had contributed to the international rivalry and friction which, for a generation, had enveloped Europe in war clouds. In those early days Mr. Wilson did not think it possible that the European belligerents would continue their warfare for more than six months at the outside. The turning of the German tide at the first Battle of the Marne brought hopes of an early peace. The President watched the bulletins of battle in an inward fever of interest but, outwardly, his calm and reserve were unchanged.

To counteract the current expressions of pro-Ally sympathy, Germany's supporters in the United States began a campaign to win public opinion. Mr. Wilson feared the consquences especially as he saw the inevitable coalition of the anti-British elements, including certain Irish, and the German-Americans.

The existence of these two groups—the Irish-Americans and the German-Americans—gave Mr. Wilson more worry than any phase of the whole war situation. He did not fail to recognize how warmly flowed the blood of sympathy in the veins of the Germans whose kinsmen were battling on the Western Front. Nor did he blind his eyes to the fact that the Irish who had waited patiently to be delivered from the British Crown could not resist the opportunity offered them of retaliation in a critical hour.

President Wilson felt that his first effort should be to preserve an equilibrium inside the United States. He believed, for instance, that the failure of the British Government to uphold traditional principles on the high seas in the rules of maritime warfare relating to neutral vessels must not be permitted to pass without protest. The British people resented Mr. Wilson's notes, arguing that Great Britain was fighting

"the battle of civilization" and that the United States should not annoy the British navy with precedents or legal arguments. Ambassador Walter Hines Page at London shared the British view and wrote many emphatic letters to the President urging that the British be let alone. Mr. Wilson hoped in his heart, of course, that the Allies would win, but for a time he was of the opinion that such a victory might be obtained without compromising the neutrality of the United States. Mr. Page's letters, many of which have been published, revealed that he was constantly trying to bring the United States Government into a view more sympathetic with his own, and the difficulty which readers of the future will have in appraising the significance of those epistles is that they may be read in the light of American participation in the war and not in the background of the neutrality days in which they were written.

Mr. Page and President Wilson were constantly quarreling with one another over American policy, and if it is true that the Washington government did not see eye to eye with Ambassador Page what was happening in Europe, so it is also true that Ambassador Page did not always appreciate what was happening contemporaneously in the United States.

Different conceptions there are, to be sure, of what the functions of an American ambassador is or should be. Under the American form of government the President of the United States is charged with the conduct of foreign policy. With the guidance of the Secretary of State, he formulates principles of action in conformity with what appears to be public opinion inside the United States and not outside. There are ambassadors who consider themselves to be not agents of the United States Government charged with the responsibility of executing in the most tactful manner the instructions and commands given them by the President or Secretary of State, but who regard themselves as Secretaries of State residing abroad. Mr. Page thought that the Washington government should follow his recommendations. President Wilson felt that Mr. Page should follow the instructions given him by the Washington government. The controversy did not become public at the time but the author and other newspapermen were well aware

of the friction and it was commonly reported that Mr. Wilson had said of Mr. Page that "he was too pro-British".

Living in the London environment, Mr. Page was tempted to absorb the British viewpoint. He was a man with the courage of his convictions. While he did not believe at the time that his letters were having effect, there is no question about their influence in staying the hand of Mr. Wilson and the Department of State with reference to the transmission of protests not too violent in language or too threatening in tone. The British never for a moment were afraid that the United States might enter the war against them. They knew that all danger of that had been swept aside by the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the constant violation by Germany of American rights on the high seas, destroying human lives, whereas the British transgressions affected contraband property of American citizens.

The United States, moreover, was enjoying the beginnings of an industrial revival due to the heavy purchases made by the Allied governments, in the United States, and prosperity was too good a political slogan to be scorned in the campaign of 1916 wherein Mr. Wilson was to come up for reëlection—a materialistic consideration by no means controlling but present nevertheless as an incidental factor.

With respect to the Irish question, Mr. Wilson did realize that he could be of service both to the Americans of Irish descent and the British Government, and he was not slow to let the British know that their cause in the United States was being injured by their policy toward Ireland. At the President's elbow stood an Irishman—Private Secretary Tumulty—who was well aware of the political value of the Irish question in the United States. Secretary Tumulty knew that large sections of the Democratic vote, especially in the large cities, came from the Irish and their sons. In his own home district, Jersey City, were thousands of Irish voters and he knew the importance of retaining their support throughout the country. Woodrow Wilson was always in sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people—he knew history too well to regard the desires of the Irish as unnatural or repressible. He never lost

a favorable opportunity to remind the British of the American relationship to the Irish question.

Perhaps the most dramatic episode of that entire pre-war period in America, if not indeed in Mr. Wilson's first administration, occurred when the first note was sent to Germany denouncing the destruction of the *Lusitania* in May 1915 with more than 100 American lives aboard. The Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, had not given up hope that moral force could and would prevail. President Wilson read the note to the Cabinet. It was strong in tone stating that "the Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or act" in obtaining a satisfaction of its demands. The Cabinet approved, but in a conference between Mr. Bryan and the President, afterwards, there was renewed discussion of the effect of the note. Mr. Bryan thought the note might provoke war and could not bring himself to believe that he should sign a note which would cause war as he had committed himself to the pacifist position. Mr. Bryan reasoned with the President that the American people did not want war, that it was not in keeping with Christian doctrines for America to threaten war, and that almost all the world was engaged in conflict anyway and some nation should keep its head and remain aloof, especially a nation like America composed of many races and able to understand the racial complexities of the European conflict.

Secretary Bryan had been negotiating treaties with thirty nations whereby disputes would be submitted to a commission of inquiry during the sessions of which the disputants agreed for at least nine months not to engage in hostilities. All the important nations of the world with the exception of Germany, Japan, Mexico and Turkey, had either accepted the principle of such treaties or had ratified pacts of that kind with the United States.

The Secretary of State pleaded with the President to give Germany another chance to accept the principle of an investigation treaty. Mr. Bryan was convinced that the Germans did not want war with America and that they would look upon the suggestions as a diplomatic loophole—a way out of an embar-

rassing situation. For, even if they had intended to send instructions to torpedo the *Lusitania,* he could not bring himself to believe that they would repeat such an act when once the effect on American opinion was known in Berlin.

President Wilson yielded to Mr. Bryan's persuasive arguments and permitted him to draft an instruction to Ambassador Gerard to be sent simultaneously with the *Lusitania* note advising the German Government of the willingness of the United States to submit the questions at issue to a commission of investigation on the principle of the Bryan treaties.

This instruction to Ambassador Gerard which has been variously called a "postscript" or a "supplementary note" was never sent from Washington. It was under the circumstances as exciting as it was significant. It would have made a world-wide sensation at the time but the swift passage of events since those dramatic days has, to some extent, robbed the incident of its true importance in the history of the neutrality period. The supplementary instruction to Ambassador Gerard reached the State Department from the White House and was about to be put into code and cabled to Berlin. No one knew about it except the President and the Secretary of State. Robert Lansing was Counsellor of the State Department, and it was natural that he should learn of the supplementary instruction as it reached the telegraph office. He could not understand it and immediately communicated with Private Secretary Tumulty in an effort to learn its significance. Mr. Tumulty communicated with his close friend, the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, who said he knew nothing about the supplementary instruction as it had not been discussed in the Cabinet meeting. Mr. Lansing made it clear that the supplementary instruction was a recession, in his judgment, from the strong words contained in the note itself. Word was passed to other members of the Cabinet and soon Mr. Wilson was besieged with requests to reconsider. Meanwhile the note itself was held up at the State Department until the matter could be canvassed further. Private Secretary Tumulty made an eloquent speech to his chief pointing out the danger of such a step, that possible misunderstandings might grow from it, that Germany might get the impression the

United States would not fight for her rights and that it was essential Germany be told she must respect American rights without equivocation.

There were no direct threats of resignation made to Mr. Wilson by members of his Cabinet but the President saw fire in the eyes of his advisers. He finally ordered the supplementary instruction suppressed and the note went forth to Berlin with the strong words undiluted by any suggestion of weakness.

Later on, in the campaign of 1916, the secret leaked out in garbled fashion and was never clearly explained. Senator Lodge of Massachusetts made a speech in Boston, reading from a letter sent him by Professor Charles H. Bailey of the Tufts Medical School, in which Mr. Bailey repeated a conversation he had had with Henry C. Breckinridge who was Assistant Secretary of War under Secretary Garrison at the time of the so-called "postscript" episode. The Massachusetts Senator was endeavoring to prove that Mr. Wilson's strong words were tempered with hints that they were not meant seriously and that Germany was destroying American rights because she knew or believed the United States would not, under the Wilson administration, defend those rights. President Wilson issued from his headquarters at Long Branch, New Jersey, a statement in reply to an inquiring telegram from Walter Lippman, then one of the editors of the *New Republic,* Mr. Wilson said:

"In reply to the telegram, let me say, that the statement made by Senator Lodge is untrue. No postscript or amendment of the *Lusitania* note was ever written or contemplated by me, except such changes that I myself inserted which strengthened and emphasized the protest. It was suggested, after the note was ready for transmission, that an intimation be conveyed to the German Government that a proposal for arbitration would be acceptable, and one member of the Cabinet spoke to me about it, but it was never discussed in Cabinet meeting and no threat of any resignation was ever made, for the very good reason that I rejected the suggestion after giving it such consideration as I thought every proposal deserved which touched so grave a matter. It was inconsistent with the purpose of the note. The

public is in possession of everything that was said to the German Government."

The foregoing statement is one of the most remarkable pieces of adroit fencing which came from Mr. Wilson's pen. He had a theory that a diplomatic denial was absolutely essential in many cases because the end justified the means. In this case every line of Mr. Wilson's statement is true—literally taken.

In the first place, Mr. Wilson was right in saying that there was no postscript to the *Lusitania* note itself nor was there any amendment of the note. Mr. Wilson was right when he said that he never wrote or contemplated writing any postscript or amendment. Mr. Bryan composed the supplementary instruction for Ambassador Gerard and it was not a part of the original note but a separate communication. Mr. Wilson also revealed that "it was suggested after the note was ready for transmission that an intimation be conveyed to the German Government that a proposal for arbitration will be acceptable". He uses the word "intimation" to cover the instruction which was to be sent to Ambassador Gerard. It was true that only one member of the Cabinet spoke to Mr. Wilson about it—that was Mr. Bryan. When the President stated that the suggestion was "inconsistent with the purpose of the note" he revealed the conclusion he finally reached, which was contrary to his first decision. To his mind, the postscript, amendment or supplementary instruction did not exist officially because it was never sent to Germany, and he spoke the real truth when he said "the public is in possession of everything that was said to the German government".

Senator Lodge, did, however, have in his possession during that campaign the elements of one of the biggest secrets of the administration, and if he had worded his accusation in a slightly different fashion it would have been impossible to deny the existence of a supplementary instruction. On the other hand, since the instruction was not sent to the German Government Mr. Wilson regarded the affair as of no importance externally. It was of vital importance internally however

because it was the basic cause a month later of the resignation of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State.

What interested Mr. Bryan was not the strong language used in the diplomatic notes to Germany but the actual intention of the American Government. When he discovered that Mr. Wilson was prepared to develop the correspondence with Germany to a climax which might result in war, Mr. Bryan declined to be a party to it. The general public wondered when Mr. Bryan resigned why he declined to sign the second *Lusitania* note to Germany which, in tone, was certainly not as threatening as its predecessor. The truth is Secretary Bryan learned of President Wilson's readiness to go to war if Germany persisted in her violations of American rights. Mr. Bryan was sincerely convinced that war would be unpopular and he left the Cabinet with the hope of persuading Mr. Wilson through public opinion that a war policy was inadvisable. Some of the best speeches made in defense of Mr. Wilson's administration were those of William Jennings Bryan during the campaign of 1916. He traveled from one end of the West to the other. His plea was for peace. It was he who emphasized that Woodrow Wilson had kept us out of war. In his heart was a hope that the speeches of the campaign would constitute a commitment and that Mr. Wilson would listen no longer to the clamor for war. When war did come William Jennings Bryan was a loyal supporter of the Government, but his record against a policy of involvement that would lead to war is clear. His was the theory of moral force. So long as Mr. Wilson agreed with him the union of these two Democratic leaders was indissoluble. The moment physical force was contemplated by Mr. Wilson, the two men separated. It was a conflict of principle, not of personality, and the parting of the two statesmen was truly an affecting one. Each stood by his conviction.

But if President Wilson had his troubles with one extreme—the pacifist member of his Cabinet—so did he also break with the man who represented the other extreme—Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War.

Publication of the correspondence exchanged between them

bringing to an end their official relations did not disclose the inside story of the incompatibility of temperament of the head of the War Department and the Chief Executive. The resignation of Mr. Garrison has a far greater significance than appeared in the letters exchanged, which emphasized as his reasons the Administration's Philippine policy and the failure of the President to press upon Congress the continental army plan.

Briefly, it was just as inevitable that Mr. Garrison should part company with Mr. Wilson as it was that Mr. Bryan should leave the Cabinet before the expiration of the President's term. Secretary Bryan represented the one governmental policy and Secretary Garrison the other. Mr. Wilson sought to maintain a happy medium, with the result that he did not agree with the ultra-pacific views of Mr. Bryan, or the aggressive conception of foreign policy held by the Secretary of War.

Mr. Garrison attempted to resign four times before his resignation was finally accepted. First, he was irritated because President Wilson determined to send to the Senate the nomination of Joseph Davies, later Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, to be Governor of the Philippines without consulting the Secretary of War. Again, Mr. Garrison disagreed with the Administration's policy on the tariff and Mexico, and when Chairman Hay of the House Military Affairs Committee, on leaving the White House, gave out an interview indicating that the President was not committed to the continental army plan sponsored by Mr. Garrison, but would stand for a bill enlarging the militia, the Secretary of War decided to sever his connection with the Administration.

On each occasion, except the last, the President sought to placate the Secretary of War, who was naturally of an impulsive temperament. Other members of the Cabinet also interceded. Mr. Bryan, himself, once urged Secretary Garrison not to resign. But to those who knew the deep convictions held by Mr. Garrison on the various questions that confronted the Administration, his resignation was plainly foreseen for many months.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Secretary of War disagreed with the President and a majority of the Cabinet on nearly every important issue laid before the Administration. He dissented vigorously from the sending to Germany of the note warning the Imperial Government that it would be held to a "strict accountability" for the acts of its submarine commanders. Mr. Garrison objected to the announcement, in advance, of any specific course, declaring that the United States should not commit itself to any general policy until each case could be examined on its merits.

When the *Lusitania* was sunk, a few months later, Mr. Garrison, however, was among those who advocated a drastic course. Largely through his counsels was the first note on the case made as emphatic as it was. In those days Mr. Garrison's influence was in the ascendancy, and, as it rose, Mr. Bryan's hold on the President was correspondingly weakened. When Mr. Bryan resigned Secretary Garrison hailed it as meaning that the President would not hesitate to go to war if necessary on the issues involved. The protracted negotiations did not meet with Mr. Garrison's approval.

On the tariff the Secretary of War was also not in accord with the Administration's policy until the Tariff Board was determined upon. Mr. Garrison was for moderate protection and did not believe in a tariff for revenue only.

It was on the Mexican question that Mr. Garrison was heard most frequently in Cabinet councils. He believed in firm, deliberate action. Although he absorbed from General Hugh Scott some of the latter's admiration for General Villa, this did not alter his viewpoint with respect to the use of force in Mexico when necessary to obtain a compliance with American demands. A famous colloquy in the Cabinet between Mr. Garrison and the President soon after William C. Benton, a British subject, was murdered in Mexico runs about like this:

"What would you do in the circumstances, Mr. Garrison?" the President asked the Secretary of War at the Cabinet table.

"We have made a demand for the body of Benton," answered the Secretary. "I should send word to General Villa that we want that body; that we are sending a few regiments of in-

fantry and cavalry to Juarez, Chihauhau, or elswhere in Mexico to get it. I should inform General Villa that we do not intend invasion of Mexico, intervention, or territorial aggression. We simply want the body of Benton. That is all."

"But that would mean war?" Mr. Bryan interposed.

Secretary Garrison indifferently shrugged his shoulders and the President piloted the conversation into other directions.

Lindley Garrison was so outspoken and frank in his views, so bound to his convictions, that it was natural he should irritate those with whom he disagreed. And while it is true that the constant friction between the President and his Secretary of War involved nothing personal, the repeated clash of personalities produced a reaction that did not make for intimacy between the two men. The President never summoned Mr. Garrison to the White House for consultation on general matters of Administration policy outside his department.

It was a question of whether the Secretary of War would remain an actual counterpart of the Administration or a detached personality. Mr. Garrison could not draw a distinction between his personal views and those of the Administration. If the President did not like the personal views and convictions of the Secretary of War, the latter's resignation should be requested. On the same theory, when the views of the Secretary no longer coincided with the President's, Mr. Garrison believed the portfolio should be surrendered. He, himself, was under no obligation to the President. He entered the Cabinet entirely at Mr. Wilson's solicitation in 1913. He was not in politics and had no idea of becoming a member of the Wilson Administration, being satisfied with his position as Vice-Chancellor of New Jersey. His qualities as a lawyer appealed to Mr. Wilson. Mr. Garrison was chosen specially for his administrative ability. His studious application to the problems of the War Department vindicated that judgment.

But Mr. Garrison was not content to confine himself to a single department. It was his theory of government that a Cabinet officer should be broad and versatile, as intimately interested in the problems affecting other departments and Administration policy as in the management of his own depart-

ment. He had a free hand in the War Department. Members of Congress stood in awe of him, for he would not brook political influence in the matter of army promotions or organization. The President never disagreed with Mr. Garrison on War Department matters. He gave them his blanket approval.

The Secretary of War did not regard his own disagreements on policies outside of his Department as necessarily affecting his usefulness to the Administration, and so long as he was permitted to conduct the War Department along his own ideas, there was no cause for complaint. When, however, the President seemed to sanction the Clarke amendment to the Philippines bill, this action was in such direct contradiction to a policy carefully formulated by Mr. Garrison in the War Department for the gradual extension of self-government to the Filipinos that he could not share in the endorsement of the Clarke plan.

The differences on the continental army plan had not yet crystallized, it is true. The President counseled Secretary Garrison to be patient, to await the appearance of the military bills and further clarification of the difficulties.

The Secretary of War, however, thought the President's support of the continental army plan lukewarm. He was disappointed especially after the President had endorsed the plan in his message to Congress and speech at the Manhattan Club, New York City. Mr. Wilson sought to make clear to the Secretary that he did not want to be dogmatic about it with Congress, hoping to reconcile the various differences of opinion later on, when the Senate formulated its bill and the whole matter came to the conference between the two Houses.

While there was genuine regret over the departure of so strong a personality as Mr. Garrison, the President felt that in the interest of Cabinet harmony the resignation was desirable. He appointed Newton D. Baker, former mayor of Cleveland, to be Secretary of War.

In all the discussion and debate of that period with reference to the problem of national defense, an issue of prime importance, transcending political partisanship and factionalism, the most surprising fact was the scant attention given to the molding of a rational foreign policy for the United States—which

alone could be the true object of the clamor for "preparedness."

Until the scope of American foreign policy was settled with some definiteness, the passage of makeshift measures by Congress involving large expenditures seemed to a certain extent an economic waste. For, if the verdict were in favor of a quasi-imperialistic policy, such steps as were proposed constituted a negligible and inharmonious factor in any pretentious scheme of military or naval organization. If public opinion favored a moderate, unaggressive foreign policy, based more on the principle of intensive development of American resources than on the dread rivalries of a materialistic expansion, clearly none of the schemes laid before Congress looked either comprehensively or thoroughly into questions of permanent military policy.

Congress was legislating along lines of least resistance because it was a political Congress. Whether or not Republicans combined with Democrats to pass pending measures, as far as the Army was concerned, considerations of expediency, particularly affected by the influence of National Guard politics, prevented a real definition of military policy.

There was confusion of thought in the whole business because there was confusion of purpose. Democrats and Republicans alike were divided. Imaginations rivaled each other in citing the dangers of attack or the absence of such danger. Hypothetical questions never seemed more abundant or perplexing.

Underneath it all could be read the basic reasons for the dissension throughout the country reflected curiously in congressional debate. The American people, accustomed for the most part to live in smug indifference to the fires of world politics, felt for the first time the heat of the flames. The European war awakened the people to a consciousness of what it meant to be "a world Power." Almost within a generation, the United States had been stirred from its isolation by one cause or another until the nation became a living, vital force in world diplomacy. The change came almost involuntarily. Faced with all the large obligations and implications of duty, the people of the United States calmly took measure of the lengths to

which the nation already had gone and might go in asserting and protecting traditional rights.

The outbreak of war in Europe at once fastened its imprint on American life and thought. At the beginning of the war there was a natural, almost violent, revulsion of feeling against "militarism" or anything that savored of huge military organization. The preachments of peace and the right of a people—not a government—to determine the destiny of a nation became the gospel of the hour. The cry for national defense was heeded but little. Even President Wilson found it necessary to exert a negative rather than an affirmative influence towards the agitation, saying in his annual message in December, 1914, that we "shall not turn America into an armed camp". He emphasized what America should not do rather than what it should undertake in the way of national defense. A lull of several months ensued.

Then came the *Lusitania* disaster. The apprehension of war served as an opportune stimulus to those interested in agitating for national defense. Insofar as the effort of the President to bring Germany to terms lacked material support—for no military preparations were under way—the potentiality of his position was open to criticism. To make his diplomatic power impressive the President himself set in motion the currents of public opinion by calling for reports from the Secretaries of War and Navy on the state of preparedness of their respective establishments.

What followed—the President's ardent espousal of the cause of national defense, the organization of anti-preparedness movements, and the activities of defense leagues—served hardly to crystallize American opinion on how much preparation was needed but on the purposes for which such preparation was desired. Everywhere the discussion turned to the probabilities of war, and as many spokesmen appeared for a permanent Utopia wherein no war could occur as for the spread of a new fear that the United States would within the next few years be invaded by one of the powerful belligerents or a group of the most powerful.

Contemporaneously, the American people began to think of

the subject of abstract legal rights. The Atlantic seaboard pronounced itself ready to fight at the drop of a hat for the sinking of a British ship carrying munitions and American passengers, because such were the guaranteed rights of international law. A multitude out in the Central West and South spoke rather frankly the simple opinion that Americans should keep out of trouble. At first such an apparent desire to abandon American rights was regarded as almost treasonable until the force of public opinion, ever sensitive to the equities of an international controversy, made a deep impression on Congress. The result was that, on this point, Congress was for a long time in substantial accord with the country while the executive branch of the Government, though outwardly in disagreement, was inwardly sympathetic with the popular view.

So was it also with the matter of intervention in Mexico. The bluster of the average American, the desire to "clean up," diminished noticeably as the horrors of the European war were borne in to the peace-loving homes of America. The dispatch of so small an expedition as that engaged in the pursuit of General Villa after the latter's raid into American territory, failed to arouse military ardor. The fear that it would involve a greater military undertaking and a disagreeable clash with a defenseless population was uppermost, instead of the enthusiasm for war, and revenge, which ordinarily might express the feeling of an emotional people.

Courage, as Epictetus said, is not inconsistent with caution. Such sympathy for peace as characterized the body politic in the United States could hardly be denominated a "peace-at-any-price" disposition. It embodied rather the matured conviction that the American people should not and would not fight, except for a just and compelling cause.

Travel by American citizens on armed belligerent vessels was considered by a great many thoughtful and unhyphenated people in the United States as a hair-splitting issue; the continued presence of Americans in a rebellion-torn country was held by a vast number to be neither prudent nor necessary to the economic welfare of the 100,000,000 people living within the territory of the United States proper. Transgression by Japan

of the "open-door" policy in the Far East and selfish commercial expansion on the part of the European Powers awakened resentment, yet little enthusiasm for war on that account. Congress seemed disposed at the time to withdraw from the Philippines. Our Government and statesmen committed us to a policy of nonexpansion territorially in Latin-America. But we intervened forcibly in Haiti; we established practically a protectorate over Nicaragua and not many years before we helped to set up Panama as a republic over the protest of Colombia. We sent an ultimatum to Chili for nonpayment of an old, almost forgotten debt. We had boasted of "dollar diplomacy." Yet we withdrew later from the "six-Power loan" in China. Contradictions and inconsistencies could be cited *ad infinitum.*

It was not surprising that the American people found it difficult in 1915 and 1916 to decide what kind of a foreign policy they wanted. The last three administrations had variously interpreted American duty and obligations.

Pertinent, therefore, to a settlement of the question of preparedness was a clean-cut definition of what the influence and power of the United States should be in the affairs of the world. Should it be moral and spiritual without the material force that speaks so loudly, though vainly, nowadays? Or imperialistic, assertive, aggressive? Or should it limit obligations and functions to the safeguarding of essential rights trusting to the power of example and America's command of unrivaled resources to influence the destiny of mankind?

We were at the parting of the ways in these matters. By coincidence, 1916, a year of Presidential campaign, was otherwise unusual in American history. Foreign policy was to be a vital issue.

CHAPTER X

THE TREND TOWARD AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR

President Wilson made up his mind during the latter part of 1915 that an adequate program of national defense ought to be provided by Congress, and he soon revealed a readiness to stake his own political fortunes on the issue. The cry of second-term had been raised so frequently that it became sickening to the President himself. He said he would lead the party if it wanted him, if by its acts it approved of his leadership in the past. But he would not campaign for renomination.

Something of the old fire, the grit that the President showed when he pushed the Currency bill through against big odds in the hot summer two years before came back in 1916. Mr. Wilson was keenly alert to the criticisms of his foreign policy—that it had lacked action or assertiveness. But he felt it to be wise statesmanship to avert war, if possible, to keep the American people from being embroiled in a world conflict. This, he confidently believed, would be approved and applauded in later days since he still saw no just cause for intervention. He realized, however, there would be no excuse, no apology, no palliation in the future should measures of defense fail to be provided to meet an emergency.

The President was convinced that it was absolutely necessary to increase the Army and Navy so as to afford a nucleus readily expanded if the occasion arose. He read the confidential reports of American Ambassadors and Ministers and naval and military attaches. He knew much about the intentions and attitudes of foreign Governments and, though he believed the ways of peace should be followed almost to the last extremity, it was his conviction that some precaution, some insurance must be made against the erratic disposition of future protagonists.

With this argument the President decided to go to the country and stir up a sentiment for national defense.

Stories of indifference to the matter of preparedness had been coming to the White House regularly, especially from the Middle West. It was related that the people did not wish to see vast sums expended and new burdens of taxation imposed upon them. The President's problem was to show the need, to explain the purpose, to appeal to the fair-mindedness of the American people, and be guided by their manifestations. He was ready to labor long and patiently with Congress, with all the various programs that might be proposed until a rational program could be evolved.

Many plans for a trained citizen reserve were proposed. Secretary Garrison had proposed a continental army raised by federal districts. Chairman Hay, of the Military Affairs Committee, thought an enlarged militia better than a continental army. The President did not insist on any particular scheme. He wanted all proposals discussed on their merits, and urged Congress to select the best.

The President realized from the beginning that he had a fight on his hands, that the foes of preparedness were making headway, and that the opposition to military increases had to be reckoned with and reasoned with. Mr. Wilson took a pronounced stand for reasonable, adequate preparation, not for aggression, but for the nation's defense. And on what was "reasonable, efficient, and adequate" preparedness, a multitude of words, speeches, and newspaper columns were used in a nation-wide debate.

President Wilson's two speeches in Pittsburgh were mediocre, their reception only casually enthusiastic, but in Cleveland there was no mistaking either the effectiveness of his argument or the spontaneous outbursts of applause and approval which greeted the nation's Chief Executive on tour.

The Wilson audiences, for the most part, used to sit in solemn silence not unlike the quiet of the lecture-room. But the Cleveland speech marked a turning point. There were more punctuations of applause, more cheers and genuine manifesta-

tions of approval than Mr. Wilson had had showered on him even in his campaign days.

The reasons were clear. Mr. Wilson forsook the long-drawn-out sentences, the vague generalities which frequently marked his speeches, and spoke forcefully, unequivocally, and earnestly. His remarks were almost Rooseveltian in their "punch" and directness. The President talked, indeed, like a man who had really convinced himself. If Woodrow Wilson theretofore had given the impression of half-heartedness in his support of national defense no one who heard his Cleveland speech believed such a thing possible. And the more the reflex of the cheers and applause and the stirring appeal to the patriotism of America was borne in on Mr. Wilson himself, the more did he seem confirmed in his new judgment. His advocacy of the cause so new to him and his pacific character was significant. He did what for three years he had studiously avoided—he appealed to the patriotism of the average American. Only the President of the United States, by virtue of the fact that all the confidential reports of what our relations really are with foreign countries are read by him, is able to know accurately whether there are breakers ahead in our foreign relations. And, because "the President ought to know," the masses were ready to believe him, to take him literally.

The President's solemnity inspired awe. As he talked of the nation "daily treading amidst the most intricate dangers, dangers not of our making and not under our control," and added gravely that "no man in the United States knows what a single week or a single day or single hour may bring forth," one might have heard a pin drop in the big armory in Cleveland. With parted lips and bated breath they heard the Chief Executive of the greatest of neutral countries warning his people frankly and openly that the terrible conflagration in Europe conceivably might spread across the seas to their homes.

And when the President turned adroitly to the subject in hand, and said, argumentatively and seemingly without attempt at braggadocio, "America is not afraid of anybody," the words had hardly been uttered a fraction of a second when perhaps to the President's own surprise the din of a mighty applause

swept through the armory. Men and women alike almost shouted their approval. Again there was a noisy response as he continued his thought, saying: "I know that I express your feeling and the feeling of all our fellow-citizens when I say that the only thing I am afraid of is not being ready to perform my duty. I am afraid of the danger of shame; I am afraid of the danger of inadequacy; I am afraid of the danger of not being able to express the great character of this country with tremendous might and effectiveness whenever we are called upon to act in the field of the world's affairs."

The President was heartened immeasureably by the cheers that this brought, but never for a moment in his argument did he lose sight of the dangers of militarism or the folly of attempting to awaken an enthusiasm for war itself. He balanced always the idea of preparing for a fight with the thought that every effort within the control of this nation would be exerted to avoid the use of the preparation he advocated. This was strikingly illustrated when he remarked: "Where we are lacking more, perhaps, is on land and in the number of men who are ready to fight—not the number of fighting men, but the number of men who are ready to fight."

The crowd caught the distinction and cheered. Clearly they wanted no large body of professional soldiers, but an emergency force well trained. No one, perhaps, had a more strategic advantage in this kind of argument then President Wilson, for his foreign policy, his dealings with Mexico and European belligerents, were characterized by constant forbearance and without resort to the temptations which a military or naval demonstration might have suggested to another type of President.

Small wonder, therefore, that when Mr. Wilson with measured emphasis drove into the minds of his hearers with convincing forcefulness the thought, "You may count upon my heart and resolution to keep you out of war," the great audience that gathered to hear him believed it literally. Small wonder, too, that the President won his Cleveland crowd when, a moment later, he added: "But you must be ready, if it is necessary that I should maintain your honor; you have laid upon me this

double obligation, 'We are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep us out of this war, but we are relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep the honor of the nation unstained.' Do you not see that a time may come when it is impossible to do both of those things? Do you not see that if I am to guard the honor of the nation, I am not protecting it against itself, for we are not going to do anything to stain the honor of our own country? I am protecting it against things I cannot control—the action of others. And where the action of others may bring us I cannot foretell."

Such logic was all-powerful. The author mingled with the crowd as in thoughtful stillness the people filed out, in their eyes not the high glow of war enthusiasm, of exhilaration of buoyant hopes for a test of arms to exhibit America's might, but in their faces the marks of a great responsibility, a consciousness of danger ahead, and of the necessity for resoluteness in a critical hour.

"There's no sense in trying to fool yourself," said one man to his companion. "We wouldn't be one-two-three with any of the European countries or Japan."

"It was a short speech, wasn't it?" suggested another, "but wonderfully clear."

"A little too short," interrupted a third, "I should like to have heard more. I was getting very interested."

"He must be saving his voice," defended a fourth.

"What more could he tell us? We're not prepared," finished a fifth in the group.

Another set of comments ran thus: "I had no idea things were so serious."

"In other words, look out for war any minute."

"I guess it means we're getting ready to throw our weight against the Central Powers on account of the *Lusitania.*"

"Some speech," mused a slangy youth, and *"Some* speech," agreed many others with him.

Altogether Cleveland was awestruck—not alone the few thousands who obtained the precious tickets for the armory and squeezed their way into the small auditorium, but the hundreds

of thousands more who read the alarming headlines and excerpts from the speech in black type the next day.

"The President has given us something to think about," said the man in the street.

"And are the people hereabouts with the President—would they vote for him if there was an election to-morrow?" I asked.

"I have always been a Republican," he answered, "but there isn't going to be any party line this year. It isn't going to be Republican votes, or Democratic votes, or Progressive votes, but plain American votes. And if one man is doing his job fairly well and apparently making no big mistakes, are you going to fire him for a new man who might make worse mistakes? No, sir, we don't swap horses in the middle of the stream."

That was typical of the political sentiment of the hour. Mr. Wilson must have been aware of this when he said:

"For my own part, I am sorry that these things fall within the year of a national political campaign. They ought to have nothing whatever to do with politics. The man who brings partisan feeling into these matters and seeks partisan advantage by means of them is unworthy of your confidence. I am sorry that upon the eve of a campaign we should be obliged to discuss these things for fear they might run over into the campaign, and seem to constitute a part of it. Let us forget that this is a year of national elections. That is neither here nor there. The thing to do now is for all men of all parties to think along the same lines and to do the same things and forget every difference that may have divided them."

And yet there was no forgetting politics on that trip.

There was applause in Chicago for the program the President recommended and the things he said about self-sacrifice and the need for preparation, but somehow, either because Mr. Wilson himself had not originally favored national defense, or because he talked to an audience so largely Republican, and one which considered his Mexican policy as the arch-weakness of his Administration, the fact was that the comments of the crowd as it passed out were by no means as unanimous as the hand-clapping would seem to have indicated

About five thousand people heard Mr. Wilson in Chicago. He spoke easily—of course, extemporaneously—and with as fine a command of words as he ever had exhibited. He talked by implication and in generalities; but what his Chicago audience would have liked was something definite about army increases and navy enlargement and something definite in facts and figures about the cost and length of time for preparation. Also they were curious as to what "vision" Mr. Wilson referred to when he dissipated the idea that he was preparing not for mere invasion (otherwise the militia would be sufficient), but to defend sacred principles. One could interpret Mr. Wilson as referring to the pending troubles with Germany, the violation by the German submarine commanders of the rules of humanity, but Mr. Wilson quietly dispelled the notion in another of his speeches that the new preparations grew out of any "sudden crisis."

"Nothing new has happened," he said, "I am not out on this errand because of any unexpected situation. I have come to confer with you upon a matter which it would in any circumstances be necessary for us to confer when all the rest of the world is on fire, and our own house is not fireproof."

Running throughout his speech in Chicago, however, were such veiled references to the rights of humanity and to the things which affected the "spirit and thought of America" that it was hard to rid oneself of the idea that Mr. Wilson really feared the United States would get into the war against the Central Powers.

As if he had some such thing in mind, the President seemed anxious to meet the widespread criticism heard in Great Britain and among the Entente nations that America did not realize what splendid ideals the Allies were fighting for and that these ideals were identical with American thought and civilization. So Mr. Wilson said:

"I know that on the other side of the water there has been a great deal of cruel misjudgment with regard to the reasons why America has remained neutral. Those who look at us at a distance, do not feel the strong pulses of ideal principle that are in us. They do not feel the conviction that her mission is

a mission of peace, and that righteousness cannot be maintained as a standard in the midst of arms. They do not realize that back of all our energy by which we have built up great material wealth and created great material power, we are a body of idealists much more ready to lay down our lives for a thought than for a dollar."

Having thus echoed what Senator John Sharp Williams said in the debate with Senator Hoke Smith, that the rights of man superseded the rights of property, that the controversy with Germany was much more pressing than the pending commercial difficulties with Great Britain, the President referred again by implication to the submarine controversy with Germany.

"What America is bound to fight for when the time comes," he declared, "is nothing more nor less than her self-respect. There is no immediate prospect that her material interests may be seriously affected, but there is constant danger every day of the week that her spiritual interests may suffer serious affront."

In this his auditors clearly perceived a warning to Germany, and these implied references to the status of international relations aroused much more curiosity and interest, indeed, as they were examined in retrospect by his auditors, than any other features of the speech.

There was also much comment on the adroit and naive way that Mr. Wilson covered his own change of front on the question of preparedness.

"It is not a happy circumstance," he said to his Chicago audience, "to have these tense moments of national necessity arise, and yet I, for my part, am not sorry that this necessity has arisen. It has awakened me, myself, I frankly confess to you, to many things and many conditions which a year ago I did not realize. I did not realize then that the things were possible which have since become actual facts. I am glad that I know better than I knew then exactly the sort of world we are living in."

Plainly Mr. Wilson gave his audience the impression that he never believed Germany would violate the laws of humanity and international law to the extent that she had, and he hinted

that even the Monroe Doctrine might be menaced and the integrity of the other American republics threatened.

The President spoke, too, of his own "private prejudices" in a way that carried the conviction that he was not as detached from the merit of the struggle as he would have his hearers believe. Altogether, as usually happened with Mr. Wilson's extemporaneous speeches, he said a number of contradictory things, things which fitted very well on careful explanation, but which nevertheless required some explanation to make them fit.

"Oh, his speeches probably read better than they sound," said one man in the crowd, as he stepped into his limousine.

"But he hasn't got the punch that Roosevelt has," interrupted another.

"And where would we have been if T. R. had been in the chair?"

"Well, I'd like to see him run again anyway. I'd vote for him."

"I voted for Wilson in 1912, but—" said a third; but his voice was drowned in the noise of the crowd.

"He's a fine talker," suggested a man who didn't have a limousine.

"And he's kept us out of war," interjected a Socialistic-looking person of long hair and heavy-rimmed spectacles.

"And we don't swap horses in mid-stream," said his companion.

So politics played its part in the aftermath of Mr. Wilson's second day of nonpartisan speech-making. The country was thinking in political terms about the whole business of foreign policy and national defense. And the President despite his warnings of impending danger seemed to possess a magic control over the masses who blessed him for having "kept us out of the war."

In Iowa and other Western states there was a deep-rooted belief that the preparations for national defense proposed by the Administration were the outgrowth of unnecessary alarm and hysteria. Mr. Wilson's speeches beyond the Mississippi River while arousing a deep interest were hardly convincing. This was the territory where sentiment was noticeably against

preparedness, where the farm journals and leading newspapers openly opposed any increases in the Army and Navy.

Throughout Iowa there were enormous crowds—probably 50,000 people along the route from Davenport to Des Moines. Along the streets of the latter city and outside clamoring for admission were thousands and thousands more—striking evidence of the remarkable respect which the people here had for Woodrow Wilson and the office of President. Not every day did they have the privilege of seeing a man so conspicuous throughout the world. For only a glimpse it was enough to brave the zero weather and the dangers of the icy, slippery streets.

Des Moines gave Wilson a friendly welcome. A great mass of humanity packed itself in the Coliseum and was locked in two hours before the President was ready to go to the hall.

As one mingled with the crowd afterwards, it was plain that Mr. Wilson's main theme—prepare carefully and scientifically lest modern warfare exact a fatal toll of lives because of neglect of training—was considered sound logic. There was nothing wrong with the principle that if there were emergencies to meet, some preparation should be made for those emergencies. But the people were skeptical about emergencies, and just what measures or policies were really needed to meet them. Even as the crowd filed out, deeply impressed that Mr. Wilson was telling the truth when he spoke of possible dangers in the conduct of our relations with the European belligerents, making necessary perhaps a call to arms some day, there was heard on every side the view that the chances of war were at a minimum and would so continue.

Every utterance that Mr. Wilson released on the subject of peace, the creation some day of an international tribunal to guarantee peace and the mission of America in pursuing the ways of peace, met with loud applause. When, indeed, Mr. Wilson called attention to his own advocacy of Government manufacture of armor plate and munitions, he touched an issue of unquestioned popularity in the West.

As the President left industrial centers like Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago and struck out through Iowa and Kan-

sas, he met the agricultural West—where the people think for themselves, detached from the influences of the propagandist or the demagogue. He saw not the high-strung, excitable, blustering crowds that gathered in Chicago, yearning for belligerent utterances from him which only a Roosevelt could give them.

Having carefully read the President's speeches, his call to patriotism, and his nonpartisan appeal, Iowa was ready to welcome the President as the typification of the American flag itself, as the temporary symbol of Americanism in trying moments of world history. There was much of the reverence, the respect, and the worship shown that Americans are wont to bestow on persons of exalted station in life. The calm, unruffled, and solemn presence of the nation's Chief Magistrate drew favorable comment. But though Iowa, the natal chamber of Progressivism and independent thought, admired the President, it still took pains to examine his argument with critical circumspection. An independent newspaper of Progressive leanings, and perhaps the most influential in the State, greeted the arrival of President Wilson with a long editorial entitled "Vague Alarms," dissecting with minuteness Mr. Wilson's previous speeches, and arriving at the regrettable conclusion that he was spreading needless alarm. Discussing at length the improbability of war with Germany because the Allies by virtue of their sea-power were engaged in keeping German forces from emigrating from the Continent, the newspaper decried the notion of trouble with Japan or England. Pointing out that Japan has now taken China "under her suzerainty," the editor argued further that all Europe was jealous of Japan's hold in the Orient, and Japan, therefore, had neither the time, the money, the navy, nor the incentive to pick a quarrel with the United States.

"Why," asked the editorial, "is it not possible for men to make sensible estimates of national situations? War will not come for America without notice. It will be long notice, for it will take a long time for any people to get its courage up to an assault on America. This notion that somebody will assault the richest and most potential people on earth over

night in a mere spirit of mischief is too childish to deceive anybody. There will be all sorts of friction in our international relations. We may be called upon to make some very decided protests, but nothing is going to happen that does not happen to every business man every day in the conduct of his own affairs, and that with the aid of his lawyer he does not adjust on the regular routine, as we shall adjust it if we but keep our heads.

"There may be some reason why the National Guard should be gradually frozen out, for that is what the President has in mind in spite of the felicitous phrases with which he sugar-coats the dose, and there may be some reason why we should go to a standing army of the European type. That is a matter for further consideration. But whatever course ought to be adopted in this country, the danger of assault from Europe, either now or in the immediate future, is so negligible that it does not count, in determining the American judgment, and when the President goes about spreading a senseless alarm, at the very time that he says he has no particular danger in mind, he is merely playing upon the natural timidity of people who do not understand the situation."

The foregoing sentiment was typical of what the author heard from dozens of people in different walks of life in Iowa. The President's speeches aroused their patriotism. But on every side the query grew more pronounced and insistent—if the danger which the President vaguely portrayed was liable to come "any minute, any day, any month," was not the Administration program only a drop in the bucket and were not emergency measures necessary? The navy proposed would be ready in ten years. The continental army and reserves would amount to a million men only at the end of six years. The feeling, therefore, of farmers of Iowa, for they were examining the subject carefully, was that the Army and Navy should be brought up to high standards of efficiency, that the Government should manufacture its own war materials and that more exhaustive study should be given to the whole problem; though, indeed, they would not be-

grudge any expenditure if the President, as the head of the nation, insisted it was then necessary.

President Wilson made by far the most effective speech of his trip in Kansas City, not in the character of his argument, for it was much the same as that which he employed in other cities in the Middle West, but in the straightforwardness of his appeal, the clarity of his expression, and the emphasis with which he hammered away on the need of adequate national defense.

The crowd was enormous, taxing powers of description. Fancy an immense auditorium jammed to the roof with tiers of cheering humanity, many thousands of little American flags waving to and fro, almost coloring the air itself, and you have an idea of the demonstration which President Wilson received as he walked down the steps of a banked stage to the platform from which he spoke. There was no mistaking the enthusiasm of the people. They had waited—nearly 18,000 of them—in the tightly packed Convention Hall for two hours, while a crowd, almost as large, stood disappointedly outside, hoping the police lines would break and give them but a moment's glimpse of the President.

And the remarkable part of it all was that the great crowd imposed upon itself a mighty silence, and listened eagerly and attentively.

Many times the President was interrupted by applause, and often, too, by the remark of some one here and there in the crowd who shouted, "We're with you!" or, "You can raise 500,000 men in Missouri," and the audience roared its satisfaction.

The people shouted approval as the President revealed how earnestly he had striven to keep the country out of war. A solemn silence fell upon all when he said the time might come when he could no longer write notes to foreign Governments, and when force might have to be marshalled to back up the written word. He told his hearers impressively that such a moment might come any time, for it depended upon the actions of naval commanders of submarines and naval commanders conducting blockades. He wanted the nation to be ready to

do its duty, and not to suffer the fatal losses that lack of sanitation brought to the American forces in the Spanish-American War, before they even came in sight of an enemy.

The full effect of the President's description of an imaginary invasion that might threaten the munitions plants on the Atlantic seaboard was almost lost by the exclamation of a wag who shouted: "Move them to Kansas City."

"That's up to you," said the President amid laughter, as he renewed his appeal for support of a program for a large navy to protect "long coast lines." For the first time during his tour he expressed the fear that the Administration program might be "too little." He said talk of militarism was nonsense, and his hearers applauded. Much of his argument about the control of their Government by a people in a democracy was involved and complex, and went far above the heads of the crowd, but they caught his main ideas on national defense. They were impressed that he didn't want war and would try hard to avert it, and that he really believed the country was in danger, and, therefore, urged the mobilization of its energies in a state of readiness.

Running throughout the President's speech in Kansas City however, was an appeal not alone for national defense, but for support in case he felt obliged to ask Congress to declare war. He frankly said he wanted to know if the people were with him should he find it necessary to use force to vindicate their rights. Apparently he referred as much to violations by Great Britain as by Germany, for he included acts of blockade as well as attacks by submarines.

There was no doubt that the remarkable reception given the President made him firm and insistent in the conduct of the United States Government's controversies with European belligerents. The change wrought in Woodrow Wilson himself was one of the most significant things about his tour. He went back to Washington much more zealous to protect the honor of the United States than he would have dared to be before his trip.

It was justly suspected, indeed, that the President in his speeches talked not only to the American people whose support

he besought for his program of national defense, but hoped also to warn the European nations that they need no longer doubt the earnestness of the United States or its readiness to fight, if necessary, for a principle.

By arousing public opinion and asserting the readiness of the nation to back up with force its legitimate demands, the President was confidently hopeful that a conflict would not be invited by the belligerents of Europe, and that America would thereby be able to fulfill her mission of peace-maker. In this respect the implied objects of his trip were not critically examined. The President himself maintained a discreet silence as to his plans and purposes, springing new thoughts as to the character of our foreign relations in almost every speech.

President Wilson returned to the national capital happy over the results of the first "swing around the circle" he had made since he was elected in 1912. He went out to stir up enthusiasm for the Administration program on national defense, and came back confident that he had achieved that object.

After listening to all his speeches, watching the great throngs that greeted him everywhere, and talking with fair-minded observers in the various States which he visited, it was the author's opinion then that the President's trip was a distinct triumph for the unique personality of Woodrow Wilson. The President "got" the people. They showed for him a remarkable reverence; a hero-worship that was almost affection itself; something of the demonstrative enthusiasm which the West would never have dreamed of bestowing on the cold, impassive Wilson they had heard about.

It was impossible to divorce politics from the "winter campaign" of the President. He repeatedly stated that his mission was nonpartisan, his point of view nonpolitical, but the American people think of their Presidents, especially in a year of campaign, in terms of election day and party contest. So, whether Mr. Wilson intended it or not, he acquired a prestige and popularity by his trip which stood to his advantage on election day in 1916.

The great source of the President's strength in the rural

as well as the urban districts, was the fact that he had "kept us out of war." It was heard on every lip. Woodrow Wilson was known as a man of peace, and therefore, when he went about asking support for what he called a "moderate" program of preparedness, the masses did not think he would become a victim of militarism. The Mexican policy of the Administration was, of course, a thorn in its side, but one heard more of it in the East than in the West. The great majority of the people in the Middle West, especially in Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri, thought the President was right in avoiding Mexican intervention. Mr. Wilson gave his auditors food for reflection about the outcry for an aggressive policy in Mexico when he said, "I haven't even had enough troops to patrol the Mexican border." He left to the imagination the inadequacy of the regular Army for an invasion of Mexico for which some Republican Senators had been clamoring.

It was virtually Mr. Wilson's last chance to tour the Middle West as President. He thought it would be unethical for him to make a stumping campaign for in the autumn of that year Democratic National Committeemen stayed away from the President by instruction on his trip. He greeted them among the other visitors, but they were not in charge of the arrangements at any place, or conspicuous anywhere. Businessmen's organizations entertained the President instead. The strength of the President's appeal was its nonpartisan character, though everybody realized that that very kind of a plea is, after all, the most beneficial thing for the man who happens to be President.

Perhaps, however, aside from the political aspects of the President's trip and his campaign for preparedness itself, not the least of the incidental benefits that it conferred upon Mr. Wilson himself was the rather humanizing influence which came from contact between him and the enormous crowds. Not a station, a village, or hamlet but turned out at all hours of the night, if not to see him, still to cheer the President's train.

The President threw off the restraint that characterized him

for nearly two years, and really mixed with the people. He jested with them over the rail of his car. The President was generous with his back-platform speeches, too, and handled himself unusually well in the big crowds in the cities. On the streets and in the hotels where he went he seemed more of a "mixer" than ever before, and more than one of those who accompanied him noticed the evident good humor of the President. The crowds stimulated him, bringing to his ears the voice of the country in its mandate for peace. Mr. Wilson, realizing this, referred often to his own careful course amidst the eddies of international controversy:

"So far as America is concerned, no man need go about amongst us preaching peace. We are disciples of peace already, and no man need preach that gospel to us."

But the President's effective argument was that the time might come when "peace is inconsistent with the maintenance of honor and self-respect," and here it was that, as he introduced the necessity for national defense, his audiences for the most part agreed with him. As to the need for preparation for emergencies, he found universal sanction, but as to whether the emergencies existed, or were likely to come, or could be prevented, and as to the amount of armament really needed, Iowa and Kansas were inclined to debate with him.

The President's speeches had an important effect there in stirring up interest in the question itself. He divided an almost solid opposition in both Iowa and Kansas. He set the farmers thinking about defense of international rights, translating it into terms of easy comprehension by references to restraints on commerce that might affect their cargoes of wheat and corn.

From the viewpoint of international affairs, the President showed clearly by his speeches that he felt Great Britain to have violated essential principles, as had Germany, and that force was the underlying power which he believed would cause all the nations to respect American rights.

The President came back much more determined, indeed, to press for a settlement of international questions than he was before he left. He felt that he now had public opinion

behind him. It was fair to infer, also, that the President wanted to sound out public opinion in case it should be necessary to cease note-writing and take drastic action in controversies with the belligerents. He took the people into partnership with him, intending that they should share the responsibility he had theretofore carried alone.

They were unmistakably emphatic in their expressions of willingness to stand by him, if it was necessary to use force to sustain the nation's honor.

Plenty of inconsistencies and contradictions appeared in Mr. Wilson's speeches—perhaps because they were extemporaneous, perhaps because the President's ardor for his new case led him astray; but on the essential principles of preparing the country by a citizen reserve and an increased and efficient navy to repel invasion of American rights, the masses caught the drift of the President's message to them.

CHAPTER XI

MARRIAGE TO MRS. EDITH GALT; THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN OF 1916, AND RE-ELECTION.

The transition period in the life of Woodrow Wilson dates from the summer of 1914 when Mrs. Wilson died to the spring of 1915—the days of his acquaintance with Mrs. Edith Galt. Eight months of tomb-like seclusion in the White House changed the whole temper of the man. His moods in those months were so despondent that the members of his family groped in vain for something that would lift him from the depression into which he had languished. Public business he transacted with the same earnestness but without zeal, without ambition, without inspiration.

Two daughters had been married, his wife was dead. All his old friends were away from Washington. The President of the United States cannot make new friends as quickly as a private citizen. Mr. Wilson knew that if he drew to his side either the members of his Cabinet or Senators or Representatives they would surely talk to him about the problems of the day from which, mentally at least, he was seeking to escape. Dr. Cary T. Grayson was almost constantly with Mr. Wilson. The companionship of Professor Stockton Axson, a brother of Mrs. Wilson, was also sought by the President. Private Secretary Tumulty lived at the White House for several weeks while his family was away for the summer. Everything possible to divert Woodrow Wilson's mind from the sorrow which weighed upon him was done but his spirits never rose and the horizon seemed to grow darker and darker. At last Dr. Grayson, whose diagnosis of Mr. Wilson's dilemma was not merely that of an attendant physician interested in maintaining the health of the nation's

Chief Executive, but a man of breadth and understanding who knew continued seclusion would dispirit the President and perhaps break down his health, suggested the time had come for musicales at which the President might hope to spend a social evening once in awhile. Guests were invited and among them was Mrs. Galt, a charming widow. A short time previous she had been introduced by Dr. Grayson as a walking companion for Miss Helen Woodrow Bones, a first cousin of President Wilson, who lived at the White House. Dr. Grayson was engaged to at the time, and subsequently married, Miss Alice Gertrude Gordon, whose mother had been the intimate friend of Mrs. Galt.

Everyone around the White House was early aware that a romance had begun. The eyes of many attendants are turned upon the President of the United States at all times and when he and Miss Bones rode home with Mrs. Galt in one of the White House automobiles there was an instant impression that Mr. Wilson's need for companionship had at last been fulfilled. The President's interest grew from day to day as he sent books to his new-found friend. Her modest little home on Twentieth Street, Northwest, became the almost daily destination of the President on his walks or rides. Miss Bones invited Mrs. Galt to accompany her on one of the cruises of the *Mayflower* from Washington to New York where the fleet was reviewed by the President. Later on, during the summer months, the home in Cornish, New Hampshire, was opened again for the Wilson household and Miss Bones and Mrs. Galt went there to escape the heat of Washington. The President spent many weeks at Cornish during the summer of 1915. When he returned, in the autumn, Washington generally had learned of his infatuation for Mrs. Galt.

Members of the Cabinet and people in official life began to wonder what would be the effect of the President's engagement on his political fortunes, but no one had the temerity to advise Mr. Wilson on his personal affairs as it was recognized that the new mistress of the White House would be able later to wield both power and influence against anyone who might earn her disfavor. Secretary Lane is credited with having

remarked to some of his colleagues in the Cabinet that Mr. Wilson would lose his popularity if he remarried because the country had become intensely sympathetic with him in his loneliness. Secretary Tumulty with his keen vision of politics shared to some extent this view but he knew that the President was more interested in the woman he loved than in holding political office. There is abundant evidence that Mr. Wilson did not care as much about a second term as did the leaders of the Democratic party who wanted to see the Administration continued in power and that Mr. Wilson would have easily swallowed his disappointment if he had failed of renomination or reelection. The truth is that his frame of mind was such that he did not enjoy public office and ardently hoped to be released from responsibility. He was a human being first and an executive machine second. As between a life of freedom and public office, there is no doubt that Mr. Wilson would have chosen the former if he had been able consistently to do so.

The months of Mr. Wilson's courtship of Mrs. Galt involved a let-up in his labors of previous years in the White House. He did not work as long at his desk. He found diversion in the animated conversations with his *fiancée*. In the inner circle of Washington rumors started that the President's desk was piled high with unattended business. There was a noticeable delay at one time in the dispatch of a note to Great Britain protesting against violation of neutral rights. Rumor had it that Mr. Wilson was not concentrating on the note but in this respect at least the reports were unfounded. Mr. Wilson chose to delay that note because a Cabinet crisis in Great Britain was beginning to develop and he did not wish to do anything that would add complications to Great Britain's internal political confusion. Premier Asquith and Sir Edward Grey were at the helm. Mr. Wilson had for both of them at the time a warm admiration. Besides, Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador, had insisted in his letters to the President that the United States tone down its protests to Great Britain.

Mr. Wilson finally sent the note—not by cable—but by

messenger, who carried special instructions to Ambassador Page. In the autumn of 1915 the controversy between the President and Ambassador Page reached a climax. One Sunday afternoon word came that Ambassador Page had resigned. The author, who was at the time in charge of the news relating to American neutrality for the Associated Press at Washington, sought to verify the report of Mr. Page's resignation but neither Secretary Tumulty nor any member of the Cabinet knew anything about it. The Associated Press had received a private cable from London but as usual did not print any news of this kind until verification could be obtained. The author, of course, did not know how long the secret would be kept and feared that competitors might obtain it and score a "beat" if it were disclosed. The President could not be reached—he had gone to the home of Mrs. Galt on Twentieth Street. Across the street two secret-service men lounged against a tree in an all day vigil. Neither one would carry a message into the house. The idea of disturbing the afternoon social call of the President of the United States was dismissed by them as absurd. The telephone operator at the White House switchboard, through which a private line to the Twentieth Street home of Mrs. Galt had been connected, would not disturb the President. The author penned a note to the President telling him of the sensational developments and waited outside hoping that somebody might emerge from the Galt home and carry a message inside. The President spent the afternoon and evening there. Finally Dr. Cary T. Grayson appeared on the scene and with his customary courtesy took the note and a few minutes later returned with the answer: "Mr. Page has not resigned."

For a long time this episode was unexplained because the man who sent the cable from London actually read a copy of the letter of resignation written by Mr. Page and knew of an exchange of cables between the President and Ambassador Page relative to the letter.

But Mr. Wilson did not accept the resignation—hence to his mind it was just as if Mr. Page had not offered to relinquish the post. And the President saw no reason at that time to

disturb the delicate situation which existed by revealing the friction he was having with the Embassy at London. It is a fact, however, that Mr. Wilson did for a time consider accepting the resignation and offering the Ambassadorship to Great Britain to Cleveland H. Dodge, his classmate at Princeton, who, however, did not care to undertake the mission.

Shortly after this incident Mr. Wilson called in his private secretary and told him that he could announce the engagement of the President to Mrs. Galt. Secretary Tumulty, still mindful of the political dangers of an early marriage, hoped the President might postpone the announcement believing that it should be deferred until after the 1916 campaign. But Mr. Wilson would not listen to it, and Secretary Tumulty like a faithful friend promptly accepted the situation and loyally sought to set the stage for a favorable response by the press to the news he was about to disclose. For many hours he labored over the form of the announcement and the necessary data which would give to the newspapers the best impression possible of the romance and would completely sweep aside the criticisms of those who might be disappointed over the remarriage of the President fifteen months after the death of his first wife.

Mr. Tumulty talked with the newspapermen about the rise in the President's spirits and his general improvement in health together with the fact that all the members of the Wilson household, including the daughters, were fond of Mrs. Galt; all this had its effect and made the wedding pass without incident and without political ill-effect.

Mr. Wilson's disinclination to postpone his engagement—he never for a moment considered it seriously—was convincing evidence of the strength of his affection for the fascinating widow. He cared nothing about the political phases of it—he was in love. Those who knew him best realized that it meant a prolongation of his life and an inspiration to do greater things. For he was the type of man who lived on feminine inspiration.

Privacy in the extreme was the outstanding characteristic of the President's wedding. Devoid of all official glamor,

away from the White House, unattended by members of the Cabinet, Justices of the Supreme Court, leaders in Congress, or members of the diplomatic corps—it was the wedding simply of Woodrow Wilson and Mrs. Edith Galt, on December 18, 1915. The one was fifty-nine, the other forty-eight.

The ceremony was at 8:30 o'clock at night at the home of the bride, a simple though not unattractive dwelling just a block from Dupont Circle, a three-story brick structure, built on a thirty-foot lot, but handsomely furnished within. Less than thirty composed the wedding company. There were no aides, no gold lace, no official color of any kind, no long line of carriages, a simple home wedding, much as any average American might have; and after it was over, following matrimonial precedent, the bride and groom slipped away for a wedding trip of a fortnight.

While the fact of the President's marriage was everywhere the single theme of conversation in the national capital, official Washington never had so small a part in any affair participated in by the President of the United States. It suggested Mr. Wilson's previously applied theory that he had a right to an official and to a private identity, and that the one was not necessarily related to the other.

The President chose for the wedding trip a time that would permit him without embarassment to public business to be absent from Washington—the recess period of Congress—but unfortunately for him a serious situation with Austria-Hungary over the sinking of the *Ancona* hung like a cloud over the international horizon. Mr. Wilson had been engrossed in a multitude of things since Congress convened and the trip was welcomed as a change and vacation. He was, however, unable to escape his official labors for he took with him a stenographer and a mass of papers. Also a corps of newspaper correspondents accompanied him—convincing evidence that while a few hours of privacy may not be begrudged the President of the United States, thereafter he must resume his public identity. For the American people through the medium of the press renewed their observation of his official

acts, utterances, and travels. And a Presidential campaign was near.

Woodrow Wilson was theoretically bound by the one-term plank of the Democratic national convention of 1912 on which he was elected but his views on a second, and even a third term, were set forth in February 1913—a month before his first inauguration. He wrote to A. Mitchell Palmer, then one of the Democratic leaders in the House of Representatives, as follows:

"Put the present customary limitation of two terms into the Constitution if you do not trust the people to take care of themselves. But make it two terms (not one, because four years is often too long), and give the President a chance to win the full service by proving himself fit for it. . . .

"I can approach the question from a perfectly impersonal point of view, because I shall most cheerfully abide by the judgment of my party and the public as to whether I shall be a candidate for the Presidency again in 1916. I absolutely pledge myself to resort to nothing but public opinion to decide that question."

On February 14, 1916, President Wilson made public the following letters to Charles Q. Hildebrandt, Secretary of State, at Columbus, Ohio:

"My dear Sir:

"I am enclosing to you a letter the occasion of which I dare say will be quite obvious. Friends in Ohio have called my attention to Section 4954 of the General Code of Ohio as amended in 1914 with regard to primary elections and have requested that I indicate my willingness to have my name used. I accordingly take the liberty of sending you the enclosed letter as formal permission under the statute."

The letter read as follows:

"While I am entirely unwilling to enter into any contest for the Presidential nomination of the Democratic party, I am willing to permit the use of my name that the Democrats in Ohio may make known their preference in regard to that nomination. In order, therefore, to satisfy the technical requirements of the

statutes of the State of Ohio, I hereby consent to the use of my name as a candidate for the Presidency by any candidate who seeks to be elected a delegate to the National Democratic Convention which is to assemble in June next.

"Respectfully yours,
"WOODROW WILSON."

The Democratic National Convention on June 16th at St. Louis, Missouri, was unique in its singleness of resolution. It renominated Woodrow Wilson for a second term; defiantly upheld his doctrines of peace, and confidently sought the nation's approval of the domestic and foreign policy of the Government in the preceding three and one-half years.

The mind of one man, the remarkable personality that forced itself forward to success at Baltimore four years before, dominated the Convention. By acclamation Woodrow Wilson became its nominee. His wish prevailed in the selection of Thomas R. Marshall as the nominee, once more, for Vice-President. His views, his own phrases, were written in the party platform. On his record as an administrator of the Government, the party in power went forth confidently to solicit the suffrages of the country. In every essential, even the details of party organization, there stood out the commanding figure of the President. Rarely in history had a convention followed so readily the titular head of the party.

Were it not for the triumph of an irresistible public sentiment in the Republican Convention at Chicago the week before, where a man also of the highest character and singular capacity was chosen to lead a rival party, the proceedings might have been perfunctory in St. Louis. But the anticipation of coming battle, the realization of an approaching clash unparalleled in American history, stimulated a spirit of militancy and enthusiasm. The character of appeal, the argument on which the Democratic party was to conduct its side of the battle, was eloquently expressed in a series of speeches by Martin H. Glynn, temporary chairman, and Senator Ollie James, permanent chairman, as well as by William Jennings Bryan, thrice the nominee of his party for the Presidency.

The appearance of Mr. Bryan as an earnest supporter of Mr. Wilson, with whom he parted official company under dramatic circumstances just a year before, symbolized the harmony that prevailed in the ranks of Democracy. Mr. Bryan heroically buried bitter antagonisms and personal disappointment to espouse the chosen leader of the party he had fought for so consistently in twenty-five years of politics. Regulars, bosses, organization men, progressives, and independents cooperated in sending forth from the Convention a united Democracy. Party differences, personal quarrels, patronage controversies, all were subordinated to the greater wish for party success.

Undismayed by the reconciliation of discordant elements in the Republican party, the Democrats conducted their Convention as serenely as if there were not the slightest question of their ultimate success in November.

Smooth in its organization, enthusiastic, happy, almost picnic-like in celebration of its acts, the Convention adjourned, completing its work in the record-breaking time of four brief sessions. The dominating characteristic of the whole was an abiding confidence in the fairness of the electorate to maintain the Administration in power for having resisted belligerent temptations and kept the United States out of the European war. Was this Government's policy of prolonged negotiations with Germany and Mexico a humiliation that merited rebuke, or was patience and forbearance a virtue deserving of reward?

Thirteen miles—lucky or unlucky, as the linear superstition may be—measured the distance between Sea Girt, New Jersey, the Wilson headquarters in 1912 and Shadow Lawn, Long Branch, New Jersey, the summer capital of President Wilson. The span of time covered just four feverish years and a hectic month.

Turning back to the happy midsummer day in 1912 when the same Ollie James, then junior Senator from Kentucky, stretched his famous voice across a crowded lawn and in the bellowing tones of an anticipated triumph tendered to Woodrow Wilson the nomination of a remarkable convention held in the heat of embattled Baltimore; in almost the same set-

ting the same huge form of Ollie James, senior Senator from Kentucky, tendered to the same man another nomination, this time from the peaceful precincts of St. Louis's Coliseum.

The visitor from afar might have happened in at Shadow Lawn and if he had been present four years before at Sea Girt might well have imagined that the affair was but a continuation, or at best a repetition, of the ceremony of 1912. For the crowd was virtually the same—Democrats and sightseers.

Yet what had happened between the August day in 1912, when Mr. Wilson stood beneath a spreading oak and read his speech of acceptance to the enthusiastic men and women who looked upon him as the Moses of progressivism—a great intellect applied to the confusion and chaos of politics—and the September afternoon when the same man read to an assembly of men and women of his home State another speech of acceptance based on four years of toil and perplexity?

There was first the change in the man. His hair was much grayer; the lines in his face were deeper; the expression of the mouth was that of a man who has been through the crucible; at times the look of it seemed irritable, at times, breaking into a forced smile, at times sad, but for the most part reflective—a psychological composite that only the most tremendous of responsibilities and the strain of incessant labor could make. He, himself, would probably have been the first to admit that the job of the Presidency had far exceeded his most expert calculations based, as they were, on long academic study of governments and the functions of the Chief Executive.

What a lot of things can happen in four years! What hopes rose or fell, what aspirations were realized, what mistakes were made, what blunders, what problems unforeseen cropped up at untimely moments to upset the most carefully laid plans for an Administration of vigorous domestic reform! What political expediencies were resorted to in the hope that the end justified the means, what compromises were effected, what friends alienated, and what bitter enmities bred—for the path of the Presidency lies only through thickets of thorn and briar!

Who, least of all Woodrow Wilson, thought that the office

of Secretary of State would be so important, or that the Secretary of the Navy would have to be other than the easy-going sinecure of past Administrations? In the comfortable contemplations of 1912 it was easy to pick Mr. Bryan for Secretary of State and to console oneself with the thought that of course John Bassett Moore would be counselor and all would be well. No one dreamed of trouble with Mexico or a war in Europe. No one thought there would be agitation about a larger navy.

The Administration of Mr. Wilson had been in fact one of many events—one problem after the other in rapid, choking succession. No sooner was one thing settled than another dilemma presented itself from an unexpected quarter. The campaign of 1912, on which Mr. Wilson sought the support of a divided Republicanism, itself abnormal in our politics, had been the single normal thing since the nomination at Baltimore, one of the few things that came to pass as per program. Mr. Wilson made some good stump speeches, drew good crowds, and was in due course elected, as everybody anticipated. Then began his troubles. A whole Government was to be turned upside down. Hungry Democrats were crying for political food, and when Mr. Wilson wasn't shaping ambitious plans for legislative reform he was worrying about how not to offend the men of his own party whose support was essential to the success of his legislative program. So Ambassadors were selected and governmental jobs of various sorts dispensed in panicky haste to satisfy the demands of the party vultures. Patronage was like so much débris in the path of a vehicle that wanted to run smoothly. All had to be cleared away.

The disregard of civil service reform and the appointment of some men to ambassadorial or ministerial posts who would never have been sent as first secretaries, even, had there been the slightest suspicion that a war was brewing in Europe, constituted an indefensible chapter of the first part of the Wilson Administration. But in the mêlée of change which Mr. Wilson wrought such things were at the time considered trivial. The new President did approach the larger problems of his Admin-

istration with a zeal that won friends everywhere. Right or wrong on the principles of tariff revision, he forced through Congress a downward revision, in the main based on sound Democratic doctrine. Then, in a memorable fight with members of his own party in Congress, he drove through a currency bill which won more praise than any other single achievement. Mr. Wilson had tasted fight, and relished it. He stood up manfully for a repeal of the tolls provision in the Panama Canal act, boldly rode over the opposition within his own party and breasted the tape victoriously again. The shipping bill brought a vexatious tangle; the party bolters were this time successful. Mexico loomed up threateningly and shunted off the Wilson single track all domestic legislation.

One Victoriano Huerta became obstreperous in Mexico. Vera Cruz was seized on an April morning in 1914, the word "tension" came into vogue, followed quickly by the "acute crisis," and with such descriptive phrases the newspapers were destined to be filled for many months; for as soon as the Mexican trouble was patched up by the Niagara Falls mediation conference, and everybody was ready for a quiet summer and the Congressional elections of 1914, the reckless hand of an assassin in Europe opened the flood-gates of war. Though America was not inundated, the dikes of neutrality that had to be immediately constructed gave Mr. Wilson additional controversy and sleepless nights. First, there were Americans to be gotten out of Europe, money to be sent to the panic-stricken refugees, and all sorts of precautions to be taken along our coasts, and at factories manufacturing supplies admittedly contraband. Then the belligerents grew irritable over the fact that America was "too proud" or "too civilized" to get into a brawl not of her making or whose European issues it had been the constant and traditional endeavor of the United States to shun.

Troubles with Germany—almost war—the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other submarine outrages; the resignation of Mr. Bryan amid dramatic circumstances; later the departure of Mr. Garrison and the controversy with Representative James Hay and Congress about the continental Army; the

"hysteria" over preparedness; the ever-present Mexican dilemma, the recognition of Carranza and the resentment and pique therefrom which led Villa to raid Columbus, New Mexico, and brought about the dispatch of the entire American military establishment to protect the border; the vexatious difficulties with Great Britain about censored mails and detention of cargoes—all these were flung in pell-mell fashion on the head of the Chief Executive, who, through it all, was trying to get through Congress some domestic legislation on which to base an appeal to the people for a second term.

And the Congress responded, giving the country a Rural Credits law, legislation granting virtual autonomy to the Philippines, large appropriations for the Army and Navy, a Workman's Compensation act, and a Child Labor law. All seemed to be going well.

The notification ceremonies at Shadow Lawn were to be in celebration of the close of a glorious legislative march. Factional grievances were to be buried. Tammany, "Jim" Nugent, of New Jersey, Tom Taggart, of Indiana, and Roger Sullivan, of Illinois, were to mingle with the forward-looking men from the East and West, including William Jennings Bryan, all in grand jubilation over "words that had been translated into deeds."

But the gods of things as they should not be did not suffer such a proceeding to pass without another "crisis" and another spell of nervous excitement. So the railroad dispute came in due season. And Mr. Wilson went to Shadow Lawn more or less unstrung by the strain of impending domestic disturbance—he went to accept the nomination, and then, not as might have been the case in normal times, to step forth on a little stumping tour for himself, he was compelled to rush back to Washington to avert a nation-wide rail strike.

Four and a half months of intermittent campaigning—Mr. Wilson made a few speeches from the verandas of his summer home at Shadow Lawn—and the American people registered their judgment.

Out of a night that seemed to spell defeat came the chance of victory to President Wilson through the triumph of the

West over the East. The President could not be certain on election night that he had won. Only the final counts in the far Western States told the story. The upheaval in Republican States like Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, Kansas, and Minnesota, indicated that the landslide west of the Mississippi was almost as astonishing as the uniform ease with which Mr. Hughes captured the Atlantic Seaboard, including the President's home State of New Jersey.

All night the vigil at the Executive office in Asbury Park, N. J., was maintained, while five miles away at Shadow Lawn, the President, on the advice of his physician, retired early. He was up with the sun to examine the returns, and was happy that overnight bulletins did not defeat him. Every incoming report added more hope of ultimate success. With that remarkable poise which the President had developed in two years of contact with international problems, he analyzed the returns, calmly commented on them to Secretary Tumulty and gave the impression of being as much concerned as he might be in a Congressional or State election in which he himself was not a candidate. This was because Woodrow Wilson made up his mind a long time before that the American people would be just to him, that he would not consider himself defeated until the last ballot had been counted.

Admittedly the early morning news was better than that which filtered through everybody's mind as the President went to sleep. Claims galore and election statistics in constant stream poured in at the Executive offices. Only those reports which showed a distinct trend in either direction were given to Mr. Wilson over the telephone. He disliked scattering and meager returns, and preferred always to have none rather than those telegrams which confused and led nowhere.

The hope for victory became strong as the morning hours brought returns from the Far West. But no one felt absolutely confident. None of the reports was discouraging, and it was felt that later returns would show the Western landslide had taken Oregon and California with it.

It was a nerve-racking ordeal for the President's family, Secretary Tumulty, and those who were wrapped up in the

situation. No such intense anxiety or suppressed excitement was recalled by White House employees as having characterized any election of the last twenty-five years.

For a few days the result was in doubt as the votes in California and Minnesota were counted, but President Wilson was reëlected by 277 votes in the Electoral College to 254 for Charles Evans Hughes, nominee of the Republican party.

While the anti-war element in the United States during the campaign of 1916 was not made up entirely of persons who sympathized with Germany as against Great Britain, thousands of anti-British partisans voted the Democratic ticket because of a belief that Mr. Wilson would keep the United States out of war on the side of England. In not a single speech or statement did President Wilson promise to keep the country out of war but the stump speakers did, and the theme of the entire campaign, as conducted by Democratic headquarters, was a defense of Mr. Wilson's policy in refusing to go to war with Germany. From this the inference was clearly drawn that he was a candidate who would maintain peace. Nor was there anything tangible in the declaration of the Republican candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, to indicate that he would plunge the United States into war. Mr. Hughes confined himself simply to a general declaration of his intention, should he be elected, to assert American rights and protect American interests everywhere.

Irrespective of Mr. Wilson's own part in the campaign of 1916, the West certainly had the idea that Mr. Wilson's action in the past was an assurance of his intentions in the future. Since those momentous days, especially in view of the fact that within six months after the election of 1916, the United States was engaged in war against Germany, there has been a tendency to regard the Democratic campaign of 1916 as a deception and Mr. Wilson's part in it as an acquiescence at least in the program of peace.

The truth of the matter is that Woodrow Wilson feared the United States might be drawn into the war against her will but never cherished the idea in 1916 that Germany would be so foolish as to drag America into the conflict. Mr. Wil-

son's hopes were that the United States might be mediator and peacemaker. For himself, he craved the privilege of intervening and giving the basis of peace to the belligerents. He made a speech to the Senate in which he spoke of the possibility of "peace without victory" and it was widely misconstrued abroad as a desire on the part of Mr. Wilson to deprive the Allies of the fruits of their ultimate triumph by a premature armistice. It was derided in America as an empty phrase. But what Mr. Wilson hoped for was that the deadlock might enable peace to be made on a basis that would not kindle the fires of revenge or sow the seeds of another war. He meant a peace without revenge.

CHAPTER XII

REASONS FOR ENTERING THE WORLD WAR

Looking back over the neutrality period which preceded the entry of the United States into the European war, the whole may be divided into three distinct epochs:

First, there was the era in which President Wilson believed the war would come to an early conclusion and that, by a careful balancing of diplomatic notes against Germany, on the one hand, and the Allies, on the other, the legal record of neutrality might be scrupulously kept.

The second stage dated from the sinking of the *Lusitania* and continued through several months during which sharp-toned notes were exchanged with Germany on the scope of submarine warfare.

The third, the last period, was that in which the United States hoped against hope that America's entry into war would be unnecessary, but preparations were made by both the Army and Navy for the inevitable. Armed neutrality was proclaimed in a desperate but futile effort to avert hostilities.

President Wilson experienced in February 1916 his first real apprehension since the beginning of the European war that Congress might interfere in the handling of the foreign affairs of the nation and fail to support him in the firm policy that he had adopted as to the right of Americans to travel on armed as well as unarmed merchant ships, provided the vessels did not resist or attempt to flee when encountered by the enemy.

Indications were that Germany would ask America to define what it considered an armed merchantman, and how it could place the responsibility for offensive and defensive action at sea. All these questions promised further negotiation and discussion.

But the reason for alarm was not what Germany was about to do but what Congress might do. Senator Stone of Missouri, Democrat, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told the President that some of the Southern Democrats, among them Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia and Senator Gore, of Oklahoma were of the opinion that the United States should warn its citizens not to travel on armed ships. The Missouri Senator saw signs of dangerous agitation and wanted to know just how to deal with the situation. The President made it clear that he wanted no discussion of such delicate questions while the latter were in process of negotiation with foreign governments. He was necessarily emphatic in what he said. Senator Stone thought the majority leader of the Senate and the head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee should hear what the President had to say. Accordingly Senator Kern and Representative Flood were summoned.

Perhaps the President talked too frankly, or those who saw him were somewhat indiscreet in their reports of the conversation, but little by little the strong words of the President reached Congress generally, and a flurry of war talk resulted.

If the President wanted to warn Congress not to add fuel to the flames by weakening the hand of the Executive branch of the Government in its firm attitude toward Germany, those Senators and Representatives most interested in getting a resolution passed preventing Americans from obtaining protection on armed merchantmen took exactly the other view—namely, that the President was pursuing a course too drastic and dangerous, and that he was leading the country to war. They were persuaded, therefore, that in reality war could be prevented by keeping Americans off armed vessels.

There was no doubt that, if a resolution embodying such a proposal had come to a vote, it would have had surprising support. The general sentiment in Congress reflected popular feeling to a certain degree in holding that, while Americans had legal rights on armed merchantmen, they ought not jeopardize the country's safety by deliberately asserting them at a critical time. There were many in Congress who held that point of view from honest conviction, including Representative

Jeff McLemore of Texas who sponsored the House resolution. A few Senators and Representatives from States and districts where the German vote was preponderant felt the full weight and pressure of their constituents. But in fairness it must be stated that there were also some Senators whose intimacies with the British Government were equally pronounced. In all the controversies over neutrality it was easy to pick out the distinctly pro-British and the pro-German Senators. Yet the combined number was not large.

The troubles in Congress, however, arose because a certain plausibility attached to the argument that Americans ought to keep out of the danger zones, even though they had a right to travel there. The fact that the United States in its *modus vivendi,* written by Secretary Lansing, saw the reasonableness of the German contention about the tactics of armed merchantmen, won many in Congress to the view that if the British merchantship captains really did fire on every submarine they saw, as was alleged, Germany might have a theoretical right to attack at sight.

With the Speaker of the House only lukewarm, at best, in his support of the President on this issue, with the Majority Leader of the House himself convinced that the President was wrong, with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee holding different convictions from the President, the control by the Chief Executive over the legislative branch of the Government was in jeopardy. The impression of divided counsels reached Europe. Germany let it be known through her Embassy in Washington that the new proclamation to sink armed merchantmen might be postponed for a month or so to allow the American Government and Congress to study the situation further. Already realizing the advantage gained, Germany hoped to profit by subsequent agitation.

Owing to the difficulty of operating submarines in cold weather, our officials thought Germany never had any serious intention of beginning her new campaign until the spring months anyhow.

But the temper of the House and Senate was unmistakably significant. The resolution of Senator Jones, of Washing-

ton, Republican, was typical of what members of Congress generally felt. His resolution declared that before any ultimatum was sent to any foreign government, before there was any break in foreign relations, the Congress should be consulted, and the judgment of no one man, meaning the President, should be permitted to thrust the country into war. With this view there was widespread sympathy, but at the White House it was reiterated that Mr. Wilson wanted to do everything humanly possible to prevent war, and would not fail to take Congress into his confidence if the issue warranted it.

Occasionally a Senator like the late William Hughes, Democrat, of New Jersey, expressed himself thus:

"I would rather be beaten ten thousand times than stand with those who are too cowardly to vindicate American rights. Some people in Congress can't think of anything else but votes."

There was an atmosphere of tension everywhere.

Speaker Clark at first thought the resolution warning Americans off armed merchantmen of the belligerent powers would not get out of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, but that if it did it would pass by an overwhelming vote. Representative Kitchin, the Democratic leader, thought likewise. The President and his Cabinet talked over the situation at length. Mr. Wilson wrote a letter to Representative Pou calling for a vote. It forced the issue in the Senate as well as the House.

The President won a grudging victory in the Senate. By parliamentary strategy, Mr. Gore, of Oklahoma, so amended his original resolution warning Americans to remain off armed merchantmen of the belligerents as to deprive the vote that followed of the significance which a clean-cut decision on the merits of the question would have given it. As a consequence, the roll call of 68 to 14, by which the Senate ordered that the Gore resolution, its amendments, and all resolutions pertaining thereto laid "on the table" was susceptible of as many doubts and constructions as there were parties to the controversy.

The Oklahoma Senator, at the last moment, insisted suc-

cessfully on the right to amend his original resolution so that an attack without warning on an armed merchantman resulting in the death of Americans would be considered a "just and sufficient cause for war with Germany."

Even Senator Gore triumphantly joined those who voted to "table" the resolution, since in effect it postponed the issue until an actual case arose wherein American rights were violated. What an affirmative vote meant, therefore, was entirely a matter of individual opinion—certainly it gave small solace to the President, except insofar as it was interpreted as a desire to permit the President to handle the foreign affairs of the nation without the embarrassments and interference of Senate action.

But a spirited, almost bitter debate, before crowded galleries, immediately followed. Senator Clarke, of Arkansas, accused the Administration of being unneutral and favoring the Allies in its neutrality decisions. Senator Borah of Idaho clamored for defensive action. Senator Jones of Washington, demanded a vote on the merits of the questions.

Perhaps the post-mortem discussion that followed the vote was proof of the inconclusive character of the roll call.

"We have settled nothing," exclaimed Senator Jones, of Washington, almost immediately after the vote was announced. "We have not complied with the President's request for a definition of American rights, and have not even granted the full discussion which he asked for in his letter to Representative Pou."

Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, Republican, thought the victory "decisive." Several Administration Senators held that it was a distinct expression of confidence in the President.

As for the House of Representatives, the vote of 256 to 160 by which the "previous question" was ordered and the vote of 271 to 138 by which the rule to limit debate on the motion to table was carried in favor of the President, made the Administration victory complete and the McLemore resolution was tabled.

But the parliamentary maneuvers by which Republicans and Democrats alike evaded the fundamental question did not

represent the view of the House on the underlying issue of international law. The vote in the House was a mixed answer to the President's wish. It did not mean that Congress had yielded the right to have its say on international affairs, or to agitate against circumstances that might lead the United States into war.

It might truly have been construed abroad as a vote of confidence in the President's policies, but it did not, by any means, register the true feeling of the House, which was still, as Speaker Clark originally expressed it, two to one against travel by Americans on armed merchantmen of the belligerent powers.

Amid the various roll calls, the late Representative Mann, Republican leader, was greeted with the thundering applause of the House when he said:

"Citizens of the United States, under existing conditions and irrespective of their legal rights, ought to refrain from taking passage on belligerent vessels except in case of imperative necessity."

Although the circumstances of the debates in the House and Senate were unparalleled, because the discussion was hypothetical, it was recognized that the destruction of American lives would present a new situation and that Congress would be required to meet it in the light of whatever circumstances subsequently arose. If Germany misjudged not the American Congress but the spirit of the American people, grave complications could be expected to ensue from her folly. The limitations of American patience were as well known in Berlin as in Washington, and were to be observed in the strict precautions announced by Germany in a formal memorandum to the United States promising to ascertain whether a vessel carried armament—in other words, whether the vessel would offer resistance, a technical, but not an actual, evasion of the responsibility for drowning Americans on a ship that neither resisted nor attempted to flee.

In other words, Germany openly claimed that she would torpedo all armed merchantmen, but actually, in practice, she was expected to observe the rule of international law with re-

spect to the right of a merchantman to defend itself against attack. So a virtual truce was maintained for nearly a year.

Early in 1916 however Mr. Wilson realized that if he were to continue to threaten Germany effectively he must make some signs of war preparation. He called upon the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War to take inventory of the state of the American fighting resources and recommended increases to Congress. To Colonel Roosevelt's way of thinking, not enough preparation had been made, but, when war did break, it was apparent that all the suggestions made, including those of Mr. Roosevelt for an army two or three times the size of the then existing force was only a drop in the bucket compared to the huge forces needed to wage the battle in Europe. Among the opponents of Mr. Wilson who were far sighted and wanted him to prepare for war, not a single plan suggested provided for an army of even one-twentieth the size of that which was finally mobilized by the United States.

The first epoch in the neutrality ended with the resignation of Secretary Bryan. Up to that time Mr. Wilson had given the impression that preparations for war on the part of the United States would be misconstrued abroad as an intention on the part of the United States to engage in the conflict, whereas the best assurance of continued neutrality was the introduction of no unusual items in the military or naval budget. The sinking of the *Lusitania* in May 1915 began to work a change in the President's mind. He knew that the war spirit had not yet been kindled in the United States and he was confirmed in that feeling by careful analysis of the editorials of newspapers large and small from coast to coast. It is a singular thing that while a few people on the Eastern seaboard were clamoring for war, a careful examination of the editorials showed that out of 1,000 compiled by telegraph in the three days after the *Lusitania* was sunk in May 1915 less than one-half dozen indicated a belief that war should be declared. Opinion was almost unanimous that the situation called for diplomacy and an effective expression of American feeling, with the hint, of course, that if satisfaction could not be se-

cured the American people would be behind the President in whatever course he should formulate.

Reading the letters of Ambassador Page in London on the reaction of European opinion to President Wilson's note-writing, one is convinced that the true state of mind on this side of the Atlantic was not accurately portrayed to those on the other side of the vast ocean—for America was not yet ready to go to war in May 1915 or even a year later when the President revealed as follows his thoughts on the diminishing influence of moral force and the rising necessity of physical force:

"There are two reasons why the chief wish of Americans is for peace. One is that they love peace and have nothing to do with the present quarrel; and the other is that they believe the present quarrel has carried those engaged in it so far that they cannot be held to ordinary standards of responsibility, and that, therefore, as some men have expressed it to me, since the rest of the world is mad, why should we not simply refuse to have anything to do with the rest of the world in the ordinary channels of action? Why not let the storm pass, and then, when it is all over, have the reckonings? Knowing that from both these two points of view the passion of America is for peace I am, nevertheless, aware that America is one of the nations of the world, not only, but one of the chief nations of the world—a nation that grows more and more powerful almost in spite of herself; that grows morally more influential even when she is not aware of it; and that if she is to play the part which she most covets, it is necessary that she should act more or less from the point of view of the rest of the world.

"If I cannot retain my moral influence over a man except by occasionally knocking him down, if that is the only basis upon which he will respect me, then for the sake of his soul I have got occasionally to knock him down. You know how we have read in—isn't it in Ralph Connor's stories of western life in Canada?—that all his sky pilots are ready for a fracas at any time, and how the ultimate salvation of the souls of their parishioners depends upon their using their fists occasionally.

If a man will not listen to you quietly in a seat, sit on his neck and make him listen; just as I have always maintained, particularly in view of certain experiences of mine, that the shortest road to a boy's moral sense is through his cuticle. There is a direct and, if I may be permitted the pun, a fundamental connection between the surface of his skin and his moral consciousness. You arrest his attention, first, in that way, and then get the moral lesson conveyed to him in milder ways that, if he were grown up, would be the only ways you would use.

"So I say that I have been aware that in order to do the very thing that we are proudest of the ability to do, there might come a time when we would have to do it in a way that we would prefer not to do it; and the great burden on my spirits has been that it has been up to me to choose when that time came. Can you imagine a thing more calculated to keep a man awake at nights than that? Because, just because I did not feel that I was the whole thing and was aware that my duty was a duty of interpretation, how could I be sure that I had the right elements of information by which to interpret truly?

"What we are now talking about is largely spiritual. Men say, 'All the people out my way think so and so.' Now, I know perfectly well that they have not talked with all the people out their way. I find that out again and again. And so you are taken by surprise. The people of the United States are not asking anybody's leave to do their own thinking, and are not asking anybody to tip them off what they ought to think. They are thinking for themselves, every man for himself; and you do not know, and, the worst of it is, since the responsibility is mine, I do not know what they are thinking about. I have the most imperfect means of finding out, and yet I have got to act as if I knew. That is the burden of it, and I tell you it is a pretty serious burden, particularly if you look upon the office as I do—that I am not put there to do what I please. If I were, it would have been very much more interesting than it has been. I am put here to interpret, to reg-

ister, to suggest, and, more than that, and much greater than that, to be suggested to.

"Now, that is where the experience that I forecast has differed from the experience that I have had. In domestic matters I think I can in most cases come pretty near a guess where the thought of America is going, but in foreign affairs the chief element is where action is going on in other quarters of the world and not where thought is going in the United States."

This was six months before he was reelected.

The general public did not know that Mr. Wilson was so set upon making a move for peace during the summer of 1916 that he actually framed peace proposals. He was dissuaded then from making a peace offer, however, because of the belief that such a step might be considered as political—it might be interpreted as a gesture intended to improve his own chances for reelection and might be construed abroad as without serious purpose because of the criticism certain to issue from political opponents.

So Mr. Wilson delayed his peace move until after the campaign and sent the note to the European belligerents after he had been elected hoping that his position would carry even greater weight because of a triumph at the polls.

But it was peace Mr. Wilson was thinking about in December 1916, and January 1917. When it became evident, however, that the fortunes of war were turning against the Allies, that the Germans were planning a big drive, that the extremists in Germany were gaining the upper hand and that submarine warfare without restraint was to be sanctioned—then did Mr. Wilson resign himself to the inevitable. There was a time in the early days of 1917 when he thought the dismissal of Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, would be sufficient warning to Germany that the United States must not be offended by further depredations on the high seas, and he called in the author one day to ask if the activities of the German Ambassador, as noted by the newspapermen, had reached the point where they were compromising America's neutrality. It was true that the German ambassador con-

ducted a propaganda, did all he could to influence American opinion in favor of Germany, but the author told the President that he did not believe the German Ambassador was doing any more than some of the other Ambassadors of the allied world in their efforts to influence American opinion during the Presidential campaign.

The continuation of submarine warfare contrary to pledges given the United States justified, however, not only the dismissal of Count von Bernstorff, but the declaration of war against the Imperial German Government. The tide of battle was going against the Allies and, again, Mr. Wilson hoped that America might be able by the very fact of her entering the war to force peace at an early date. It was for this reason that the President subsequently gave himself over utterly to the prosecution of the war recommending, at the very outset, universal conscription and the extension of large loans, materials and supplies to the Allies. For by this he hoped at once to break down the German morale.

Critics have risen to say the United States should have gone to war when the *Lusitania* was sunk—all Europe still thinks, no doubt, that our two years of official neutrality were due to vacillation, indecision or even timidity. But Mr. Wilson's reasons for hesitation were due entirely to his belief that the United States must enter the war, if at all, with a united public opinion. So far as politics were concerned, he knew the American people would surely reelect him in 1916 if he were Commander-in-Chief of their forces during the war. He was well aware that he would gain politically if America entered the war during 1916—for it had been an old political saying that "the American people never swap horses in midstream".

The evidence is all against the European idea that the United States withheld its forces because of an indifference to the issues and fundamentals of the conflict abroad. American public opinion alone was Mr. Wilson's guide and he recommended a declaration of war only when he was convinced that the verdict was virtually unanimous. From an altogether different viewpoint, however, it is possible to prove that the

neutrality of the United States, far from being a disadvantage to the Allies, was an asset of immeasurable value. The German historians who know the truth about Von Tirpitz's plans for unrestricted submarine warfare, as outlined in the latter part of 1914, are convinced that only the influence of the conservative element in the German foreign office, namely, the diplomats instead of the militarists, prevented the earlier adoption of unrestrained submarine warfare. Mr. Wilson's note-writing held the Germans at bay in the sense that they did not proclaim unrestricted warfare for at least two years. And the losses in tonnage which the Allies suffered during the first few years were so serious and alarming that it doesn't require much stretch of the imagination to understand how distressing might have been the turn of affairs for the Entente powers, if the United States had been eliminated from Germany's thoughts so far as submarine operations were concerned, and if the German navy had been turned loose to sink without trace everything in sight.

Could the United States have transported an army of 2,000,000 men to Europe if the British navy had not secured command of the seas? And would the British navy have achieved such mastery of the seas if two years had not been vouchsafed them in which to develop means of defense against the submarine? The military tactician and the naval strategist will have to answer those questions dispassionately, but anyone who knew the truth about submarine warfare during 1916 must admit that the Allied losses were terrific and that, had the Germans started a year earlier on unrestricted submarine warfare the whole course of events might have been changed or, at least, the war itself prolonged because the United States would not have been able so quickly to transport its armies or supplies to Europe. The Wilson policy did have the effect of delaying unrestricted submarine warfare until past the time when it could win the war for Germany.

Mr. Wilson's second inaugural address in March 1917 reflected his own consciousness of the tremendous changes that had been wrought in four years. He wrote it under the strain of one of the most remarkable situations in Congress since

the nation was born. Bitter criticism was flung at the men who defeated the will of the majority in the Senate by filibustering against the bill providing for armed neutrality. Telegrams from constituents demanding the resignations of those who had failed to stand by the President in a critical moment came from many parts of the Middle West.

The President only referred to this situation by implication in his address. He announced definitely that America would proceed with its policy.

"We stand firm," he said, "in armed neutrality, since it seems that in no other way can we demonstrate what it is we insist upon and cannot forego."

The first part of the President's speech was devoted to thoughts of the immediate future—the possibility of war. But with a hopefulness of spirit typical of so many of his writings, he drew again a picture of the world at peace on a basis of right, justice, and equality.

"The shadows that now lie dark upon our path," he concluded, "will soon be dispelled, and we shall walk with the light about us if we be but true to ourselves—to ourselves as we have wished to be known in the counsels of the world and in the thought of all those who love liberty and justice and the right exalted."

Interest in the President's address had been intense because of the unusual circumstances of its delivery. The President's announcement of his intention to go ahead with the policy of armed neutrality, notwithstanding the Senate's inaction, was regarded as the most significant thing he said. He took the manifesto signed by more than seventy Senators, who said they would vote aye if they could, as a vote of confidence.

Overshadowing even the busy activity of Congress was the interest in Germany's acknowledgment of her effort to embroil Mexico and Japan against the United States as revealed in the famous Zimmerman note. It served to intensify opinion against Germany.

President Wilson had tried to keep bitterness of feeling against Germany in bounds by declining to reveal from time to time the true nature of German insults. He refused to

"arouse patriotism." He felt he should hold down the war-spirit but the filibuster against the Armed Neutrality bill led to a dangerous sequel. Mr. Wilson had been confident that Congress and the Executive could move harmoniously in paths of restraint. His statement after the filibuster betrayed alarm. When Mr. Wilson began to use phrases concerning possible "disaster" to the nation and spoke of the United States as "helpless" before the world, they carried a special significance. They meant that he was personally fearful America was in danger, that the Zimmerman note did reveal a menace whose far-reaching character could not be overestimated. They disclosed that he was more anxious than ever to arouse the nation to patriotic fervor and that he would become even more vigorous in his leadership.

Under these circumstances of panicky thought, bitterness, resentment, and legislative confusion did Woodrow Wilson face his second term. The prospect of four years more of mental strain and incessant strife was not made brighter by the great personal tribute in the applause of the crowds, or even the pledges of support from State Legislatures and national organizations the country over. With a heavy heart Mr. Wilson took his oath in the President's Room at the Capitol on Sunday morning March 4, 1917. Surrounding him were his Cabinet and a few friends. Chief Justice White read the oath slowly in a voice husky with cold. The President repeated it. Almost at the same moment Senator Robinson, Democrat, in the chair was pronouncing these words: "The hour of twelve o'clock having arrived, by the Constitution of the United States, I hereby declare the Sixty-fourth Congress adjourned *sine die.*"

On the next day, Monday, the inaugural ceremony was repeated, for the benefit of the crowd on the East Front of the Capitol. Voice amplifiers were used for the first time at an inaugural celebration, and the crowd, comprising nearly forty thousand, was able to hear Mr. Wilson's speech clearly.

The month of March 1917 will ever be set down as unique in our history. Confusion of counsels, grave apprehensions about the nation's foreign relations, concern over an embit-

tered alien population, weariness over the long, futile fight in Congress for various measures designed to make the United States a better land to live in, measures framed in accord with the progressive spirit of the nation—all these impressions were the mental background of the great quadrennial event that brought to the national capital tens of thousands of visitors.

There was no disposition in 1917, as four years before, to prolong the merrymaking. It was a time too serious for recreation, for somehow the burden on the man who was the center of all the celebration was keenly appreciated. A dangerous international situation impended. It could not be got out of mind. Wherever the groups of politicians, state officials, or Congressional folk gathered, the topic was ever: What will the President do about the arming of ships, an extra session, and international affairs generally?

The Senate filibuster proved in the end not a defeat but merely a temporary setback. Closure for Senate debate had been one of Mr. Wilson's aims since he was elected in 1912, but he never found the opportunity favorable for its accomplishment. And a modified closure rule did result from the agitation.

As the Sixty-fourth Congress drew to a close, there was general gratification that the legislative branch of the Government, by overwhelming votes, was ready to grant the President the authority to arm American merchantmen and protect American lives on the high seas.

The debate in Congress emphasized, nevertheless, the desire of the American people to keep out of the Europan war. Not even the extreme proponents of the armament bill dared to indicate more for the future of American policy than armed neutrality. The wish to avert war was sincerely expressed on all sides, and the argument of those who wanted to limit the power of the President, while unsuccessful, was not ignored in the debate.

No one thing led the United States into war with Germany. The sinking of American ships by submarines, the loss of American lives on the high seas, the plotting of the German

foreign office of an alliance between Mexico and Japan against the United States, the proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans in defiance of the laws of war and the rights of neutrals, all of these played their influential part, but when Woodrow Wilson read his message to Congress on April 2, 1917, he idealized the war—he said it was to make the world safe for democracy through the defeat of militarism and autocracy.

Those who watched at close range the events in Washington which led to the great climax will differ in their judgments of what turned the scales to war, but it is the author's conviction that President Wilson, conscious of a united public opinion and resentful of the violation of American rights, entered the contest because he believed, first, that the United States must aid the Allies to win, and, second, that the entry of the United States was the surest means of forcing peace.

The Russian revolution, which at first inspired everyone with enthusiasm because it seemed to mean a rebirth of Russia itself, soon came to be understood as a German victory, for the new government was inefficient and the Kaiser's troops were gradually released from the Eastern Front enabling the German high command to concentrate on the Western Front, where the Allies were in danger of being overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers. Mr. Wilson never believed that a German victory would mean peace in Europe. He thought it would only be a truce until another war could be fought, for he knew the spirit of France and England. In the United States, preceding the declaration of war, there was no doubt about the determination of President Wilson. The severance of diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3rd because of the breaking of pledges had paved the way for the inevitable step. The President was simply shaping his course to write a war message that would assure him of a sympathetic opinion and an enthusiastic nation. Even in those days there was a distinct objective in Washington, fulfilled, twenty months later, when the German people overthrew the Imperial German Government and sought an armistice. Mr. Wilson recognized that his message would be looked upon by future generations as

the exposition of a new foreign policy. The Spanish-American war changed our policy in the sense that it gave us overseas possessions and interests. There was no telling in 1917 what the result might be of the bigger venture.

By making war on the Imperial German Government instead of the German people, Mr. Wilson left the door open to resume relations at any time with the German people of whom so many had migrated to America and had become useful and loyal citizens. He hoped the German people some day would demonstrate, by their choice of leaders, that they were ready and willing to return to those ways of honorable dealing and humane action which German governments had so often, in the past, manifested in their intercourse with the United States. The whole capital seemed under the spell of the historic scene in Congress when President Wilson read his war message. Fewer than fifteen hundred persons were able to hear the address, as the seating capacity of the House of Representatives is limited to that, but fifteen thousand would have pushed their way into the Capitol Building had it not been for the police.

Mr. Wilson had addressed Congress in person several times in the previous four years, but never under circumstances or setting more dramatic. The streets leading to the Capitol were crowded. White searchlights etched the dome and pillars of the nation's legislative hall against the clear blue sky. The Stars and Stripes floated in the breeze, a searchlight revealing its colors in majesty array. Two troops of United States cavalry in dress uniform, with sabers drawn, formed a guard around the entrance of the House of Representatives. Police by the hundreds, both in uniform and plain clothes, were scattered along the route taken by the President's automobile. The crowds cheered as Mr. Wilson motored by.

Inside, the members of the House, who had been in almost continuous session, were given a brief respite about eight o'clock, but they were ready to receive the President at 8:30. The Senators walked slowly from the north end of the Capitol to the House, each carrying a red, white, and blue handkerchief presented by Senator McLean of Connecticut. Members of the Supreme Court, diplomats of every nation, including Ignacio

Bonillas, the newly arrived Ambassador from Mexico, Cabinet officers—in fact, the whole United States Government, legislative, judicial and executive, gathered to hear the leader of the American people render the indictment of the United States against the Imperial Government of Germany.

The President was visibly nervous. As he turned the pages of his message, his fingers trembled. His face was pale. His voice was neither strong nor clear. He seemed to be deeply affected by the awfulness of his task. His distinguished audience, listened in profound silence as he developed America's case without bluster and without rancor. There was no applause until the President spoke these words:

"There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored, or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life."

Mr. Wilson had hardly uttered the single word "submission" when applause spontaneously issued from the fifteen hundred people before him. Chief Justice White, sitting in the front, led the handclapping, his face revealing an expression of supreme satisfaction as the President read on and on in his message.

The members, Democrats and Republicans, interrupted constantly with cheers. On the other hand, Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin did not fail to show his disagreement with what the President was saying. He threw his head back now and then with a sneering laugh which attracted the attention of his colleagues.

Expressions of approval came from all sides after the reading of the message was finished. The so-called war party was pleasantly surprised. The President had exceeded their expectations. For once, they said, he was specific. He left no ambiguous ground for debate. He was for whole-hearted support of the Entente Allies to the end.

The scene in the House, as the debate, beginning the next day, on the war resolution dragged through seventeen hours of

speeches by upwards of 150 members, were hardly inspiring. Members lounged in their seats, and "joshed" some of the speakers by excessive applause along about midnight of the third day. Representative Fitzgerald, in the chair, admonished the House members that they were not "at a vaudeville performance, but in the midst of a solemn duty." Few seemed to realize what war meant.

The club spirit was so pronounced in the House that, even though Representative Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, the Democratic leader, spoke against war and voted against it, he was hailed affectionately as a man of great courage. Many of the speakers, including Republican Leader Mann, took time to pay him tribute. On the whole, the pacifist speeches seemed to be better received than those favoring war. Representative Kitchin, Representative Roberts, Representative Decker, and others made forceful pleas against war which brought cheers and applause. The average spectator, unaccustomed to the eccentricities of House behavior, might have been perplexed at this, but in the lower branch of Congress it isn't so much what a man says that counts as the fact that he speaks his convictions. Representative Sherley of Kentucky, Garrett of Tennessee, Harrison of Mississippi, Longworth of Ohio, Fitzgerald of New York, and Lenroot of Wisconsin made the best speeches in favor of the war resolution.

Representative Hulburt of New York tried in vain several times to force a vote before midnight Thursday so that some members would not have to vote for war on Good Friday, April 6th, but Leader Mann insisted that all who wanted to speak be given an opportunity to be heard. Scores of members made five-minute speeches, with leave to extend their remarks *ad lib* in the Congressional Record.

The House grew impatient at midnight and many members shouted "Vote, vote" but Mr. Fitzgerald ignored all calls and recognized in order the men who had applied for time to speak. Representative Britten, of Illinois, proposed an amendment to prevent the President from sending troops to Europe, Asia, or Africa, without authority of Congress, but to allow those who volunteered for such service to go to the trenches. Representa-

tive Ragsdale, of South Carolina, berated Mr. Britten for declaring that the men of his district didn't want to go to the trenches while those in other parts of the country, such as New England, might so desire. Mr. Ragsdale shouted that he didn't believe citizens of any one part of the United States wanted the men in the other sections to do the fighting for them. Representative Sherley said the amendment was tantamount to saying that while we declared war, we wouldn't fight. The amendment was beaten by a *viva voce* vote.

The calling of the roll saw every member in his seat. Rarely has so great a number voted. Only ten members were absent, and those on account of illness. It was nearly four o'clock in the morning.

When the name of Miss Jeannette Rankin, of Montana, was called, she did not answer either aye or nay, but fidgeted nervously in her seat. After the roll call the names of those who had been out of the chamber were once more called and an opportunity given to vote. All eyes were turned toward the first woman Representative in Congress, who sat in the last row of the big semicircle of crowded seats. She finally rose, and apparently in deep emotion said:

"I want to stand by my country—but I cannot vote for war."

Some member shouted "Vote, vote," and the roll call proceeded. Jerry South, Clerk of the House, was sent to Miss Rankin's side to ask her how she wished to be recorded. She said in the negative. Apparently she had wanted to be excused from voting at all, and did not know that she could have been recorded as "present but not voting." There was applause from the galleries as Miss Rankin made her brief speech, and sank back into her seat, her face flushed, and her lips trembling. She had passed through a trying day. She had been urged by the National Woman Suffrage Association to vote for war, and show men that women could vote to make sacrifices, but the Congressional Union leaders, the other faction of the suffragist movement, pleaded with her to show by her vote that the women of the country wanted peace.

The House buzzed with excitement as the clerk announced the vote as overwhelmingly in favor of war, and a tired body

of men and women who had sat through the debate all day and most of the night, went home to rest after a fatiguing ordeal, many of them visibly relieved, but not a few soliloquized on the many other ordeals to come, events and sacrifices still buried in the darkness of an unknown future.

The President had been walking with Mrs. Wilson and returned to the White House just as a messenger from the Capitol, shortly after noon, brought the war resolution with the signatures of Vice-President Marshall and Speaker Clark. Without ceremony and in private the President affixed his signature at 1:19 o'clock on April 6, 1917, proclaiming to the world the existence of a state of war as against the Imperial German Government.

The joint resolution had been adopted by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 6 and had passed the House by a vote of 373 to 50.

Whistles were blown at the Navy Yard in Washington and throughout the national capital, and the wireless at the Arlington towers flashed the news to the ships of the United States Navy at sea.

The President not only directed the Secretary of State to advise all foreign nations but he issued, as well, a proclamation to the people of the United States and its insular possessions notifying them of the declaration of war and outlining the regulations for the conduct of "alien enemies" resident within the jurisdiction of the United States.

Immediately upon the signing of the war resolution which directed the President to employ the naval and military forces of the United States against Germany, and pledged all the country's resources to the successful prosecution of the war, orders were issued by the Navy Department to mobilize the fleet. Fifteen thousand men in the Naval Reserve were called to man battleships, destroyers, submarine chasers, and other craft of patrol.

As Mr. Wilson was completing the legal steps formally aligning the United States against Germany in the war, Secretary McAdoo discussed with bankers and Federal Reserve Board members at the Treasury Department questions relating to the floating of loans, taxation, and other details of financial

policy in connection with the $3,400,000,000 asked of Congress to support the new army and navy of millions of men, thousands more of marines and of bluejackets, submarine chasers, and auxiliary craft.

Not only was a new military system devised for the period of the war, but espionage bills, and a variety of other laws needed to protect the United States, both within and without its territorial confines, were drafted and promptly passed.

The President emphasized, in a statement issued from the White House immediately after signing the war resolution, that the military measures being taken were not intended "to solve the question of a permanent military policy for the country," because after the war it might be possible by international agreement to reduce and limit armaments—a pledge he labored to fulfill in later days.

CHAPTER XIII

AS A WAR EXECUTIVE

Hardly had President Wilson begun to organize America's forces when the series of missions from France and Great Britain started an era of confusion as to the best method of applying America's help to the struggle abroad. The British wanted food and ships, the French wanted troops. The story of America's mobilization is too recent and too vivid in recollection to be portrayed here. The President's burdens were staggering yet he moved into the fray with precision, kept his head and never lost sight of his main objective—peace. Even as early as October, 1917, Mr. Wilson sent Colonel House abroad to bring about if possible an understanding among the Allies on a declaration of war aims which would lay the foundation for ultimate peace. The author had occasion to present to the President in that month an inquiry propounded by a newspaper editor with reference to peace discussion. Mr. Wilson thought the newspapers could have no conception of what fire they would be playing with in discussing peace then at all, in any phase or connection. He said:

"The Germans have in effect realized their program of 'Hamburg to Bagdad', could afford to negotiate as to all the territorial fringes, and, if they could bring about a discussion of peace now, would insist upon discussing it upon terms which would leave them in possession of all they ever expect to get. It is, therefore, very indiscreet in my judgment and altogether against the national interest to discuss peace from any point of view if the Administration is brought in in any way. It is perfectly evident to everyone that what Colonel House is attempting to do neither brings peace nearer nor sets it further off, and it is my stern and serious judgment that the whole matter ought to be let alone."

In that same autumn there began an undercurrent of criticism about the conduct of the war. Early in January, 1918, the author happened to be discussing with the President the morale of the country and what should be done to erase the impression of chaos. Mr. Wilson said:

"We are working under the sternest conditions that men ever worked under since civilization began. The duty of every man in the United States just now is to look at the facts and not at the color which anybody puts upon them, and look at the facts with a view not to critcism but to cooperation, to putting everything before the public in a way which will help the public to help the Administration by straight thinking on the actual facts.

"The plan you have in view seems to me an excellent one of setting forth just how European conditions, which have again and again undergone kaleidoscopic change, necessarily react upon our work and condition it on every side.

"Since our entrance into the war we have had to change our plans half a dozen times upon earnest representation by the Allies as to radically altered conditions. Unfortunately not all of this can be put into the public prints because to do so would reveal many difficulties and disappointments on the part of the Allies which it is not necessary or desirable that our enemies should know, but the work of interpretation should rest, it seems to me, upon such statements as the Secretary of War made. As a matter of fact, all the data given in that report was carefully gone over by the House Committee on Military Affairs when considering the Army Appropriation but the whole scene needed to be described in a single statement, and the Secretary of War showed his admirable insight, ability and candor in the way in which he did it."

The statement to which Mr. Wilson referred was made by Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, and revealed the fact that the United States had proceeded further along with its war mobilization than the public had been led to believe by the attacks of the critics. The discussion of a war cabinet, indeed, the efforts of certain Senators to choose a Cabinet for Mr. Wilson, seemed thereafter to lose momentum and the Adminis-

tration went forward without embarrassment in those early months of 1918.

The attacks from the outside, however, did not cease. The author was preparing at the time an article for the *Saturday Evening Post* showing how Woodrow Wilson was managing his job, but it is an interesting fact that in the preparation of that article Mr. Wilson was of little use—all the information about his activities had to be obtained from members of the Cabinet and others who conferred with him. In this connection Mr. Wilson said early in 1918:

"I have been thinking a great deal about your proposal of an article about my executive work and I find that I can't for the life of me think it out in any way that would be striking and effective. That is my trouble. The day seldom seems impressive when summed up because most of the questions which I have decided come to me in the form of memoranda to which I reply in writing. Interviews and consultations are chiefly with people who need not have taken my time and lead to nothing except the gratification on the part of those who see me that they have had their say.

"I am hopelessly useless for publicity purposes. I have long been convinced of that. It is true that I am constantly playing a part in the formation of all important decisions which are formed in every branch of the Government's war activities, and its peace activities, too, for that matter, but after the work is done I necessarily forget its details. If you were to sit down with me and pump me I could not recall the particulars or the conferences, or the methods.

"I do not think that the articles of attack to which you refer do any particular harm. I think the people of the country are satisfied that I am keeping hold of as much of the job as is humanly possible."

The foregoing quotations were typical of many others. Mr. Wilson was not capable of self-advertisement or self-expression though he was a master of impersonal advocacy of broad policies. He was no publicity expert like Colonel Roosevelt. Woodrow Wilson never failed to hold national attention on

major questions but in the technic of iteration he was a victim of self-consciousness and modesty.

Campaign managers found him difficult to manage. Principles and ideals were his fetish, not persons or individuals; acts and results counted in government, he contended, not the idiosyncrasies of method or personality.

But Mr. Wilson's methods were novel, and, therefore, bound to excite inquiry. His disregard of precedents and traditions whenever they seemed to conflict with naturalness or directness of action will always be food for biographers, historians, scribes and critics of future days. Secretaries and attaches at the Executive offices, to whom the comings and goings of Presidents are almost like the passing of the seasons, testify to Mr. Wilson's originality. For they found him unlike his predecessors from the very day he sent back to them the first memorandum which they had submitted to him for his approval or disapproval and on which he wrote in pencil the curious phrase "Okeh W. W." They hazarded guess after guess as to where the President got the word. They had heard of his wholesome respect for the English language. Finally, after more memoranda similarly marked came to them, one of the assistant secretaries asked the President why he didn't use the abbreviation "O. K."

"Because it's wrong," replied the President as he went on signing his mail. "O-k-e-h"—he spelled it out—"is the correct word."

There was a sudden search for dictionaries that day, but though some of the lexicons attributed the use of "O. K." to Andrew Jackson for "Oll Korrect," none made mention of "okeh."

"Look it up in the latest dictionary," suggested the President to his puzzled inquirer. And here is part of what was found:

"O. K.—a humorous or ignorant spelling of what should be 'okeh,' from the Choctaw language, meaning 'It is so,' an article pronoun having a distinctive final use; all right; correct; used as an indorsement of a bill."

So it came about that "Okeh W. W." was a kind of symbol of executive power in and about the White House.' Most of

Woodrow Wilson's decisions were made on paper, and that ancient Indian word conveys the approval of the Chief Executive to many vital acts of government policy. For his was primarily an administration by letter or memorandum, a reliance on the written rather than the oral word. It was Mr. Wilson's conception of how he could best manage his big job—a theory thoroughly and completely his own.

Was it an effective way? There is in truth no formula for a war president any more than there was a formula for extraordinary war. There is no precedent by which we can judge Woodrow Wilson because nobody ever had Woodrow Wilson's job to do. He felt his way forward amid the emergencies of rapidly changing situations—just like a general in the field.

Twenty-seven men have been President of the United States, but no two have been alike in manner, method or personality. No two had exactly the same problems, Nevertheless, we attempt to gauge our Presidents by the standards of bygone days. We gather from a dramatic, forceful, bellicose type an impression of the vigorous Executive, and forthwith imagine that vigor can be expressed only in terms of sharp gesticulation or grim-set teeth.

We want each President on taking office to have absorbed all the fine qualities of his predecessors and to have rid himself of all their ill-fated theories. We want no jerky curves in the chart of intermittent administration. We covet regularity, symmetry and unremitting efficiency, no matter who the man or what the barrier. We want to synchronize men and policies. And our demands take the form of personal likes and dislikes of the incumbent President, according as he resembles or differs from the picture we have mentally drawn. We admit that a thoughtful Providence created Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson in different image, but we unconsciously imagine a composite personality—a combination of all the wisdom of past experience. We insist that the President, in time of war, must be even more than this—he must be meticulously nonpartisan, judicially poised and scrupulously impartial to every interest, be it social, financial or commercial. What we think we ought to have is a

kind of coalition president—but what we really describe is a Utopian superman.

Mr. Wilson did business by a minimum of personal conference and a maximum of personal correspondence. No mind could retain all the things that would be said to a president were he to see even half the subordinate officials who seek to talk with him. Anything that was worth while saying at all, reasoned Mr. Wilson, could be said on paper. Any business that could not be dispatched through the frankness of the written word had better not be dispatched at all. Persons who wished to take the President's time, with the exception of Cabinet officers and members of Congress, had to make known to him in advance something of their errand. Cabinet officers and heads of commissions, boards and bureaus wrote long letters to the President every day and were given comprehensive instructions in reply. It may not have been the most effective way—but it was a new way of administering the Presidency, and, applied to the mechanism of war, was probably the most distinctive case of executive management in the world.

There were many "okehs" from the pen of Woodrow Wilson to requests for engagements, but the great majority of persons who sought audience with the President were unsuccessful in their quest. From this rose the impression that Mr. Wilson was an exclusive person, that he "didn't see people" and was too much to himself.

Critics rose, therefore, to question whether Mr. Wilson was a good executive, a good administrator. But criticism, to be useful, must be based on truth. And most of the amateur critics who arrived in our national capital to dissect the war machine, to pick flaws and expose weak spots, found nothing more difficult to ascertain than just what President Wilson did with his time.

Some of the newcomers were not dismayed by that drawback, but absorbed all the gossip and hearsay, all the peevishness and petulance of intemperate officialdom, and after a few days of more or less personal observation set down in sophistic sentences that Mr. Wilson was a fine moral leader but none the less a poor executive.

Others, more charitably inclined and of longer memory, admitted that Mr. Wilson got along pretty well as an executive in public business during the years before we entered the war, but as to the huge tasks of organization incident to the fighting, why, a man so peacefully inclined couldn't put ginger and pep into the enterprise of war! They caught a glimpse of him motoring to and from the golf links; they saw him at the theater enjoying the show. Of this recreation they were informed; of his work they were ignorant. They saw a list of engagements at the Executive Offices daily, they read his proclamations and occasional speeches to Congress, and they imagined this constituted the sum total of his effort.

That's the trouble—they imagined. Imagination may help understand the romance of war, but fact is indispensable to valid criticism. There ought to be more known about what a President does—how he manages his job. It would help every President to understand the spirit and temper of his critics, but it would mostly help the country to understand a President.

True enough, the public impression of Mr. Wilson was quite different from the actual personality of the man. The President himself remarked that of all the sketches and articles that were written about him since he entered public life he was able to recognize himself in only a few of them. He was portrayed either as a cold, methodical mental machine, devoid of sentiment and emotion, or described as a dilettante and dreamer, full of abstract visions, discouragingly impractical in concrete performance.

"I have never read an article about myself," said President Wilson, "in which I recognized myself, and I have come to have the impression that I must be some kind of a fraud, because I think a great many of these articles are written in absolute good faith. I tremble to think of the variety and falseness in the impressions I make—and it is being borne in on me that it may change my very disposition—that I am a cold and removed person who has a thinking machine inside which he adjusts to the circumstances, which he does not allow to be removed by any winds of affection or emotion of any kind but

turns like a cold searchlight on anything that is presented to his attention and makes it work.

"I am not aware of having any detachable apparatus inside of me. On the contrary, if I were to interpret myself, I would say that my constant embarrassment is to restrain the emotions that are inside of me. You may not believe it but I sometimes feel like a fire from a far from extinct volcano, and if the lava does not seem to spill over it is because you are not high enough to see into the basin and see the caldron boil. Because, truly, in the position which I now occupy there is a sort of, I do not know how else to express it than to say, passionate sense of being connected with my fellowmen in a peculiar relationship of responsibility.

"I have mixed, first and last, with all sorts and conditions of men—there are mighty few kinds of men that have to be described to me, and there are mighty few kinds of experiences that have to be described to me—and when I think of the number of men who are looking to me as the representative of a party with hope, with the hope for all varieties of salvation from the things they are struggling in the midst of, it makes me tremble.

"It makes me tremble not only with a sense of my own inadequacy and weakness, but as if I were shaken by the very things that are shaking them, and if I seem circumspect, it is because I am so diligently trying not to make any colossal blunders. If you just calculated the number of blunders a fellow can make in twenty-four hours if he is not careful and if he does not listen more than he talks, you would know something of the feeling that I have."

For the conflicting versions of himself Mr. Wilson was partly to blame. He shunned personal publicity; it was genuinely odious to him. Full description, however, of half the things that Woodrow Wilson did from the beginning of the war would probably have answered many of those who were skeptical of his whole-hearted interest in the military and naval sides of the war as distinguished from diplomatic phases and the interchange of peace speeches.

Take one thing, which for many months was unknown to

the country and certainly to all but a few persons in Washington—something that would have made a splendid newspaper story at the time, something that would have refuted completely the absurd notion that Mr. Wilson's passion for peace and an end to the world's agony made it impossible for him to express contemporaneously a passion for war, for action, for victory as a means of peace.

It happened early in 1917. Our Navy was getting ready for action overseas. We had sent many destroyers forth, but the bulk of our forces were at home. The President left Washington for a trip on the *Mayflower*—the newspapers said. That was true, but they knew not where he went. The *Mayflower* moved slowly down the Potomac and several miles out to sea, where on the deck of one of the biggest American dreadnoughts the next afternoon were gathered the officers of the Atlantic Fleet. Everyone in home waters was there. Orders for the assembly had been previously issued by Secretary Daniels.

The President tabooed ceremony. There was no salute of guns or pomp of celebration. He went directly to the business in hand. And the business in hand was telling the officers of the Navy of the United States that the submarine had to be beaten and that they had to do it. He talked—and if you ever heard a football coach talk to his team between the halves, if you ever heard a captain tell his men what he expected of them as they stripped for action, if you ever knew what the fighting spirit of Woodrow Wilson really was when it was on fire—then you could visualize the whole scene. He wanted not merely as good a record from our Navy as other navies had, he wanted a better record. He wanted action, not merely from the gold-braided admirals but from the ensigns too; and he wanted every mind turned to the solution of the submarine question; and regardless of rank or distinction he wanted all to work and fight for the common object—victory.

Somebody suggested to the President that the speech be published. He declined. Most of it wasn't said to be published. It was a direct talk from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to his men. It was inspiration itself. The officers cheered and went away across the seas. And they gave an account of them-

selves that won the admiration of their Allies and the involuntary respect of their foes.

Some other President might have had the reporters present. The latter would have been all too eager to go. The movies might have been brought along. But what the President had to say was not for the reporters or the public, but "in the family," to the Navy. History could record the results.

No wonder there were so many different impressions of Mr. Wilson extant, that some people called him exclusive, shy, indifferent, taken up with himself, visionary and abstract. Not knowing what he did do they imagined he did nothing. Reading the acts of individuals in official life subordinate to the President they did not see the directing hand of the man who was responsible for the policies which those subordinates executed.

It is difficult to give a complete picture of Woodrow Wilson at work—and be fair. One got only glimpses here and there. For the things he did were written in countless memoranda distributed throughout dozens and dozens of bureaus, divisions and departments. They were conveyed over private telephone wires and through unseen and unknown switchboards. They were messaged in private letters as well as in numerous rules and regulations. They were courteously uttered and clearly explained in personal consultations and Cabinet conferences.

The President was by habit economical, but most thrifty in the use of time. He figured out that he could handle a problem much faster and more effectively if he got all phases before him in writing than if he received various individuals interested in the same thing. He had a passion for facts. They were the things that made him change his mind. That's why he didn't hesitate to reverse himself. Facts, he said, would always conquer mere opinion. And so many of the things brought to the President's attention were purely opinion.

Many people said "Oh, if I could only get this to the President!" and they tried to think of unusual ways to reach him. They wanted to see him in person. They claimed to be unable to write it; they must deliver themselves of a speech to him. But Mr. Wilson had the same thing presented to him by a dozen other people, and he believed it would be a waste of his

time to grant the interview. By insisting on a memorandum he could determine whether the subject matter was new. Letters written directly to the White House which contained new suggestions reached him, of course; but so also did letters transmitted by members of the Senate and House in behalf of their constituents.

There was indeed much uncertainty about getting personal interviews with the President, but any man who could write convincingly and express his thoughts clearly on paper had a much better chance of winning Mr. Wilson's approval for his idea or project than if he actually did present it in person. When a memorandum with a new viewpoint came, he asked for an opinion from the department in question. Then he examined all the papers together and made his own decision. To give consideration to matters that seemed feasible on their face but against which some practical object might later be made by a division or bureau of the Government, meant a loss of time and energy. By the written method, Mr. Wilson considered himself safeguarded, too, against roundabout and indirect drains on his time. If he wanted to discuss a subject further he could summon the individual or telephone him.

And Mr. Wilson used the telephone more than any other President. For instance, he had private telephone wires to Secretary Lansing, to Secretary Baker and to Secretary Daniels. The newspapermen wrote only of the conferences they knew about, those that they saw. On days of big happenings in international politics they recorded it as very significant if members of the Cabinet were seen going into consultation with the President, but they were obviously unaware of the many more times that Mr. Wilson conducted his consultation over the wire.

The President telephoned to scores of officials, Senators and Representatives, not merely because it was a more rapid means of communication, but he could end the conversation so much more easily. Incidentally there was no one in Washington who could terminate a personal conference so gracefully when the business in hand was completed. There was no lingering gossip or story-telling. Not that Mr. Wilson wouldn't have en-

joyed it as much as did Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Taft, but in only rare cases did Mr. Wilson permit himself any such relaxation. He kept on the go every minute.

Take Cabinet meetings, for instance; they were rarely debating councils. Government business was handled by departments, and Mr. Wilson frequently on Cabinet days saw his secretaries separately for a half hour or more, dispatching with them in rapid fashion the vital matters which they brought to his eye. The President necessarily gave less of his time to some departments during the war than he did before. He depended more than ever on men like Secretary Lane, who had absolutely a free hand in the Interior Department. He kept in the closest possible touch with the Department of State; but Secretary Lansing so organized his department that only when the Government was about to embark on large policies, involving, of course, the initiative of the Chief Executive, who is constitutionally responsible for foreign policy, did Mr. Lansing take any of his problems to the White House. This permitted the President to keep his mind free for the formulation of principles of action rather than details. But it was surprising the number of details Mr. Wilson did keep in mind. Every Cabinet officer will tell you that. The President, for instance, read every cablegram of importance that came to the Department of State. He examined carefully the long reports from Ambassadors and Ministers abroad.

Someone has said that Secretary Baker was closer to the President than anyone else in the Cabinet. It should have been stated just the other way: The President was closer to Secretary Baker than to anyone else in the Cabinet, because the job in the War Department was the biggest single task before the Executive branch of the whole Government. So was Mr. Wilson close to Secretary Daniels. He was a party to every move made to bring the United States Navy into effective cooperation with the Allied navies. It was the President who was consulted by Secretary Daniels before Vice Admiral Sims was sent abroad. It was the President who helped distribute the high naval officers, and he surprised even his intimate friends every now and then by his analytical comment of the work of

individual naval officers. He knew personally of the service being rendered by the men of high command and kept in touch with their activities as if they were in the Navy Department at Washington. But these were things which were part of the job of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy—and in time of war they were necessarily kept secret.

Until the war was over it remained a secret just what part the President played in the naval councils of the Allies, and, for that matter, in the deliberations of the Allied War Council at Versailles. General Tasker H. Bliss sent his reports to the War Department, but they went to the President of the United States too. It was General Pershing who thrilled America with the eloquent offer of American forces to General Foch at a critical stage in the German offensive, but it was President Wilson in the White House who directed the move. Other Presidents might have blusteringly given themselves publicity at such a moment—not so Woodrow Wilson. Yet he was as much a part of American military and naval strategy as if he were sitting in London or Versailles himself.

The President took just as intense an interest in the fighting side of the war as in the public discourses by which he hoped to win the liberals in the Central Powers to an overthrow of German militarism. Not only did he direct through the Committee on Public Information the efforts made to express to the whole world the viewpoint of America in the war, but he became absorbed in the military technic which contributed the essential force to victory.

While the discussions were going on in the press and in Congress about the Springfield rifle and the Enfield rifle, Mr. Wilson had nothing to say. Secretary Baker made the public explanations of policy. But Mr. Wilson, months before, familiarized himself with every decision involving the use of these types of rifles. He did not merely take someone else's word for it. Military men had to demonstrate it to him, and up in the President's study were two or three of those rifles, which he could take apart as quickly and explain as clearly as anybody in the Ordnance Department.

How did the President get public opinion? He showed a

remarkable exactness in approximating the wishes of the people, and the curious part of it was that a man mingling so little with the outside world should have been so well informed. Of course, fundamentally, the President followed his instincts in determining what was right and what was wrong. But he watched very carefully opinion as it was expressed, not merely in the East, but in the South, the Middle West, the Northwest and the Far West. Editorials in the newspapers and magazines were, to be sure, one way by which Mr. Wilson gauged public sentiment. But of that more later.

As for editorials, they fell into classes—those that were respectful in their criticisms and those that were not. The staff of secretaries, who sifted out the editorials, brushed aside the latter kind. They were of the sort that produced only anger and irritation and were usually of extreme prejudice. Differences of opinion were welcomed; but it was one thing to take issue by clear and forceful expression, and another thing merely to call names. Every day the editorial opinion of the country was clipped from the newspapers and set before Mr. Wilson by subjects. Editorials typical of each section of the country were selected so that the President might not be required to wade through several editorials expressing the same point of view.

Many people wondered just how much the President was influenced by editorial opinion. Watching events and policies in the national capital for some years, it was my observation that many of the ideas which found their way into Mr. Wilson's speeches and proclamations of public policy came from the people—through the newspapers. Sometimes his absorption of newspaper opinion was unconscious, but in many cases he probably would have been the first to admit that among the valuable means by which he was guided to interpret the will of America was editorial expression.

But there was another way. Woodrow Wilson had many personal friends. He remembered the soundness or unsoundness of each man's judgment in the past. These friends wrote him continuously. The President relied constantly upon the help of thousands of friends, and in that latter number were always persons with whom he was not himself acquainted. He

knew of their reputations or the things for which they stood; or else, through persons in whom the President had confidence, came the views of other men whose opinions were worth while. In this way Mr. Wilson not only acquired an idea of the thought of American communities during the war but learned promptly of popular complaints.

The President's time, of course, did not permit of a detailed study of public opinion every day in the week. He relied upon Secretary Tumulty and Colonel House and others to keep him informed. He had absolute confidence in these advisers—in their fidelity and disinterestedness of judgment. Secretary Tumulty was constantly bombarded. He received by far the bulk of the complaints, suggestions or requests that were intended for the President. He kept in close touch with the newspaper correspondents—absorbed all their information and gossip; and if something happened that required the attention of the President immediately he did not hesitate to communicate promptly with the Chief Executive.

The Cabinet officers and their friends constituted another source of information. When all was said and done, the President knew that, though he was not personally accessible to those who wished to air their views, he was at all times accessible to anyone who would put those views on paper. Mr. Wilson had a singular dislike for conferences or conversations on subjects that were "too delicate to be put on paper."

The President formed his judgment of men not by personal impression but by analyzing their work. A most remarkable quality of the President, indeed, was his power of analysis of things written. But he showed on the other hand an even more intense power of concentration on things spoken. He had a quick grasp of the most complicated or technical subjects. Men who talked with him, for instance, about developments in the steel industry came away impressed by his knowledge of its detail. Railroad executives said the same thing. Financiers and labor leaders said it too. These men did not always agree with Mr. Wilson's theories, but usually they found him much better informed on basic facts than they had supposed before visting the White House.

Mr. Wilson very quickly got at the heart of subjects under discussion at Cabinet meetings. Minutes counted; and the President never forgot that ,either. After a week of conferences, voluminous correspondence with nearly every division and bureau of the Government engaged in the war activities, telephone conversations and personal visits, the President tried to rest on Saturdays and Sundays. He made absolutely no engagements on those days except in rare emergencies.

He tried to catch up on the week-end. He read memoranda, digests of army and navy intelligence reports and communications of a confidential nature. All of these things he had, perhaps, glanced at during the week. But those laid aside for more careful reading occupied him on Saturdays and Sundays. If he went away on a trip on the *Mayflower* on a week-end he took his papers with him. The President's job was mostly one of reading and studious examination of written reports. In this busy age many people may think reflection means indecision, but with Mr. Wilson the art of meditation was not lost. He liked to mull over problems, especially to make sure of the facts. He was open-minded until the whole case was in. His decisions were then irrevocable unless new facts could be presented.

From the war's beginning Mr. Wilson made frequent visits in person to the different war bureaus. He developed the habit of dropping in when least expected. His calls were brief, but for the most part they were in the nature of a relaxation for the President when he wanted to stretch his legs.

The secret of Mr. Wilson's physical well-being through the war crisis was his ability to detach himself completely from his work for a few hours every day. That's why when he did work he could work hard and penetrate to the very details of numerous problems. For the President's interest in detail was as surprising to his subordinates as it was significant of the extent to which he felt his responsibility for the success of the war machine. Many things, of course, were sent to the President for his "okeh" which were approved without change, but if they contained a flaw usually it was the President who detected it.

"We sent some regulations to the President," said an official in the Treasury Department, "and though we had no doubt of their approval we felt that Regulation Five was a perplexing one. We made no comment on it. Sure enough, it came back —approved all except Regulation Five. That, the President said, had been taken up by two of the other departments of the Government and would require further study by them. He remembered it—though in reality it was a thing I never would have supposed he could have kept in mind."

As an illustration of the same strength of memory, another instance is cited: The President promised Secretary McAdoo that beginning April 6, 1918, for a period of three weeks there would be no campaigns for food or fuel conservation, Red Cross or kindred activities. Secretary Lansing's department received a request for approval of a loyalty celebration to be given by Greeks in this country on April seventh, an anniversary of particular significance to Greeks. It was a little thing, comparatively speaking—but the President had some weeks before given his promise to the Treasury Department, and he suggested that some other day be found for the celebration desired.

Mr. Wilson's memory stood him in good stead in other ways. Once he tackled a problem, however unfamiliar its subject matter, he retained what he had learned. This faculty was invaluable, too, in the filing of correspondence and the handling of his papers. Attachés say that he could almost invariably direct them to the place where a letter might be found. His desk was piled high with papers, but they were all arranged in order, and the President could always tell just exactly where in this pile a certain memorandum was located. And as a rule he could tell also if his papers had been disturbed by any of his secretaries.

The President kept up to his mail every day. He did not delay decisions on matters that needed prompt attention. I have heard it said by men in executive position in the Government that during the war they could get an answer faster from the President than from officials much less important. The President dictated to only one stenographer, Charles

Swem, in the forenoon; but he was often his own stenographer, especially at night, when he typed brief notes to Cabinet officers or subordinate officials.

Almost never did he require a letter rewritten. He knew exactly what he wanted to say—at the moment he concentrated on the saying of it. He rarely wrote long letters; most of them were not more than two or three sentences, but they were always polite and courteous, never blunt or brusque. His orders were rarely imperative in tone; but their very phraseology was nevertheless compelling. And requests or suggestions signed "W. W.," of which there were many in the Government, were rarely denied except for good and sufficient reasons made plain to the Chief Executive himself in similar memoranda.

Hardly a governmental policy of importance that the United States undertook during the war but had the personal attention of the President. He watched every move in the controversy over wooden ships, and when he eliminated General Goethals and William Denman in the controversy over ships he was better acquainted than any other man in Washington with their incompatibilities.

The President, moreover, kept his finger on the Shipping Board and tonnage construction. He insisted on detailed reports, and studied them carefully. The selective-service act was put into operation only after it was explained minutely to him. Many of the points proclaimed in the series of regulations had to have his approval before being issued. He studied the plan for the drawings to determine liability of service, examined the questionnaire, and took no small part in the mobilization of the draft army.

For days and days he analyzed questions of transportation, not to the exclusion of everything else, but with perhaps more intensity than he gave to any other subject. His study of the railroad question didn't begin until December 1917, when the agitation arose. He had been following it carefully from the beginning of the war. His final decision in favor of government control came after long discussions with Cabinet officers, after thorough study of reports on the British experience, and

after examining data submitted in person by railroad men and financiers of national prominence.

These were only a few of the big problems with which he dealt every day.

Many people tried to draw parallels between the President's Cabinet and the British and French war ministries. In the latter two cases the cabinets were part of the majority parties in the national legislatures. Abroad the entire cabinet was responsible. But Mr. Wilson was really his own premier. His was the responsibility for everything the members of his Cabinet did. The secretaries acted for him. He delegated authority to them. But on him was the final responsibility for what was done or undone—no matter how many war councils or war cabinets he had by legislative or executive fiat.

Mr. Wilson was the kind of Executive who wanted to know constantly what was going on round him. He was too busy to shout from the housetops all that he knew, and his silence on many phases of war preparation that was the subject of public criticism did not always mean that he was ignorant thereof. Sometimes he was assisted to an understanding of a weakness in the machine by the exposures in the press; but at a time when the morale of the people could be weakened by exaggerated statements and unverified impressions, Mr. Wilson told his friends that he believed newspapers or individuals on discovering things wrong in the Government's war machine should at least advise the Executive before carrying the case to the public prints.

Some things went wrong from the beginning of the war. Many things went right. We expanded on an unprecedented scale. We built a house and at the same time tried to live in it, and some people thought they ought to be permitted to live in it with the same comfort as before. The national capital was congestion itself. The President worked harder than ever, and he was a hard-working citizen even in times of peace; but his years of experience were an incalculable preparation for the big executive job he had during the war. He knew the government machine like a book.

The President did not pretend that he could manage the

whole job with efficiency in every single branch of it. Too many human equations were involved. But he believed the American people were satisfied that he was doing all that was humanly possible. To them he turned always with an abiding faith that when all was said and done, when his administration was ended and he passed from the stage, the people would write opposite his name that simple Choctaw word of which he was so fond, and thus make his epitaph in history, at least with respect to the war, read "Woodrow Wilson, Okeh."

CHAPTER XIV

WHEN POLITICS WAS NOT "ADJOURNED"—THE END OF THE WAR

Outwardly, politics was "adjourned", to use Mr. Wilson's own words, during the period beginning with the declaration of war on April 6, 1917 and the Armistice November 11, 1918, but the atmosphere inside Washington was hardly less partisan than in peace times. The country as a whole knew very little of the partisan warfare going on at the national capital. Whether the course of the President provoked his opponents to a display of partisanship or whether they on the other hand were unable to permit a Democratic President to carry the laurels of a war in which Republicans as well as Democrats were fighting, it is unnecessary and futile to discuss. The fact remains that Woodrow Wilson was conscious of the partisanship on Capitol Hill and resented bitterly the efforts made to furnish him with a war cabinet. He was convinced that this was not a constructive but a destructive move. His theory was that most of the big interests which had been selling materials to the Allies before the United States entered the war sought a means of safeguarding their business by getting their own personnel into governmental bureaus. There never was any real intention on Mr. Wilson's part to ignore the business interests of the country but in the prosecution of the war he had two fundamental ideas. One was that men who had been the mainstay of the American army knew more than civilians did about military matters, while the practical men in the United States Navy knew more than any outsiders about the conduct of the fleet. President Wilson gave a free hand to General Pershing—he never rebuked him or withheld support. To the credit of Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War,

may it also be said that he backed up General Pershing on every occasion.

But the war was not merely a combat of armies and navies, it was a struggle of materials. Here Mr. Wilson floundered about expecting the business interests of the country themselves to render the support to the officially accredited body known as the Council of National Defense. In these advisory bodies, strangely enough, the first breakdown occurred. The business men could hardly be blamed. They encountered in Washington a mesh of red tape and antiquated regulations. Many of them accepted positions in the Army and Navy only to find the question of discipline and rank so vexatious that it stifled business initiative and repressed enterprise.

President Wilson's shrewd maneuver in answering the cries for a war cabinet by demanding of Congress the legal power to consolidate bureaus and cut red tape right and left was one of the most important factors in the efficient mobilization of America's resources. The selection of Bernard M. Baruch of New York to be Chairman of the War Industries Board marked the beginning of an era of true coordination. Vance McCormick was put in charge of the War Trade Board which dealt with the embargo and administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Dr. Harry A. Garfield, a former colleague of President Wilson at Princeton, was placed in charge of the Fuel Administration. Herbert Hoover won his place as Food Administrator because of the splendid work he had done on the American Commission for the Relief of Belgium.

As one looks over the list of men whom Mr. Wilson put into positions of responsibility during the war there is no escaping the impression that he followed not the rule of party but the rule of personal trust and personal loyalty. Early in the conflict there was talk of a coalition cabinet similar to that which had been established in Great Britain and in other parliamentary governments abroad. But Mr. Wilson would not listen to it. He said coalition cabinets meant constant wrangling and political friction. Throughout the government, however, many Republicans were appointed to positions of importance and in a general way no distinction as to party was

made. The President's conception of his own responsibility led him to select only those whom he knew personally. With him loyalty counted for more than a reputed executive ability. Mr. Wilson always had a suspicion of the expert *per se*. The superefficient business man who might be proposed as the most capable man to administer a certain job might be all that was claimed, but Woodrow Wilson did not like to be disturbed by thoughts that men in whom he had reposed large powers might not be loyal to him. And by loyal to him was meant simply a willingness to carry out the ideals and policies in public office which President Wilson had set as his standard.

It is interesting to note, however, that the President did not permit this line of reasoning to interfere in any way with the actual administration of the military or naval establishment. He did not dictate appointments to the General Staff nor did he question the activities of the naval command. To him the uniform was sacred and nobody in it could be other than loyal to the best interests of the Government irrespective of party. Men like General Enoch Crowder, who had administered the selective draft act, and General Peyton March, who was Chief of Staff in Washington, can testify to the free hand given them in the discharge of their duties. It was a policy that helped to win the war though it brought about plenty of friction between the Executive and Congress.

Although Mr. Wilson outlined his famous fourteen points in January, 1918, no dissent was heard in Congress. Senator Lodge did not express his opposition until the following August when he made a speech in the Senate which Mr. Wilson feared would give the impression abroad of disunity in American councils. On September 21st Representative F. H. Gillett, acting floor leader for the Republicans, made a speech to the House insisting that a Republican Congress should be elected. Representative Fess of Ohio in accepting on the same day the chairmanship of the Republican Congressional campaign committee, announced his purpose to work for the election of a Republican Congress. On October 23d, the two former Presidents of the United States, Taft and Roosevelt, both Republicans, united in a joint appeal to the voters of the

State of Michigan to support Truman H. Newberry, who was the Republican nominee for the United States Senate, in opposition to Henry Ford who was then running on the Democratic ticket.

Then former President Roosevelt sent an identical telegram to Senators Lodge, Poindexter and Hiram Johnson which was published on the morning of October 25th. Mr. Roosevelt said:

"I earnestly hope that on behalf of the American people the Senate will declare against the adoption in their entirety of the fourteen points of President Wilson's address of last January as offering a basis for a peace satisfactory to the United States."

The Colonel added that the fourteen points were "thoroughly mischievous" and if made the basis of a peace, "such a peace would represent not the unconditional surrender of Germany but the conditional surrender of the United States."

President Wilson regarded this as a challenge to his leadership. The Germans had already appealed for peace and on October 12th had promised that the fourteen points would be accepted as a basis for peace discussion. Under the circumstances the Roosevelt telegrams aggravated Mr. Wilson and made him apprehensive that he could not expect united support from the Republicans in making peace. The next day, October 26th, he issued his appeal to the American people for a Democratic Congress to support his peace program.

Mr. Wilson did not understand why Chairman Will Hays of the Republican National Committee, former President Roosevelt, and former President Taft should be pointing out that the country could be kept from ruin and disaster only by electing a Republican Congress, while he, as the leader of the Democratic party, which they hoped to oust, should be forced to remain silent and without means of defense.

Mr. Wilson was no more able of course to control the desires of those Democrats who believed they deserved reelection than he was to compel Chairman Hays and Senator Penrose and Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt from attending Republican state conventions and crying out for the return of the

Republican party. Visions there were of nonpartisan elections, but only as between candidates whose loyalty had been questioned. Where both aspirants had been loyal in every sense, and had pledged themselves to a winning-of-the-war program, the fight undoubtedly was along the usual lines of party as before. But the Administration took as its precedent the words of Col. Theodore Roosevelt, who, when the United States had not yet made peace with Spain, was a candidate for Governor of New York:

"Remember that whether you will or not, your votes this year will be viewed by the nations of Europe from one standpoint only. They will draw no fine distinctions. A refusal to sustain the President this year will, in their eyes, be read as a refusal to sustain the efforts of our Peace Commission to secure the fruits of the war. Such a refusal may not inconceivably bring about a rupture of the peace negotiations. It will give heart to our defeated antagonists; it will make possible the interference of those doubtful neutral nations, who in this struggle have wished us ill."

Former President Harrison pleaded for a Republican Congress to support McKinley in November, 1898, declaring that "if the word goes forth that the people of the United States are standing solidly behind the President, the task of the Peace Commissioners will be easy, but if there is a break in the ranks, if the Democrats score a telling victory, if Democratic Senators, Congressmen, and Governors are elected, Spain will see in it a gleam of hope."

Nobody suspected that the Republicans of 1918 were any less anxious for America's program to succeed than were the Democrats in 1898, but the impression abroad in 1918 was something which the Wilson Administration was as solicitous about as were Messrs. Roosevelt and Harrison twenty years before.

Both sides, of course, claimed to be supporting the President in his war program, but the Democratic view of Republican support was that it was qualified by a partisan jealousy and an ungovernable party impulse to delay and baffle the Administration's effort by cavil and criticism, making cooperation and

support often a matter of difficulty. Then there were Republicans who felt the same way about Democrats, openly claiming that the President would get further ahead with a Republican than with a Democratic Congress. But, on a point of this character, the leader of the Democratic party, the President, felt he was a better judge.

"The leaders of the minority," said the President in his appeal to the country, "have unquestionably been pro-war, but they have been anti-administration. At almost every turn, since we entered the war, they have sought to take the choice of policy and the conduct of the war out of my hands and put it under the control of instrumentalities of their own choosing. . . . .

"The return of a Republican majority to either house of the Congress would, moreover, certainly be interpreted on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my leadership. . . .

"I have no thought of suggesting that any political party is paramount in matters of patriotism. I feel too keenly the sacrifices which have been made in this war by all our citizens, irrespective of party affiliations, to harbour any such idea. I mean only that the difficulties and delicacies of our present task are of a sort that makes it imperatively necessary that the nation should give its undivided support to the Government under a unified leadership, and that a Republican Congress would divide the leadership.

"I need not tell you, my fellow countrymen, that I am asking your support, not for my own sake or for the sake of a political party, but for the sake of the nation itself, in order that its inward unity of purpose may be evident to the world".

The appeal was a shock to the country. The Republicans might have been anti-administration in Washington but, outside of the national capital, they had no such reputation. Despite Mr. Wilson's disclaimer that he was accusing the Republicans of a lack of patriotism, the leaders were not slow to tell the country that he had in effect failed to give the entire Republican party credit for its proper share in winning the war.

The President had stated explicitly that he did not question the patriotism of his opponents. When criticism on this point

came from all parts of the country, Mr. Wilson refused to say anything more. He did not realize the necessity of iterating his views. He did not answer the Republican accusations. He said not a word from the day his appeal was issued till the November day when he lost both houses of Congress—and he did not even comment then on the result. He could not understand the meaning of the defeat.

Although Mr. Wilson was partisan enough to wish to see the Democratic party continued in power, he was desirous, on the other hand, without doubt of winning a vote of confidence so that he might go to the Peace Conference with the united support of the nation behind him. He had anticipated political opposition to his peace program. Hints of it had come in the speeches of Senator Lodge, statements of Colonel Roosevelt and other Republican leaders.

Mr. Wilson was accused during the months of September and October of getting ready to make a "soft peace" and his political opponents encouraged the formation of "Unconditional Surrender Clubs" throughout the country. These clubs were superfluous to all who knew the facts, for President Wilson had placed entire confidence in Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who was to fix the military terms of the truce. Mr. Wilson did not attempt to participate in the making of the armistice terms by the Naval and Military High Command of the Allied forces. It was not he who suggested that his previous addresses should be made the basis of peace negotiations. Germany chose that course. And the Allies with proper reservations accepted the German peace proposal and the Armistice was duly signed.

The approach of the end had been sensed in America. Indeed, Mr. Wilson for several months had been giving attention to the questions that would arise at the peace table and had expected that Colonel House who went abroad during 1917 would assist in the arrangements for peace.

President Wilson addressed three questions to Germany in answer to her plea for peace. As they were issued to the American people they provoked much comment, and in some cases bitter criticism. They were not understood because the

President was not in a position to take the public into his confidence.

"What will be the effect—what do you hope to accomplish by the inquiry?" was asked of Mr. Wilson by a friend.

"This will bring revolution to Germany," he replied. "Her people are ready to overthrow their present rulers to get peace."

The President by his answer to Germany intended to test the good faith of the new Socialist Government that had come into power, an event of which the world generally took little notice. He meant also to sow the seeds of social revolution.

The President's prediction was fulfilled. Mr. Wilson had more information than the public, most of it confidential, and during the last month of the war he was more worried over the prospect of anarchy in Europe than anything else. He knew that when the German request for an armistice came, Germany was on the road to collapse, and his concern was how to manage the situation without forcing Bolshevism on Germany, a disease of such contagion that, if left unchecked, might spread to neighboring countries.

Accused by his critics of trying to "negotiate" peace with Germany, and of "weakening," by newspapers and public speakers, the President deliberately ignored this criticism and acted as he thought best. He sacrificed the good esteem of these critics for a short time, with the conviction that the events of the future would vindicate his position.

From the moment Germany made her first plea for a cessation of hostilities on land, on sea, and in the air, it was apparent to the President that she was trying hard to surrender and keep some kind of a governmental structure intact for the making of peace. The President refused to heed the cries which bade him have nothing to do with any German Government, which bade him order the armies to proceed to Berlin and to permit the Allied troops to go on fighting indefinitely until Germany was occupied. Mr. Wilson felt a wiser course would be to recognize Germany's desperate effort to keep herself from anarchy, to assist the Socialist Democrats of Germany into power, and to render such cooperation as would

prevent Germany from becoming another Russia—ruled by the red flag of terror.

Even before the public was aware of the revolts which began at Kiel and spread to other parts of Germany the President was discussing with Herbert Hoover what might be done to prevent a food famine and Bolshevism—its inevitable consequence. Mr. Wilson wrote Mr. Hoover a letter authorizing him to undertake on behalf of the United States and in cooperation with the other governments of Europe a huge relief project. The President expressed in that letter his warm appreciation of the remarkable work done by Mr. Hoover and his splendid staff in handling the food problem during the war and asked that the same instrumentalities be employed to conduct the world through the critical days of peace.

Germany, it was calculated, could get through to the next harvest, but needed meats and fats. Austria was in very bad straits. The Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs and other liberated peoples were in need of both food and clothing. While there was confidence in the ability of the German people because of their habits of discipline and education to keep orderly, no such assurance was felt about the peoples of what constituted the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

The whole situation was so disturbing that even in the moment of his greatest triumph the President was gravely concerned over the outlook. It was not simply a concern for innocent persons in Germany and Austria, but a fear that Bolshevism might work its way to Italy, France, and England.

All Washington was happy over the victory of America and the Allies written in the dispatches telling of an overthrow of the Hohenzollerns and steps toward the establishment of a free government in Germany. As former Premier Asquith said, it was not until President Wilson in his famous war message of April, 1917, put the meaning of the war in a few phrases and boldly made a distinction between the German people and their government that the possibility of just such events as occurred was even admitted. For a long time the best informed students of German character had scouted the idea of a revolution. Americans smiled at the thought that

there could be any distinction between the German people and the German Government. What President Wilson strove to do was to disillusion the German people, to turn them from their belief in the supremacy of physical force and brutality to an understanding of moral force and a nation's conscience. By insisting on unlimited financial help and food supplies and a selective draft at the outset, American troops went to Europe by the hundreds of thousands and two million troops were sufficient to turn the scales and disillusion Germany.

The German people did overthrow their government, and there remained to be realized only the great theme of Mr. Wilson's first war message in preventing Bolshevism and anarchy and making the world at last safe for democracy.

"The war thus comes to an end."

Mere shouting and hand-clapping as it swept across the halls of Congress when these words were spoken by a fatigued but happy President conveyed only in part the inexpressible sighs of relief breathed by the men in the legislative and executive branches of the Government, accompanied for the moment by the judiciary, too, as the terms of the Armistice inscribed in history the most colossal failure of autocracy and the greatest victory ever achieved by democracy.

There were riotous celebrations in which an otherwise phlegmatic officialdom joined, noisy exuberances and enthusiasm, tears of joy over the expected return of the many and tears of sadness over those who would never return. All this the nation as a whole felt, as did Washington, but nowhere could the loosening of tension, the relaxation from burdens of nineteen months, have been as dramatic an event as with the individuals who were responsible for the conduct of the war.

Military men empowered to draw on the manhood of the nation for the upbuilding of huge armies, naval officers whose minds for months had been concentrated on nothing else than the depredations of the submarine, officials of rank, high and low, felt that at last a great load had been lifted.

But, as the military and naval services were enabled to slacken speed, just so much more did the civilian organizations like the Red Cross, the Food Administration, and the

United War Work institutions feel that, for them, the job was only beginning.

Reports from Government attaches in countries adjacent to Central Europe told of unparalleled suffering. Famine was widespread and frightful. Very little was known of conditions inside Germany. So far as public opinion was concerned, the varying sympathy for the people of Germany was not yet aroused, notwithstanding the beginnings of a reign of Red terror. Some people in Washington, for example, were indignant that any material aid should be given the people of Germany and insisted that a taste of Bolshevik cruelties would be fitting reprisal for the brutalities inflicted by the German armies on the innocent peoples of Allied countries.

It was fully recognized in Washington that the lofty note sounded by the President would not awaken immediate enthusiasm, but, on the other hand, even those who were not moved by appeals for American magnanimity to the defeated might be influenced by the knowledge that unless the German people were fed and kept intact, under some sort of respectable government, the Empire would be broken up into lawless groups, every one of which would have to be conquered before the Entente armies could be safely withdrawn. Indeed, the Allies had the choice of making their own task difficult and painful or comparatively easy. If they failed to remove the elements that were making for anarchy inside of Germany, particularly the leaders of the proletariat who believed the way to get food was to introduce their own ideas of requisitioning or commandeering, the whole situation might require the presence of American armies in Europe for an indefinite period.

Herbert Hoover went abroad immediately at the request of the President to get the cooperation of the Allies on this point. There was some reason to believe that a large section of opinion in the Entente countries wanted to see all the Entente nations restored to normal before any food was given to the Central Powers. America's hardest job was to see to it that every nation of Europe which fought on the side of democracy was given more food than it had during war time. The policy of the United States was one of insistence that

every country keep down to its requirements and that enough food be permitted to get into Germany and Austria through neutral countries to prevent anarchy from upsetting Germany entirely.

The President in his address to Congress had this situation in mind as he said:

"With what governments and of what sort are we about to deal in the making of covenants of peace? With what authority will they meet us, and with what assurance that their authority will abide and sustain securely the international agreements in which we are about to enter? There is here matter for no small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose promises and engagements beside our own is it to rest?"

It was anticipated that efforts would be made by reactionaries in Germany to play upon patriotic sentiment and to foment counter-revolutions against the Socialist government which had accepted the terms on behalf of Germany. The Socialist Government could be maintained only if given food and help from the outside to check popular discontent. Secretary Lansing himself so interpreted Dr. Solf's appeal "to mitigate the fearful conditions." His impression was that this was by no means an effort to get soft terms of peace or a modification of the provisions of the Armistice already signed, but a warning that unless the German Government, which had signed the truce, was given material support of some kind by the Allies it would collapse.

Food and a restoration of credit arrangements between neutrals and Germans and a lifting of some of the drastic provisions of the world-wide blockade in operation against Germany were sought by Dr. Solf and his government. The United States and the Allies were disposed to extend aid gradually as the terms of the Armistice were complied with. Thus was anarchy avoided and the abrupt change to conditions not, of course, normal or satisfactory but much better than might have resulted if the currents of confusion had not been checked.

The next task was the selection of the American peace del-

egation. The names of William Howard Taft, former President, and Elihu Root, former Secretary of State, were suggested by the press as leading Republicans for it was supposed President Wilson would make the commission bipartisan. But Mr. Wilson felt displeased with Mr. Taft because the latter had issued a caustic statement the month before criticizing him in connection with the appeal for a Democratic Congress. And Mr. Wilson remarked to a friend that he could not "trust Mr. Root". This was only another way of saying he feared partisanship at the peace table. Mr. Wilson's error in judgment in this respect was later established conclusively for, of all the leading Republicans, Mr. Root not only remained a friend of the League of Nations, advising Warren Harding during his Presidential campaign "not to declare the League dead" but he assisted materially in creating the Court of International Justice under provisions of the covenant of the League of Nations.

Mr. Wilson chose his Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing; Colonel E. M. House, who was already in Europe together with General Tasker H. Bliss, America's representative on the Supreme War Council; and Henry D. White, former Ambassador to France, and a life-long Republican. Mr. Wilson constituted himself the fifth member and president of the delegation.

The commission was hardly representative of either political party for General Bliss had spent his life in the army. Mr. Lansing had never been active in politics being absorbed most of his time in the practice of international law. Colonel House was Mr. Wilson's intimate friend and adviser but had never been elected to office nor had he held any official position by appointment. Former Ambassador White, like so many men who had spent their lives in the diplomatic service, was not a partisan.

It was a commission of men who were expected not to raise political questions at the peace table. Editorial criticism of the selections was widespread—the country did not think Mr. Wilson had picked outstanding leaders of the two parties, men calculated to help influence the Senate to ratify the treaties to be made. Mr. Wilson was expected to name members of

the Senate, but as will be explained in a subsequent chapter he believed that would be unconstitutional.

The President sailed on the steamer *George Washington* three weeks after the armistice. He reviewed a naval parade of Allied battleships as he approached the harbor of Brest, France, on Friday, December 13th. The welcome he received the next day in Paris was nothing less than fanatical. It was a tribute to the man who had been recognized as the spiritual leader of the war but it was also a tribute to the American people for the part they had played in saving France.

CHAPTER XV

AS PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN MISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

But if Woodrow Wilson had his troubles on this side of the Atlantic with the national politicians, he had even more sources of worry with the international politicians. All through the war President Wilson had sought in vain to get an explicit agreement on the peace aims of the Allied and associated powers. Except for the vague general phrases which served their purpose in raising the hopes of the German people as well as the hopes of the Allied countries, there was no definite understanding. Mr. Wilson's diplomatic exchange of notes with the British, French, and Italian governments during the months of September and October was a notable effort to commit the Allies to a peace without rancor and a peace that would not sow the seeds of another war. Mr. Wilson strove for a peace without selfishness.

Prime Minister Lloyd George of Great Britain, Premier Clemenceau of France, and Premier Orlando of Italy were not as ready to embrace the Wilson idealism chiefly because their own peoples were not in the mood to be kind to the enemy who had given no quarter and had waged a relentless and ruthless battle on helpless men, women, and children—non-combatants on land and sea. Undoubtedly Mr. Wilson's views were those of the far-seeing statesman—they were the terms of dispassionate judgment, not of anger or prejudice. But it was a materialistic and political atmosphere which Woodrow Wilson encountered on his arrival in Europe at the head of the American Peace Mission.

Mr. Wilson came to Europe after more than a year's correspondence by cable, through the indirect channels of Ambassadors and special representatives, with leading statesmen of

Europe. The truth is the European Premiers had their misgivings about him and he had his own doubts about them. They had never talked with him or worked out the personal equation—and the President realized that he, too, did not have an accurate knowledge of what constituted the real personality of each of these statesmen. There was an inevitable period of getting acquainted. Many observers think it was the most critical month of the Peace Conference, for during that time the President was seeing Europe at first hand and confirming his own impression that the idealism he had been preaching at 3,000 mile range was not shared by some of the Allied governments but that for the sake of Allied unity they had made no public expression of their differences while the war was on. When the war ended they would have preferred to continue silent about these differences and to reach an agreement in secret conclave.

Objection to an open Peace Conference was made by one of the Allied Premiers, for example, on the ground that differences might be accentuated and lead to serious friction between peoples. There was much truth in what he said. If it had been known, for instance, that a certain French official at one of the first talks with President Wilson practically suggested that America should pay a proportionate share of the cost of the war, including the two years when the United States was neutral, resentment over the suggestion might have created in America a lukewarm feeling towards further parleying with European governments about world organization and encouraged those in the United States who were advocating the return to a policy of aloofness from European entanglements.

The President went to Europe with fixed notions of what he might expect from European statesmen—he had followed their course intimately throughout the war—but he made up his mind that he would get along with them, that he would study each man and make himself as agreeable and congenial as possible.

The Europeans, too, were endeavoring to form a true impression of Woodrow Wilson. Unfortunately the President

did one thing which retarded his progress at the start. He talked defiantly on board the *George Washington* about the forthcoming conference. Certain press dispatches from ship sent by radio to American newspapers were picked up and published in England. They gave the impression of a dictatorial Wilson coming to Europe in belligerent mood to negotiate peace.

Great Britain was in the midst of a general election when Mr. Wilson reached France. Premier Clemenceau had conferred with the British Prime Minister before Mr. Wilson's arrival and there were rumors that the French and British statesmen had reached an understanding whereby they would stand together against Wilsonian imposition.

An American who called on Mr. Wilson mentioned the campaign speeches of Mr. Lloyd George in which the latter had pledged himself to have the Kaiser tried, and had declared that the much discussed "freedom of the seas" meant that Great Britain would guarantee the seas would be free by dominating them with superior naval armament.

"Oh, that doesn't worry me at all," commented the President. "If Mr. George springs anything like that I can deal with it. I shall simply point out to him that the United States can build more battleships than he can."

The President chafed over the delays in getting the conference started for he was ready to go ahead the day he reached Paris. Prime Minister Lloyd George, who made two engagements to come to Paris canceled them—giving domestic problems as his excuse. Mr. Wilson was determined that he would not talk Peace Conference problems anywhere but in Paris. It was stated Mr. Lloyd George would not go to see President Wilson first. There was much talk about the mountain going to Mahomet. Finally, Lord Northcliffe intervened as peace-maker and the President and Mrs. Wilson decided to go to England as the guests of the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. It saved a delicate situation.

Before going to London, however, the President went on the evening of December 24th to Chaumont, headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces, where Christmas Day he

was to get his first sight of a large body of American troops which had been in action on the western front.

All along the roads by which the Presidential party traveled in motor cars thousands of privates and officers came unbidden from billets to get a glimpse of Woodrow Wilson. Young and old among the French populace shivered in the muddy roads or leaned from house windows waving tiny American flags in tribute to the representative of a nation regarded as the savior of France.

The review of 10,000 troops took place shortly before noon in an unploughed field between Humes and Langres, to which point Mr. Wilson, in an army motor car, followed by twenty other automobiles carrying his party, was escorted by a squadron of airplanes. Mr. Wilson wore a big brown fur coat with a silk hat, and as he stood beside the generals saluting the passing colors one could not help feeling that it was a historic day of reunion in which General Pershing, the gray-haired commander of America's greatest Expeditionary Forces, presented formally a triumphant army to the civilian Executive to whom the American people had contributed men and money as the sinews of victory.

Some enterprising officers had distributed in the grandstand printed folders showing the record in action of the Twenty-sixth, Twenty-ninth, Seventy-seventh, Eightieth, Eighty-second, and Sixth Divisions, which participated in the review, but wound-chevrons, service stripes, decorations, and medals gave even more eloquent testimony that these divisions were part of the great force which fought so gallantly at Chateau-Thierry and in the decimating struggles of the Argonne Forest.

Far from America, with many a homesick heart and yearning face, they stood in solid lines of olive drab in the valley of the upper Marne and listened to a stirring address from the President of the United States. He did not greet the troops as their Commander-in-Chief but with the words "My fellow-countrymen." As his eyes swept the rolling landscape over which infantry, artillery, cavalry, machine-gunners, and

tank troops stood at attention, he expressed the gratitude of America in a voice full of emotion.

Here were men who had come thousands of miles to fight for an ideal, and he told them he was well aware they expected him to realize that ideal.

As the President, in a clear voice that carried far into the upstanding lines of troops before him, stood bareheaded, proclaiming new Christmas Day principles among peace-loving nations, the scene had an odd solemnity.

The speech contained no boasting of American achievement, but much pride in the splendid example of American manhood. Through the slippery mud the soldiers trudged, keeping their lines with difficulty, but symbolizing effectively the many hardships they had learned stoically to face. It was not a review of well-groomed, gold-laced columns, but the passing of sturdy battalions of citizen soldiery fashioned out of Yankee homes. They wore the inverted pan helmets, hiding their features, and heavy packs slung across the backs of olive drab overcoats, but they wore also many decorations given by European nations for bravery on the field of action.

The Presidential party stood in an open grandstand in the middle of the field and an American band played "The Stars and Stripes Forever" as the troops filed by. When they had passed, "doughboys" who had not been selected to march, but who came from near-by billets, crowded around the grandstand. There was a moment of silence as the troops, held by discipline, remained quiet. Suddenly a French civilian in the crowd shouted in a loud voice, "Vive Wilson," and the whole body of troops answered with an old-fashioned American yell.

It seemed strange to hear such a cheer on the fields of France on Christmas Day and before a President of the United States, but the happy, laughing faces of the "doughboys" were not at all unfamiliar. In an instant it was a crowd of American boys and not an army.

Another voice from a crowd of privates, lifted timidly but loud enough so that Mr. Wilson heard, said, "Let us go home,"

and the President joined in the laugh of surprise at the impromptu but pointed appeal.

To call that review impressive was but to merge it in memory with military parades of yesteryears in America. It was distinctive both in dramatic setting and in world-wide significance. There marched an army which had come to safeguard democracy by overthrowing a menacing autocracy. There stood the man who had conceived it to be his mission to make permanent in treaties and covenants "a people's peace."

Gusts of raw wind came over the hills from the battle-front in the tranquil distance, biting reminders of cold, cheerless days spent in winter-soaked trenches and damp dugouts, but hundreds of thousands of others still encamped on the terrain of France would have braved greater hazards to be present among the fortunate men who wrote that page in American history.

Swishing through the soft earth which soon became mud puddles, almost impassable for tanks, the mud-bespattered hosts of America's first field army quickly passed by. A band played "The Star Spangled Banner," which echoed in the Christmas stillness, and slowly there passed over the hills in columns of fours with resolute step the men who had ignored pain and smiled at danger, who had often stood face to face with death, men whom it was worth coming thousands of miles to glorify, for they were crusaders who truly dedicated that natal day of the Prince of Peace—the first peaceful Christmas for France and the world in four dark years.

Arriving the next day in London, the President was given a spontaneous welcome. He broke his precedent about special newspaper articles and gave the London *Times* an exclusive interview, making many complimentary references to England and the British people. Conferences were held at 10 Downing Street between the Prime Minister and Mr. Wilson. One cannot forget with what anxiety the British newspapermen awaited the outcome of that first conference. The question was: "Would these two leading statesmen of the two largest countries at the peace table become friends or would each cling to the vanities of his respective personality?" As a British newspaperman of prominence expressed it—the two men had

come prepared to hate each other. But they did not. Their first conference was affable and, in every sense, the very opposite of what had been anticipated. The two statesmen who had been sitting in Paris and London, each waiting for the other to make the first move, suddenly found they had many things in common.

When he was so inclined, Mr. Wilson could be as pleasant and charming in conversation as any statesman ever was. He could at times throw off his cold and forbidding manner and set out to make friends. He was successful with Mr. Lloyd George, and to the close union between these two men which followed their first meeting in London can be attributed the smooth course of the Peace Conference in later months. Mr. Wilson talked freely and frankly. The British Prime Minister satisfied himself that many of the things which the President had been reported as coming to Europe to dictate were not inflexible determinations with him at all, that he appeared ready and willing to hear the other side and be convinced when he was in error.

The visit to Great Britain was a success in the sense that the British press became friendlier, and impressions of hostility as between the Prime Minister and the President were removed. Mr. Wilson had no sooner achieved an entente with Mr. Lloyd George, however, when Premier Clemenceau, in a stirring speech, pleaded for the making of alliances. Mr. Wilson seized upon the opportunity at Manchester to answer the French Premier pointing out that the system of alliances was the old balance of power scheme which had unsettled the peace of the world.

The President went from England to Italy with only a day's stop in Paris. The reception accorded him in Italy was even more énthusiastic than he had received in London or Paris. He was the guest of the King who was particularly hospitable and gracious. Mr. Wilson paid a visit to the Vatican and went from Rome to Genoa, Milan and Turin. His address before the Italian Chamber of Deputies and his speeches at other points aroused the highest emotions of the Italian people—it was in marked contrast to the bitterness of

later days when President Wilson began to oppose the Italian claim for Fiume.

Coming back to Paris the first week in January, Mr. Wilson was ready to begin work on the peace treaty with the Allied governments—the Germans were by arrangement not to be called in until the Allied powers had reached an agreement. But there were more delays. Finally after a series of preliminary talks of an informal character the first formal session convened on January 18, 1919.

Solemnly and with undramatic stillness, yet with a smooth sequence of business that partook more of serious deliberation than ceremony, the greatest peace conference in all history opened.

Neither in eloquent speeches nor in details of organization nor in the assembling of distinguished delegates, but in the great masses of the people they represented and in the immensity of the task ahead, lay the fascination of the gathering to the onlooker. Somehow the President, the Premiers, the Foreign Secretaries, and Generals like Foch and others in the background seemed reduced in the scene to a level of uniformity and equality. No nation, no individual, presided or dominated unless it was the unconscious domination the peoples in the outside world exerted upon the chosen delegates. This seemed to be in the very atmosphere of the meeting itself. How did it look? What were one's sensations at the most vital international of gatherings? Come and be a spectator yourself at this, the first open peace conference of modern times.

It is 2:45 P. M. The outside sun which shines so rarely in January sends shafts of warm light across the Seine to the "Quai d'Orsay," the French Foreign Office, where the conference is held. Outside a small curious crowd has gathered. Inside the members of the press, happy over their newly-given privilege, assemble early. They place themselves in a large room which opens through three big arches into the main peace chamber. Several hundred of them have come, and they form a fringe on the left side. Some of them have desks, but most of them stand. They do not mind this inconven-

ience, but are glad to be there after the struggle of a week for admission.

At 3 o'clock the delegates begin to arrive, and the room fills up with secretaries and assistants. It is really unsuited to so large a gathering by a hundred feet, but seems to accommodate all those who are properly accredited. There are crystal chandeliers, filigree decorations in the style of Louis XIII, red portières, red carpet, and red upholstery, and these give the whole a setting not unlike the conferences of past generations. With its high ceiling, elaborately ornamented, the room seems more like a banquet hall than a legislative chamber. At 3:05 Mr. Balfour arrives and smilingly greets President Wilson. Premier Clemenceau moves busily among the delegates as would the host at a social function. At 3:10 President Poincare enters. There is no applause, no music, no demonstration. Quietly and, with all the delegates standing, he begins his speech. Mr. Lloyd George arrives in the middle of it and takes his place on the left side of Premier Clemenceau, nodding to President Wilson. The British Premier looks the picture of health. The French President reads his address in French in a low voice. It is rather a long speech, but in it he pays gracious tribute to each nation represented. Not a sound is heard when he finishes, but the delegates sit down as the translator arises. He is a French officer who speaks French and English equally well. He translates the speech offhand with remarkable accuracy. Those who understand French look a trifle impatient at the second reading, but it is necessary to have everything said twice because of the importance of every word and every procedure. Language makes little difference with an expert translator. Premier Clemenceau arises at the end of the address and calls for the nomination of the permanent chairman.

President Wilson in an extemporaneous speech briefly and eloquently pays tribute to the great personality of the French Premier. He characterizes the meeting as "the supreme conference in the history of mankind." His delivery acquires forcefulness from the simplicity in which it is delivered. He looks tired. Everybody listens with intense interest. At 3:40

Mr. Wilson sits down, having spoken but a few minutes. His speech has been warm in praise of M. Clemenceau, but again there is no sound or no applause from the delegates, but seeming approval in the silence. Again the translator arises, this time to reproduce the speech into French. At 3:45 Mr. Lloyd George seconds the nomination of M. Clemenceau. He, too, speaks in terms of highest compliment, referring to the "grand young man of France." As he speaks the British delegates behind him murmur their customary "Hear, hear." At 3:50 M. Clemenceau gets up to respond. He wears gray gloves and evening clothes. His style of speaking is that of the finished orator, his voice clear, forceful, almost Rooseveltian in emphasis. He wittily acknowledges compliments given him by remarking that President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George have apparently caught the French habit of courtesy and politeness in speaking. He modestly says he has been chosen chairman because of the international tradition to choose the head of such a conference from the nation where the meeting is held. He is talking of moral reparation now, and declares it will embrace new institutions whereby the world may escape ruinous wars, terrorizing the populace, and preventing them from going freely about their work for fear enemies may rise up at any time. His bronze-colored complexion, his gray mustache drooping on either side of his strong jaw, which has spelled infinite courage during the dark hours of recent history, his determined gestures and voice of appealing tones make it seem that he has earned the nickname of "Tiger" whereby he has been known throughout his public life. His eighty years have not deprived him of the utmost vigor. He seems strong-looking, physically, and as robust as Mr. Lloyd George. President Wilson, alongside of them, seems like a student or philosopher whose power issues not from spoken but from written words. M. Clemenceau shows that his power in speaking comes from political contacts and debates characteristic of the European systems of government wherein the Premier must be able to defend himself against opposition and all manner of controversy during sessions of Parliaments.

At 4 o'clock Clemenceau turns towards Mr. Wilson as he utters the significant sentences: "The program of this conference has been laid down by President Wilson. It is no longer a peace of a more or less vast territory, no longer a peace of populace—it is the peace of nations that is to be made. This program is sufficient in itself. There is no superfluous word. Let us try to act swiftly and well."

At 4:15 the conference has really opened at last. It is methodical and devoid of passionate outbursts of any kind. Nor has there been any benediction or religious word pronounced. Too many religions and creeds were represented to harmonize them all—Christians, Moslems, Confucionists, Buddhists. Premier Clemenceau proceeds to the business of the day in a simple way. First comes the responsibility for the war. The chair invites the submission of memoranda on this point. M. Clemenceau mentions the pamphlet drawn up by the French, referring to the "penal responsibility of Emperor William." He remarks that doubtless in America and England other works have been written on the subject. One could not help wondering whether the Conference Room could hold all the editorials, newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets and books that had been written denouncing the Kaiser.

The French Premier asks for memoranda on the punishment for the crimes of the war and data on international programs on the labor question. Evidently labor in European countries has to be assured that its interests will be cared for. At 5 o'clock secretaries are appointed to organize details, and the appointments are approved. No dissenting voice has been heard as to anything. The chairman asks for remarks, but none are made. At 5:10 he announces the subject for the next meeting will be the League of Nations, and declares the gathering adjourned.

Less than two hours were consumed. The delegates mingled with each other after the adjournment. General Smuts of South Africa drew President Wilson aside and began an earnest conversation. They discussed a point in the League of Nations plan in which the Boer general was deeply interested. As Mr. Wilson passed from one chamber to another

the author talked with him a few minutes about the opportunity of the newspapermen to appear at future meetings. He seemed anxious that the greatest freedom possible be given to the press. The Premiers, delegates and diplomats gathered for refreshments in a small anteroom. The spectators withdrew. In this matter-of-fact way, almost fifty years to a day after the German invasion of Paris in the war of 1871, began the peace enterprise to correct the errors of the past and reconstitute a world anew for the children of the morrow.

The President and Premier Clemenceau did not have altogether smooth sailing. They were personally very respectful of each other and one discerned much admiration on the part of Mr. Wilson for the sturdy personality of the Grand Old Man of France. At the same time, the whimsical turns which M. Clemenceau occasionally gave to matters under discussion and his fidelity to what might be called the old school of diplomacy caused many a moment of irritation. The French Premier was a master politician and a dominating figure. One could not help liking his abrupt manner and his decisiveness. But it was clear that he imagined because America went to the aid of France in the war against Germany, the United States was fully committed to all the implications of a partnership in European affairs, that financially, economically, and otherwise she was ready to take an active part in European politics.

From the moment Mr. Wilson stepped off the train at Paris the French officials began talking to him about a visit to the devastated areas. It was mentioned by President Poincare and the same day by Premier Clemenceau, and almost everybody who sat next to the President or talked with him had something to say about the necessity of seeing the ruins of France before he did anything else. The French imagined that Mr. Wilson either knew nothing about the destruction or that if he saw the stricken cities and towns he would become very wrathful and give all his time to the calculation of an indemnity. The inclination to force a visit to the battlefields on him rather offended Mr. Wilson.

That very evening a personal friend from America who had

no connection whatever with the peace mission, said to Mr. Wilson:

"Well, Mr. President, I suppose you will be going up to see the *de*vastated regions in a day or so?"

Mr. Wilson sighed, held up his hand and said: "Et tu, Brute?" The caller raised his eyebrows, because the French had been talking about little else except a proposed visit to the battle line.

"I don't want to see the de*vast*ated regions," he replied, correcting his visitor's pronunciation by accenting the second syllable. "As a boy, I saw the country through which Sherman marched to the sea. The pathway lay right through my people's properties. I know what happened, and I know the bitterness and hatreds which were engendered. I don't want to get mad over here because I think there ought to be *one* person at that peace table who isn't mad. I'm afraid if I visited the de*vast*ated areas I would get mad, too, and I'm not going to permit myself to do so.

"As a matter of fact, if I had my way I'd adjourn the Peace Conference for one year, and let all these people go home and get the bile out of their systems."

Mr. Wilson chose his own time to make the trip and only spent a day there. Everybody ought to see the battlefields of France to get an idea of the destruction which has been wrought, but the President evidently formed the same impression as Premier Lloyd George, who declared that the ruins seemed to him to be proof of the fact that civilization had thus far invented no other way to settle disputes between nations and that a League of Nations was the primary requisite of the age. As for the indemnity, the President's representatives in France had made it clear before his arrival—and he himself stated it even more positively in his first conference—that the amount levied on Germany should be just as large as the actual cost of the destruction and that undoubtedly the bill would be much larger than anything Germany could ever pay. In other words, the indemnity question quickly resolved itself into a problem of mathematics and statistics—how much could

be extracted from Germany and still keep intact her social and industrial structure?

Mr. Wilson's difficulties with the French methods of diplomacy were known to correspondents generally. Many an intimation of the feeling of irritation that prevailed every now and then at the Supreme Peace Council came to the men writing about the conference. But it was not always possible to learn whether personal incompatibility or mutual lack of knowledge of the true French or American viewpoints caused the dissension. Certainly it was a surprise to most of the men who went to Paris to write about the Conference to find that the French, with whom they had expected the United States to be in intimate and friendly contact, were more often apart than in agreement with us on questions involved in the settlement. Those who had been longer in Paris criticized the French misconception of the limits of America's altruism, but, at the same time, pointed out that it was only natural to find a Government which represented a devastated country interested chiefly in financial, territorial and material questions because only in that way could the terrible losses of the war be partially recouped.

Of Premier Orlando much might be written. The President got along splendidly with him, and he, in turn, always seemed to carry away a good impression of Mr. Wilson—until the latter opposed Italian occupation of Fiume. But the power behind the throne in Italy was Baron Sonnino, the Foreign Minister. It was Sonnino with whom both British and Americans frequently were out of patience, referring to him as the Machiavelli of Europe. There were one or two little incidents on the Wilson journey to Italy which indicated that Baron Sonnino was not anxious to have the Italian people get too close to President Wilson. The pressure of the people was irresistible, and one of the finest things about the Wilson journey to Europe was the demonstration of friendship for America which the plain people of Italy manifested until propaganda for Fiume aroused them to the point of bitterness. Fiume became a symbol of victory and Mr. Wilson's opposition was bitterly resented.

The Japanese delegates were the mystery of the Conference. They said least and interfered less in what was going on. Silently they listened to what was said, rarely making comment. Viscount Chinda, one of the Japanese delegates, was formerly Ambassador to the United States, and a close friend of Colonel House. The Japanese delegation always appeared to be on cordial terms with all the other delegations. They seemed merely interested onlookers, but promised subsequently to take a vital part in the Conference.

On the whole, the President managed rather well personally with the European statesmen, and, while they did not always agree with him, they, too, formed a good opinion of his tactful manner in handling the most delicate of problems. They liked his readiness to say "Yes" or "No" and his flexible attitude on questions wherein he became convinced that America must modify her attitude to meet the needs of Europe. Because Mr. Wilson did not understand the French or Italian languages and because most of the other delegates did not speak English with fluency, the President found himself much closer to the British delegation than any other. He was frequently in conference with the British Prime Minister and renewed a warm friendship that sprang up with Arthur James Balfour when the latter visited Washington in May, 1917. He developed a close friendship, too, with General Smuts, of South Africa, and had long talks with George N. Barnes and Andrew Bonar Law, of the British delegation. It is easy to do business with a man who understands your language, and successful diplomacy rests upon an accurate knowledge of the spirit as well as the substance of a government's viewpoint. The British through long years of association were close to the French. Most of the British delegates talked French fluently. Henry White was the only American who knew French well enough to carry on an official conversation. So the British and Americans worked out many a proposal, the British would develop it with the French delegates, the French or British would take it up in detail with the Italians, while the English, by reason of their close association with the Japanese, secured the lat-

ter's adherence. This order was not necessarily true of all questions, but it was often the way agreement was reached.

No true American could leave the atmosphere of the Peace Conference at Paris and return to the United States without a feeling of having literally left one world to get back to another—so different were the problems of European peoples from ours, so different was the attitude of their statesmen and politicians, their viewpoint on national morality, and the partnership between governments and private business.

Notwithstanding President Wilson's insistence that a League of Nations should be the keystone of the peace treaty, notwithstanding his emphasis on the humanitarian and idealistic phases of the world settlement, and his argument that something must be done at once to prevent the world from being plunged anew into a devastating war, questions of territory and money and all the numerous desires, which are derived from those two things, were constantly forced to the front by European countries.

America wanted nothing but world peace. Other governments professed the same thing through their spokesmen, but if the world had a stenographic record of what was said at the private conferences between the heads of governments, it would wonder whether the Peace Conference at Paris was a council of peace or a consultation of victors dividing spoils. Certainly the influence of America was a check upon the tendency which existed at the beginning to make the Paris Conference nothing better than the Congress of Vienna, where peoples were handed about like so much property by princes and kings. And, it may be said in passing that, in an environment of this kind the British delegation was glad to join hands with the Americans in an effort to prevent the Paris Conference from patching up only territorial squabbles and levying an indemnity on a country that was to be deprived of the means of earning that indemnity.

President Wilson was successful in getting the League of Nations discussed first and made a part of the peace treaty itself. He was successful in getting a constitution of the League of Nations drafted. He was able to get something con-

crete done in his preliminary visit because of the splendid co-operation given him by Great Britain. It was the single outstanding fact of the Peace Conference—England and America were working together for the common benefit of mankind.

So pronounced was the entente between representatives of the two English-speaking democracies that certain French politicians deemed it wise to stir up a little propaganda, both inside England and France, to the effect that America was too far away to be a permanent ally, that America wanted to cut down the size of the great British Navy, and that really France and England, being neighbors, must combine and stay combined, and so on. If Great Britain found herself closer to the United States, however, at the Peace Conference than to France, it was because she preferred to support ideals which men like Sir Edward Grey and other English Liberals had for years been endeavoring to implant in European politics and because the French Government was dominated by men who did not have the same faith in liberalism as their British and American colleagues.

But it is easy to give a wrong impression of France when discussing merely the political class in power in Paris. France is a mixture of many things. American soldiers returning from France were bitter in their criticism of French shopkeepers and merchants—but these were not representative of France. Financiers and special interests who were in league with certain political leaders and pulled the strings of intricate French politics ought never be projected as the true France. Those Socialists who embraced President Wilson as their savior, but who merely represented elements of anarchy and Bolshevism, were by no means representative of the true France any more than were the politicians who kept an inspired press busy doing their bidding and the critical press muzzled by censorship. The real France is out in the villages and towns where the brave French poilu dwells. Millions of these heroic men and women survive the most terrible war in history, and no historian probably will ever be able to picture adequately the wonderful stoicism of the Frenchman who fought for his country notwithstanding the fact that he re-

ceived a few cents a day, while at his side foreign troops received $30 a month. The people who bore the burdens of the war reflect the soul of France. For them the affection of Americans can never diminish, no matter what the politicians say or do.

All the dispatches of American correspondents were read by French censors. Assurances were given that they were not in any way deleted or delayed, but the French censors read them just the same. It was like having someone over your shoulder all the time. On one conspicuous occasion Premier Clemenceau had in his hand a copy of a dispatch sent by an American correspondent and discussed it with President Wilson before the message was permitted to go to America. On the ground that they wished to distinguish between military and political matters, the French justified their censorship.

As it worked out, the French Government permitted Paris newspapers to publish insidious attacks on President Wilson and to print conspicuously reports reflecting on the behavior of American troops. A Paris newspaper for instance published a report that American soldiers during the month of December had committed thirty-four murders, several hundred assaults, and other crimes in Paris. Also it was persistently circulated throughout Paris that an American officer had killed a French officer and had been himself shot by another in a brawl just around the corner from the American Peace Mission's headquarters. Neither the report of the murders nor the brawl was true, and General Pershing himself issued a denial and a statement of facts. So the censorship which so many French officials attempted to justify on the ground that it was necessary to prevent attacks on their Allies by irresponsible newspapers, did not work out at all in that direction, and the American Mission had many a complaint at the treatment it received by certain French newspapers known to be in the confidence of the French Administration.

The trouble about reporting the Paris Peace Conference was that many people there thought the war was still on, and that war conditions should continue to prevail with respect to public expression. Many correspondents felt intimidated by

the situation. Others found themselves called to book by the French in various ways whenever they endeavored to speak in criticism of French proposals. Altogether, there was none of the freedom which newspapermen would have felt had the Conference been held in a neutral country.

Mr. Wilson thought that by his speeches he had won public opinion to his side. It was true—for a while. What Mr. Wilson did not realize was that public opinion in Europe is not made as it is in America by the newspapers but solely by the officials in power and the professional cliques who control parliamentary governments. Just as soon as President Wilson began to interpose objections to the plans of the Allied peacemakers, the press was turned against him with the simple ease with which one touches a match to a fire. Liberal opinion in Europe stood by Woodrow Wilson, but it was helpless. The French press guided by the French Government, and particularly by M. Clemenceau and his colleagues, kept up a constant bombardment of the Wilson policies. The French newspapers were convinced they were acting for the best interests of France and that Mr. Wilson's plans would mean insecurity. President Wilson agreed to many of the Allied proposals, even though he would have phrased them otherwise if they had been given to him alone to decide. The defects he accepted, however, because of a belief that the League of Nations would be a continuing peace conference, revising constantly the mistakes of the Treaty and modifying those provisions which in actual practice might work hardship.

So President Wilson staked all to get the League of Nations established. The French were won over to the League idea only because of a belief that the international organization would be supplied with an army and navy sufficient to police the world and enforce the Treaty. When Mr. Wilson refused to accept the idea of an international police force, some of the Allied statesmen, particularly the French, were dismayed.

To one who was an eyewitness in Paris during the Peace Conference and who later watched at close range the debates in the United States Senate over the meaning of the League of Nations nothing could be more contradictory than the two

situations. For in Paris it was Woodrow Wilson who was fighting almost the entire Allied group in constituting a League of Nations which would not be an interference with the sovereignty of any signatory power but an advisory body through which all the nations could act independently or jointly if they desired. In the Senate, however, the League proposal was hailed as a supergovernment and a surrender of American sovereignty.

There was a time when the French press criticized Mr. Wilson's refusal to go along with the Allied plans for a strong League of Nations, backed by military force, because of a belief that the Republicans in the United States would certainly support the French militaristic idea. It was interesting, indeed, to see the French press completely out of tune with what the Republican party in the United States was actually seeking to accomplish, and it was not until many months after Mr. Wilson returned to America that Europe saw at last that the Republican party was drifting toward a policy of isolation while President Wilson was the true friend of international cooperation. Had Mr. Wilson's position been appraised sooner in Paris, he might have been listened to more sympathetically by the Allied world.

Mr. Wilson's mind was set on keeping the constitution of the League of Nations an integral part of the Treaty because he believed that if a pact settling territorial questions—in which America had a secondary interest—were completed separately, there would be no leverage for the acceptance of an international organization such as the League was intended to be. He rejected all suggestions for a separate conference on the question of an association of nations. He was convinced that the League would never be established if its formation were postponed until after the peace treaty itself was signed.

So far as the United States Senate was concerned Mr. Wilson felt that the main issue before it was the acceptance or rejection of the League because in the other portions of the treaty the United States sought no indemnity and had no

desires for territorial gain insisting only upon freedom of commercial opportunity in all newly acquired regions.

No human being it seems could have survived the mental strain which rested upon Woodrow Wilson during the Peace Conference. Oppressed on every side by the demands on his time and aware of the intrigues set afoot to influence him, Mr. Wilson suffered his real breakdown in Paris. He had an attack of influenza accompanied by severe digestive disturbances. There was a time when his illness was so serious that it caused alarm to his household. After the few days of illness Mr. Wilson never seemed the same to his associates. Stung by the criticism that he had compromised too much, Mr. Wilson was adamant to the last days of the Conference, refusing to concede anything and siding with the French in an insistence that the Germans be compelled to sign without modification the terms that had been proposed. Even the British were inclined to compromise and permit the Germans to make modifications, but the French would hear none of it and President Wilson, anxious to get back to America to secure the ratification of the Treaty, concurred in the French view.

There developed inside the American Peace Mission distinct differences of opinion. Some of the advisers threatened to resign but fear of the misinterpretation of such a step back home prompted them to keep up the appearance of unity. There was one man who was no longer in the President's confidence—Colonel E. M. House. The story of the separation is significant of a strange influence which played its part in the life of Mr. Wilson and will be analyzed subsequently in connection with Mr. Wilson's series of broken friendships.

CHAPTER XVI

THE APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS; PHYSICAL COLLAPSE

President Wilson came back to the White House in July 1919 with the Versailles treaty. He had been away six months —an absence unprecedented in American history.

He acknowledged that he was out of touch with the situation inside America. He sought the counsel of those who had been intimately in contact with domestic affairs and particularly the maneuvers and strategy of the Republican leaders who had been exercising their American right to pick flaws in the peace program and to present their views. Mr. Wilson came back to debate with them before the American people, before a bar of public opinion, which had sometimes disappointed him but often sustained him.

Those who liked the Versailles Treaty said the famous fourteen points had been carried out. Those who disliked some of the settlements said the fourteen points were wrecked on the rocks of political expediency in the hope of establishing the League of Nations which was so close to the President's heart. Mr. Wilson himself described the Covenant and the Peace Treaty as a chart on which nations might venture in self-assurance and security on the always uncertain seas of economic, racial and political rivalry.

The President did not get the kind of treaty he wanted, but the best he could under the circumstances. He conceded, yielded, demurred and deferred on points that might break up the Conference. He placed his hope for correction on the League of Nations and its commissions and councils. He offered the League Covenant backed by an awakened sense of

morality and conscience among the nations of the world. To those who did not like the Covenant itself he pointed to the opportunity for revision and amendment.

To reconstruct the world's map in six months, to get the signatures of a score of nations to settlements which had to be made quickly in order to save Europe from further chaos and disintegration was a task of unparalleled magnitude. Mr. Wilson did not insist that the work at Paris was free from imperfections. He prepared to defend the Treaty and League. He was a shrewd enough hand in dealing with Congress to know that part of the opposition was political, part of it based on personal antipathy to him, part of it on his own unfortunate course of aloofness and seclusiveness, and part of it on a well-defined but genuine dislike of European entanglements and engagements and a desire to return to our ante-bellum policy of national isolation.

Mr. Wilson had learned in the first few weeks of his European experience that the statesmen of Europe had exalted ideals, too, but that they doubted the efficacy of those ideals in actual practice. He adopted an attitude of dignified humbleness. He did not stand on ceremony. He walked into the French Foreign Office and called on M. Pichon, the Foreign Minister, during the first week of his stay. Such things had not been done before. A Foreign Secretary might call on a Premier or President, but never would the latter go calling on officials of lower rank.

What Mr. Wilson did in Paris he was criticized for failing to do in Washington. Not only had he neglected Republican Senators during the war, but he had rarely called into counsel the members of the Democratic party in Congress. He never fraternized. Consequently, as he departed for Europe, he had been given the coldest reception he ever received on the occasion of an address to Congress. When he returned to Washington in February for a short stay and invited Republicans as well as Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the White House for dinner, most of them went but some of them felt, and privately said, that the invitation was a trifle belated and might have gladdened the Congressional

heart much more in the chilly days of December than in the balmy evenings of early spring.

Something else hurt Mr. Wilson, too. His Cabinet officers —not all of them, but a goodly number—took their war powers so seriously that they did not take especial pains to draw the right line between unnecessary restriction and the public patience. Irritation ensued. Much of the blame went Wilsonward. So the President came home to straighten out a political house which had been wobbling in his absence.

As for the controversy over the League of Nations, Mr. Wilson's friends counseled him to throw off the mantle of seclusion which, rightly or wrongly, avoidably or unavoidably, had kept him from personal contact with Congress and influential persons outside of Congress during the hectic days of war confusion. They told him to "open up" and get back to the Woodrow Wilson of campaign days. They advised him that he must keep the nonpartisan flag constantly unfurled, doing nothing that might be construed as an effort to help the Democratic party's fortunes in 1920 at the expense of the Republican party. If the Republicans wished to differ with him and criticize him in unmeasured terms, Mr. Wilson must calmly seek just the same to win to his side the Republicans who were open-minded on the big questions of foreign policy and who wanted specific, informative arguments and enlightenment so that they might be guided in their votes.

The President soon brought the controversy over the ratification of the Peace Treaty to a climax. In perhaps the most remarkable debate in Washington in many generations Mr. Wilson on August 19th faced seventeen members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republicans as well as Democrats, answered questions with facility and ease, and stated the position in which he, as the Chief Executive of the United States, saw the fortunes of America and the peace of the world if the Treaty were ratified with qualifying clauses which might give other nations an opportunity to reopen the negotiations and thereby begin anew the debate at Paris.

Mr. Wilson read a lengthy statement—an appeal to the country, as well as the Senate, to realize the perils of delay.

Copper and lead mines, manufacturing establishments, cotton export and the channels of trade were, in the President's opinion, choked and waiting for release with the ratification of the Treaty.

Our military policy could not be formed till it was determined what part the United States would play in world affairs—inside or outside the League. He talked at length for the first time on the Monroe Doctrine. He revealed what the other delegates at Paris had been told about the American view of the doctrine and that they had accepted it. He explained why it was called "a regional understanding." He outlined his understanding of the famous Article X and made clear that he concurred in the view of the Senate that Congress alone could declare war. He stated specifically that the American peace delegation had told the other delegates about this provision of the American Constitution and that they all understood Article X was purely advisory, but that it was left to the conscience of every people to determine whether they would participate in the punishment of a nation which had violated the territorial integrity or political independence of a signatory to the Treaty.

The President handled himself in masterful fashion. He never hesitated with an answer and seemed full of his subject. The Senators, moreover, displayed no animus or personal feeling in their questions and treated Mr. Wilson with the utmost courtesy.

The scene was unique. Nothing like it had ever happened before. The big iron gates of the White House, which had been locked during the greater part of the war, were thrown open to admit the several Senators, who came in groups or individually, some in their big motors and limousines, and some afoot. Senator Lodge, Republican, drove up in a big automobile. Senator Williams, Democrat, followed in a little machine. Senator Borah walked. Under his arm he carried a bulky copy of the Treaty—he looked like a schoolboy going to class. Senators Swanson and Hitchcock, the two Democratic leaders, motored up the drive, talking earnestly.

Senator McCumber, Republican, drove his own seven-pas-

senger car. Senator Johnson, Republican, nodded out of the big glass windows of his limousine as the correspondents watched the historic procession. Senator Fall, of New Mexico, Republican, and Senator Mark Smith of Arizona, Democrat, conspicuous chums of the Senate, strolled up the White House walk together, followed by Senator Harry New, Republican, of Indiana, and Senator Moses of New Hampshire. Senator Pomerene, Democrat, came in a little electric driven by his wife. Senator Pittman, Democrat, and Senator Knox, Senator Harding and Senator Brandegee came singly but in big cars.

One wondered what Clay or Webster and the men of a half century ago would have thought of the modern way of calling on the President. There was dignity in it—much the same as one might expect to see in Europe. All seemed to feel that the occasion was momentous and called for formality. Peace treaties were not considered every day.

The President greeted his guests with a smile. The meeting was held in the big East Room. Secretary Tumulty, stage manager of the affair, had arranged typewriters, desks, and facilities for newspaper men in the corridors just below the East Room. Relays of expert stenographers wrote a running account of what was said.

Nearly a hundred correspondents were gathered there and the public was given with unparalleled speed a textual report of what was happening. The big press associations communicated the transcript of the debate to all parts of the country and the world.

Many of the questions were technical and of little interest to the average observer. Many were legal. Many involved disputes of long standing about the power of a reservation or an amendment. To all suggestions that the United States might embody her understanding of the Treaty in the text of the ratifying resolution, Mr. Wilson answered again and again as he did in the opening statement. He feared it would open up the whole thing. Other countries would want reservations along lines of domestic policy and the cumulative effect of the Treaty would be nullified.

Mr. Wilson made it clear, too, that Germany's consent would be necessary. He did not feel like asking Germany's approval of America's understandings. They might be embodied in separate declarations, and be a notification of the limit of American purposes, but a contract was a contract, and anything put in the ratifying resolution which modified the contract would impair the limits of the contract.

Mr. Wilson made a final appeal for an unamended treaty, though he plainly showed that he did not oppose the program repeatedly suggested of putting America's understanding of the Treaty in a joint resolution and passing it separately. Many of the Senators were not inclined to accept Mr. Wilson's judgment of what would happen if they did not qualify the Treaty with reservations.

It was the beginning of Mr. Wilson's appeal to the country. He was not in an uncompromising mood—he seemed anxious to reach an agreement with his opponents.

But anybody who expected the Republican Senators, who were opposing President Wilson's ideas on the League of Nations, to be overcome at once by the spell of Presidential persuasion was doomed to disappointment. Anybody who thought the Senators would emerge from the White House conference and issue statements saying that they had been all wrong in their speeches of the previous weeks and that Mr. Wilson was right did not understand Senatorial psychology or the reverence with which the Congressional mind held consistency.

Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee went about around the Capitol saying they had not obtained a bit of information, while other Senators waded through twelve to fifteen columns of reading matter on the Presidential quiz of the day before. Sundry statements were issued saying not a vote had been changed and that not an opinion previously held had been shattered.

The debate brought out just one thing—that lawyers could not agree on what the Treaty meant and that language does not mean the same to two sets of minds, when one set is Republican and the other is Democratic. Mr. Wilson admitted there might be different interpretations of America's future obligations

under the Treaty. But he said to the Senate: "Adopt a separate resolution embodying your understanding."

The President pointed to the supreme power of the American Congress to express its will and register its moral judgment. If the world thought the United States unmoral—which Mr. Wilson believed never could happen—then friction might develop which would produce war. He conceded that disputes might still lead to war, but he thought the League reduced the chances of bloodshed and made remote the necessity for armed conflict by substituting an assurance of concerted power.

Many Senators frankly disagreed with Mr. Wilson's optimistic outlook. They did not see all the nations remaining in the same moral union as existed during the war. They foresaw commercial rivalry and an era of selfishness. Mr. Wilson said the League of Nations would apply the brakes to that—and, if it failed, the world would be no worse off than it was before 1914. He pleaded for some experiment, however untried, as a means of at least endeavoring to keep the big powers together for the protection of all the world.

The President, for several weeks, continued his efforts to win friends for the Treaty, inviting Republican Senators singly and in groups to confer with him. Finally he started West, September 4th, on an appeal to the country. The street crowds, however, were not enthusiastic, a handclapping group here and there, occasionally a cheer—so rare as to be conspicuous—and Mr. Wilson proceeded down the main thoroughfares of American cities a respected magistrate of the people with an austerity and dignity that begot a reverent silence, not applause.

In Ohio, which helped reelect Wilson in 1916, one might have expected a joyous welcome. But to anyone who saw the cheering throngs on the Champs Élysées in Paris, or even the demonstrations of the undemonstrative British or the fanatical enthusiasm of the emotional Italians, the reception at Columbus was a painful anti-climax. Here was the man who had come back from overseas after representing the United States in the most momentous conference ever held between Governments. But there was nothing triumphal or heroic about the Presi-

dent's journey down the streets of Columbus. He had had more attention in that very city seven years before as a relatively unknown candidate for President.

All Mr. Wilson's speeches were extemporaneous. That was a tremendous strain. In his effort at Columbus to make a comprehensive survey of so vast a subject as the Peace Treaty, the President touched only superficially on a number of things.

If interruptions of applause mean anything, then Mr. Wilson's audience at Columbus not only seemed to accept his doctrines but to exhibit faith in the man who was exhorting them anew to follow his leadership. Again and again the President failed to explain why the people should accept his view rather than the view of the Treaty opponents, but insisted that the people ought to read the Treaty and see for themselves, and if they did not read it, then they should accept the interpretation of the men who made the Treaty and knew what was intended. It was the familiar appeal—asking the people to have faith. Indeed, that idea in his speech seemed to win more applause than any other. For through Mr. Wilson's speech ran a sentimental note —a constant exaltation of American ideals and principles and of the promise made to the lads who died—the promise to make it a war against war.

The President put on his campaign clothes. He tried to get close to the people and to translate the technical language of the Treaty into understandable Americanism. He was applauded as he reverted to the Declaration of Independence and the rights of people to govern themselves and then transferred his audience to Bohemia, and to Poland, and exclaimed that the Treaty was "shot through with American principles of self-government." Instead, too, of talking about "plebiscites," Mr. Wilson spoke of the "referendum" by which the people of upper Silesia were to be given an open American method of study whether they wished to belong to Germany or to Poland. In simple language he showed why "strategic frontiers" had been rejected as a principle in disposing of territories wrested from Germany and why, under a League of Nations, Italy would not need Fiume. But he promptly added that, if there were no

League, not only would Italy need a strategic frontier but that the military point of view would prevail everywhere.

The President strolled into the club car and chatted with the correspondents between stations. He seemed eager to answer questions and talk about the Treaty. He said he did not propose to enter into a debate with the Senate at long distance. That would be futile, he thought, because it would divert attention from the main issue—what the Treaty contained which was so valuable to the American people that they could not afford to reject it. The President believed his mission was simply to explain the Treaty and to discuss only incidentally the objections which had been raised against it.

One criticism which Mr. Wilson answered in his speeches was that which claimed America would be obliged continuously to send troops to fight in foreign countries. A deafening roar of applause greeted the President as he said: "When this Treaty is accepted men in khaki will never have to cross the seas again."

All through the trip the President appeared anxious to tell the people that the program of "no annexations and no indemnities" had been fulfilled. He denied that the former German colonies had been "annexed." He praised the system of trusteeship which he said would enable the peoples living hitherto under German rule to develop into self-governing nations. He stressed the thought that no punitive indemnity was levied upon Germany but merely reparation for damage done. He appealed again to the working masses by his emphasis on the Magna Charta of labor drawn at Paris, and the humanitarian phases of the Treaty—suppression of opium and liquor traffic in backward areas of the world, sanitation, and extension of the work of the Red Cross against disease. These and other things which the President described as a "league of the fine passions of the world," made a deep impression.

Mr. Wilson sought to regain the faith which neglect of domestic problems or his absence abroad or the pain of acute ills like the cost of living had tended to drive away. The President did not convert his audiences to a sudden interest in foreign policy—but he left them warmer than he found them.

Mr. Wilson elicited a friendlier response, a heartier greeting and a progressively earnest enthusiasm for the fundamentals of his errand as he moved through Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska in that section of America where the people revealed an indifference to party politics and an impatience to remove for all time the obstacles to a permanent peace.

Nothing seemed to impress the big audiences more than his denunciation of the party maneuvers which had kept the American public perplexed and bewildered about national and international policy. Loud applause followed the President's remark, before 15,000 people at St. Louis, that he some times wished "both parties might be smothered in their own gas." And again at Kansas City and then at Des Moines, Mr. Wilson took occasion with excellent effect to say that the Treaty and League of Nations were by no means a party matter.

It may have been the strain of extemporaneous speaking or the saturation of argument and thoughts carried away from his visit to Europe, but Mr. Wilson forgot from one night to another the substance of speeches already delivered. For example, at the Coliseum at St. Louis, he went to considerable pains to explain that "this was a commercial war" and that Germany feared her rivals would wrest trade from her, but at Des Moines the President, to make another point, said the bankers and business men of Germany did not want war, but thought it "unspeakable folly." Whether the President meant to convey the impression that a militaristic group in Germany persuaded business that the way to greater commercial success was by a war of conquest, or whether he thought that in some of the Allied countries the seeds of commercial jealousy helped to breed antagonism in Germany and to play into the hands of the militarists, was not explained. Mr. Wilson harped on the necessity for breaking down pan-Germanism and keeping the road open from Bremen to Bagdad and safeguarding the republics along the way, but his auditors did not seem to grasp the meaning of Mitteleuropa politics.

It was apparent that whenever the President stayed on simple ground he made an effective impression. Mr. Wilson frankly told the people of Des Moines that he did not like the Shantung

settlement any more than they did, but that Great Britain and France in order to induce Japan to come into the war had made a bargain which had to be kept.

The President pointed to Article X as the solvent of our own as well as China's troubles with Japan. Although men in the Senate called it a breeder of wars and wanted the article qualified, if not stricken altogether from the Treaty, the President won loud applause when illustrating the value to the United States of that much mooted article. First, he applied it to Belgium and showed how a pledge by all the world including the United States to protect the territorial integrity of Belgium and its political independence would have been sufficient to prevent the last war. He then turned to Central Europe and declared that unless Article X were in the Treaty, the whole structure fell and that Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bohemia and Poland were left helpless in the midst of strong fighting nations and possibly another world war. Mr. Wilson referred to the Philippines. He said in effect but plainly enough for his audiences to catch the hint that America had been worrying for the last decade how she could turn the Philippines loose without seeming to toss the helpless islands into the arms of Japan. He implied that but for the League America would have to stand guard with a big navy in the far East to guarantee the independence of the Philippines. He exhibited the League of Nations and Article X in particular as a safeguard for the Philippines, saying the combined armies and navies of the world would be obliged to defend the territorial integrity of the new republic when once independence was granted.

The streets in Des Moines were jammed with cheering thousands at eventide. It looked like a triumphal procession as the President rode through the throng of Iowans. The 10,000 people who crowded the Coliseum to its very rafters came from all parts of the State. Many rode 200 miles to hear Mr. Wilson. It was a spontaneous tribute. The President won his election in 1916 by the drift of the Western people toward his program of peace, and his supporters west of the Mississippi River had not altogether deserted him. His

strength was still predicated upon an intense desire of the people for enduring peace.

As the President went further West into Montana, Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Utah and Colorado, he attracted great crowds.

At Wichita, Kansas, on September 26th, the President broke down. The strain of seven years of official burden had at last gotten the better of him. His physician, Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson, compelled Mr. Wilson to cancel the remainder of his speaking trip for the League of Nations and go back to the White House.

The President had insisted on fulfilling his speaking engagements but his nervousness was of such a character that it was deemed best not to let him leave the train. The official statement issued by Secretary Tumulty said the President had "so spent himself without reserve on this trip that it brought on a nervous reaction in his digestive organs." Nothing else was said about the seriousness of the President's condition, but there had been an undercurrent of apprehension about his health ever since the trip started.

The correspondents on the train suspected for several days that something was wrong. Usually Mrs. Wilson was all smiles; the worried look on her face in the last few days before the break came had been inexplicable. During the night of September 26th Dr. Grayson was awakened to go to the bedside of the sleepless President. The night before he had also been restless. The last speech at Pueblo was a masterpiece of eloquence, but it was noticeable that the President spoke without the usual power of voice. As he talked of the visit he had paid to a French cemetery where American soldiers were buried and spoke of the promise made that there should never be another such war, if human ingenuity could prevent it, men and women in the audience wept. There were tears in the eyes of Mrs. Wilson, and it gave some onlookers the impression, as she looked anxiously at the President, that she feared he might break down during his speech.

The President had evidently been despondent. Many of his speeches referred to the sacrifices of the war and the scenes of

destruction in Europe. Again and again he exalted the nobility of death for a great cause and on one occasion said he would gladly die to bring about peace in the world. This moody strain had been noticeable. The President worked day and night, sometimes until past midnight. He caught a cold, too, in Europe from which he never seemed to have entirely recovered, and there was an occasional cough. It was necessary frequently to cancel automobile rides planned by local committees in various cities.

What the President needed was a complete mental and physical rest. But with the intensity of the fight for the League of Nations and the approaching conference between capital and labor, as well as the visit of the King and Queen of Belgium, Cardinal Mercier, the Prince of Wales and other notables, it was doubtful whether Mr. Wilson would be able to rid himself of worry over the many tasks which were set for him in the month of October.

The President had complained of headaches so much that the previous afternoon the train was stopped between stations in Colorado while he and Mrs. Wilson took a long walk, accompanied by the Secret Service men. They spent an hour tramping country roads.

The decision to stop the trip altogether was taken over the President's protest, particularly because he feared a wrong impression might ensue from such action, but Secretary Tumulty assured him that he had presented his case completely, and that he could add little more in the succeeding six speeches set for Friday, Saturday and Monday.

Incidentally, the last news which the President received from Washington was of a decidedly encouraging character and should have stimulated him. Word came, for instance, from Senator Ashurst of Arizona that he would support the Peace Treaty without reservation, and this was deemed significant in view of published stories that the Arizona Senator was to lead a group of eight insurgents in the Democratic ranks.

Senators Simmons and Overman of North Carolina and Robinson of Arkansas and Vance McCormick had sent messages to the Wilson train saying the tide was turning at Wash-

ington. All of this should have cheered up the President, but it did not.

It was suggested to Dr. Grayson by one of the newspapermen that the President might be benefited by stopping off at some health resort and not undertaking the long journey to Washington immediately, but the physician said he believed it was best to rush the President back to the White House and make him comfortable there.

There was nothing yet on which to base an impression of an alarming character except the natural fear of a permanent break in a man past sixty years of age who had been weighed down by extraordinary cares. First there had been the Mexican trouble at the outset of his Administration, next the neutrality problems from the outbreak of war in 1914 until the United States entered, then the many long hours of vigil and reading of confidential cables concerning war operations and finally the unparalleled strain of the Paris Peace Conference.

From the time of the President's return from Europe in July he had conferred with Senators almost constantly on the League of Nations, and tried to catch up on domestic problems neglected in his absence. To take a speaking trip after such a series of burdens would have exhausted men of more robust health.

So it was that on the plains of Kansas the appeal of Woodrow Wilson to the American people to give their support to the League of Nations stopped suddenly. The Presidential train was turned homeward. The symptoms of a breakdown of the arteries—the inevitable collapse of an overburdened physique —had cast their warning none too soon.

The President tossed nervously in his bed in the private car, tormented mostly by the thought that his enemies would say he had quit the fight, that he was shamming illness. There were skeptics among the newspapermen but a minority. Most of us felt that the break, long-expected, had come at last. The train sped rapidly to Washington with hardly a stop. Arriving on a Sunday morning the President walked briskly through the Union Station, was photographed as usual and the skeptics

increased in number—for outwardly he showed no signs of change.

It was not until a few days later, in the White House, that a clot formed in the blood vessels of Mr. Wilson's brain, permanently impairing the use of his left arm and leg. After that he was never the same. To his physical condition with the accompanying lapses of memory, irritability, and excessive emotion, must be attributed many of the acts of Woodrow Wilson beginning in October, 1919, and continuing until the day of his death, more than four years later. Every criticism, every coolness which old friends experienced, every expression on the part of Woodrow Wilson with reference to the few problems that he was permitted to consider or discuss cannot be appraised in retrospect without being mindful of the tired brain that once swayed the world and then feebly sought to retain its hold on the Presidency and public opinion.

CHAPTER XVII

WHEN AMERICA HAD NO ACTIVE PRESIDENT

No period in American history parallels that in which the Government of the United States had no President for, immediately following Woodrow Wilson's physical breakdown, he was unable to function as the Chief Executive.

Opinions may differ as to whether any important piece of public business was neglected—the Cabinet took care of every decision and executed every policy. But there can be no doubt that, for a few days at least, after his return from the Western trip, the President was disabled. For a long time thereafter he was unable to discharge the duties of his office to the extent that he had in the preceding years of his term.

Serious moments there were when it was thought Mr. Wilson would not live. As the crisis was passed and it became apparent that the President would be an invalid the rest of his life and would be unable to see many callers or write extended communications on matters of state, his supporters developed the fear that in the Senate or elsewhere there might be raised the question of succession, under the Constitution, which provides that the Vice President shall succeed the President in case of inability.

The Constitution itself is not very clear on the question of what shall be done when a President is disabled. It says:

"In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected."

Is the Vice President to become President or merely assume the duties and discharge the powers of the Presidential office until the President's disability is removed? No Vice-President has ever assumed office on the disability of a President, and Mr. Thomas R. Marshall, who was Vice-President during President Wilson's incapacity, made no effort to succeed him. Congress has never passed a law specifically giving the procedure that should be followed in case of Presidential inability.

After the President suffered a stroke his condition was so alarming that he was unable for several days to sign documents or attend to public business. The Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, called at the Executive Offices to learn the true condition of the President because the King and Queen of the Belgians, who were in New York, had expressed a desire to come to Washington if they would be received. Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson, the President's physician, told Mr. Lansing that Mr. Wilson was in no condition to receive the King and Queen, much as he would like to do so, and that, perhaps, if their itinerary were rearranged the visit might be accomplished later on. Mr. Lansing was unable to obtain any definite information as to the true nature of the President's illness.

The next day he asked Secretary Tumulty whether the President was able to sign documents and carry on his duties. Mr. Lansing relates that he expressed to both Admiral Grayson and Mr. Tumulty the fear that a demand might be made in Congress to have the Vice President take office under the disability article of the Constitution. Secretary Tumulty voiced indignation that anyone in Congress would consider such a thing, while Dr. Grayson pointed out that he would not certify as a physician that the President was incapacitated for duty. Both Admiral Grayson and Secretary Tumulty, however, are credited by Mr. Lansing with having agreed with his plan of calling Cabinet meetings. The first notices to Cabinet members were sent through the telephone switchboard in the White House. Admiral Grayson attended the first meeting and reported on the improvement in Mr. Wilson's condition. There was no discussion about the Vice President succeeding Mr.

Wilson either at the first or any of the Cabinet meetings which followed.

Mr. Lansing's idea was that Cabinet meetings would instill confidence in the country that the Government was functioning. Other members of the Cabinet concurred with him in that view.

In all, twenty-five Cabinet meetings were held and many important matters discussed and decided. As early as December Mr. Lansing had occasion to communicate to the President two important matters which had been discussed at these Cabinet meetings and embodied his own suggestions for action. Mr. Wilson acknowledged these communications by taking the action suggested.

Imagine the surprise of Secretary Lansing when two months later—after the Cabinet meetings had been proceeding regularly—he received a letter from the President asking him if it were true that he had been calling Cabinet meetings without authority. The whole country was amazed, too. Even thick and thin supporters admitted that the true reason for the President's request that Secretary Lansing resign lay in earlier differences of opinion on the Peace Treaty. No one could explain the excuse given in Mr. Wilson's letter.

Defenders of Mr. Wilson promptly suggested contributory reasons such as the dissent expressed at Paris by Mr. Lansing with respect to the Shantung settlement in the Versailles Treaty. Mr. Wilson showed displeasure, for instance, on his Western trip when he received a telegram from Mr. Lansing stating that one of the attaches of the American Peace Mission, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had revealed Mr. Lansing's disagreement with the President on the Shantung question, a circumstance which had up to that time been rumored but not confirmed and which, of course, was ammunition for Mr. Wilson's opponents in the Treaty fight.

It must not be imagined that Robert Lansing did not exert a very great influence on our foreign policy in the four years he was Secretary of State. Even before he took office he framed the neutrality policy of the Government as Counselor of the Department of State, and was the author of the phrase "a strict

accountability," used in one of the first notes to Germany on submarine warfare.

But, like a true counselor, he was always ready with a comprehensive statement of the alternatives involved. Usually he gave the President the various courses of action which could be followed, and, while politely suggesting what he himself thought best, invariably left it to the President to choose. Secretary Lansing knew traditional American doctrine, and he also put in every note he wrote a certain liberalism and altruism which many people promptly attributed to President Wilson.

Even on the notes for which the President received the highest praise Secretary Lansing would never admit his collaboration. One of the best notes ever sent out by the United States Government was a communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government about the requested embargo on arms. Secretary Lansing and Solicitor Woolsey framed that note and the editorial praise which the President received for doing what he did not do had no effect on the feelings of the men in the Department of State. They took it as a matter of course.

It is true that Mr. Lansing did not favor the coupling of the League of Nations with the Peace Treaty. He thought better consideration could be given to each if they were separated. But he did not press his views and when the American Mission reached Paris he worked as hard as anybody to help realize the ideal which the President had projected before the Peace Conference.

Secretary Lansing wrote a plan for a league of nations, but showed no signs of displeasure when it was not approved, nor was he disturbed over the prominence bestowed upon Colonel House. Yet the President instead of appreciating his Secretary of State oftentimes forgot he had one.

It was when the Shantung settlement came up in Paris and the President became involved in the meshes of European diplomacy that Mr. Lansing expressed dissenting views on a number of points, all of which served to irritate Mr. Wilson who could not brook disagreement. But in the period when Mr. Wilson began to consult less with Colonel House he relied more on the advice of the Secretary of State. It began to

look as if the two men would get close together after all. Mr. Lansing continued to work hopefully. He did not want the President to go on the Western trip. He thought Mr. Wilson could do much more effective work in Washington and he felt, too, that the physical strain might break him down .

The real crux of the situation came when Mr. Lansing showed an unmistakable readiness to write a compromise on the Peace Treaty, a willingness to adapt the Lodge rservations to the Wilson viewpoint in such fashion that ratification could be accomplished without loss of dignity by either side. Mr. Wilson was indignant. He began to be impatient with anyone who even mentioned the word "reservation" in his presence.

The nearest one could get to him in a communication that would not incur his displeasure was by the employment of the word "interpretations."

There were inferences drawn that Mr. Lansing took a decisive step in the Mexican situation without consulting the President—the release of Consular Agent Jenkins was demanded in peremptory language. But on previous occasions Mr. Lansing handled for the President, and with full discretionary power, cases fraught with more danger than the Jenkins incident.

The friction between President Wilson and Secretary Lansing can be traced only in part to differences of opinion at Paris and the readiness of Mr. Lansing to urge reservations to the Peace Treaty to secure its ratification.

There is only one theory on which the break with Mr. Lansing might be defended. It is that Mr. Wilson, while aware of the Cabinet councils, did not have the impression they were formal meetings but simply informal consultations. Even this would hardly have aroused him unless something more pointed accompanied the information as it was brought to him. It is plausible to assume that Mr. Wilson in some way received an erroneous report of the first conversation between Secretary Lansing, Admiral Grayson and Private Secretary Tumulty. Mr. Lansing contended that his purpose in referring to the possible succession of the Vice President was simply a statement of what political opponents of Mr. Wilson might do. It is

conceivable that as the incident was described to the President it was distorted into a statement that Mr. Lansing had actually endeavored to bring about the succession of the Vice President.

There is no doubt that Mr. Wilson's condition became much better after the first few weeks of his illness and that, by the month of February, when he called for the resignation of Secretary Lansing, he had recovered sufficiently to do at least one or two hours of work each day.

The President's shaky signature to public documents and the gradual improvement thereafter in his handwriting tell a story of how difficult it was for the President to carry on in his hours of physical distress. Only the most important matters were placed before him in the limited time that his physicians said he could afford to give to public business.

Unfavorable news was withheld from Mr. Wilson and nothing was done that was in the least calculated to excite or disturb. The President was given to emotional outbursts, wept very often, and grew melancholy over his breakdown.

Throughout this period Mrs. Wilson was constantly at his bedside as was also his eldest daughter, Miss Margaret. The devotion of the wife and daughter was no small factor in nursing the President back to more and more participation in public affairs. Mrs. Wilson stood between her husband and the Government, indeed between him and the outside world. It was she who acted as personal secretary, taking notes and writing memoranda and messages to the various Cabinet officers and officials of the Government generally. Even the Private Secretary, Mr. Tumulty, refrained from entering the bedchamber except when sent for. He placed his memoranda on vital questions before Mrs. Wilson, leaving it to her to discover the proper moment to ask the President for his opinion or decision. She was, so to speak, the reigning monarch.

What Mr. Lansing did as Secretary of State—the responsible officer of the Government who must certify to all proclamations and whose duty under the law it was to notify the Vice President of the death or disability of the President, undoubtedly was just the thing that would irritate an individual who felt he

was by no means incapacitated. An impartial judgment of the affair cannot but lead to the conclusion that the unprecedented functioning of the Cabinet as an entity without executive direction, guidance or authority, except as derived by implication from the statutes, was a tactful move which prevented the unpleasant question of technical disability from being raised by the many who were opposed to Mr. Wilson in those bitter days of the Treaty fight.

Nor was Mr. Lansing wrong about his impression that Congress might raise the question of disability. It was discussed in the Senate cloakrooms. It was the subject of leading editorials. Newspapers were clamoring to know how the Government was functioning, if at all.

What was the atmosphere and situation in which the first Cabinet meeting was called after the President broke down? Congress was restless, political enemies of the President were circulating stories that he was mentally unable to fulfill the duties of the Presidency, and were talking about Constitutional methods of getting a successor. Members of the Cabinet thought it was up to them to do something to prevent public alarm. It was the political and loyal side of the Wilson following trying to meet public criticism in an awkward situation.

The President's friends did not know how sick he was. They knew only that he needed rest and freedom from worry. If they could only give the appearance of uninterrupted Government, they would be doing him a service. At the first Cabinet council it was agreed that no action could be legally taken on a question which the President was authorized to act upon by law, unless the President himself approved. The Cabinet took that as a natural limitation upon them and understood what they could and could not do.

But it was decided, for the sake of appearances, as well as for the good that might come out of inter-departmental conferences and consultation, to continue the meetings. White House officials constantly pointed to them as proof that the Government was functioning and that all was well with the affairs of the Republic.

Unquestionably Mr. Wilson was extremely sensitive on the

question of his disability. Only a few days after he returned to the White House from the Western trip he suffered his first stroke and exacted immediately a promise from his intimates that his true condition should not be made known to the public. Dr. Grayson was an Admiral of the Navy and could not, of course, have disobeyed the command of his superior even if he had been so inclined. Mrs. Wilson was probably the only other person besides the physicians who knew the true nature of the President's illness and her silence was, of course, forgiven. For several days, however, the alarming condition of the President caused much uneasiness outside the White House. Mr. Wilson had fallen on the bathroom floor at four o'clock in the morning and was hardly conscious when picked up. His left arm and leg were paralyzed—an impairment from which he never entirely recovered. Other physicians besides Dr. Grayson were called into consultation but they all maintained a discreet professional silence. It was one of the biggest secrets in American history.

In December, 1919, after the President had weathered the first two months of his illness, it was apparent that he would recover but not sufficiently to take an active part in the Presidency. He was incapable of sustained effort. Yet there was a message to be written to Congress in December. Mr. Wilson was spared the necessity of composition. His Cabinet officers wrote memoranda on the topics that had to be covered and, with the help of Secretary Tumulty, who wove them together, the document was put into finished form and read to Mr. Wilson. With a few changes he gave his approval and so was able to fulfill his Constitutional function in reporting to Congress on the state of the Union. Thus did his intimates struggle to keep up appearances in the days when America really had no active President.

Congress took the message of December 1919 with an outward show of scorn, indifference, and even captious doubt as to the true authorship of the document.

While some Republicans preferred to express wonder whether Wilson wrote his own message, others thought the message altogether too Wilsonian. They thought they recog-

nized too well the familiar phrases, the "glittering generalities" and the "excessive fondness for the viewpoint of the labor." Nor did certain of the thoughtful Republicans doubt for a minute that the tendency toward free trade exhibited by the President was a product of the Wilson mind.

Not a word was said specifically in the message about the Peace Treaty. This was a studied omission and was defended as an attempt to concentrate on domestic questions.

For the Republicans had been criticizing the President because of his absorption in foreign policy to the neglect of domestic problems. The truth was that the President could not write extensively about the Treaty. Over-work on that subject had been the cause of his collapse and there was natural hesitation to worry him about it for fear of a further break.

At the White House officials placed the blame for the intensified curiosity about the President's condition to the studied campaign of doubt which political opponents had been casting upon his acts from the moment he broke down.

Instead of adopting a resolution of sympathy for the President—not an expression of that kind was introduced in the House or Senate by the Republicans who were in control—speeches were made tending to cast discredit upon those who were speaking on behalf of the President as well as upon Mr. Wilson himself.

Doubts were expressed whether Mr. Wilson's signature was his own on a public document, the inference being that it was forged by some of his subordinates. There followed then the publication of a letter in which one Senator spoke of a cerebral lesion of which he heard rumors and on which he based his own judgment that the President would be incapacitated for the remainder of his term.

It was significant that Mr. Wilson made no comment on the Treaty situation from the day he broke down at Wichita, Kansas, September 26, 1919 until January 8, 1920, when he addressed a letter to the Jackson Day Banquet of the Democratic Party at Washington. On this document, which was in true Wilsonian style, no question of authorship was raised, but it was a thousand words long and the general opinion has always

been that though it embodied his ideas completely, it was prepared for Mr. Wilson's signature. In that communication Mr. Wilson said in part:

"Personally, I do not accept the action of the Senate of the United States as the decision of the nation. I have asserted from the first that the overwhelming majority of the people of this country desire the ratification of the Treaty, and my impression to that effect has recently been confirmed by the unmistakable evidences of public opinion given during my visit to seventeen of the States. I have endeavored to make it plain that if the Senate wishes to say what the undoubted meaning of the League is, I shall have no objection. There can be no reasonable objection to interpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself. But when the Treaty is acted upon I must know whether it means that we have ratified or rejected it. We cannot rewrite this Treaty. We must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it and then, after the rest of the world have signed it, we must face the unthinkable task of making another and separate kind of treaty with Germany. But no mere assertions with regard to the wish and opinion of the country are credited. If there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out is to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play in completing the settlements of the war and in the prevention in the future of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetrate. We have no more moral right to refuse now to take part in the execution and administration of these settlements than we had to refuse to take part in the fighting of the last few weeks of the war which brought victory and made it possible to dictate to Germany what the settlements should be. Our fidelity to our associates in the war is in question, and the whole future of mankind. It will be heartening to the whole world to know the attitude and purpose of the people of the United States."

The letter created a sensation. Did it mean Mr. Wilson wished to postpone the settlement of the all-important Treaty

question beyond the November elections? No other conclusion was possible. He had said so in as many words. Did it mean that Mr. Wilson believed that the Versailles Treaty was so popular that it would be a vehicle for the return of the Democratic party to power and possibly a third term for himself? There is abundant evidence that the third-term idea was not distasteful either to the President or Mrs. Wilson though at heart there is no question that Mr. Wilson's controlling reason for wanting a "solemn referendum" was to administer defeat to his foes and secure personal vindication at the polls.

William Jennings Bryan insisted that the President should compromise and permit the Treaty to be ratified. Mr. Wilson's position on reservations was open to criticism and he finally authorized in March 1920 the publication of a letter to Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska, in charge of the Treaty fight for the Democrats, explaining his attitude in detail on reservations.

Were it not for the fact that political clouds hung heavy —Mr. Wilson's desire to go campaigning for a third term being suspected on Capitol Hill just as much as the White House held the Treaty foes guilty of political motive—the President's letter to Senator Hitchcock on Article X would have fallen on more fertile soil.

But the White House and Congress had rubbed each other the wrong way so long that Mr. Wilson's appeal on the merits of Article X itself, wherein he pointed to the dangers of militarism and the return to the old order of things in Europe unless the United States put the weight of its moral influence in the scales, hardly had the effectiveness which might have attended the same argument under other circumstances.

The President continued to hurt the sensibilities of Senators, both Democrats and Republicans, forgetting that while they themselves were not disposed to see the broad outlines of international policy with the same clarity that he did, they nevertheless had enough votes to ratify or reject the Treaty. Mr. Wilson was naturally impatient with the Democrats who were ready to surrender to the Lodge reservationists. He minced no words in his letter to Senator Hitchcock because he did not

think the Senators had been particularly mindful of his own sensibilities.

For Mr. Wilson's letter, defending Article X against even interpretative reservations, and certainly against all other kinds of reservations, did several things.

It discouraged Democratic Senators who had been working for a compromise on Article X, and who offered interpretative reservations. These Mr. Wilson dismissed as a work of "supererogation."

It revived talk of a third term for Mr. Wilson, who, intentionally, or unintentionally, had not taken the least pains to refute the impression that he wanted to prolong the League controversy as the basis of another campaign in his own behalf.

It confirmed the viewpoint of Senators Borah and Johnson, who argued all along that the League involved a distinct departure in American foreign policy, and that, if Mr. Wilson was right, the covenant should be adopted without qualifications, and if he was wrong, it should be rejected entirely without going through the camouflage of "reservations." Mr. Wilson defined the alternatives the same way. He saw no middle ground.

It challenged the "mild reservationists" to drop their middle ground. It called them "mild nullifiers," a terminology which offended the group of Senators who had been zealously trying since November, 1919, to bring about the ratification of the Treaty.

Finally, it cracked the whip over the heads of the Democratic party in the Senate and made those Senators up for re-election stand firmly by the President, who unquestionably could write into the Democratic platform all of Article X, whether or not he could get it into the Treaty.

The President put his letter in the fight at the psychological moment. But he forced the mild reservationists to take their stand with Senator Lodge and the Republican party, with the prospect that their number, added to the irreconcilables in the Republican ranks, would be enough to accomplish what Senators Borah, Knox, Johnson and the rest of the out-and-

out opponents of the Treaty had sought for months to accomplish.

The awkward and regrettable part of the dilemma was that at heart the Senate of the United States did not want to repudiate the obligations, moral or physical, imposed upon this country by the war. The very group which was most opposed to the Treaty favored the famous paragraph five of Senator Knox's resolution to the general effect that, whenever it became necessary to preserve peace in the world, the United States would even consider seriously putting the strength of her army and navy into the balance to prevent a recurrence of such a condition as brought on the European war.

So it looked as if the issue would go to the people after all. Mr. Wilson, fighting proudly for his conception of Americanism, wanted the whole people—not a bare majority of the Senate—to pass upon American foreign policy. If he was to be repudiated he wanted to take his medicine in an election, which, unlike 1918, would be fought out primarily on matters of foreign policy.

Twenty-four Democrats stood with President Wilson, twenty-three Democrats deserted him. The Treaty of Versailles signed in June, 1919, was still unratified when the final votes were taken in March, 1920. The deadlock in the Senate was to be carried into the Presidential and Congressional elections the following November.

Briefly, that was the story of what happened after nine months of wearisome debate. The Republican party in the Senate stood 34 for ratification with the Lodge reservations, as against 15 who wanted neither Treaty nor League of Nations. But the votes of the 15 were grouped with 24 Democrats who said they wanted the Treaty but not the reservations to the League.

But there was no escaping one outstanding fact—President Wilson suffered the third defeat in eighteen months. His loss of Congress in November, 1918, was followed by the defeat of a ratification resolution on the Treaty in November, 1919, and then in March, 1920, the Treaty was formally sent

back to him with the Democratic party in the Senate split in twain.

Mr. Wilson had lost the tight hold on his party which he once exercised. Hardly any Democratic Senators from Northern or Western States remained with him. Only a handful of Southern Democrats stood till the end. Nor could the split be measured on the basis of the advice given by William Jennings Bryan to accept the Lodge reservations. There were men who deserted the President but who had no interest in Bryanism of any kind. These Democrats favored ratifying the Treaty with the Lodge reservations.

Kendrick of Wyoming, Chamberlain of Oregon, Henderson and Pittman of Nevada, King of Utah, Myers and Walsh of Montana, Nugent of Idaho, Phelan of California, Owen and Gore of Oklahoma, Pomerene of Ohio, Walsh of Massachusetts, Wolcott of Delaware, Smith of Maryland, Ashurst of Arizona, Beekham of Kentucky, Fletcher and Trammel of Florida, Randall of Louisiana, Smith of Georgia, Jones of New Mexico and Terry of Rhode Island. Total 23.

Examine the list of 24 Democrats who stood with the irreconcilable Republicans for the defeat of the Lodge resolution of ratification containing reservations. It included Senators Reed of Missouri, Shields and McKellar of Tennessee and Thomas of Colorado. The viewpoint of these four men on the Treaty by no means coincided with that of President Wilson, even though they were finally recorded with his supporters. They, like the irreconcilable Republicans, found other things in the Treaty objectionable and cast their votes against ratification. So Mr. Wilson, on the final muster, had only a bare majority of his own party with him, and with the exception of Senators Hitchcock of Nebraska and Johnson of South Dakota not a single Democratic Senator north of Mason and Dixon's line or from the West supported the position of the President on the last count.

This defection from the leadership of the President was unquestionably the most disappointing circumstance of all to the man in the White House, for it showed the Democratic party,

stampeded by the arguments of their Republican opponents, that defeat of the Lodge reservations might be viewed by the country as hostility to the making of an early peace.

The Republicans did not fear the Treaty as an issue. They were cocksure of winning on domestic counts against the Wilson Administration. The Democrats, on the other hand, who stood with President Wilson, believed that the League issue would furnish a transcendent question for the voters and would tend to submerge complaints on domestic policies.

The politicians however managed to muddle the whole situation so completely that it was apparent the average voter would have a difficult time determining what he was voting for the next time.

Meanwhile in April, 1920, the fact that the President discontinued his daily automobile rides started gossip anew.

It was explained in contradictory ways. One statement emanating from the White House was to the effect that the President had been too busy with public affairs to get his accustomed outing. On the other hand, members of the Cabinet were wondering whether the President considered them necessary at all, for no Cabinet meeting had been called. Another story, given with a tinge of White House authority, was to the effect that the President was under too great a nervous tension while motoring. People in the streets stared at him curiously, wondering if all the gossip they had heard about his health were true.

There were persistent reports current that the Cabinet members felt somewhat slighted by the President's indifference. Mrs. Wilson finally invited all the wives of the Cabinet members to tea. It was the first social function of its kind for many months. It had the effect of preserving happiness in the official family.

The slow recovery of the President was discouraging to his many friends, who had hoped the spring months of 1920 would see him going about with his accustomed vigor. His detachment from official Washington was much more pronounced than anyone dreamed would be the case. Not only had the President failed to see his own Cabinet, but several foreign

Ambassadors accredited to the United States, also waited in vain for months to gain an audience.

The President kept his own counsel, too. None of his Cabinet knew what he intended doing about the Peace Treaty, and it was seriously doubted at Capitol Hill whether Senator Hitchcock was aware of Mr. Wilson's plans.

There was a recurrence, too, during the Senate debates of the feeling that Mr. Wilson was unable to function as President because of his physical weakness. This insinuation, however, had so often been injected in the partisan warfare that it was discounted. Friends of the President, like Senators Overman and Williams, openly charged the Republicans with conspiring to give the country that impression.

The failure of the President on the other hand to appoint a Railroad Labor Board, as provided under legislation passed more than a month before, gave concrete excuse for the revived argument that Mr. Wilson ought to have delegated some of his authority. The White House explanation was that the President had had difficulty getting men to serve on the Labor Board. But the interesting and regrettable truth was that throughout Washington scepticism about the stories of the President's ultimate recovery seemed to extend even to friends who could not be suspected for a moment of permitting the wish to be parent to the thought.

President Wilson finally met with the Cabinet for the first time in nearly eight months the second week in April, 1920. It had a favorable effect entirely apart from the confidence it instilled that the Government was taking hold of the menacing situation caused by the "outlaw" strike of railway employees. The mere fact that, in a crisis, the Chief Executive was able to confer with the heads of the ten departments of the Government served to brush aside, for the moment at least, thoughts of the physical incapacity of the President.

There were days when Woodrow Wilson seemed to be mentally as keen as ever. Shutting one's eyes to the drooping figure and listening only to his fiery logic, the illusion of an unchanged personality would not have been difficult to maintain. Little by little, as gradual improvement in his condition was

evident, more executive work was undertaken but always at his side stood the devoted wife and the physician, Admiral Cary T. Grayson. Together they carried the secrets of the sick room while Private Secretary Tumulty played the rôle of everything-as-usual in the Executive Offices, a mark of loyalty to his Chief which alone should have earned him something better than the brusque treatment he later received.

But those were topsy-turvy days and many an old friend who had served Mr. Wilson in the past was turned away. The tragic events that followed Mr. Wilson's breakdown cannot be explained by any theory of logic. Those who had it in their power to persuade President Wilson to permit advisers to reach him failed to realize the immensity of their responsibility in shutting him off so completely from the outside world.

Whether America would have benefited by entrance into the League of Nations it is not necessary to discuss, but the United States would today be in the League officially if the President had been able to get the advice he so much needed in his enfeebled condition. On his sick bed he almost agreed to accept the Lodge reservations, but someone urged him to make of it an issue in the 1920 campaign and in January, 1920, he asked that a solemn referendum be taken. Was it the whispering voice of ambition which put into his mind the forlorn hope that he could recover and that a third term in the White House was possible? For himself, Mr. Wilson was not ambitious. Those around him—not all—felt the magic spell of power and inevitably longed for its continuance.

Early in 1919 the author had made a tour of the United States and had written for the London *Times* a cable stating that while sentiment for the League was preponderant, the cause would be strengthened if people were sure Mr. Wilson did not mean to use it as a vehicle for a third term. The President read that article in Paris and cabled to his private secretary to discover if the sentiment reported were correct and if he should issue a statement saying he would not run for a third term. He was advised that it was unnecessary. Nearly a year later when the author published a story about the President's cable and his apparent willingness to forego a third nomination

if it would help the cause of the League, there was evidence of displeasure that Mr. Wilson's position had become public. Mrs. Wilson demanded to know of Secretary Tumulty if the author had access to the President's cables from Paris. The information to the author had come not from Washington, however, but from Paris, yet the significance of the action lay in the apparent disinclination to give up the third-term idea especially at a time when other candidates were seeking the Democratic nomination.

The Democratic National Convention at San Francisco in June, 1920, was a disappointment to Woodrow Wilson in many ways. The delegates failed to give Mr. Wilson even a complimentary nomination. Nor did his friends think it wise to announce that he had sent a light-wines-and-beer plank to the Convention for adoption. He had vetoed the Volstead Act and felt that its modification would not be a violation of the Eighteenth Amendment.

Immediately after the San Francisco Convention James M. Cox, the Democratic nominee, went to the White House and affirmed his faith in the League of Nations. President Wilson was able to give but little assistance during the campaign and, as for his desire that a referendum on the League issue be held, there was no machinery by which this question could be divorced from other questions discussed in the campaign and voted on in the same election. For no doubt a good deal of resentment prevailed throughout the country against the Democrats due to the many restrictions imposed during the war and the inability of the Administration in power to adjust itself quickly to peace-time conditions.

Perhaps the best proof that the 1920 campaign was not a "referendum" on the League of Nations question, and that the verdict rendered in the election of Warren Harding by an immense majority was not a clearcut judgment on the merits of the Versailles covenant, is to be found in the speech delivered during that campaign by former President William Howard Taft, now Chief Justice of the United States. Mr. Taft spoke at Port Huron, Michigan, on October 19, 1920. He said:

"The issue which the American people are going to vote upon in this election, no matter what Mr. Cox wishes, Mr. Wilson wishes, Mr. Lodge wishes or Mr. Harding wishes, is whether they approve the administration of Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson is a man of exceptional ability and of still more exceptional personality, and he has stamped that personality upon his administration so completely that he is the administration. It is impossible, therefore, to talk in this campaign without talking of Mr. Wilson. Never since the days of Andrew Jackson has a President exercised over his party and over the Government such control as Mr. Wilson. He loves the exercise of power and he is morbidly sensitive to any attempt, real or fancied, by anyone, whether Congressman, Senator or prominent Democrat, to interfere with his control. He has used all his power and influence in many instances to discipline Congressmen and Senators of his party and to defeat them for office, because they have questioned the wisdom of his action or have offered obstruction to his will. Circumstances have enabled him to gratify his love of power. He came into office as a minority candidate and his party, dry with a thirst for office and power caused by sixteen years in the desert of the opposition, was only too anxious to submit to his dictation. . . .

"When the war came on, both Republicans and Democrats, had to extend to the Executive much arbitrary authority. No czar or king ever had greater power than Woodrow Wilson during the war, and no potentate ever exercised it with less willingness to consult those interested. He established a seclusion from conference with members of the Senate and members of the House unheard of before in this country. . . .

"Mr. Wilson's jealousy of his power and his grudging delegation of it led him to adopt a course that required the heads of his departments and others not to do anything of any importance until he was consulted. It was impossible for him to know the facts and acquire familiarity with the merits of the question without delay and a halting of the business. This is the one explanation of the exasperating slowness with which decisions were made in that critical year beginning April, 1917,

when it became necessary to change a nation profoundly steeped in the methods of peace into a military organization. . . .

"And so it was that not until protesting public opinion pushed on the Administration was there given to men who knew how, the power to do the things that had to be done in order to enable American courage, American ingenuity, American efficiency, American genius for organization, American patriotism and American dash to save the world."

Mr. Taft criticized the President's election appeal for a Democratic Congress in 1918 and added:

"All wars, and especially this war, should abolish partisanship during its existence. It did so in all the other countries engaged in the war. Mr. Wilson should have opened his arms and invited to his assistance all Republicans capable of rendering service, but this he did not do. It was contrary to his nature; and the examples of Great Britain and France and Canada and other countries had no effect upon him. He could not brook the thought of anyone sharing his power or his responsibility. Nothing else could explain the remarkable correspondence between the President and his Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing."

Mr. Taft reviewed his own efforts in favor of the original League and spoke of the suggestions which he had made as to amendments for the League and as to the best means of securing its ratification.

"I soon became convinced," he said, "after the League had been submitted to the Senate, that it was impossible to secure its ratification without reservations, and then I sought to bring about, so far as I could, agreement upon reservations which would least weaken the League. Mr. Wilson's failure to secure his League was due in great part to his desire always to exercise one-man power."

Mr. Taft pointed out that the President had ignored members of his own party in the Senate and contrasted the appointment by President McKinley of Republican and Democratic Senators to negotiate a treaty with Spain.

"I did not object to his going over to Europe. Indeed I thought it would educate him in the affairs of the world, but

insofar as it minimized the necessity of appointing able men on the Commission to assist him, it had bad results. I would have been glad to have the League adopted as Mr. Wilson submitted it but this is a republic. This is a constitutional government in which the Executive in negotiating treaties must abide the confirmation of his action by two-thirds of the Senate. He must, therefore, defer to their judgment, and if he cannot secure all that he would wish, he must in order to obtain progress make concession."

Mr. Taft said the President instead "rejected the compromise offered him on November 19, 1919, which would have given us what in my judgment would be a most useful advance to an international agreement to prevent war."

Mr. Taft declared that in Mr. Cox's election the country faced a "stale mate—the continuance of the deadlock which Mr. Wilson insisted upon." He said that had Mr. Wilson accepted the compromise offered him by the Republicans the United States should now be in the League of Nations, functioning in that body and helping it to amend itself." He continued:

"Mr. Harding's attitude upon the League has been this: that in an earnest desire to help the other nations he was willing to vote for the League with the Republican reservations and he did so twice. In anticipation of Executive responsibility, however, and of initiative, he does not wish to submit the Wilson League to the Senate. He prefers to negotiate with the leading powers now in the League to revise and amend the League by an agreement with those powers before submitting the matter to the Senate.

"In his speech of August 28 and in his speeches at Indianapolis and Greencastle, Indiana, this last week, he has made it clear that this country should help in an association to avoid war and that he is willing and anxious to bring about a modified or revised league, avoiding those features of the Wilson League to which he has made objection. His insistence is that the League should center around a court of justice, and Mr. Root's International Court of Justice furnishes a basis for his proposal. Expressions that Mr. Harding has 'scrapped' the

League, has 'repudiated' it, are grossly unfair expressions. He has vigorously opposed Article X and the Monroe Doctrine provision, but he has not repudiated its other provisions and purposes. All inference that he is opposed to any league or opposed to the present League, when those features which he deems to be objectionable are removed, and when other features are added that he deems to be necessary, does him injustice. I wish to be a real democrat in spirit. I wish to play the game of government as its rules are contained in the Constitution of the United States. I feel, therefore, that though I favored the Wilson League and hoped that it might be ratified, and favored Article X and hoped that that might escape elimination, when I found that it could not be ratified I urged, as strongly as I could, the acceptance of the reservations offered by the Republicans in November, 1919, and in February, 1920. I felt that President Wilson made himself the proper subject of the severest criticism in not being willing to accept a compromise which the Senate had the right to offer him. By insisting on Article X he destroyed his League, and Mr. Cox proposes to do the same thing. The only possible hope of making progress toward a league of nations to secure peace is by the election of Mr. Harding.

"The present election is not a referendum the result of which will determine whether the American people are in favor of Mr. Wilson's League or against it. The issue of this campaign is whether we shall approve the Wilson administration. From my observation, and I have had great opportunity in every part of the country, I believe that the majority of the American people were in favor of Mr. Wilson's accepting the reservations and entering the League. I believe further that a majority of the people are against Article X, and I think this, although I favored Article X and would have been glad to see it ratified. The question is what can be done under the rules of the game, *i.e.,* under Constitutional provisions, to bring the United States into an arrangement with other nations to prevent war. It seems to me clear that in the existing situation Mr. Harding's election is the only means of securing this."

No comment was issued by President Wilson on the decisive defeat administered to James M. Cox. Mr. Wilson's health continued to improve and, by December, 1920, he was able to walk about his room on the arm of an attendant.

There was a pathetic meeting during the first week of December, 1920, at the White House between President Wilson and his political foe, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, the leader of the Republican opposition.

It is customary for Congress on the day of its opening to send a committee of the two Houses to notify the President that all is in readiness to receive any communication he may have. Senators Lodge and Underwood, and Representatives Mondell, Fordney and Champ Clark were appointed to go to the White House for that purpose.

They were received in the Blue Room where they waited for the door of the Red Room to be opened. An attendant stood beside the President as the door swung open, having supported him in the walk to the door, but as the President entered the Blue Room, leaning on his cane, the attendant stood aside.

The first newspaper accounts referred to the fact that Mr. Wilson did not shake hands with his callers but failed to give as the reason for this that his left arm had not recovered its full vigor, and with his right he leaned on a cane. What he said was: "You see, gentlemen, I cannot yet dispense with my third leg." As the President spoke, his head was bowed. He did not stand with the same erectness which had so often characterized his meetings with people in the White House. His eyes were turned downward. His voice was not strong, but it was clear. His callers heard and understood every word spoken. The occasion called for formality and Mr. Wilson, in a quiet tone, said he would communicate a message to Congress the next day.

Mr. Wilson's message to Congress mostly concerned domestic affairs. He dictated every word of it himself to his stenographer, Charles L. Swem. The message closed with this significant paragraph:

"I have not so much laid before you a series of recommendations, gentlemen, as sought to utter a confession of faith, of

the faith in which I was bred and which it is my solemn purpose to stand by until my last fighting day. I believe this to be the faith of America, the faith of future, and of all the victories which awaited national action in the days to come, whether in America or elsewhere."

The foregoing was Woodrow Wilson's valedictory to Congress. It was meant to be his answer to the election returns of the month before. He held still to the conviction that his cause would be vindicated.

Amid all the excitement of the week, the joy of the Republicans and the earnest hopefulness which Warren Harding displayed in his parting speech to the Senators, there was a shadow of tragedy even at the Capitol, where foes and friends alike realized that the spirit of Woodrow Wilson had not capitulated even though the gaunt figure in the doorway at the White House gazed downward in physical defeat.

Disappointment inevitably followed Mr. Wilson's inability to secure the ratification of the Versailles covenant of the League of Nations but even if he had accepted the reservations proposed by his political opponents, there will always be some question as to what the true value might have been of America's participation in the League in the years immediately following the war. For there developed in the United States a reaction against all things European, and, if the United States had entered the League technically as a member, the political situation in America would have prevented, for a few years at least, the exercise by the United States of any considerable influence in European affairs.

The President of the United States possesses great powers of negotiation and cooperation which do not require specific treaty agreements, but the temper of the opposition to further cooperation with Europe was such, in 1919, that even a simple proposal to permit the United States to assume her place on the Reparations Commission failed of adoption when asked for apart from the Versailles Treaty and as a direct method of making sure that the interests of the United States would be safeguarded in the all important councils of the Commission.

Woodrow Wilson's last hour as President of the United

States on March 4, 1921, was a curious comingling of sadness and attempted cheerfulness.

To the last he seemed to be in a fighting mood, though everybody who stood around him felt that his feeble figure belied his attempts to appear in the belligerent spirit of old.

Slowly Mr. Wilson wended his way at the Capitol along the corridor for fifty feet from the elevator just to the right of the Senate chamber. As he proceeded he leaned heavily on his cane. His left shoulder was stooped, his left hand hung limply at his side. As former Mayor "Honey" Fitzgerald of Boston extended his hand to the President, Mr. Wilson quickly hung the hook of his cane in the upper pocket of his overcoat, and, standing for a moment, smiled his greetings.

Senator Overman of North Carolina, Democrat, walked along beside Mr. Wilson and asked him if he would go out to the front of the Capitol to witness the inauguration of Mr. Harding, but in a hollow voice Mr. Wilson replied that he feared he did not have strength enough to do it.

Surrounded by members of his Cabinet, Democratic senators and military and naval aides, Mr. Wilson entered the President's Room, there to be greeted by the President-elect, Warren G. Harding. An aide helped take Mr. Wilson's overcoat from his shoulders and the man who had driven through the streets of Rome, Paris and London, hailed as the great peacemaker of this generation, sank limply into a chair. For a moment only, however, did he seem nervous and ill at ease. Gradually he recovered his composure.

For a moment the President had appeared as the decrepit figure so often pictured since his physical collapse, two years before, and then again as he sat at his desk and signed bills with a firm hand and a steady pen, his eyes burned with the fire of the soldier who never surrenders.

Warren Harding stood over him, bending low and almost paternally beside the man whose arduous labors in the presidential office had caused his physical, if not political, overthrow. It was evident that a kindly feeling existed between the two men, intensified, indeed, by that human quality which made Warren Harding beloved by his colleagues.

The President-elect made it clear that if Mr. Wilson did not feel strong enough to go outdoors for the inaugural ceremony he would not regard it as a discourtesy, and he urged Mr. Wilson not to do anything that would tax his strength.

"I guess I had better not try it," remarked Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Harding passed out to the Republican cloakroom, while the outgoing President signed bills. The first measure placed before him was a bill authorizing additional expenditures for hospital facilities to take care of disabled soldiers. Every now and then the signing of bills would be interrupted by a handshake from some member of Congress who had stepped into the room to pay respects. When General Pershing stepped forward, Woodrow Wilson smiled, and, extending his hand, said:

"Excuse me, General, for not rising."

Courteous to the last, Mr. Wilson had many kind words of greeting for his former associates. Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State, chatted with him for a while and, standing close at hand, as of old, was Postmaster General Burleson.

It was a truly Democratic setting. Josephus Daniels was there and Newton Baker and David F. Houston and Edwin Meredith—all the Cabinet in fact—and Senators Underwood, Robinson, Harrison, Heflin, Swanson and others, who had been close to Mr. Wilson. Each one was called by name and, really, as Mr. Wilson sat writing his signature, those who had known the man for years felt that he looked just as healthy and acted just as naturally as in the earlier years of his administration when he came to the President's Room.

"Well, I think I had better scoot, now," remarked Mr. Wilson, with a laugh, but just at that moment a committee from both houses of Congress appeared in the room. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and former Speaker Joseph Cannon, veteran Republicans, were in the front row of the committee directly facing Mr. Wilson. Quickly there came over the Wilson countenance that frigid expression which had, on more than one occasion, been employed to express his displeasure. It was evident that Mr. Wilson was trying hard to fight back something inside of him that rebelled at the necessity of receiving that final communication from Mr. Lodge.

"This committee begs to inform you," said Senator Lodge, "that the two Houses have completed their work and are prepared to receive any further communications from you."

Woodrow Wilson's face flushed. His eyes were fixed upon the eyes of Senator Lodge. These two men stood face to face in the final scene of what was perhaps the greatest of battles in American history over the ratification of a treaty. Clearly and seemingly with the peremptory spirit of the past, Mr. Wilson said:

"I have no further communication. I would be glad if you would inform both Houses and thank them for their courtesy—good morning, sir."

It was that last "Good morning, sir," which seemed to cut the air with its finality and coldness. Nothing more formal could have been spoken. Nothing more fittingly represented the inward emotions of the outgoing President of the United States. He turned quickly in his swivel chair, willing hands helped him with his coat. Warren Harding again came forward to wish Mr. Wilson good health. Mrs. Wilson with characteristic graciousness told Mr. Harding she wished him "all the luck in the world," and gradually the picture faded.

"I'm afraid, Mr. President, I shall have to beg off," was Mr. Wilson's final remark to Warren Harding, who told him he thoroughly understood.

Then it was that Woodrow Wilson, with halting step and downcast head, his left shoulder stooped but his eyes turned upward endeavoring to smile, trying to the end to exhibit a fighting spirit and an attitude of no surrender, passed out of official life into the sunshine of the Capitol grounds, there to be motored to the privacy of his new home and the consoling atmosphere of colleagues and friends—faithful to the last to the idealism that once thrilled a war-torn world.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCEPTIONS OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

Woodrow Wilson's conception of party leadership and party discipline was novel indeed. His favorite textbook in the college lecture room was Bagheot's "English Constitution", a remarkable treatise on the British parliamentary theory as contrasted with our own. Often in the subsequent years of his political career, Woodrow Wilson revealed the unconscious influence of these studies of parliamentary government. From the days when the Underwood-Simmons tariff law and the Federal Reserve Act were under consideration he was ready to "read out of the party" those who disagreed with his leadership. It persisted even after he left the White House. To him it was an essential of party discipline. He maintained this notion through the days of his illness expressing his views in a series of letters relating to the candidacy for renomination of certain United States Senators who had strayed from his leadership and occasionally approving others who had remained faithful.

Woodrow Wilson admired certain features of the English governmental system. He liked the idea of responsibility to the people of a Cabinet formed by the party successful in an election. He was impressed by the opportunity of a prime minister and his cabinet when opposed by the legislature either to resign and permit another ministry to be formed by the same party or to carry the disagreement at once to the country so that the voters might decide it in a general election.

Only the few who knew of the deep impression which the parliamentary form of government had made on Woodrow Wilson's mind in his college years realized what he meant when on two occasions he spoke to his intimates about re-

signing the Presidency of the United States. The general public never has known that Woodrow Wilson harbored such thoughts while he was in the White House.

The first instance occurred but a few weeks after Mr. Wilson was inaugurated. He had delivered an address to Congress in person asking for the repeal of the legislation which had exempted American vessels from the payment of tolls in passing through the Panama Canal. The exemption, he claimed, discriminated against the vessels of Great Britain which under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty had been guaranteed equal rights with the ships of the United States. This was Mr. Wilson's first test of strength with his own party. It looked for a few days as if he would be defeated.

"I would rather resign," he said one day, "than remain President of a country which repudiated its treaty obligations."

On another occasion, just before the United States entered the European war, when Congress was considering the McLemore resolution providing that American citizens be warned to keep off armed ships of belligerent nations so as to avoid complications with Germany, Mr. Wilson was told that such a resolution might pass in direct opposition to his wishes. He talked again of resigning. Woodrow Wilson won both fights however. Whether if he had lost either one he would have carried into effect the threat of resignation, nobody knows. Subsequent events would seem to prove, however, he came at last to realize that, unless the members of Congress resigned also and the country had an opportunity to pass judgment simultaneously on those who had disagreed with the Executive, the move would be futile.

Within his own party, on the other hand, Woodrow Wilson did consider it his duty to appeal to the people to decide for or against his leadership. He wrote letters which were made public and used against the candidacy for example of Senator Vardaman of Mississippi in the party primary campaign. He opposed several members of the House of Representatives who sought renomination on the Democratic ticket. Some of these contests turned in his favor and some he lost. This did not swerve him from his conception of party leadership. Al-

though he rarely commented on public questions during the last three years of his life, he never failed to respond to a request from Democrats for an expression of opinion as to a Democratic candidate for renomination who had opposed him. Typical of these were his bitter epistles on the party infidelity of Senators James A. Reed of Missouri and John K. Shields of Tennessee, both of whom had failed to support the Versailles Treaty and League of Nations with or without reservations.

There was nothing personal in any of this. When he characterized Senator Shields as the "least trustworthy" of his associates in public life, he did not mean personally. No one had achieved a higher reputation for integrity than Senator Shields of Tennessee. At one time Mr. Shields was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. But he differed with Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy. This act made him in Mr. Wilson's judgment unworthy of trust as a Democrat. For he, as leader of the party, had come to regard the League of Nations as a cause which the Democratic party should champion to a man particularly because almost all the Republicans had chosen the other side. Mr. Wilson felt that when Senator Shields voted with the Republicans he forfeited his right to the votes of Democrats in a party primary contest.

Perhaps the most striking example of this Wilsonian theory about party discipline occurred after he left the White House. He had always been fond of Oscar Underwood, worked in close cooperation with him when the latter led the Democrats in the House, and wrote him many friendly letters notwithstanding the fact that one wing of the party—particularly the Bryan influence—was opposed to the conservatism of the Alabama statesman.

After Senator Underwood voted for a "separate peace" with Germany and served on the delegation with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, which negotiated the four-power pact between the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, Mr. Wilson was deeply disappointed.

"If Underwood is a Democrat," he remarked to a friend, "then I am a Republican."

Woodrow Wilson's ideas of government were first publicly

expressed in an article which he wrote for the *International Review* in 1879 when he was but twenty-three years old. He admired the responsible cabinet system of the British Government and felt that some improvement on the American system might some day be made.

"The President can seldom make himself recognized as a leader," wrote young Wilson. "He is merely the executor of the sovereign legislative will; his Cabinet officers are little more than chief clerks, or superintendents, in the Executive departments, who advise the President as to matters in most of which he has no power of action independently of the concurrence of the Senate. The cardinal feature of cabinet government on the other hand, is responsible leadership—the leadership and authority of a small body of men who have won the foremost places in their party by a display of administrative talents, by evidence of high ability upon the floor of Congress in the stormy play of debate. . . .

"The Executive is in constant need of legislative cooperation; the legislative must be aided by an Executive who is in a position intelligently and vigorously to execute its actions. There must needs be, therefore, as a binding link between them, some body which has no power to coerce the one and is interested in maintaining the independent effectiveness of the other. Such a link is the responsible cabinet."

Nearly thirty years later seated at his typewriter in the modest library of his little cottage at Princeton on a rainy afternoon, he wrote the following:

"The President can never again be the mere domestic figure he has been throughout so large a part of our history. . . . Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the world, whether he act greatly and wisely or not. . . . We have but begun to see the Presidential office in this light; but it is the light which will more and more beat upon it, and more and more determine its character and its effect upon the politics of the nation. We can never hide our President again as a mere domestic officer. We can never again see him the mere executive he was in the '30's and '40's. He must stand always at the front of our affairs, and the

office will be as big and as influential as the man who occupies it."

It was part of his series of lectures on Constitutional Government. These thoughts were so ingrained in his mind that when the professor had an opportunity to practise what he had preached, he revealed a consistency of thought and action.

He had also written in 1908 the following:

"He (the President) cannot escape being the leader of his party except by incapacity and lack of personal force, because he is at once the choice of the party and of the nation. He is the party nominee and the only party nominee for whom the whole nation votes. Members of the House and Senate are representatives of localities, are voted for only by sections of voters. There is no national party choice except that of President. No one else represents the people as a whole, exercising a national choice. . . . He can dominate his party by being spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the country, by giving direction to opinion, by giving the country at once the information and the statements of policy which will enable it to form its judgments alike of parties and of men.

"For he (the President) is also the political leader of the nation, or has it in his choice to be. The nation as a whole has chosen him and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country and no other single force can withstand him; no combination of forces will easily overpower him. His position takes the imagination of the country. He is the representative of no constituency, but of the whole people. When he speaks in his true character he speaks for no special interest. If he rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it, he is irresistible; and the country never feels the zest of action so much as when its President is of such insight and caliber. . . . A President whom it trusts cannot only lead it, but form it to his own views. . . . His office is anything he has the sagacity and force to make it. . . .

"The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to

be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit; and if Congress be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the makers of the Constitution—it will be from no lack of Constitutional powers on its part, but only because the President has the nation behind him and Congress has not. He has no means of compelling Congress except through public opinion."

Perhaps the most interesting light on the processes in Mr. Wilson's mind in connection with the Versailles Treaty is to be found in his doctrine on the powers of a President in foreign affairs:

"The framers of the Constitution made in our President a more powerful, because a more isolated, king than the one they were imitating.

"Some of our Presidents have deliberately held themselves off from using the full power they might legitimately have used, because of conscientious scruples, because they were more theorists than statesmen. They have held the strict literary theory of the Constitution, . . . and have acted as if they thought Pennsylvania Avenue should have been even longer than it is; that there should be no intimate communication of any kind between the Capitol and the White House; that the President as a man was no more at liberty to lead the houses of Congress by persuasion than he was at liberty as President to dominate them by authority—supposing that he had, what he has not, authority enough to dominate them. . . . The personal force of the President is perfectly Constitutional to any extent to which he chooses to exercise it. . . .

"Those Presidents who have felt themselves bound to adhere to the strict literary theory of the Constitution have scrupulously refrained from attempting to determine either the subjects or the character of legislation, except so far as they were obliged to decide for themselves, after Congress had acted, whether they should acquiesce in it or not. And yet the Constitution explicitly authorizes the President to recommend to Congress 'such measures as he shall deem necessary and expedient,' and it is not necessary to the integrity of even the literary theory of the Constitution to insist that such recommendations should be merely perfunctory. . . .

"A President's messages to Congress have no more weight or authority than their intrinsic reasonableness and importance give them; but that is their only Constitutional limitation. The Constitution certainly does not forbid the President to back them up, as General Washington did, with such personal force and influence as he may possess. . . . The Constitution bids him speak and times of stress and change must more and more thrust upon him the attitude of originator of policies. . . .

"Because the Constitution gave them their veto in such explicit terms our Presidents have not hesitated to use it. . . . and yet in the exercise of the power to suggest legislation, quite as explicitly conferred upon them by the Constitution, some of our Presidents have seemed to have a timid fear that they might offend some law of taste which had become a constitutional principle. . . .

"One of the greatest of the President's powers I have not yet spoken of at all: his control, which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely." . . .

"The President cannot conclude a treaty with a foreign power without the consent of the Senate, but he may guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if the faith and prestige of the Government are to be maintained. . . .

"He (the President) need disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete, and when in any critical matter it is completed the Government is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination, the Senate may feel itself committed also."

Mr. Wilson realized that he was hedged in by precedent and tradition with respect to the operations of the Cabinet. He would have preferred the British system of cabinet responsibility.

Nothing perhaps illustrates more forcibly the psychological effect of the parliamentary idea on the mind of Woodrow Wilson than his determination to attend the Paris Peace Conference as the head of the United States delegation. It was no sudden decision arrived at in the three weeks between the

signing of the armistice and the day he set sail. Mr. Wilson had seriously considered going to Europe even in the months when the United States was neutral if by personal and official mediation he could bring about world peace. When Mr. Wilson did go to Paris to represent the United States in a conference of belligerents, people on this side of the Atlantic failed to grasp the significance of his relationship to the other negotiators.

It was not a conference of sovereigns—no kings or emperors were present. It was a conference, however, of the heads of parliamentary governments—prime ministers and premiers. In point of rank all were on an equal footing except Mr. Wilson who was not only prime minister but the head of the state he represented. By virtue of his dual rôle, he was entitled to the consideration due both offices.

To have stayed in America and sent a member of his Cabinet as head of the delegation would have permitted the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premiers of the other countries to outrank the chairman of the American delegation. This did not comport with Mr. Wilson's idea of the dignity of the United States as an equal nor was it consistent with the influential part America had played in articulating the aims of the war. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the British Cabinet, Arthur Balfour, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the French Cabinet, Stephen Pichon, were members of their respective delegations but they did not preside. Prime Minister Lloyd George, the head of the British Government, and Georges Clemenceau, the French Premier, as well as Signor Orlando, the Italian Premier, were at the head of their respective delegations. Together with the President of the United States they made up the famous "big four" who conducted the Peace Conference.

It was the first time in the history of the American republic that the Executive of the presidential system and the head of the parliamentary system came face to face. Mr. Wilson found himself constantly explaining the differences between the two. The British Prime Minister and the other Premiers were able to commit their governments to a specific line of

action. President Wilson told his colleagues he could not do so. He needed the concurrence of two-thirds of the United States Senate to validate his committments. The other negotiators were sure of their parliaments—if they had not been they could not have remained at the Peace Conference. A crisis back home would overnight have forced a resignation or a general election. Mr. Wilson had lost a majority of both houses of Congress but hoped to win nonpartisan support for the Treaty because never in American history had a treaty of peace been rejected by the United States Senate.

In this same connection it is pertinent to disclose what were Woodrow Wilson's reasons for declining to appoint to the American peace delegation any members of the United States Senate. He was bitterly criticized for his failure to do so the argument being made that since treaties can be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate, the latter body should have representation on the mission which negotiates the treaties. Mr. Wilson never made public his viewpoint on this. But he gave, nevertheless, careful consideration to it before he announced the personnel of the American peace delegation. He called for an opinion from the Department of State. The opinion rendered was in consonance with a belief always held by Mr. Wilson that President McKinley made a mistake when he appointed two members of the Senate, a Democrat, and a Republican, to sit on the delegation which concluded a treaty of peace with Spain after the war of 1898. The action of Mr. McKinley was debated at length in the Senate at the time, some of the best constitutional lawyers of the day contending that it was improper to permit a member of the legislative branch of the Government to hold any office with or without compensation in the Executive branch of the Government. On this point the Constitution says:

"No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the

United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office."

Woodrow Wilson was a keen student of the Constitution. That document placed the negotiation of treaties entirely in the domain of the Executive. Mr. Wilson felt that not his Secretary of State or any special commissioner he might appoint but he himself, the Chief Executive, would be held responsible for the negotiation of a treaty, especially one of such vast importance as that ending the greatest war in history.

So he took no members of the Senate with him, believing that anyone who took part in the negotiation of the Treaty would be in a sense disqualified from voting in an unprejudiced way on it as a member of the Senate and that the framers of the Constitution were wise in prohibiting members of Congress from holding office under the authority of the Executive branch of the Government as would have been the case if Senators became a part of the peace delegation subject to the instructions of the President and Secretary of State.

When President Harding appointed Senators Lodge and Underwood special commissioners to act with the Secretary of State in negotiating the four-power treaty with Great Britain, France, and Japan, Mr. Wilson felt that the Constitution had been disregarded again as in the McKinley case. The answer made by the other side was that since the Senators received no compensation they were eligible but Mr. Wilson's objection was that they could not remain Senators and act under the authority or orders of the Executive branch of the Government at the same time.

The ill-fated appeal of October 1918 when President Wilson asked the American people to elect a Democratic Congress was really a natural development of his theory of party responsibility. He asked for a Democratic Congress because Republican leaders had expressed opposition to his declaration of peace aims. He feared embarrassment by his opponents in the making of peace. His fears were confirmed. Even before the Executive could complete his negotiations with other governments, the Senate by informal round-robin expressed dissent. On January 8, 1920, after the weary deadlock in the United

States Senate over the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, President Wilson again conscious of party responsibility appealed to the national gathering of Democrats for a "solemn referendum" to decide whether the United States should accept the Treaty and enter the League of Nations. Six months later when the Democratic National Convention was in session in San Francisco, Woodrow Wilson felt that he should be nominated again for the Presidency so that he might make the fight for the League. He believed his leadership was on trial and that since he had made the record he should enter the lists as its defender.

But he hoped his health would return so that he might seek vindication by a personal appeal to the voters. His party associates at San Francisco including Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State, who was to have made the motion to suspend the rules and nominate Woodrow Wilson for the Presidency, joined in a telegram to the White House advising their chieftain that circumstances would prevent the passage of such a motion and that the plan had better be abandoned. The telegram was never published and Mr. Wilson never replied.

Was the election of 1920 the referendum Mr. Wilson sought? He never thought so. Thirty-one Republicans including such eminent statesmen as Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes and Herbert Hoover signed a statement issued to the Republican voters of the country declaring that a vote for the Republican Presidential candidate was a vote in favor of the League of Nations with suitable reservations. When the Republican nominee took office he announced in his inaugural address that he would not favor entering the League with or without reservations. The interpretation of Republican policy on which presumably millions of voters had cast their ballots was declared to have been erroneous. For that reason Woodrow Wilson hoped for a clearcut issue in the platforms of the next Presidential contest but he died before the lines of battle for 1924 could be drawn.

In the latter part of October, 1923—just three months before the end—Mr. Wilson was asked by James Kerney, Editor of the Trenton *Times,* to become a candidate for the United

States Senate in the Democratic primaries in New Jersey. Mr. Wilson did not care to enter a Senatorial contest and Mr. Kerney quotes him as follows:

"I am going to look at myself as though I did not exist, to consider the whole thing in an impersonal way. From the messages I get I realize that I am regarded as the foremost leader of liberal thought in the world. And the hopes and aspirations of that liberal thought should find some better place of expression than in the Senate. There is only one place, you know, where I could be sure of effectively asserting that leadership."

Mr. Wilson was described that day as depressed in spirit, remarking sadly:

"I am helpless, Kerney, this left side is gone."

He must have realized that he could not engage in an active campaign or perform the duties of a Presidential office in a third term. But he never believed himself incapable of leadership in thought and ideals. He bequeathed to friends the draft of a Democratic platform for 1924. Thus to the end he carried his theory of personal responsibility to the party that had honored him as its leader for eight years.

CHAPTER XIX

FRIENDSHIPS—LIFELONG ASSOCIATIONS

The personal and impersonal in Woodrow Wilson's life were as separate and distinct as if they were derived from two different beings. Once as he stood on the platform of a railroad station during the 1912 campaign and saw a big cloth banner stretched across the street with the words "For President and Vice President, Wilson and Marshall", he said to the newspaperman with him:

"Somehow I cannot bring myself to believe that I am the fellow mentioned on that banner. I never can get used to it."

And he never did. Yet therein lies the key to an understanding of Woodrow Wilson's lifelong friendships, on the one hand, and his series of breaks on the other with persons closely associated with him at times in the business of regulating the affairs of Princeton University or administering the two public offices he held,—the Governorship of New Jersey and the Presidency of the United States.

As a husband and father, as a chum of his college classmates, as a host at family reunions, Woodrow Wilson was full of human qualities. As a trustee of the public interest, as a crusader for large policies of state, he knew neither friendship nor compassion—he was as stern as he was inflexible.

The sternness of Woodrow Wilson's attitude toward questions of duty was never better illustrated than in an incident which occurred when he was President of Princeton. The mother of one of the students who had been expelled for a breach of discipline came to the University to ask reinstatement for her son. Dr. Wilson was obdurate. She pleaded with him and, as he expressed it, she almost succeeded in touching his sentimental side. Finally the woman said:

"I am going on the operating table to-morrow and it may mean my death. If you will reinstate my son, I shall go cheerfully to my fate. Otherwise you may be responsible for my death."

Dr. Wilson's answer was given with measured emphasis. He said:

"As between your life and that of Princeton—the institution—it is better that you should die; for Princeton must live."

Relating the episode afterwards Mr. Wilson said it was one of the most trying experiences of his life. He explained it, however, as a supreme test of duty remarking that the compulsion of duty was such in his mind that if his own brother were guilty of crime, and he were the judge on the bench, he would sentence his own brother to death but would himself die of a broken heart afterwards. That was his true conception of duty—the institution he loved, the University, the state of New Jersey, the Government of the United States, all of these things were greater than anything personal, anything sentimental, anything human.

"I want to talk with you about the Captain G—— case," said an intimate friend one day. The President's face grew serious. He held up his hand and said:

"Now, you are encroaching on a subject in which I claim to be an expert. Captain G—— cheated in his examination at Fort Leavenworth. He has been court-martialed and sentenced to be dismissed. The case is now on my desk for review."

"I understand," continued the visitor, "but it happens that I have known Captain G—— for twenty-five years; that I have seen him under a great many different sets of conditions, and under all circumstances I found him to be a man of good character, and I simply want to convey to you the testimony of a man in whom I believe you have confidence. To my knowledge for twenty-five years he has been a man of good character. Now the only explanation that I can offer for what he did was the possibility that under the terrific competitive course at Fort Leavenworth, which is much worse than that

at West Point, that under that terrific course, he must have, just at the conclusion, broken a little bit, perhaps due to the fact that he was not quite himself. What he did was to make a tracing of a map instead of going out on the ground and making a survey and then make an original map."

"A great many people," said the President, "have talked to me about this case—the sons of my best friends, people in whose opinions I have a great deal of confidence, but everyone has said just what you have said, that under the strain of this hard course of competition at Leavenworth he had broken. I have been at a loss why everybody makes that point. It seems to me that makes the case much worse. Why, his job is *not* to break under a strain. If he were a baker, a real estate man, merchant, lawyer, doctor, there might be some excuse, but the job of an army officer is not to break under a strain. The fact that he did shows he is disqualified as an army officer. He might be all right in a dozen other vocations."

And he approved the sentence of dismissal

Woodrow Wilson was always in search of what he called "disinterested men"—he not only yearned to find men of ideals who felt the spirit of the age but men who could forget themselves.

"I have found a few disinterested men," he said in 1916. "I wish I had found more. I can name two or three men with whom I have conferred again and again and again, and I have never caught them by an inadvertence thinking about themselves nor their own interests, and I tie to those men as you would tie to an anchor. I tie to them as you would tie to the voices of conscience if you could be sure that you always heard them. Men who have no axes to grind! Men who love America so that they would give their lives for it and never care whether anybody heard that they had given their lives for it; willing to die in obscurity if only they might serve! Those are the men, and nations like those men are the nations that are going to serve the world and save it. There never was a time in the history of the world when character, just sheer character, all by itself, told more than it does now. A friend of mine says that every man who takes office in Washington

either grows or swells, and when I give a man an office, I watch him carefully to see whether he is swelling or growing. The mischief of it is that when they swell they do not swell enough to burst. If they would only swell to the point where you might insert a pin and let the gases out, it would be a great delight. I do not know any pastime that would be more diverting, except that the gases are probably poisonous, so that we would have to stand from under. But the men who grow, the men who think better a year after they are put in office than they thought when they were put in office, are the balance wheel of the whole thing. They are the ballast that enables the craft to carry sail and to make port in the long run, no matter what the weather is.

"I have something that it is no doubt dangerous to have, but that I can not help having. I have a profound intellectual contempt for men who cannot see the signs of the times. I have to deal with some men who know no more of the modern processes of politics than if they were living in the eighteenth century, and for them I have a profound and comprehensive intellectual contempt. They are blind. They are hopelessly blind; and the worst of it is, I have to spend hours of my time talking to them when I know before I start as much as after I have finished that it is absolutely useless to talk to them—I am talking in vacuo."

The series of breaks which Mr. Wilson experienced throughout his career have made him seem almost devoid of human compassion. His capacity for personal friendship, however, was not less than that of other people—in fact he was bound by ties of the deepest emotion to friends of a lifetime. No better testimony on this phase of Woodrow Wilson's life is available than that of Robert Bridges, who graduated from Princeton in 1879 with Woodrow Wilson, and has for many years been the Editor of *Scribner's Magazine*. Mr. Bridges, in a personal tribute, recently said at Princeton:

"To have known a man for almost fifty years, to have watched his steps on the way from undergraduate to President of the United States, is a great privilege. So often the way to glory and great achievement is one of disillusionment; so

often the strenuous effort, the indomitable will, seem to harden the mind and congeal natural feeling. We begin always to generalize about successful men and great men—and label them with certain qualities. A man with an analytical mind like Wilson's is always a particularly good subject himself for such analysis. How often we have heard him use—in this very hall—the word to describe it. Certainly I shall not attempt to 'assess' the career of Woodrow Wilson. It is far beyond my capabilities or my inclination.

"But to me he has always been so human and so lovable—so much a part of a beautiful friendship beginning on this campus, that I cannot put his qualities among the cold abstractions of greatness.

"There is really nothing like it, as one looks back on it—several hundred boys—fortuitously gathered from the ends of the earth, to be thrown into a close relationship that lasts through life.

"Wilson was a boy like that, peculiarly adapted to college life. He came from a small southern college where conditions were then very simple and you had to know your fellows. We soon found out that he had an eager mind. That is a rare quality among youngsters of eighteen. But there was not a touch of the pedant or dig about him. He was as keen for the life of the college as any one of us; but we soon discovered that what he called 'the play of the mind' was as exhilarating to him as the play of the body to the athlete. He took great pleasure in the writers who used language with precision and with imagination. To him this was not a scholastic pursuit. It was full of the stuff of existence. He would trail a word or a phrase with that eagerness that Robert Louis Stevenson so exalted. They would pop out in his conversation at the club table as a part of a jest or a noisy dispute. There was a twinkle in his eye, but he knew, and you knew, that he had scored.

"It was as natural for him as an undergraduate to talk about Burke, Brougham or Bagehot, as for the rest of us to allude to Cooper or Mayne Reid.

"We soon found out that the thing he was most interested

in (to which this play of words was accessory) was government. Now that sounds abstract and dull. To him it meant the evolution of a method by which all kinds of people could live together in the same country and same world. For him it began in our little college world with its coteries. He soon had around him a group of fellows who could play the game of hall or club politics with the skill of practiced parliamentarians. It did not interfere with the fun of athletic contests—and it certainly added to the zest of college life. Through his initiative they followed the rules of the British Parliament—and if you could not uphold your contention in debate, you were overthrown as a Prime Minister is in Great Britain. Of that little coterie one became Attorney General of New Jersey, another Chancellor and later Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, another Mayor of his City and Congressman from an important district, and one—Governor of New Jersey and President of the United States.

"In all this, good-fellowship was an essential feature. Wilson soon began to use the word 'comradeship' as expressing his idea of the best part of college life. He never lost that point of view—and you will find that as President of the College, Governor of New Jersey, or President of the United States, or negotiator of a World Peace, he put at the root of it all the comradeship of men and nations.

"I recall that when he was considering the possibility of running for Governor we had a little talk about it, and I pointed out the helplessness of a Governor with a hostile or divided legislature. His eyes snapped and he said: 'Well, I can *talk*, can't I?' And that is exactly what he did, as you recall. He found that his bills were having a hard time in the legislature, and he went right to the source of power—the people—and talked to them; the bills were passed by a divided legislature.

"And that was what he had in mind when he broke the custom of 100 years, and as President went in person before Congress to read his message. At a class dinner on the eve of his departure for Washington, in a delightful, frank and confidential talk, he said, 'Boys, I want to find some way to bring the

Executive in closer contact with the legislative branch of Government.' It was his old idea as an undergraduate about the inefficiency of committee government, later developed in his book, 'Congressional Government'—and personally applied by him both as Governor and President.

"He always wanted to put his mind alongside of yours: the exercise of the faculty of intelligent debate and discussion was of infinite variety and joy to him. I never knew but one other man who got so much fun out of the exercise of his faculties—and he was also a President of the United States.

"This comradeship of his which began on the campus had a strong hold on him always. It included all kinds of men on the campus and diverse interests. He never lost the joy of it—and I know it often lightened his burdens. Whether in a professor's house or in the White House, he made a point of having the crowd with him. The informality of a class dinner in the White House was something long to be remembered and recalled. I have thought that it would not be a breach of faith or taste to let him speak to you in a few brief extracts from personal letters—phrases that show this affectionate comradeship without any bluff or self-consciousness. I want you to know the man who was one of us—as you are one of the great body tied by a thousand bonds to the college that we love. I believe that he would like to speak to you in his own words in this hall which so often echoed his voice:

"May 21, 1885—'I believe that I love the fellows of that crowd and value the genuine friendships existing amongst us now more than I ever did before.'

"December 20, 1885—'I often long for a renewal of our old comradeship more than I can tell you. The old love never dies down for a moment, but I can't keep myself from occasional heart-sickness now and again, because of the dispersion of the old crowd and the necessity which keeps us apart.'

"May, 1899—'We couldn't enjoy the Reunion ourselves if we did not have you all here under our own roof.'

"March 17, 1902—'The blessed thing about poetry is that a lot of a man's *self* has got to go into it, or it isn't poetry at all.'

"January 21, 1909—'It was a great delight to have you here. I do not think that a Seventy-nine Reunion would be the source of delight it is to me, if I could not have you and the rest of the crowd about me.'

"November 10, 1910—'Thank you with all my heart for your note. It brought me cheer, for I wanted to win your approval of my venture. . . . I want fellows I know and trust about me to keep me straight with advice.'

"February, 1916—'Bless you for your generous and affectionate letter. I believe that what is fair and right will prevail so long as those who are partisans of what is fair and right do not lose heart or let their lines be broken at all.'

"January 2, 1918—'It was a deep distress to me that I could not get over to Charlie Mitchell's funeral. His death has affected me very deeply. My thought like yours goes back to the old days of our delightful comradeship, and those memories, thank God, are a permanent possession. Death seems to me in such instances a very unreal thing, but it has this terrible aspect of reality, that it does take the dear fellow away from us for the days to come, and I grieve with all my heart.'

"May 24, 1919—'Your affection and confidence mean a vast deal to me.'

"June 3, 1921—'It was a great disappointment not to get over to Cumberland while you were there. . . . I hope you found the boys all well and in good spirits. It seemed strange not to be part of such a re-union. I shall certainly seek some opportunity to recover the lost ground.

" 'Please send my love to the gang when you get a chance, and tell them how proud I am to have won their confidence and admiration.'

"June 22, 1923—'To see our classmates would be altogether a joy.'

"There was a certain integrity in his ideal from boy to man that gave his friends a peculiar confidence in his ultimate destiny as a leader of men. It was a jest of his in college which ended 'When I meet you in the Senate, I'll argue that out with you.'

"Every step in that great career was like a new chapter in a book that we began long ago and in which we were absorbingly interested. To visualize it, I saw him at his various inaugurations—on this platform, saying of Princeton in the Nation's Service: 'Who shall show us the way?'—and little dreaming that on his tired shoulders would fall the task in a supreme world crisis. I saw him as he marched on foot at the head of a war time procession along Fifth Avenue—with head erect—alert and firm and enjoying it as he always did.

"I know and you know what tunes were ringing in his head as he marched. No Princeton man forgets them. They speak of life and joy and comradeship—and these he had in full. And at the last scene of all, I could rejoice that I had known such a man—that his was the supreme comradeship that never failed in the right.

"I could hear the tramp of feet, and boys marching together, and a clear voice singing.

"And I thought of the welcome given Kipling's Knight on his return to the castle from great wars:

"'Draw-bridge, let fall!
He's the Lord of us all,
The Dreamer whose Dreams came true.'"

CHAPTER XX

BREAKS WITH HARVEY, MCCOMBS, HOUSE, LANSING AND TUMULTY

Woodrow Wilson's breaks in Princeton were about the controversal aspects of university development. He was convinced always that his differences arose on principle and not petty personalities.

In 1912 when Colonel Harvey asked Governor Wilson point blank if the support of *Harper's Weekly* (of which Colonel Harvey was then editor) was hurting him, the answer came without hesitation from the Governor that it was. Much as he appreciated Colonel Harvey's personal friendship, he did not relish the idea of having his candidacy represented before the country as emanating from the Wall Street atmosphere in which Colonel Harvey moved. He did not look upon the question from the viewpoint of personal service rendered by Colonel Harvey. The late Colonel Henry Watterson, the famous editor of the *Louisville Courier Journal,* who was present at the interview, was dumbfounded. In all his experience in practical politics, he had never encountered such an abrupt change of front. To Woodrow Wilson it was principle—something larger than a personal friendship. He was as unhappy over the break as anybody. But he viewed it impersonally as inevitable necessity.

Somewhat the same motive prompted the break with William F. McCombs, one of the prime factors in the movement which brought Governor Wilson to the front in the days before the Baltimore Convention. Mr. Wilson gathered the impression that Mr. McCombs, his campaign manager, had promised certain appointments to office to get delegates. He never had the same confidence in Mr. McCombs after that. It is true

that President Wilson later offered Mr. McCombs the Ambassadorship to France but the latter declined the appointment. It was also true that Mr. Wilson seriously considered at one time appointing Colonel Harvey to be Ambassador to Great Britain, as a reward for earlier service, but an untimely attack by the Colonel upon Mr. Wilson in a newspaper article made that impossible.

Minor breaks between Mr. Wilson and political friends were numerous. In many cases he was undoubtedly wrong. He either learned only one side of a controversy and passed judgment without getting the other side, or else someone convinced him of a friend's incapacity and thus brought about a severance of relations. There were incidents in which Mr. Wilson felt that friends were presuming upon his friendship, that they were assuming to capitalize that friendship for self-interests, or else they represented themselves as his spokesman in delicate public questions. He never liked the idea of a spokesman and resented efforts of certain persons to give the impression from time to time that they were influencing his course. Service to him meant modest performance behind his leadership in a great cause, greater than he himself, or any other individual.

The influence of Mrs. Edith Wilson on the life of the President, beginning as it did early in 1915 and extending to the hour of his death, is one of those intimate chapters which will never be adequately written by the historian. Here was a charm which affected Woodrow Wilson at every turn of his later career. Without seeking to dominate, yet guiding him just as surely as any advisor had in the past, sympathizing, helping with the details of his work, receiving his confidences, discussing problems of state, testing friends for their loyalty and unselfishness, in short, playing the confidante in a way that completely absorbed Mr. Wilson, there stood at his side through the critical years of his life a woman who it may truly be said shaped the destinies of the United States Government for nearly six years.

Like every other woman she had her likes and dislikes. Some of those who in preceding years were frequent callers did not

come as often to the White House when she became its mistress. Those who sought to reach the President on the other hand knew that to reach Mrs. Wilson first was frequently incalculable aid. She moved about without ostentation, holding her place as first lady in the land with all the grace that befitted such a position.

The election of 1916 played an important part in the development of Mr. Wilson's new life. He was more confident than ever of the support of public opinion. He did not seek new companions. He lived in the comfortable seclusion and quiet of the White House with his beloved wife. He did not make a transcontinental campaign in the summer of 1916 as did his opponent, Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican nominee. He spent his summer at Shadow Lawn, Long Branch, New Jersey, making speeches every Saturday to visiting delegations. Altogether it was a season of recreation for the President and Mrs. Wilson, not to the exclusion of public business, of course, but a happy blend of work and play.

Just after the memorable 1916 election, when the doubts and anxieties about a second term had been removed for all time, the beginning of a new era in the White House was apparent. Changes began to be made in the personnel. The author discloses one episode which has never before been related but which illustrates how completely Mr. Wilson had separated himself from his previous life. One day the President in casual conversation with Private Secretary Tumulty told the latter that he believed he ought to resign the secretaryship and go in for a political career in New Jersey as a member of Congress. For weeks preceding this conversation there had been reports published that Mr. Wilson had offered Mr. Tumulty a post on the Board of Appraisers in New York. Secretary Tumulty was at a loss to understand the origin of these rumors as to the place he was to occupy in the second administration. He could not recall offending the President in the slightest but at last Mr. Wilson revealed that the published reports were true—he did suggest resignation to his private secretary.

The author learned of the incident at noon on Sunday, No-

vember 19, 1916—and feeling sure there must be some misunderstanding, sent a note to the President requesting an audience that afternoon and was received in the Green Room almost immediately.

Woodrow Wilson never liked to hear criticism yet he was one of the fairest of men. Knowing him for years as a man who would not render a judgment unfairly if he knew the facts, the author sought Mr. Wilson's reasons and found that prejudice had been carried to him with respect to his private secretary which was unfortunate—a prejudice based on a political cabal and upon impressions which were wholly unjust to his private secretary. For three-quarters of an hour we talked—it was a dramatic conversation only because the author felt that in such a case vehemence was essential in order to impress Mr. Wilson with the ingratitude that would be his if he listened to the enemies of his private secretary and gratified their wishes. Nobody would understand, the author told the President, how one who had rendered as faithful service to him as had Secretary Tumulty could be asked to retire. None of the newspaper men who knew what had been accomplished by Secretary Tumulty for Woodrow Wilson would understand and the old taunt of New Jersey days—ingratitude—would arise once more. Mr. Wilson seemed to realize that he had wounded his faithful friend—the man who had fought his battles day and night—and he sent word through the author to his private secretary not to be disturbed.

As the critical days of 1917 approached, Mr. Wilson came more and more to appreciate how valuable was the aid of his private secretary and while Mr. Tumulty was undoubtedly impulsive at times and made mistakes, there is no question that he was loyalty itself in his service to Woodrow Wilson. Four years later the break did come and undoubtedly the influences which brought it about were not far different from those which were operating in 1916.

The incident which separated Woodrow Wilson and his private secretary occurred after the breakdown of the President and after his retirement from the White House. The letters in the record exchanged between Woodrow Wilson and Joseph

P. Tumulty do not explain the break. They show clearly that Mr. Wilson never gave his former private secretary the audience he sought, for it would have readily explained the misunderstanding.

Mr. Tumulty had, however, written a book which displeased some of the inner circle, and he had conveyed a message to a banquet of Democrats in New York which Mr. Wilson claimed never to have written but which was given orally to his former private secretary just as were so many verbal messages in the years of their association. It was a harmless communication, simply an expression of the hope that the Democrats would do their part in leading the world to a better understanding between nations. There could be no possible objection to the message even if Mr. Tumulty had phrased it himself which he did not. Mr. Wilson objected to the message because it was construed by the newspapers as a participation by him in the selection of a candidate for 1924, but the message was merely a pretext—the anti-Tumulty influence won out and the man who stood by his chief for so many years was never even granted a hearing—indeed there is nothing to show that the subsequent messages from him ever reached Woodrow Wilson.

In the last months of Mr. Wilson's life efforts were made to reunite the two. Again influences hostile to Mr. Tumulty prevented such a meeting. What Mr. Wilson did do, however, just a few months before he died, was to write a letter to James Kerney, Editor of the *Trenton Times,* stating his opinion that the best man to make the race in New Jersey on the Democratic ticket for the United States Senatorship in 1924 would be Joseph Patrick Tumulty. This letter was to have been published in the *Saturday Evening Post* and already was in type five weeks after Mr. Wilson died when Mrs. Wilson asserted her legal rights to suppress the document. The missive shows that Mr. Wilson did not lose his high regard for the man who served him eleven years as private secretary, and who deserves to be called by those words which Woodrow Wilson used with peculiar precision namely, a loyal friend.

There was never a break between Colonel House and Presi-

dent Wilson. Strictly speaking it was a coolness and a separation—in contrast with the warm friendship and intimacy of nearly eight years. After leaving the White House Woodrow Wilson never saw Colonel House again.

Like all great men, Mr. Wilson had certain weaknesses, and one was a peculiar susceptibility to what traditionally is known as "court gossip" and what in the parlance of an American democracy is sometimes defined as "tattle." Prejudices were conveyed to him by those who tried to sway his judgment and Mr. Wilson unconsciously absorbed those prejudices and dropped many of his friends without even giving them an opportunity to present their side of a controversy.

The experience of President Wilson with Colonel House has about it an air of mystery as well as tragedy. Few men ever served others with the same zeal and with the same indifference to reward as did Colonel E. M. House. His discharge from the President's confidence occurred in Paris. It was as much a shock to Colonel House himself as it was to all who had followed the Damon and Pythias relationship which had sprung up between the two men.

Colonel House occupied a position so extraordinary and yet so influential with the President that he was the object of much envy. He had gone to Europe in advance of the President and had been dealing with Allied statesmen so long that he felt he knew their maneuvers and could guide the President in handling them. When Mr. Wilson reached Paris he found Colonel House in close contact with the entire situation. The Allied statesmen continued to deal with the Colonel in the hope that he might influence President Wilson. Instead of occupying, therefore, a position subordinate to the President he really became an intermediary between the President, on the one hand, and the Allied statesmen on the other. The headquarters of the American Peace Commission were at the Hotel Crillon where Colonel House held forth. The other members of the Peace Mission saw him occasionally but for the most part there were no meetings of the entire peace delegation at which any action was taken except to ratify conclusions already reached in conferences either by the President or Colonel House. Rela-

tives of Colonel House were attached to his staff. The unique position of the Colonel developed the usual antipathy so that among the Americans in and about the American Peace Mission there were two groups—those who were anti-House and those who were for him. Those who opposed did not hesitate to spread the word which eventually reached the President that Colonel House had set up a sort of counter-establishment at the Hotel Crillon. One day the President happened in at the Crillon to see Colonel House who talked with him a few minutes and excused himself in order to receive Premier Clemenceau. Incidents of this kind was not lost upon those who sought to give the impression that the Colonel was trying to lord it over his chief.

Newspaper articles began to appear telling that the real power in the American Peace Delegation was Colonel House. Some of these stories caught the eye of Mrs. Wilson who did not fail to take a deep interest in everything that affected her husband, and particularly those things in which she deemed that Mr. Wilson's interests were being subordinated. One day the Colonel went to the house where the President and Mrs. Wilson lived during the Peace Conference. As was his custom the Colonel stopped to chat for a few minutes with Mrs. Wilson. The Colonel was in high spirits feeling that the Peace Conference was proceeding to a successful conclusion. He was particularly jubilant that day because of the apparent conversion of an influential section of the British press to the support of Mr. Wilson. The Colonel told Mrs. Wilson that one of the most prominent London editors had become so impressed with the American viewpoint that he could count on effective editorial aid from that quarter. The Colonel remarked that his sole object was to help make the whole negotiation a success so that it would redound to the credit of his chief, Woodrow Wilson.

At this point Mrs. Wilson drew forth a clipping from the London newspaper in question and pointed to an article of laudatory character which gave Colonel House the credit for the many things accomplished in the American Peace Mission, and which pointed out that if Mr. Wilson would let the

Colonel alone there would be an earlier agreement and a much better feeling all around.

Mrs. Wilson asked Colonel House for an explanation of that article which had appeared in the newspaper edited by his friend. Her inquiry inferred he had inspired the article, the inference being that he had exploited himself instead of the President. The Colonel is not given to outbursts of indignation but took the accusation quietly. Just then the President asked for the Colonel and their conference began.

After that episode the Colonel did not return to the Wilson home but conducted all his conferences with the President at the Hotel Crillon. Gossip had it that he never explained the newspaper article to Mrs. Wilson. Nor was there anything to explain. He was not responsible for the speculative comments of the newspapers. The Colonel was cut to the quick by the coolness which Mrs. Wilson had shown and which the President himself developed immediately afterward. Inside the American Peace Mission it became known that there had been a separation. The relations between the President and Colonel House were formal thereafter. They were simply those conferences which official business required. Undoubtedly the President absorbed Mrs. Wilson's viewpoint which together with the attacks that had been made on Colonel House for his alleged compromises in negotiations served to end the warmth of the relationship between these two statesmen.

There is another important phase of the episode which played an important part. Colonel House was naturally of a conciliatory disposition. He was always trying to keep the Allied statesmen in good humor and while he had no power to commit the American Peace Mission to concessions he was trying constantly to bring about an early peace and a series of agreements which would make all the powers feel more kindly toward the Treaty itself as well as the League of Nations. His policy may have been a mistaken one, his concessions may have been too numerous, but certainly they did not commit Mr. Wilson to any acceptance of the suggestions the Colonel was making.

Mr. Wilson was warned shortly after he arrived in Paris that Colonel House had made arrangements with the various

Allied statesmen which would make it difficult for the President to make peace. The criticism came in the form of a letter from a prominent New York editor who had been in Paris, an editor whom Mr. Wilson held in high esteem. Thus the campaign against Colonel House began almost immediately after the Armistice. It succeeded in the early spring of the following year. The man who for so many years had worked tirelessly and without compensation of any sort for the United States Government, was cast adrift by Mr. Wilson. The defenders of President Wilson in this controversy will say no doubt that the activities of Colonel House were deserving of the rebuke that they received. It was natural that the Colonel who had been given so much power should be the victim of his own efforts to please Woodrow Wilson and at the same time make a practical peace. The documents in the records may prove that had President Wilson followed Colonel House's advice he would have secured more prestige for the Versailles Treaty, but this will always be a moot point because it involves the hypothetical and there were so many circumstances interrelated in Paris that no clear judgment as to the merits of this particular phase of the controversy will ever be formed. For Mr. Wilson carried to his grave the secret of his separation from Colonel House. Messages were exchanged of a courteous nature after the President became an invalid but the old association was never re-established. Indeed at the funeral of Woodrow Wilson Colonel House was not even invited to sit in mourning in the home on "S" Street where his chieftain lay dead.

Greater by far than those who basked in his halo was Woodrow Wilson. Petty intrigues constantly surrounded him and, at times, misled him. Selfish, jealous-minded, and often childish persons, poured into his ears the prejudices of scorn and the insidious poison of hate. Above it all Woodrow Wilson's own record stands untarnished—he fought for vital principles. He led a victorious nation in the greatest war of all history. His Napoleonic struggle for a triumph of broad idealism over provincialism met defeat on a field which counted him in its casualty list. He never intentionally hurt his fellowman though the stern paths of duty led him to part with so many who failed to grasp the impersonality of his battles.

CHAPTER XXI

RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS

Considering the ability of Woodrow Wilson by the printed word to reach into the hearts of men and women everywhere and stimulate liberal ideals, nothing seems so surprising as the relations between Woodrow Wilson and the press. From the beginning of his public career until the end, they constituted a series of misunderstandings and unfortunate clashes. Mr. Wilson's quarrel with the press was not personal—it was impersonal. He disagreed with the methods of American journalism. He was contemptuous of that type of newspaper, for instance, which is given over to levity and what he considered triviality, and withholds from its readers the substance of the day's news, national and international. To him the London *Times* was the greatest newspaper in the world because it printed more actual news about happenings the world over than did any other newspaper.

The growing tendency in recent years in America to anticipate news and to discuss future events or the processes by which conclusions are reached, were deeply resented by Mr. Wilson. His theory was that nothing was news until it was completed—that a discussion was of secondary importance, and that only conclusions or decisions were of interest to the public.

To some extent Mr. Wilson's early antipathies toward the press were justified.

When he was President of Princeton he went to New York to deliver an address before a group of scholarly people. It was a serious gathering. During the course of his remarks he said:

"It is unfortunate for the purpose of society in America that we are running to big cities because it is impossible for

people to think in big cities. Thought comes from the valleys and mountains and the farms, the hills, its villages, the cross-roads store where men sit around the stove and spit into a sawdust box. But"—parenthetically and humorously added Mr. Wilson,—"whatever else may be said of the habit of chewing tobacco, this much must be admitted in its favor, that it makes men think because they must stop between words to spit."

Mr. Wilson was horrified to find that the only part of his address printed in any of the New York morning papers was his humorous parenthetical remark about chewing tobacco under headlines like the following:

"President of Princeton says chewing tobacco makes men think."

An illustration of Mr. Wilson's attitude of dissatisfaction with the daily newspapers was revealed on one of his Western trips in the 1912 campaign. He was scheduled to deliver a speech in Omaha at 12 o'clock noon on a certain day. The night before, one of the correspondents went to his drawing room and said, "Governor, it would be fine if you could give us an advance either late to-night or early to-morrow morning on the speech which you are going to deliver in Omaha at noon to-morrow. If you could even give us 200 or 300 words by 9 a. m., we could get it off early and it would be a big help."

"Why all the rush?" asked the Governor.

"Well, you see the World's Series baseball games start to-morrow and from 12 noon until the games are over, nothing short of the assassination of a President could get on the wire, so if we don't have an advance on your speech we won't be able to carry much of anything on it."

Governor Wilson replied, sarcastically: "I realize, of course, that it is highly presumptuous of me to run for President of the United States at the same time that a World's Series is being played, but nevertheless I am doing it, and in my opinion the fact that I am running is of equal and even greater importance."

During the 1912 campaign, however, Governor Wilson was as pleasant and sociable a companion in the newspaper car as any candidate had ever been. He exchanged confidences freely,

jested good-naturedly, and was, in all respects what the politicians call a "good fellow".

The correspondents were particularly amused to watch for news pronunciations—or rather unusual ones. Mr. Wilson was a stickler for accuracy, and while some of the words to which he gave an unusual accent, had optional pronunciations, as a rule, upon consulting the dictionary, Mr. Wilson was found to be right. He never, for instance, said *"dee*-tail" but always "de-*tail*". He always accented *"dem*onstrable" on the first syllable. He never said "im*pov*erished" but always said, *"im*poverished". He pronounced "amateur" as if it had been spelled "ahmaturr". He surprised Americans in Europe by speaking always of the "de*vas*tated" regions instead of accenting the first syllable. The night the reporters first heard him say "improveezed" instead of "impro*vised,* they consulted the dictionaries but never after that—they knew instinctively his pronunciation was correct.

Mr. Wilson never mentioned Theodore Roosevelt in public speeches. Urged in 1912 by a newspaperman to answer the Colonel who had been attacking him bitterly, Mr. Wilson replied:

"No, I'm not going to do it. That's what Roosevelt wants. It's like the case of the southern county boss who was running for sheriff and was challenged to a joint debate by the other candidate. In the debate, the boss was getting decidedly the worst of it when one of his adherents in the rear of the hall yelled: 'Aw hell, Bill, call him a liar and turn it into a fight.' "

Speaking of Colonel Roosevelt, there is no doubt that the newspapermen, accompanying Woodrow Wilson on his various trips, were among the few persons who heard his true opinions of the man who kept up a constant bombardment of the President even during the war. In one of the books written about Mr. Roosevelt by a newspaper friend are given the Colonel's opinions of Woodrow Wilson, an impression conveying a distinct idea of distrust and the conviction that Mr. Wilson was a confirmed egotist. So it is interesting, in turn, to relate what Woodrow Wilson said to a newspaperman in the 1912 campaign:

"I believed in Roosevelt. I followed him with enthusiasm. He is the kind of a fellow that arouses your feeling, makes your heart beat, and you feel like getting out and whooping it up for him, and feel enthusiastically enlisted in his cause, and that was the way I felt. But his judgment is not trustworthy and the reason his judgment is not trustworthy is because he is egotistical. I don't object to his egotism the way so many people do, that it is offensive. So far as I am concerned he can be as egotistical as he wants, but his egotism makes it impossible for his judgment to be safe on anything else. His judgment is so warped about the status he occupies in the equation, that it renders him impossible to form any decision of judgment that is reasonable. It is perfectly obvious that he has become the monumental fakir of history."

After he reached the White House Mr. Wilson did not revise his opinion. One morning in 1918 the newspapers had displayed an attack by Roosevelt. A former newspaperman was calling that day and, after a few pleasantries, asked: "What do you think of Roosevelt's statement?"

He said, "Ah, I think to-day about what I always think about Roosevelt. Once I made a trip through the World's fair in Chicago. I had a newspaper friend in Chicago, who took me behind the scenes, through the streets of Cairo. We had as a guide a very magnificent person. He had himself done up in a turban; he was 6 feet 5 tall, majestic in appearance. He escorted us through the scenes, showed us everything. He was a sort of major-domo. There was a little stable boy who ran ahead of him, pulled back the tents, made the camels stand up and shut the doors behind us. The trip lasted about an hour, and, at the conclusion, I was uncertain whether it was in order to tip him or not. I couldn't tell whether he was a servant or a member of the managerial staff, but to be on the safe side I offered a tip just as we were leaving. I tendered it to him. Drawing himself up with great dignity and in great scorn he spurned my half dollar. I was so humiliated and wanted to get out of the way and I turned to the stable boy and gave him the coin. Just as I was going through the passage to go out I turned and caught this big fellow grabbing the stable boy. He

had the boy by the neck, shaking him and trying to take the fifty cents away from him. That is what I always think of when I think of Roosevelt. He is always spurning things with one hand and surreptitiously taking them with the other hand."

Mr. Wilson could not understand why the newspapermen had to accompany him to Bermuda when he was President-elect. He submitted finally to the ordeal of being followed but could not see the news value in his own goings and comings. He resented the presence of newspapermen at Cornish, New Hampshire, where he went for the summer after he became President. What Mr. Wilson forgot, of course, was that the few newspapermen with him at all times did not represent themselves—they were not personally interested in what he was doing. Most of them were usually bored with the idea of trailing his dust through country roads. But the newspaper corps represented all the dailies in America—they represented the people. And, if a mishap befell the President, the people were entitled to know about it at once. The presence of the newspapermen has always been an insurance against the circulation of unfounded rumors about a President.

Mr. Wilson's lack of knowledge of American journalistic practices was illustrated upon one occasion when as President-elect he lectured the newspaper correspondents at Trenton thus:

"I have been very much embarrassed by having the newspapers print articles under a Trenton or Princeton date line, speculating as to who will or who will not be in the Cabinet. Even though I am not quoted, it is obvious to the average reader that any newspaper story coming out of Princeton or Trenton attributed to 'some person in authority' or 'someone close to Governor Wilson' will be accepted as coming from me and unless this practice ceases I will be put to the necessity of publishing a card."

The correspondents looked blank. None of them had the remotest idea what he meant. After an embarrassing silence one of them said: "Just what do you mean, Governor?"

"I mean," he replied, "that I will publish a card in the newspapers saying that I am not responsible for anything published on this subject."

After that the dispatches were more cautiously phrased.

Occasionally there was something playful in Woodrow Wilson's moods and the schoolmaster in him came to the surface as he insisted upon precision. One Saturday afternoon in the winter of 1912 the group of correspondents who were camping in the outer office at Trenton of the President-elect, who was still serving as Governor of New Jersey, heard that he was planning to go to New York. On the previous Saturday Mr. Wilson had been the guest of honor at a banquet given by the members of the New Jersey Senate at Atlantic City. The newspapermen learned that another dinner was to be given by the Senate, this time in New York and in honor of the presiding officer, James Fielder.

Traveling to New York that day the correspondents, as usual, let Mr. Wilson enjoy his Pullman chair nap and as the train was approaching the metropolis, the dozen correspondents grouped about him and the conversation ran about like this:

"Are you to make a speech at the Senate dinner tonight?"

"No."

"Will there be several speeches?"

"Yes, I think so."

"What time do you think the affair will be over?"

"About eleven o'clock, I suppose."

With that the correspondents left him. The President-elect went, as usual, to the home of Colonel House while the correspondents, knowing the dinner was private, felt they could attend a theater. About eleven o'clock they appeared at the Hotel Astor and asked for one of the Senators. Mr. Fielder came to the door.

"Has the Governor gone home?" queried the newspapermen.

"He hasn't been here," said Senator Fielder.

The correspondents looked at each other in amazement and hurried away to the home of Colonel House where Governor Wilson, it was found, had spent the evening conferring with William F. McCombs and political leaders.

Most of the newspapermen had early in the evening sent over the wires brief dispatches telling of Mr. Wilson's attendance at the Senate dinner. A correction was sent broadcast by the

press associations but some of the Sunday morning editions had gone to press.

On the following Monday morning two newspapermen entered the Pullman car where Governor Wilson was sitting. They said a formal "good morning" and passed haughtily to the other end of the car. Mr. Wilson chuckled. Finally, he called out:

"Come on, get off your high horse."

The two neswpapermen walked back to his seat and explained the reprimand they had received for sending an incorrect dispatch about his Saturday evening plans. Mr. Wilson laughed and remarked that nobody had asked him point blank if he was going to attend the dinner. He knew, of course, from the questions asked just what was in the minds of the correspondents. It was not his fault, indeed, if they had assumed he was going to a dinner which it was not the Governor's custom to attend.

But Mr. Wilson was truly sorry when he learned of the embarrassment caused the newspapermen. He did not know, he said, it would cause them any difficulty.

Responsibility and the seriousness of the problems with which Woodrow Wilson was struggling made him less and less communicative with the press after he reached the White House. He rarely read the newspapers which were bitterest in their attacks upon him. The newspapermen in Washington were disposed to be kindly and showed every desire to give him fair treatment. For many months he received them in semi-weekly conferences, answering questions liberally but not always comprehensively. He showed now and then an indignation over the character of the interrogations and upon occasion fenced with his callers very much as a witness who was being cross-examined. Many newspapermen lost faith in the candor of Mr. Wilson. They felt that he made use of the official denial too often and that back of his negatives was an equivocal statement. For instance, one day, early in his administration, a newspaper printed a dispatch from Washington stating that Attorney General McReynolds had made a proposal to a Senate committee with reference to legislation affecting the tobacco

trust. Mr. Wilson was asked about it and said he knew nothing about any proposal. Silence followed the answer and finally one of the newspaper men inquired if he knew that the Attorney General had been in communication with the Senate committee, and Mr. Wilson replied:

"Oh, yes, he made some *suggestions.*"

In Mr. Wilson's mind a suggestion and a proposal were altogether different. Yet to the newspapermen it was a simple case of splitting hairs. Mr. Wilson did not long continue his conferences with the correspondents, in fact, it was inevitable that they should come to an end when the war broke out because the questions relating to the war were of such delicate nature that impromptu answers were not to Mr. Wilson's advantage nor to that of the public generally, because neutrality, and later war, offered so much opportunity for misunderstanding that only carefully worded statements prepared in advance were used to convey the Government viewpoint.

Contrary to the general impression, Mr. Wilson did not have any favorites among the newspapermen when he was in the White House. He did not believe in that kind of relationship. President Roosevelt had a favorite group and frequently inspired certain stories in order to test out public opinion. Mr. Wilson was urged to adopt such a policy but he would not do so. In all of his eight years he probably gave less time to conference with individual newspapermen than did any President preceding him, and certainly much less than has any President since his administration. Mr. Wilson had no special channel through which he cared to convey information about his position and rather resented the fact that some of his callers, especially members of the Senate and House, discussed with the press matters which had been taken up in conference with him.

On one or two occasions Mr. Wilson was so much disturbed by newspaper attacks made upon him that he wrote to the newspapers and asked that certain reporters be removed from the White House assignment. In no case did the newspapers comply with his request.

Mr. Wilson was the type of President who rarely saw newspapermen individually, but when he did he usually asked them

to retain in confidence all that he had said. Frequently the same information was obtainable from other sources without strings. The author found it to his advantage not to ask for audiences with the President, but to get information about Mr. Wilson's activities from members of the Cabinet and other sources in Washington. This often irritated Mr. Wilson because he disliked to see his plans and intentions revealed prematurely, yet it was in consonance with the newspaper practice of the day.

An interesting conversation with Mr. Wilson in Paris illustrates to some extent the attitude of the President on publicity at the Peace Conference. One of the first steps taken after the American newspaper corps arrived was a decision on the part of the Allied statesmen to bar the newspapermen from attendance at the Peace Conference. It was reported that Mr. Wilson had voted in favor of secrecy. When the author spoke to Mr. Wilson about it and asked him if it were true, he replied that it was not, and that he did not favor secrecy, but when urged to make such a statement to the public he said he believed the American people knew his position well enough. As to the suggestion that people back home would not understand how "open covenants openly arrived at" was discarded and that his action would be felt politically, he replied somewhat impatiently:

"I don't give a damn about the politics of it—if this thing is a success we will get the benefit of it, and if it isn't, we will be attacked anyhow."

Had Mr. Wilson known more about the processes of news-making he would have probably developed a more favorable public opinion on this side of the Atlantic during the time that he was at the Peace Conference. The American newspapermen were to a large extent at a disadvantage in Paris. The representatives of the press from other countries were kept closely informed and even were permitted to read the documents of the peace delegations. It looked for a time as if the French press was being given verbatim copies of everything that occurred. Mr. Wilson innocently kept to the letter of the understanding between the Allies with respect to secrecy and not only did the American press fail to report comprehensively Mr. Wilson's

valiant fights for a better peace but all Europe was given an interpretation colored by the British, French, and Italian viewpoints.

The author's relations with Woodrow Wilson have themselves been the basis of so much editorial comment and misrepresentation from time to time that the true story is set forth herein.

Having been assigned by the Associated Press to cover Governor Wilson's headquarters at Sea Girt, N. J., in the summer of 1912, I had a frank talk with Mr. Wilson at the very outset stating that while we had known each other intimately at Princeton, my function as a reporter for the Associated Press would be disinterested, and that the organization I represented was, of course, not interested in advocating the candidacy of any man but simply in chronicling the news. Mr. Wilson was at that time prejudiced against the Associated Press because of a belief that it had not given him the benefit of his victory in the Texas primaries until two days after the balloting, when the truth was the votes were slow in being counted and, as was its custom, the Associated Press did not make guesses but waited for the final returns.

When I told Mr. Wilson that my purpose was to give him a "square deal", he said he wanted nothing else. In all the years that the author covered for the Associated Press the daily news events relating to Mr. Wilson's public career during the 1912 campaign and subsequently at the White House, he never made a complaint. I accompanied him on practically all of his trips but saw no more of him than did the other correspondents. When he was inaugurated I realized that anything like personal relations with Mr. Wilson while I was engaged in the task of writing impartial reports might be misunderstood. Although there were frequent charges that Mr. Wilson inspired my articles, especially after I left the Associated Press in 1915 to become a special correspondent, the truth is I saw him alone much less than did some other men in the newspaper business and I never received from him in private conversation any stories which could be used in the newspapers at the time.

The author, nevertheless, obtained from other sources sev-

eral items of news of a sensational character and published them and found no difficulty in reflecting the President's views without even seeing him. Any newspaper correspondent who has been in Washington through several administrations realizes the futility of depending on the President of the United States himself for news, getting it instead from the many men who see him from day to day including members of the Cabinet, Congress and callers generally.

Although Mr. Wilson occasionally sent me personal messages of regard and reposed in me sufficient confidence on two occasions to ask that I undertake delicate missions which related to our negotiations with foreign governments, I was never in any sense his "mouthpiece" or his "spokesman" in the press. Some editorial writers fell into the habit of designating me as such during the war because of the belief on their part that accurate reflection of the views of the White House was due to inspiration by the Executive himself. The latter status would have involved no journalistic enterprise and would have meant writing in a vein pleasing only to Mr. Wilson.

My own writings, on the other hand, were frequently distasteful to the President. Indeed, the Washington correspondent who allows friendships or antagonisms to influence his dispatches betrays the trust imposed in him by his newspaper and its readers. The general public expects fair-minded interpretation of the facts without regard to whether an individual or party is helped or hurt by the disclosure.

Mr. Wilson resented particularly an article written by the author just before the President sailed for Europe, pointing out that he was at the climax of his career and that serious disaffection existed inside the Democratic party which, if not cured, might lead to defeat in 1920. Reports of the President's displeasure were carried to me but when I talked with him in Paris and later in Rome, he was cordial. On the Western trip in September, 1919, I found him personally friendly. I had become so interested in the details of the Shantung controversy that I spent a whole day making a digest of the pro and con of it, together with some views on the subject which I had acquired by independent study, and was gratified to find that he

thought enough of the memorandum to incorporate the argument almost verbatim in some of his last speeches on the Pacific Coast.

It was after Mr. Wilson returned to the White House, and had begun to recover sufficiently from his illness to take an interest in public affairs, that my own break with him occurred. The dismissal of Secretary Lansing on the ground that he had called Cabinet meetings without authority seemed to me unjust and I reported the facts as well as I knew them, suggesting that only a fit of temper could have prompted this action.

From that time on Mr. Wilson was represented to me as again displeased with my writings and though I had no communication with him thereafter I was apparently so sympathetic with his ideals that editorial writers continued to accuse me of being inspired by him.

It was not until a few weeks before Mr. Wilson died that I heard that he had spoken of me in complimentary terms. An old Princeton graduate had been chatting with him about his former pupils and Mr. Wilson was kind enough to include me in the list of those whom he held in esteem.

CHAPTER XXII

AS AN EX-PRESIDENT—THE LAST FOUR YEARS—A RETROSPECT

Not a word of criticism came publicly from Woodrow Wilson of the acts of President Harding or President Coolidge. It was his pointed way of showing the world, as he phrased it, "how an ex-President could behave" for he did not forget the shafts aimed at him by Theodore Roosevelt in the trying days of the war. Except for a few implied references to American foreign policy, Mr. Wilson was singularly silent after leaving the White House and not until November 10, 1923, on the eve anniversary of the Armistice just a few months before he died, did he make any extended criticism of America's failure to join the League of Nations. Here again he mentioned no individuals but based his speech on a broad principle of international cooperation.

The last few months were happier for Woodrow Wilson than the preceding years of silence. He sensed a turn in public opinion in his direction. He talked hopefully with his chosen visitors on the prospects for the 1924 campaign. He made no commitment as to candidates. He was eager to gossip with the few who came to see him. Norman H. Davis, undersecretary of State during the last year of Mr. Wilson's administration, was a frequent visitor at the "S" street home as was Bernard M. Baruch, who perhaps was as close, if not closer, than anyone to Mr. Wilson in his final days with the possible exception of Admiral Grayson and members of the family. Both Mr. Baruch and Mr. Davis were experts on reparations and European economic problems generally and brought authentic information or analysis of the trend of world affairs in which, of course, Mr. Wilson retained an undiminished interest to the end.

Occasionally, old Princeton friends came to see the broken

statesman. Some of them together with political associates gave Mr. Wilson a new automobile on his last birthday, December 26, 1923.

One of the last stories Mr. Wilson told was to a friend who was leaving Washington and who had called to bid him good-by. Some joking reference was made to the brevity of the visit, due to the fact that the caller's wife was taking him on an errand.

"That reminds me," said Mr. Wilson, "of the ancient monarch who summoned all his male subjects in the palace grounds and commanded all who obeyed their wives to stand on his right side. Every man present crossed over to the king's right side but one little, nondescript, puny fellow, who didn't look as if he had spunk enough to blow out a candle. " 'Do you not obey your wife?' asked the monarch of this one little man.

" 'Oh, yes, sire,' he replied.

" 'Then why do you not cross over to my right side.'

" 'Because my wife always told me to avoid crowds.' "

Not many of Mr. Wilson's former associates were able to see him in his last years of seclusion. Letters from old friends were left unanswered. The barrier between Woodrow Wilson and the outside world was complete.

Of the few who talked with him in his last days Bernard M. Baruch of New York and James Kerney, editor of the *Trenton Times,* both agree that the former President felt public opinion was coming back to the cause he had championed.

"When I went to see Mr. Wilson on December 7, 1923, he was in excellent spirits," relates Mr. Kerney. "His eye was bright, his mind fairly flashed with sharp things, and altogether he was full of that snap and pep that characterized the early days at Trenton and Washington. He reclined on a big steamer chair, wrapped comfortably in a blanket on the upper sun-porch of his home. It was balmy as spring time in Paris and we chatted for nearly an hour. He felt that the reception that had been given his Armistic Day radio speech had swung the pendulum back in his direction—and he did not hesitate to say so. When I reminded him that there was quite an international furor over his radio reference to the 'sinister climax'

of France and Italy having 'made waste paper of the treaty of Versailles' he fired back in a spirited voice, 'I should like to see Germany clean up France and I should like to meet Jusserand and tell him to his face'. He was plainly irritated at the French politicians. None among them, save Loucher, he felt, had told him the entire truth. Stanley Baldwin's defeat was a good thing not only for England but for its effect on Poincare 'who is a bully', he added."

What Mr. Wilson meant, of course, in his reference to France was that the march into the Ruhr and the tactics of the French toward Germany had made him feel more sympathetic with the vanquished Germans than with the group in France which he had often characterized as the militarists.

There are those who insist that, in the four years that followed his breakdown at Wichita, Woodrow Wilson was as clear of vision and as penetrating in his judgment as in previous years. There are others who dispute that analysis. Certainly Mr. Wilson was not as flexible or as accommodating in his viewpoint as he had been. He was quick to denounce his political opponents and his criticism of public men was unmeasured. He exhibited for some of his adversaries a contempt growing out of a conviction that they were devoid of liberal thought. He was a partisan to the very end, but he suppressed his true feelings.

Scarred by the war, racked in nerves, seldom forgetting the awfulness of the combat in which he felt always a personal responsibility, he never could drive out of his mind the thoughts of the hundred thousand American boys who died, as he thought, for an ideal and of the hundreds of thousands who came home wounded and maimed in the service of the flag.

"To make the world safe for democracy" was Mr. Wilson's war slogan. To his critics it became a mere phrase. But the idea of a war to end war never left Woodrow Wilson. Long after the American people began to turn their minds to domestic concerns and the material side of reconstruction, the broodings of Mr. Wilson over the breakdown of moral force continued. He was arbitrary in his views about a formula for world peace because he was in no mood for detail or distrust of other peo-

ples. All had worked together in the common partnership of war. All had put their armies and navies under one command and had given of their food and money and resources without stint for an ideal. The decision of 1917 meant to Woodrow Wilson a readiness on the part of America to assume obligations in the affairs of the world and to fulfill them. The recession from this viewpoint he could never understand. In his last speech to the American people over the radio he called that policy "cowardly" and ignoble. And his words were resented by many. To the sick man in seclusion in the national capital it was but the last feeble attempt to bestir the people to a realization of the change that had come over them since they pledged themselves in 1917 so willingly to cooperation with the rest of the world without reservation.

Seven years before to a day February 3, 1917—came the fateful turn in the career of Woodrow Wilson. On that date the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany and ordered Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, to go home. War followed two months later—a war which Woodrow Wilson never sought to enter though he felt for a long time before that American participation would sooner or later become imperative. He hoped against hope for an Allied victory without the aid of the United States. As he steered the ship of state in what he believed was a course of benevolent neutrality, he prayed that the Allies would end the war triumphantly and enable the United States to play a rôle of peacemaker and healer of the wounds of war. But when war came, he threw himself into the fray with an abandon that wiped the mistaken phrase "too proud to fight" out of the vocabulary of his critics for once and all. The Selective Service Act—compulsory military service—something which under the dread term of "conscription" had shaken the other democracies of the world to their foundations was recommended by him with a suddenness that made everybody gasp. But it enabled America to put two million men into Europe and turn the tide of battle toward the ultimate victory.

It was Woodrow Wilson who, from the first, fought for unity of command on land and sea and the brushing aside of

technical sovereignty in the interest of self-preservation of the Allied peoples. His influence in the scales made Foch the generalissimo and permitted the fleets of the Allies to be combined for effective operation under the British high command.

The hectic days of the war with their worries and burdens which his friends thought would break him down were weathered triumphantly, but he set sail for the Peace Conference with a heart saddened by the loss of both Houses of Congress after his appeal of October, 1918, for a Democratic Congress. He had been thinking of the partisan attack behind his back in the war days. He was a partisan too. His appeal for a Democratic Congress was based upon the belief that he would be able the better to make peace. His opponents construed his statement as a reflection on their patriotism. His advisers and friends begged him to deny it and set the country straight. He never issued a word of defense, he never changed a syllable of the statement. He never made a public comment on the verdict. He felt that if the Republican Congress would give him the proper cooperation in making peace, the result would speak for itself—it would prove that he was wrong. If the Republican Congress blocked his peace efforts as he predicted the country would know why he appealed for a Democratic Congress.

The events that followed convinced Mr. Wilson that the Republicans would make a partisan question of the League of Nations and the Peace Treaty and he was still so confident of the opinion of the American people that he wanted a referendum in the election of 1920 to decide the issue. But Mr. Wilson's precepts, his theories of parliamentary government, and the practical side of American politics especially in a presidential year, were at variance. Thirty-one prominent Republicans, including Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes and Herbert Hoover, interpreted the Republican national platform of 1920 and the views of Warren Harding, the Republican presidential candidate, as meaning that "a vote for Harding" was a "vote for the League with reservations". When the victory of the Republicans was won, this position was repudiated by the winning candidate who declared the "League is dead" and, in his inaugural address, the Republican president announced his

intention of keeping America outside the League of Nations either with or without reservations.

But Woodrow Wilson looked hopefully to the Democratic National Convention in June 1924 to adopt a platform which would keep alive the Wilsonian view of foreign policy.

Only a few weeks before his death the members of the Democratic National Committee passed in silent procession before the ex-President at his home. His haggard face, his feeble body loosely draping an arm chair, his smile of recognition for his old friends—it made a picture of never-to-be-forgotten tragedy. But he would resent that word. It was but his farewell counsel to his party—he had never surrendered.

But the hour of surrender—a word which in his days of power he never recognized—came to Woodrow Wilson Sunday morning, February 3, 1924.

And with it there welled up simultaneously in the hearts of the people everywhere a sadness borne of admiration for the stoicism of a statesman who fought till the last for the ideals in which he believed.

"I would rather fail," he used to say, "in a cause that I know some day will triumph them to win in a cause that I know some day will fail."

It was his philosophy of battle. To the dispassionate years of the future he looked always for vindication.

Friends and foes alike regretted that he did not retain the physical strength to continue his fight. Praise there was in abundance for his courage. Yet not a word of pity or pathos did the Wilsonian temperament want. His was the spirit of a crusader. His was the tenacity of a soldier in a hand-to-hand fight. For years he was ready for death. He went forth on his Western trip against the advice of his physician but with a smile of disregard for life itself. He used to say he would gladly give his life for the cause of the League of Nations. The remaining years were meant to him only for the accomplishment of the greatest ideal of all—a world organization for peace.

For four and a half years the death of Woodrow Wilson had been anticipated—ever since his breakdown at Wichita, Kan-

sas, the end of a life given to a great cause had been confidently expected. But not until the hour of death itself was there such an emotional reaction as swept the national capital, the seat of Woodrow Wilson's greatest battles,

As dramatic as were the scenes of his troubled life were those at his death. The kneeling crowds, the sympathetic throb of the people for a great spirit, the slow flicker of life's flame, the readiness to meet the end, the conclusion of a period of nearly three years of almost unbroken silence on public questions with a dignified attitude toward successors in office and without interference on his part, in Congressional controversies —it made the closing chapter of Woodrow Wilson's life a vivid contribution to world history. He had submitted his case when he left the White House on March 4, 1921, after eight years of service. On that record he was willing to depart to eternity leaving it to the followers who survived to carry on the battle for which he gave his life.

Could Woodrow Wilson in life but have known the remarkable words of praise uttered for his indomitable spirit even by the men who were his bitterest opponents, it would have made him glad. The vindication which he looked for at the hands of succeeding generations would have to an extent been his.

For while all the tributes recognized that the problems in controversy had by no means been solved, there was a uniform appreciation of one thing—his sincerity of purpose and loftiness of motive. The proclamation of official mourning issued by President Coolidge was written in that vein. The speeches in the Senate and House were of similar tenor. Republicans and Democratics united in eulogizing the supreme effort made by a leader of world thought to raise the standards of international morality.

The verdict of history? Cynics and critics have risen to dissect the character and personality of the man. He has been catalogued as a phrase-maker, a dreamer, an intellectual autocrat; a dogmatic, stubborn pedagogue; an egotist wielding power with Napoleonic ambition; a breaker of friendships, the ungrateful recipient of personal and political service, with a confidence in himself superinduced by the feminine adulation

which ran through his whole career. As a statesman he has been called radical, adventurous, opportunistic—a muddling idealist.

Criticism and interpretation of character are, however, the product of individualism. To the type of mind which believes an eight hour day for labor was the height of social anarchy, no doubt Woodrow Wilson seemed a bothersome socialist. To the practical politician who wanted his *quid pro quo* at the expense of the public treasury and the nation's resources, he was an ingrate. To the easy-going, flexible members of a national legislature with whom principle was a campaign convenience, his tenacity of purpose and conviction were stubbornness and coldness intensified. To those who look upon all idealists as subversive of things as they are and as meddlesome interventionists in a world already too complicated for those individuals who possess great fortunes or those nations who covet territorial wealth, he was alike impractical and dangerous. His own confession of the effects of evolution, changing circumstance and a broader vision of fact on a mind eager to be fair and just, was never accepted at its face value. Rather was he accused of inconsistency or scorned as the victim of selfish expediency.

I would not say he was cold for I have seen tears stream down his austere countenance. I would not say he was contemptuous of advice for I have known him to take counsel from the most lowly. I would not say that he was without gratitude for I have seen him reward those who had faithfully served him long before he entered public life, men whom he might well have been justified in leaving by the wayside as he selected his associates from the wider field of practical politics.

Far from the maddening crowd and the passions of contemporaneous class warfare, separated from those who had personal grievances or political transactions with him, apart, indeed, from the years of partisan strife, the life and career of Woodrow Wilson must be regarded with an objective and not subjective scrutiny. His motives must be discerned by negative tests. He did not amass a private fortune in public office. He did not select the easy or complacent course but the troubled,

nerve-wracking, exhausting roads that led him to his death. He craved no martyrdom. He sought no aggrandized fame as he lived or he would have compromised for immediate advantage. He yearned only for the patient, disinterested, impartial verdict of posterity.

Mistakes he made, the correction of which might have lifted him to a higher place in the esteem of the men of his times. But, at best, he was human. He was weighed down by problems whose right solution required almost superhuman strength and judgment.

Whatever else may be said of Woodrow Wilson, no one can deny that his vision was of a world in which toil might be more equitably rewarded, in which nations like individuals might apply the principles of Christianity—a brotherhood of men. His exposition may have been faulty, his tactics may have revealed the crudities of impulsive action, his words may have been too academic, but his idealism was an innate Christianity the practice of which cannot be regarded even by the cynic as sinful however disturbing may be its tenets in a world of crass materialism.

George Washington founded the American republic; Abraham Lincoln preserved the union and molded the several States into a single sovereignty, but Woodrow Wilson contributed at the opportune moment a leadership in war that saved the whole world from military autocracy and contributed, thereafter, a code of morality which some day may save Christian civilization from economic serfdom and the savagery of organized murder. To the far corners of the globe his philosophy has permeated—he has done more than any single statesman in history to give the world an international conscience.

* * * * * *

Years before Woodrow Wilson was thought of for the Presidency by his party, the romantic soul within him seemed by prophetic instinct to be lifted to a higher destiny. On the seashore, gazing wistfully into the unknown deep, he repeated aloud to a companion the words of an anonymous poem—the last in the "Oxford Book of English Verse"—and, concluding, talked of the Presidency of the United States as the office,

which, if he ever attained, would mean for him the supreme sacrifice. He spoke his own elegy:

In the hour of death, after this life's whim,
When the heart beats low and the eyes grow dim,
And pain has exhausted every limb—
  The lover of the Lord shall trust in Him.

When the will has forgotten the lifelong aim,
And the mind can only disgrace its fame,
And a man is uncertain of his own name—
  The power of the Lord shall fill this frame.

When the last sigh is heaved, and the last tear is shed,
And the coffin is waiting beside the bed,
And the widow and child forsake the dead—
  The angel of the Lord shall lift this head.

For even the purest delight may pall,
And power must fail and pride must fall,
And the love of the dearest friends grow small—
  But the glory of the Lord is all in all.

CHRONOLOGY OF WOODROW WILSON'S LIFE

1856—December 28th—Born in Staunton, Virginia, in manse of Presbyterian Church.
1858—Family moved to August, Georgia.
1870—Family moved to Columbia, South Carolina.
1874—Entered Davidson college, North Carolina.
1875—Returned home to Wilmington, North Carolina.
1875—September—Entered College of New Jersey at Princeton.
1879—Graduated from Princeton. Contributed article on "Cabinet Government" to August number "International Review".
1879—September. Entered law school at University of Virginia, Charlottesville. Published sketches of John Bright and Gladstone.
1882—May—Opened law office at Atlanta, Georgia.
1882—Appeared before congressional commission investigating tariff opposing high tariffs.
1883—Met Miss Ellen Axson in Rome, Georgia, at cousin's home and became engaged.
1883—September—Entered Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
1885—Published, as his thesis for PH.D. degree, "Congressional Government".
1885—June 24th—Married Ellen Axson at Savannah, Georgia.
1885—September—Became associate professor of history and political economy at Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania.
1888—Professor at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut.
1890—Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton College.
1896—Delivered notable address at 150th anniversary of founding of College of New Jersey and formal designation as Princeton University.
1902—August 1st—Appointed President of Princeton University, delivering inaugural address "Princeton for the Nation's Service."
1904—Proposed Preceptorial System of study.
1906—Introduced at banquet of Lotos Club, New York by George Harvey as future candidate of Democratic party for the Presidency of the United States.
1907—Proposed "Quadrangle" scheme for social reorganization of University.
1908—Beginning of Graduate School controversy.
1909—May—Offer by William Cooper Procter of $500,000 for Graduate School.

1910—February—Withdrawal of gift because of Dr. Wilson's refusal to accept donor's conditions.
1910—March—Visited alumni associations speaking in defense of his views on Graduate School.
1910—May—Death of Isaac Wyman of Massachusetts leaving $3,000,000 for Graduate School to be administered by Dean Andrew F. West, Dr. Wilson's opponent.
1910—July—Conferences with Democratic leaders in New Jersey relative to nomination for Governor.
1910—September 15th—Nominated for Governor of New Jersey at the state convention of the Democratic party at Trenton.
1910—October 20th—Resigned as President of Princeton University.
1910—November—Elected Governor by 49,000 majority.
1911—January 17th—Inaugurated Governor of New Jersey.
1911—March 8th—Legislative conference at which Governor Wilson presented program of reform.
1911—December 7th—Meeting with Henry Watterson and Colonel Harvey in New York resulting in break with the latter.
1912—July 2nd—Nominated by the Democratic National Convention at Baltimore to be the Democratic candidate for the Presidency.
1912—November 4th—Elected President of the United States by 435 electoral votes, Roosevelt 88, and Taft 15.
1913—March 1st—Resigned as Governor of New Jersey.
1913—March 4th—Inaugurated President of the United States before Chief Justice Edward D. White of Louisiana, Democrat.
1913—April 8th—Read first address to joint session of the House and Senate, subject: tariff revision.
1913—June 23rd—Delivered address to Congress on currency reform.
1913—July 4th—Delivered notable address at Gettysburg at reunion Confederate and Union veterans, fiftieth anniversary.
1913—August 27th—Delivered address to Congress on Mexican affairs.
1913—October 3rd—Signed Underwood-Simmons tariff law.
1913—October 27th—Delivered address at Mobile, Alabama, before Southern Commercial Congress attacking those who would "exploit" weak countries in Central and South America.
1913—December 2nd—First annual Message to Congress delivered in person to joint session of Senate and House.
1913—December 23rd—Signed Federal Reserve Act.
1914—January 20th—Delivered address to Congress advocating curb on trusts and monopolies.
1914—March 5th—Read address to Congress advocating repeal of provision of Panama Canal Act which exempted American vessels from payment of tolls in violation of Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with Great Britain.
1914—April 20th—Delivered address to Congress asking for authority to use armed forces to compel General Huerta to recognize rights and dignity of the United States in connection with re-

fusal to salute American flag after arrest of boatload of American sailors at Tampico.

1914—April 21st—Occupation of Vera Cruz by military and naval forces of the United States.

1914—May 11th—Delivered address at exercises in Brooklyn Navy Yard in memory of American sailors who lost their lives in seizure of Vera Cruz.

1914—June 28—Archduke Ferdinand of Austria assassinated at Sarajevo, Serbia.

1914—July 31—Outbreak of European War.

1914—August 4th—Great Britain entered the war.

1914—August 6th—Death of Mrs. Wilson.

1914—August 20th—Issued proclamation of neutrality to American people.

1914—August 20th—Germany entered Brussels, Belgium.

1914—September 6th—Allies won at the Marne.

1914—September 8th—Issued proclamation designating October 4th as day of prayer for peace.

1914—December 8th—Delivered message to Congress declining to turn America into "armed camp" or begin extraordinary preparations for war.

1915—January 17th—First grandchild—Woodrow Wilson Sayre born at White House.

1915—April—Meets Mrs. Edith Galt in Washington.

1915—May 7th—Sinking of Lusitania.

1915—May 13th—Beginning of notes with Germany relative to sinking of *Lusitania.*

1915—June 9th—Resignation of William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State.

1915—July 9th—Called on Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy to report on preparedness for war.

1915—August 4th—Germans occupied Warsaw.

1915—October 7th—Engagement to Mrs Galt announced.

1915—December 7th—Advocated increased military and naval appropriations in address to Congress.

1915—December 18th—Marriage to Mrs. Galt at home of latter on Twentieth street, Washington, D. C.

1916—January 27th—Beginning of appeal to people for "preparedness for war".

1916—February 10th—Resignation of Lindley M. Garrison as Secretary of War.

1916—March—Raid by Villa at Columbus, New Mexico, and dispatch of punitive expedition to Mexico under General Pershing.

1916—April 19th—Addressed Congress revealing details of negotiations with Germany relative to submarine warfare.

1916—June 16th—Renominated by Democratic National Convention in St. Louis to be party candidate for the Presidency.

1916—November 7th—Elected for second term by 277 electoral votes; Hughes 254.

1916—December 18th—Sent note to belligerents urging peace.
1917—January 22nd—Address to Congress on basis of European peace.
1917—January 31st—Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare.
1917—February 3rd—Severance of diplomatic relations with Germany announced in address to both houses of Congress.
1917—February 26th—Addressed Congress to obtain authority for armed neutrality policy.
1917—March 4—End of Senate filibuster against authority to proclaim "armed neutrality".
1917—March 4th—Inauguration of second term, taking oath in President's Room at Capitol before Chief Justice White without ceremony because of Sunday.
1917—March 5th—Monday—Inaugural address and parade and taking of oath on East Front of Capitol.
1917—April 2nd—Delivered message to special session of Congress advising declaration of war.
1917—April 6th—Signed joint resolution and proclaimed state of war with Germany.
1917—December 9th—Delivered annual message to Congress including declaration of state of war with Austria.
1917—December 28th—President Wilson ordered government to take over railways of the country.
1918—January 8th—Proclaimed fourteen points as a basis of world peace.
1918—February 11th—Addressed Congress answering early German peace offensives.
1918—March 11th—Sent message to Russian Soviets.
1918—March 11th—American troops in action.
1918—March 29th—General Foch of France given supreme command of all Allied armies.
1918—June 12th—President Wilson advocated passage of amendment to Federal Constitution enfranchising the women of America.
1918—September 27th—Opened fourth Liberty Loan campaign in New York and devoted address to exposition of his ideas on the League of Nations.
1918—October 4th—Chancellor Max of Germany appealed to President Wilson for peace.
1918—October 12th—Germany promised to accept "fourteen points."
1918—October 23rd—President Wilson stipulated conditions of peace in reply to Germany.
1918—October 25th—Appealed for Democratic Congress.
1918—November 5th—Allies informed President Wilson they accept German offer with reservations.
1918—November 6th—Lost both Senate and House to the Republicans.
1918—November 11th—Armistice proclaimed in address to Congress.
1918—December 4th—Sailed for Europe to attend Peace Conference.

1918—December 14th—Arrived in Paris.
1918—December 25th—Addressed American troops at Chaumont.
1918—December 26-30—Visited England.
1919—January 2-6—Visited Rome.
1919—January 18th—Opening of Peace Conference.
1919—January 25th—Addressed Peace Conference on the principle of League of Nations.
1919—February 14th—Addressed Peace Conference on draft of League Covenant.
1919—February 24th—Landed at Boston and is greeted by Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts.
1919—March 3rd—Senator Lodge announced that 37 Senators had signed "round robin" against Covenant of League of Nations as then drafted.
1919—March 5th—Sailed on second trip to Europe arriving in Paris on March 14th.
1919—June 18-19—Visited Belgium.
1919—June 28th—Peace Treaty signed at Versailles including League Covenant.
1919—July 8th—Arrived in New York from Peace Conference.
1919—July 10th—President Wilson, returning from Europe, laid Peace Treaty before the Senate.
1919—August 19th—Answered questions asked by entire Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the White House.
1919—September 3rd—Western trip to appeal to people for ratification of Versailles Treaty.
1919—September 26th—Trip ordered stopped by Admiral Grayson, physician, subsequent speaking engagements canceled owing to physical collapse of the President.
1919—November 18th—President Wilson advised Senator Hitchcock that he regarded proposed Lodge reservations as nullification of Peace Treaty.
1920—January 8th—Wrote to Democrats at Jackson Day dinner at Washington appealing for "solemn referendum" at November 1920 elections to decide deadlock on treaty ratification.
1920—February 13th—Secretary of State Lansing asked to resign for calling twenty-five Cabinet meetings since preceding December.
1920—March 20th—Treaty returned to President with resolution that it could not get necessary two-thirds vote.
1920—November 2d—Defeat of James M. Cox, Democratic nominee, and election of Warren G. Harding to the Presidency on the Republican ticket together with Republican majority in both Houses of Congress.
1921—March 4th—Left White House to enter private life. Inauguration of President Harding.
1922—April 13th—Break with former private Secretary Joseph P. Tumulty.
1923—November 10th—Last public address of Woodrow Wilson delivered by radio from his home on "S" street in Washington

on eve of Armistice Day, reaffirming faith in League of Nations and attacking those responsible for failure to ratify Versailles Treaty.

1924—January 7th—Last political declaration of Woodrow Wilson to State Democratic leaders assembled at Jackson Day dinner at Pittsburgh, Pa.

1924—January 12th—Received members of Democratic National Committee at his home.

1924—January 31st—Beginning of fatal illness.

1924—Sunday, February 3d—Died at 11:15 a. m. as kneeling crowds prayed outside his home, 2300 S Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

1924—Wednesday, February 6th—Buried in crypt of Episcopal Cathedral at Mt. St. Albans, Washington, D. C.

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